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Economic literature has provided abundant analysis on how taxes, government expenditures 
and government balance should be set over the business cycle for fiscal policy to be 
considered optimal and sustainable. However, experience also presents ample evidence that 
such policies were in practice not always pursued by policymakers. This has notably been 
reflected in the propensity to finance public expenditure with debt and to conduct pro-cyclical 
policies, and in difficulties to restructure public expenditure (i.e. quality aspects of public 
finances). Such developments have drawn the attention from policy analysts and academics, 
who have been exploring the reasons for the existence of a deficit bias.  
The explanations generally point to the consideration that policy makers may not have the 
right incentives to pursue sound public finances in the long run. Literature has notably 
stressed that adequate institutional settings at national level can play an important role in 
containing spending and deficit biases. These settings include in particular: 
(1)  procedural rules of the budgetary processes, i.e. the process laid down in law or 
constitution governing the elaboration of the annual budget law;  
(2)  numerical fiscal rules which are guiding or imposing constraints on the discretion of 
policy-makers; and  
(3)  independent institutions in charge of providing inputs (forecasts, analysis) and 
formulating recommendations in the area of fiscal policy.  
In the context of the discussions on the 2005 reform of the SGP, the Council has also 
emphasized the importance of developing and strengthening fiscal governance in the EU 
Member States. The Council stated that national budgetary rules should be complementary to 
the Member States’ commitments under the Stability and Growth Pact. The Council also 
underlined that domestic governance arrangements should complement the EU framework, 
and that national institutions could play a more prominent role in budgetary surveillance to 
strengthen national ownership, enhance enforcement through national public opinion and 
complement the economic and policy analysis at EU level.  
Most of the Member States have developed national fiscal frameworks in order to improve 
fiscal policy making and outcomes. Better knowledge on their design, main features and 
implementation is crucial to contribute to the improvement of the effectiveness of fiscal 
governance.  
The workshop "The role of national fiscal rules and institutions in shaping budgetary 
outcomes" organized by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
(DG  ECFIN) of the European Commission on 24 November 2006 in Brussels aimed at 
enriching the debate on these fiscal arrangements and improving the understanding of their 
functioning. This Economic Paper of DG ECFIN contains all the paper presented in this event 
that was organised in four sessions (see programme in next page). 
A first set of papers mainly focus on the impact of numerical fiscal rules on budgetary 
outturns. The paper by Ayuso, González, Moulin and Turrini, which is based on a 
comprehensive data base on the existing national fiscal rules in EU countries built up by DG 
Ecfin, finds a beneficial effect of fiscal rules on fiscal developments (i.e. lower deficits or 
higher surpluses, more moderate growth of public expenditure, and fewer pro-cyclical fiscal policy episodes). In the same vein, Broesens and Wierts show that a sound fiscal institutional 
setting, including strong expenditure rules, is one of the factors that can explain the positive 
budgetary results achieved by some countries. By contrast, the presentation by Debrun and 
Kumar raises the issue of reverse causality between fiscal rules and budgetary outturns, and 
argue that fiscal rules may however constitute useful devices to signal politic commitment to 
fiscal discipline. 
Other papers deal primarily with the appropriate design of fiscal rules and institutions. Thus, 
according to Krogstrup and Wyplosz the optimal deficit or debt ceiling is likely to be 
time-varying whereas the setting of such ceiling may be delegated to a non-partisan 
independent fiscal agency.  Hallerberg and Stéclbout-Orseau discuss under what conditions 
independent budgetary bodies may influence fiscal policy making, and argue that 'fiscal 
watchdogs" should be implemented at national level in order to be more effective. Finally, the 
paper by Kirsanova, Leith and Wren-Lewis puts forward a proposal for the establishment of a 
fiscal agency to monitor debt developments.  
An additional group of papers addresses the relationship between the fiscal governance 
approach adopted by the EU Member States and their institutional and political frameworks. 
The importance of the political and electoral system to implement either the so-called 
"delegation" or "contract" approach to centralise budgetary procedures, and the apparent 
difficulties of "delegation" States to adhere to the SGP provisions are the main message of the 
paper presented by Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen. These views are challenged by 
Hodson's presentation, who gives some evidence raising doubts on the supposed 
incompatibility between delegation Member States and a rules-based system for fiscal 
governance such as the SGP.          
Finally, the remaining presentations relate more directly to policy experiences. While the 
paper by Balassone, Franco and Zotteri evaluates the feasibility of implementing "rainy day" 
funds in the EU countries on the basis of the USA experiences, the paper by Boije and Fisher, 
and Lebrun assess the functioning of the existing set of fiscal rules in Sweden and Fiscal 
Councils in Belgium respectively. 
Overall, the majority of papers presented in the workshop, which consider fiscal rules and 
institutions from different perspectives, seem broadly to agree that these fiscal arrangements 
may be useful devices to improve the conduct of fiscal policy in terms of better budgetary 
results and less pro-cyclicality. However, it is also widely acknowledge that the appropriate 
design of rules and institutions is country-specific, and highly depend on the domestic 
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A Common Pool Theory of Deficit Bias Correction 
 
Signe Krogstrup  Charles Wyplosz
1 




  Abstract: The budget deficit bias is modeled as the result of a domestic 
common pool problem and of an international externality. Along with Piguvian taxes, 
a number of policy measures are examined and welfare-ranked: deficit ceilings, 
golden rules and delegation. In general, the combination of delegation and an 







Public debts have doubled on the average in the OECD area over the past three 
decades. This debt buildup, unprecedented in peace time, strongly suggests that 
industrial democracies suffer from a deficit bias. This bias has not gone unnoticed. 
Fiscal rules have been widely adopted in a number of countries and federated states. 
Chile and Brazil have adopted formal deficit targets. The UK has put in place a more 
informal Code for Fiscal Stability and Belgium has established a High Council of 
Finance. Denmark and the Netherlands have set up wisepersons' committees that 
inform the general public on the state of public finances. Perhaps the most prominent 
rule is the adoption in the European Union of the Stability and Growth Pact, which 
aims at limiting budget deficits.
2 
There are obvious analogies between fiscal discipline and price stability. Over 
the 1960s and 1970s, monetary policy also seemed to be generating a persistent " 
inflation bias". Following the works of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and 
Gordon (1980), the literature eventually converged on the view that monetary policy 
should aim at a medium to long term rule with some short term discretion, combined 
with institutional independence of the central bank. Wherever the inflation targeting 
strategy has been properly adopted, low inflation rates have subsequently been 
achieved. 
In contrast with monetary rules, however, the case for fiscal rules has only 
started to be articulated. Von Hagen and Harden (1995), in a static model of a deficit 
bias due to political distortions, show that fiscal restraint is desirable and that 
                                                 
1Signe Krogstrup: krogstru@hei.unige.ch. Charles Wyplosz: wyplosz@hei.unige.ch. Address for 
correspondence: The Graduate Institute of International Studies, 11A Avenue de la Paix, CH-1202 
Geneva. We are grateful to Guido Tabellini, Xavier Debrun, Heikki Oksanen, Marco Hoeberichts, 
Jürgen von Hagen and participants at seminars at Bocconi, the University of Copenhagen, The 
Graduate Institute of International Studies, the 2006 MAPMU conference and the 2006 EEA congress 
for helpful comments and discussions, and to the European Commission (under the MAPMU network) 
for financial support. 
2Following the recent revision, budgets must be " within a defined range between -- 1 % of GDP and 
balance or surplus, in cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-off and temporary measures."  2
delegation of the budget decision to a Finance Minister reduces the bias. Hallerberg 
and Von Hagen (1999) extends the previous paper by allowing for two periods; they 
show that giving agenda-setting power to the Finance Minister eliminates the bias. 
Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) show that a Stability and Growth Pact can be welfare 
improving in the presence of a deficit bias. Two other closely related papers, Beetsma 
and Debrun (2004, 2005) show that a Stability and Growth Pact may have the 
undesirable side effect of reducing public investments as well as unproductive 
spending, and then show how an optimal improvement of the Pact trades off fiscal 
discipline against productive spending through a golden-rule type of mechanism that 
displays some tolerance towards productive spending. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) 
reach similar conclusions with a model that assumes that the return from productive 
public spending is underestimated by standard accounting rules. While these papers 
show the particular welfare aspects of a Stability and Growth Pact type of 
arrangement and how delegation of the budgetary decision to a strong Finance 
minister reduces the bias, we still do not know whether these arrangements are 
optimal in the first place. The more general question of which types of fiscal restraints 
are socially desirable has not been posed, and we do not know which rules and/or 
institutions are likely to deliver these restraints. There also remains the question of 
when the deficit bias must be dealt with on the supranational level, such as the 
Stability and Growth Pact, and when the bias is more effectively dealt with on the 
national level. We address these questions here. 
To do this, we need to formulate a general model of the deficit bias. The most 
influential theories are the common pool theory formalized by Von Hagen and Harden 
(1995), Hallerberg and Von Hagen (1999) and Velasco (1999, 2000), the time 
inconsistency of preferences theory formalized by Alesina and Tabellini (1990). and 
the agency problem as in Besley and Smart (2003).
3 The common pool problem 
results when there is more than one decision maker involved in setting the budget.
4 
Thus, when the decision makers - spending ministers, lobby groups, parties in a 
coalition government - compete for their preferred public goods, they fail to 
internalize the cost of their choices on current and future cost in terms of higher taxes 
needed for debt service and repayment, which results in a deficit bias. The time 
inconsistency of preferences theory points out that when governments are subject to 
elections, they do not fully internalize the cost of taking up debt as some of that debt 
will be serviced by future governments. Political-economic interpretations of the 
deficit bias among OECD countries have been documented in a large number of 
papers. The evidence suggests that political fragmentation, i.e. common pool 
problems, play a role in the deficit bias (Persson et al. 2003; Fabrizio and Mody, 
2006; Roubini and Sachs, 1989; von Hagen 1992; von Hagen and Harden, 1994). 
There is less support for the view that uncertainty of reelection causes deficits 
(Lambertini, 2003, finds zero support for this theory, while Roubini and Sachs, 1989, 
find some). We hence adopt the common pool interpretation of the domestic part of 
the deficit bias. We do not account for time inconsistency of preferences to keep 
things simple. We note, however, that Krogstrup (2006) shows that with minor 
modifications in the modeling setup, the common pool externality can be interpreted 
as an externality due to time inconsistency. With some caution in interpretation, our 
                                                 
3An excellent survey is Persson and Tabellini (2000), Chapter 9. The seminal contribution is Weingast 
et al. (1981). 
4The delayed stabilizations case, developed by Alesina and Drazen (1991), can be seen as a case of 
common pool.  3
model and the resulting policy implications hence extend to both types of the deficit 
bias. 
We do not consider the role of parliament in amending and voting on the 
budget. The role of parliament, and its voting rules, is the object of an important 
literature that includes the seminal contribution by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). The 
more general issue of separation of power has been reviewed by Bendor et al. (2001) 
and an application to the budget process is Grossman and Helpman (2006). We do not 
ignore that the empirical evidence (e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1999) is that the issues of 
separation of power and of parliament voting rules are relevant for the deficit bias, but 
we wish to focus on the underlying issue of conflicts of interests. One interpretation is 
that the government decides alone on the budget; another interpretation is that the 
game that we describe encompasses the government and the parliament, both of which 
are politically captured and let the interest groups bargain on their own. 
In principle, the deficit bias ought to be addressed where it arises, namely at the 
national level. Yet, we observe instances of interventions by an external agent, for 
example the IMF or Europe's Stability and Growth Pact. This is likely to be desirable 
in the presence of international externalities. Discussions of the Stability and Growth 
Pact have identified different externalities
5. One channel is the interest rate. The 
assertion is that one country's deficit raises the interest rate and therefore the cost of 
debt service throughout the euro area. Alternatively, the prospect of a sharply 
contractionary fiscal policy may force the hand of an imperfectly independent central 
bank to raise the inflation rate
6. Another channel is that the threat of debt default by 
one member country could affect the monetary union's common exchange rate 
depreciation and generate a risk premium if the common central bank would have to 
monetize some or all the debt. To eliminate this possibility, the Treaty includes a no-
bailout clause. But this clause has not been tested yet and is sometimes considered as 
weak. The existence of a significant international externality remains a matter of 
debate, yet it figures prominently in policy discussions. Rather than modeling a 
particular mechanism, we simply assume that each country expects to be able to 
impose some of its debt service on other countries. 
Our model is an extension of Velasco (2000). The advantage of this model is to 
focus on deficits while leaving levels of spending and taxes out. This neatly allows to 
separate the deficit bias from the issue of government size. We extend this model in 
several ways. First we allow for productive public spending in addition to 
unproductive public good provision. Without productive public spending, the optimal 
fiscal rule is trivially a zero deficit ceiling. Second, to simplify, we consider only two 
periods. Third, we consider two countries linked by a negative debt externality. The 
resulting model allows us to obtain intuitive analytical solutions. We use it to conduct 
a broad analysis of alternative policies, comparing fiscal rules and fiscal institutions 
that can be welfare-ranked. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the model and 
characterizes the socially optimal equilibrium and the Nash and Stackelberg solutions 
in the presence of both domestic and international externalities. Section 3 determines 
the Pigouvian taxes that allow for the full internalization of both domestic and 
international externalities, and which hence take us to social optimum. We show that 
                                                 
5See the papers collected in Brunila, Buti and Franco (2001). See also Giuliodori and Beetsma (2004) 
for a discussion of the these channels. 
6Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) model an international externality of debt in a Monetary Union along such 
lines.  4
given the two sources of externalities, more than one tax is needed, and the taxes are 
highly impractical. This leads us to examine the properties of various often-discussed 
policies. In Section 4 we look at the institutional approach whereby deficits are 
delegated to a national social planner. In Section 5, we examine the properties of 
deficit ceilings or budget rules. Golden rules are then studied in Section 6. The 
welfare implications of these various solutions and brought together in Section 7 and 
the final section concludes. 
 
 The Deficit Bias 
 
 
 The Model 
 
The domestic deficit bias is due to a common pool problem, where the common 
pool is the present and future deficits that can be run given the budget constraint. The 
domestic externality arises when interest groups seek to redistribute resources to their 
advantage through the public tax and transfer system. The corresponding gross 
transfers can be seen either as pure transfers or entitlement spending, or as the 
provision of public goods that are useful only for the receiving interest group. We use 
the term interest groups, but these can alternatively be interpreted as spending 
ministries represented by a minister or as parties in a coalition government. Another 
interpretation is that spending ministries are captured by interest groups. Yet another 
interpretation is that interest groups are represented by parties, which in turn are 
members of coalition governments. Here we portray the extreme case where interest 
groups are in complete control of the net transfer part of the budget. 
As discussed above, there is no consensus on the source and strength of an 
international externality of public debt. We therefore postulate a general international 
externality: each country intends to have some of its debt paid for by the other 
country. 
The domestic common pool problem follows Velasco (2000). In each country, 
there exist  1 n ≥  interest groups, indexed by i,  =1,2,..., in . We assume that all 
interest groups are of the same size. Each group can decide on the amount of net 
transfers, 
i
t g , that it obtains in period  =1,2 t . Net transfers in the home country, 
, hi
t g , 
are defined as transfers received less taxes paid. The same applies to net transfers 
, f i
t g  
in the foreign country. 
Excessive deficits will arise when interest groups fail to internalize debt service. 
In addition, some deficits may be socially desirable because we allow for an other 
budget item, aggregate productive spending. This spending is productive in the sense 
that it raises public revenues in the next period. It is aggregate because it does not 
accrue to interest groups. One interpretation is that it covers infrastructure or effective 
reforms that will raise GDP and therefore taxable income. This is the interpretation 
given by Beetsma and Debrun (2004, 2005). Alternatively, we can think of efficient 
countercyclical fiscal policy that brings GDP back towards its potential level and thus 
reduces waste and inefficiencies. This second interpretation matches current debates 
in Europe over the discretionary use of fiscal policy. Denote productive spending at 
home in period 1 as 
h X . Spending 
h X  in period 1 raises tax revenues by  ( )
h X θ  in 
period 2. We assume  >0
' θ  and  <0
'' θ , i.e. these expenditures are subject to 
decreasing returns, which is needed for the second order condition to be satisfied.  5
We introduce a second actor, the Finance Minister, alongside the interest 
groups. The Finance Minister has no direct control over net transfers to interest 
groups, but she is in charge of setting productive spending which she does to 
maximize national welfare. Allowing for a benevolent Finance Minister, as von 
Hagen and Harden (1995) do, is not crucial to our results. Since national welfare is the 
sum of the interest groups (which represent the population as a whole) welfare, we 
could also let the interest groups select productive spending by consensus, or we 
could let the interest groups select a Finance minister amongst themselves with the 
aim of maximizing his own welfare, and the outcome would be the same.
7 
The government can borrow or lend internationally any amount that it wishes at 
the constant real interest rate r  (i.e. the economy is small)
8, and it is bound by the 
intertemporal budget constraint. Importantly, the budget constraint is understood and 
accepted by all interest groups. Thus, by assumption, we rule out defaults, an 
extremely rare occurrence in developed economies. The budget constraint of the home 









gXB + ∑  (1) 
 where 
h B  is the debt acquired in period 1. For simplicity and without loss of 
generality, we assume that there is zero initial debt. Crucially, no other actors, 
including the interest groups, can borrow or lend. This assumption ensures that the 
public debt is non-neutral, since the private sector cannot offset its intertemporal net 
transfer profile. The assumption does not change the common pool problem as a 
driver of deficits, but it is needed for realized deficits to have welfare implications. 
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 where α  represents the international externality. A portion α  of domestic debt 
h B  can be passed on to the other country while the home government must serve a 
portion α  of the foreign government deficit 
f B . This is a rough but simple way of 
capturing various international externalities previously described, as long as they are 
zero-sum. It does not account for instance, for the possibility that one country's 
indiscipline could raise borrowing costs for all countries. 
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⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ∑∑ ∑      (3)   
 where 
1 =( 1 ) R r
− + . The same constraints apply to the foreign country. 
We assume that each interest group can implement its chosen level of net 
transfers in both periods. For simplicity, they all have the same preference over the 
own transfers that they can receive, represented by the following utility function: 
                                                 
7To see this, note that the only function of productive spending in this model is to affect the overall 
common pool. Setting  X  cannot be used to redistribute resources among interest groups nor to shift 
resources from one period to the other; hence the choice of  X  cannot be used strategically. It is 
therefore in all interest groups', as well as that of the benevolent Finance Ministers', interest to set  X  
so as to maximize the common pool. 
8 The small country assumption, which allows us to treat the real interest rate as exogenous and 
constant, eliminates one of the sources of the international externality commonly mentioned. As will be 
made clear shortly, we allow for a direct international externality. 
  6
  ()( )
,, ,
12 =l o g l o g .
hi hi hi Ug g g g β ++ +  (4) 
 where  β  is the time preference factor. The term g  represents the maximum 
amount of net taxes that each interest group is willing and able to pay. More precisely, 
we assume that there is a lower limit  <0 g −  for the net total transfers received by 
each interest group
9. It follows that the maximum net revenues that can be collected is 
= Gn g . 
The general case where  R β ≠  is presented in the Appendix. When  R β ≠  there 
exists a rationale for shifting income across periods and therefore for a budget deficit 
or surplus in period 1. This rationale is well understood and not pursued further here. 
For simplicity, therefore, from now on, we assume that  == 1 R β . Again, the 
situation is identical in the foreign country. 
Who are the interest groups? In a more complete model, these interest groups 
could coexist with citizens devoid of political influence. This would greatly 
complicate the situation. At this stage, we consider that all citizens belong to one 
interest group. One interpretation is that interest groups bring together citizens with 
shared interests, and that all citizens are somehow represented by an interest group. 
Another interpretation is that each citizen is an interest group of its own, in which 
case  n is the size of population. What is important is that the Finance Minister and 
the social planners maximize the unweighted sum of the interest group utilities. 
We first consider the socially optimal allocation of deficits between interest 
groups, Finance Ministers and across countries. Then we consider the free-for-all case 
when the interest groups effectively control the transfers and the national Finance 
Ministers decide on productive spending. 
 
 The International Social Planner 
 
The international social planner decides on 
, ki
t g and 







UU + ∑∑  subject to the budget constraints (3) both countries. Given 
the symmetry between all interest groups and countries, it is clear that 
, =
ki
tt gg , 
, ki ∀ , and  = =
hf X XX . Denoting aggregate transfers  = tt Gn g , the first order 
conditions are:  
 () = 1
' X θ  (5) 
 
 
  12 = GG  (6) 
 
Condition ((5)) implies that the social planner chooses the level of productive 
spending  X  that maximizes the surplus  ( ) X X θ − . Condition ((6)) means that the 
social planner equalizes transfers across periods (this is a consequence of the 
assumption  = R β , see the Appendix for the general case). 
                                                 
9This formulation, akin to that used in Velasco (1999), implies that 
, hi U →− ∞ when 
, 0.
hi
t g →  
The formulation differs from Velasco (2000) who assumes instead a bliss level for transfers and uses a 
quadratic loss function.  7
Note that symmetry also implies that the intertemporal budget constraint ((3)) is 
the same for each country and simplifies to:  
  12 =() GG X X θ +−  (7) 
 The constraint being recognized ex ante by the international social planner, the 
international externality is fully internalized and (5) shows that the same applies to the 






∗∗ ∗ ∗ ⎡⎤ −+ ⎣⎦  (8) 





GG X X θ
∗∗ ∗ ∗ ⎡⎤ − ⎣⎦ . 
The social optimum implies a deficit to the extent that productive public 
spending exists. In that case, the interest groups receive positive transfers in both 
periods, a share of the surplus created by productive spending. If there is no such 
thing as productive spending, then we have  0 X ≡  and the socially optimal debt is 
zero. This establishes the obvious point that not all deficits are bad; some deficit may 
be justified as optimal intertemporal smoothing of future returns to current productive 
spending. 
 
 Autonomous Governments 
 
We now look at the case where interest groups and Finance Ministers set their 
respective variables independently. The game is solved backwards. Once in period 2, 
the debt to be repaid is predetermined by the net transfers chosen in period one and by 
the surplus  () X X θ −  created by productive spending. As a result, there is no choice 
to be made at that stage. Each interest group simply recognizes that its net transfers 
will have to fit within the country's budget constraint (2). We assume that partition of 
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 ((9)) shows the degree to which the cost of period one net transfers in terms of 
period two net transfers is not internalized by the individual interest group. Since 
,
1 =1 =
n hh i h
i B gX + ∑ , each interest group perceives that the second period cost of 
raising first period transfers by one unit is equal to ( ) 1/ < 1 n α − . The strength of the 
deficit bias is captured by  () /1 1 n α − ≥ ; it logically increases with the number of 
interest groups and with the size of the international externality. 
In period one, we assume that the interest groups in the two countries move 
simultaneously, and the Finance Ministers in the two countries move simultaneously 
as well, thus abstracting from any asymmetry of the sequencing of moves within the 
types of actors in the first period. As a result, we only need to consider two cases in 
                                                 
10A slightly more complex bargaining process in period two, for example along the lines of the Baron 
and Ferejohn (1989) model, would also be possible, and would not change the central common pool 
mechanism or our conclusions. But it would introduce uncertainty between the two periods from the 
point of view of the individual interest group, and it would therefore complicate the derivations 
correspondingly.  8
the first period game. The first possible setup is a Nash-Nash game, in which the 
interest groups play Nash against each other and against the two Finance Ministers 
and each Finance Minister plays Nash vis a vis the other one and the interest groups. 
The second setup is a two-stage game. In the first stage, the Finance Ministers of the 
two countries move as simultaneous Stackelberg leaders. In the second stage, the 
interest groups observe the move of the two Finance Ministers and then move 
simultaneously. The Nash-Nash setup turns out to be equivalent to the game in which 
the interest groups act as Stackelberg leaders since the Finance Ministers' decisions do 
not depend on the level of the interest groups' transfers. 
 
 Finance Ministers do not precommit (Nash-Nash) 
 
In period one, the interest groups choose the transfers that they will receive 
taking into account the intertemporal budget constraint, i.e. the fact that they will have 
to collectively repay in period 2 the debt incurred in period 1. Taking as given what 
other interest groups do, they each have an incentive to raise their net transfer above 
the socially optimal level. Moreover, neither interest groups nor the Finance Ministers 
take into account the effect of their deficit decisions on the other country's second 
period budget constraint. The domestic common pool problem and the international 
externality of debt now combine to increase the deficit above the socially optimal 
level. 
Formally, each interest group maximizes its utility function ((4)) subject to ((9)) 
and to its period 1 budget constraint ((1)), 
,,
11 =
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 Applying symmetry across interest groups (but not yet across countries) yields 
the aggregate interest group reaction function in Home: 
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Gg ∑ . The same conditions apply abroad. 
The Finance Ministers each have only one decision to make regarding the level 
of productive spending 
h X  and 
f X , respectively at home and abroad. Their best 
choice is:  
 () = 1
' X θ α −  (11) 
 
Since ( ) < 0
'' X θ  this means that  > X X
∗ i.e. productive spending exceeds the 
socially optimal level that maximizes the surplus  ( ) X X θ −  a s  i n  ( 5 ) .  T h i s  i s  a  
consequence of the Nash game between governments as each one expects to pass a 
share  α  of its debt to the other government. Importantly, the domestic political 
distortion only affects the interest groups, not the Finance Minister's choice of  X . In 
fact, by maximizing the domestically available surplus from productive spending (the 
last three terms in (10). Finance Ministers also increase the interest groups' welfare. 
That the distortion on  X  is only related to the international externality will matter for 
policy responses below.  9
In equilibrium, we have 
, =, ,
ki
tt gg t k i ∀ , =
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tt GG  and  = =
hf X XX , and the 
solution for each country is :  
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Note first that when  =1 n  and  =0 α  we find the results of the international 
social planner: (11), (12) and (13) reduce to (5), (7) and (8), respectively. The first 
term in  shows how the potential domestic common pool, the maximum taxing 
possibility G , is shared among interest groups. In addition to increasing with α , this 
term increases with n. In the limit case where  , n →∞  this term is equal to G , which 
means that infinitely small interest groups fully exhaust their future tax capacity. The 
role of productive public spending is captured by (11) and by the second and third 
terms in (13). Much as the competition to capture the common pool of current net 
transfers and feasible future budget surpluses, interest groups compete for the surplus 
() X X θ −  created by productive spending. Again, in the limit case where n →∞, 
each of the infinitely small interest groups attempts to capture the whole surplus. The 
third term in (13) is simply the borrowing to finance productive public spending in 
period 1, which is larger than socially desirable. 
The case of a single country corresponds to assuming  =0 α . In that case, the 
Finance Minister chooses the socially optimal productive spending as (11) reduces to 
(5), but the deficit bias is not eliminated since (13) becomes:  












In this case, the domestic common pool problem creates two deficit bias 
components. The first term reflects the grab for transfers in the absence of productive 
spending. The second term shows how the interest groups capture part of the surplus 
generated by the productive spending. The last term corresponds to government 
borrowing to finance period 1 productive spending, which is socially optimal when 
there is no international externality. 
 
 Finance Ministers precommit (Stackelberg leaders) 
 
We now let the Finance Ministers precommit to their chosen level of productive 
spending before the interest groups move. We still assume that the interest groups 
fully control their net transfers but now they know their respective Finance Ministers' 
selection of productive spending. This means that each Finance Minister acts as a 
Stackelberg leader vis a vis the interest groups, yet the Finance Ministers play Nash 
vis a vis each other. 
The interest groups' decisions remain the same as in the previous section. Each 
group will act according to (10). The Finance Ministers realize this when they decide 
on 
h X  and 
f X . They also recognize the symmetry of the situation, so they know that 
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The home government now sets 






U ∑  subject to the two 
above conditions and to the interest groups intertemporal constraints, taking 
f X , but 
not  1













By the envelope theorem, this amounts to setting 







equilibrium is symmetric ( = =














 Note that (14) stays positive as long as the international externality is not too 
large.
11 Finally, the model's symmetry implies that  ==
hf
ttt GGG  and the deficit in 
each country remains given by (13). Thus, by precommitting, the Finance Ministers 
end up raising productive spending further above the socially optimal level. The n 
factor in the last term in (14) actually refers to the number of interest groups in the 
other country. This implies that this additional effect is entirely due to the 
international externality (it disappears when  =0 α ) Any increase in 
h X  is perceived 
by the foreign interest groups as a reduction in their domestic common pool since they 
expect to have to pay for a proportion α  of this increase. Accordingly, they reduce 
their own transfers  1 ,
f G  which reduces, by a proportion α  again, the amount of 
foreign debt that will have to be financed by the home country in period 2. Home's 
available resources rise, which increases the Finance Minister's incentive to increase 
h X . In comparison with the no pre-commitment case (the Nash-Nash case), transfers 
to interest groups in both periods are reduced because the surplus  ( ) X X θ −  is lower 
in the symmetric equilibrium. The overall deficit is also larger with precommitment 
because the increase in productive spending  X  outweighs the reduction in transfers, 
which is spread over the two periods.
12 Thus, if the Finance Ministers are able to 
precommit to productive spending, the result is a largr deficit bias and lower 
                                                 
11The exact condition for  () >0










, which is satisfied for 
1
2
α ≤ . 
12Formally, call 
P B  and 
NP B  the deficit with and without precommitment, respectively, and 
correspondingly 
P X  and 
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 Since  ( ) > 0
' X θ  and  > ,
P NP XX  it follows that  >
P NP B B .  11
welfare
13,14. 
Note that if we look at the single country version of the model by setting  =0 α , 
there is no difference any more between the no-precommitment and precommitment 
cases. 
 
 Policy Responses: Pigouvian Taxes 
 
Whenever externalities create a wedge between the optimal and actual 
production of some good, correctly devised and imposed Pigouvian taxes can correct 
the distortions. Assume for the purposes of this section that an international tax 
authority exists with the sole purpose of imposing Pigouvian taxes to eliminate the 
distortions due to the domestic and international externalities of transfers. The tax 
authority has complete information. 
 
 Internalizing the International Externality 
 
Internalizing the international externality with a Pigouvian tax is 
straightforward. The international externality concerns the aggregate debt level, 
X G + . The international tax authority hence wants to impose a Pigouvian tax, 
I τ , on 
the debt in period one such that the total debt level to be repaid in period two is equal 
to the full amount,  X G + . Formally, the tax must fulfill:  
  












 The proceeds from this tax are then paid to the other country: 
  () () =
1







 which implies that the new second period budget constraint becomes 
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which reduces to the old budget constraint once (15) is inserted. With this tax on 
the total debt level of each country, the international externality is internalized. 
 
 Internalizing the Domestic Externality 
 
Assuming that the Pigouvian tax for the international externality derived above 
is applied, the model is reduced to the one country case, with only a domestic 
common pool problem. Since the interest groups do not fully internalize the effect of 
                                                 
13Since the interest groups first order condition implies  21
1
=( ) , GG GG
n
α −
++  welfare is 
1
1




14This result depends on the assumption that Finance Ministers take into account the reaction function 
of the foreign interest groups. The alternative assumption that Finance Ministers only take into account 










) would yield the Nash outcome.  12
their choice of transfers on the overall budget, a Pigouvian tax should address the cost 
of transfers in the first period in terms of the associated loss of period two transfers 
for the individual interest group. There is an added complication here. The revenues 
from this tax must be channeled back to the country in question without being 
manipulable by the interest groups. Tax revenue collected from interest group i 
should be channeled back to the other interest groups excluding interest group i. But 
the whole common pool problem per definition does not allow to distinguish between 
the budgets of the individual interest groups in this way, so assuming that such a 
design for a Pigouvian tax is possible would amount to assuming away the domestic 
common pool problem. We hence proceed by looking only at Pigouvian taxes that 
apply to the whole budget and do not distinguish between interest groups. 
We solve the problem by assuming that the international tax authority makes a 
lump sum transfers to the Finance Minister at the beginning of period one, which has 
the effect of increasing the overall common pool by an amount T  in the first period, 
and that this lump sum transfer is equal to the tax revenues from the domestic 
Pigouvian tax ex post. Thus, a Pigouvian deficit tax of 
D τ  is levied on the part of the 
deficit comprised of transfers to interest groups, G . Since the international externality 
is neutralized, and taking into account the lump sum transfer from the international 
tax authority, the intertemporal budget constraint becomes: 






gX g XT τθ ++ + + ∑∑  
To ensure revenue neutrality of the tax, the international tax authority commits 
ex ante to paying T  such that ex post, we have: 







Tg τ ∑    (16) 
 where  µ
1
i
g  is the optimally chosen transfer of interest group i given T and 
D τ . 
(Note that for the international tax authority to be able to know T with certainty, we 
rely on the assumptions of no uncertainty and complete information). Solving 
backwards yields the interest groups' response to the taxing scheme
15:  
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Since the international tax authority chooses T  such that (16) is satisfied ex 
post, we have 
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The international tax authority now selects the domestic Pigouvian tax, 
D τ , that 
induces the socially optimal transfers to the interest groups, which yields  
   =1
D n τ −  
                                                 
15Noting that  () =1
' X θ   and using the budget constraint, the second period deficit can be written as 
a function of first period deficits:  
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  13
This in turn implies that the initial transfer from the international tax authority to 
the two countries becomes: 








where  X  is given by the socially optimal level. 
In conclusion, if a tax on the overall deficit of 
I τ  and a tax on only the transfers 
part of the deficit of 
D τ  are levied on the two countries, and moreover, µ T  is 
transferred to each of the two countries from the international tax authority prior to 
the game (or in period one as the game has started, provided the international tax 
authority can commit credibly to transferring µ T ), the Nash solution to the game is 
socially optimal
16. 
Pigouvian taxes can internalize externalities but their implementation is doubtful 
in the absence of an international authority who can tax sovereign governments. The 
international social planner is a convenient analytical construct but it does not have a 
real-life existence. Pigouvian taxes could be raised nationally but this presumes that 
the interest groups that are powerful enough to capture the government will let their 




Delegation to National Social Planners 
 
Given our assumption that national governments are fragmented, a natural 
policy response is to delegate fiscal policy to a benevolent national social planner. 
This can take the form of formal delegation to a fiscal council, as advocated by 
Wyplosz (2005), or - since there is no issue of time inconsistency of preferences of 
government in this model - a Finance Minister who is given broad powers, as 
recommended by von Hagen and Harden (1994).
17 The social planner can make 
decisions on 
k X  and 
, ki
t g  for all i's in each country, but does not coordinate with the 
social planner in the other country. In effect, we consider a Nash game where both 
social planners act simultaneously, taking the other social planner's decision as given. 
The symmetry of the situation implies that 
,, ==
hi hi i
ttt ggg  and  = =
hf X XX . 
The home social planner chooses 
, hi
t g  and 
h X  to maximize (4) subject to (3). 
The first-order conditions are: 
 () = 1
' X θ α −  (17) 
 











 with the corresponding deficit  1 =: B GX +   
                                                 
16Note that the transfers of tax revenues from the international pigouvian tax 
I τ  between the two 
countries in the second period do not actually have to take place, as the same is symmetric and the 
bilateral transfers hence cancel each other out. 
17The underlying mechanism behind the domestic externality - common pool or time inconsistency of 
preferences - becomes important in the interpretation of the national social planner. If we assume time 
inconsistency of preferences of government, the delegation to the a Finance Minister will not 













The national social planners eliminate the domestic externality but the 
international externality remains because each national planner expects to pass a 
portion α  of its debt to the other planner. Indeed, (18) and (19) correspond to (12) 
and (13) in the Nash case with  =1 n . Exactly as in the Nash case (11), productive 
spending is set higher than  X
∗, the level that maximizes the national surplus 
() X X θ −  (compare (5) and (17). Although  ( ) X X θ − , the surplus available to each 






international externality creates a deficit bias in both countries. Note that the first term 
in (18) shows that the international externality is also an incentive for the social 
planner to raise transfers to its own interest groups. 
If the international externality is small (α ≈ 0), then (17) reduces to (5) and (18) 





Deficit (or Debt) Ceilings 
 
An alternative policy response is a mandatory cap on the deficit or on the debt. 
Deficit ceilings have been adopted in the case of sub-federal level governments as 
well as at the national level in Chile or Brazil. The Stability and Growth Pact rests on 
both a deficit and a debt ceiling, although the latter has been set aside de facto.
18. In 
our model, there is no distinction between deficit and debt, so we leave this important 
distinction out
19. We assume that the deficit ceiling is optimally set by an outside 
authority that we call the international social planner. 
A key question is which category of spending is affected by the deficit ceiling. 
Recall that we assume that the Finance Ministers do not control the transfers to their 
interest groups. If they cannot precommit, the ceiling only constrains productive 
spending  X .
20 While it is obviously better to constrain unproductive transfers than 
productive spending, restraining only the latter may still be welfare-improving. 
Indeed, we know from ((11)) that, in the absence of any corrective measure, 
productive spending is excessive ( > X X
∗). Yet, the risk is that the constraint be so 
tight that it leads to insufficient productive spending ( < X X
∗). Conversely, if the 
Finance Ministers can precommit, it is the transfers to interest groups that are 
constrained. Thus we need to consider the two cases of precommitment and no-
                                                 
18The Stability and Growth Pact includes a preventive arm and a corrective arm. The preventive arm 
prescribes a deficit ceiling set in cyclically adjusted terms. Under the interpretation that  X  represents 
a keynesian expansion, it is only " productive" during periods of slowdown. In normal times, fiscal 
policy is not needed and could be counter productive (e.g.  () ) X X θ ≤  and indeed the optimum 
solution is  =0 . X  During periods of slowdown, on the other hand, it is desirable to choose 
=> 0 . XX  
19Wyplosz (2005) emphasizes the distinction and argues that the public debt is the correct variable to 
be targeted. 
20In Section 6 below we look at golden rules that separate out the two budget components.  15
precommitment by the Finance Minister. 
In addition, it matters whether the deficit ceiling chosen by the social planner is 
credible or not. If the social planner cannot precommit and can change the chosen 
ceiling once action by either interest groups or Finance Ministers has been taken, the 
deficit ceiling is not credible; knowing this, the interest groups and the Finance 
Minister will make different decisions than if the ceilings are seen as carved in stone. 
If neither the Finance Ministers nor the interest groups internalize the ceiling (i.e. the 
game in which social planner moves last) we are back to the unconstrained outcomes 
previously studied. It therefore also matters whether the ceiling is credible. We 
consider each case and examine four different cases combining commitment and 
credibility. 
Commitment and credibility are modeled by specifying the order in which 
decisions are made. For the credit ceiling to be credible, it must be set at the outset of 
the game and taken as given by the Finance Ministers and by the interest groups in 
both countries. Conversely, when the credit ceiling is set in second stage, it is 
effective and binds the third stage movers, but non-credible because it will respond to 
the deficit choices of the first stage movers. We call pre-commitment the Stackelberg 
case where the Finance Minister moves before the interest groups; this will be stage 
two of the game when the ceiling is credible and stage one when the ceiling is set in 
the second stage. Obviously, there is no commitment when it is the interest groups 
that move ahead of the Finance Minister. 
 
 Deficit Ceiling When the Finance Minister Can Precommit 
 
We first consider the case where the Finance Minister can precommit to the 
level of productive spending before the interest groups choose their net transfers. 
 
 The deficit ceiling is credible 
 
Take first the case in which the deficit ceiling is seen as credible by the Finance 
Ministers and the interest groups in both countries. The sequencing of the game in the 
first period is as follows. In the first stage, the international social planner selects the 
deficit ceiling, denoted by  ˆ B . Given  ˆ B , in the second stage of the game, the Finance 






U ∑  for 
=, kh f . Given the deficit ceiling, the interest groups have no choice but to accept 
() 1 ˆˆ ˆ = GX BX −  in the third stage. It is thus the transfers to interest groups that 
become the residual item under the budget ceiling. The social planner credibly 
controls  ˆ B , not its breakdown between  1 G  and  X , but it knows that the Finance 








+ , the international social planner leads the Finance Minister to 
choose = X X








, which delivers the social optimum. 
The combination of the domestic fiscal institution which allows precommitment 
of the Finance Minister, and a credible deficit ceiling, eliminates the deficit bias. The 
reason is clear: government precommitment eliminates the domestic externality once  16
the debt ceiling has eliminated the international externality. Note that when there is no 
international externality, the optimal deficit ceiling can just as well be selected by a 
national social planner. 
 
 The deficit ceiling is not credible to the Finance Minister 
 
Now assume that the deficit ceiling is not credible to the first movers in the 
game, in this case the Finance Ministers. The sequence of the game is the following. 
The Finance Ministers set the levels of productive spending in the two countries in the 
first stage, after which the international social planner sets the deficit ceiling. 
Transfers to interest groups are then set in the third stage. Given Finance Ministers' 
choice of  , X  the social planner now directly controls net transfers, which she will set 








 (see (8)). Since the deficit ceiling is symmetric across the two 
countries, the international externality is eliminated and the Finance Ministers select 
the socially optimal level of productive spending, i.e.  = X X
∗, knowing that the 
international social planner will make sure in the second stage that the surplus to 
productive spending will be optimally distributed across the two time periods. As in 
the case of a credible fiscal rule, we find that when the national Finance Ministers 
move first, i.e. can precommit, a mandatory deficit ceiling delivers the social 
optimum. Credibility of the ceiling, as we define it here, does not matter. The reason 
is that forcing the interest groups to act as residual claimants eliminates the domestic 
externality while the international externality disappears because the same deficit 
ceiling applies to both countries. 
 
 The Finance Minister cannot precommit 
 
We now consider the properties of a deficit ceiling when the Finance Ministers 
cannot precommit to the level of productive spending before the interest groups select 
their net transfers. In our model, this is the case in which the interest groups move 
before the Finance Ministers. 
 
 The deficit ceiling is credible 
 
When the deficit ceiling is credible to all actors, the sequencing of the game is 
the following. The international social planner sets the deficit ceiling in stage one, 
after which the interest groups set their net transfers in the second stage. In the third 
stage, the Finance Ministers simply carry productive spending up to the ceiling, which 
is assumed to be binding. As they move first, the interest groups recognize that the 
surplus ( ) X X θ −  from productive spending will be constrained. In this situation their 
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 The fact that the same constraint binds both countries' deficits eliminates the  17
international externality, but the domestic externality now remains. In addition, the 
interest groups understand that when they decide on the transfers, they effectively set 





i X Bg −∑ . The symmetry of the situation 
implies that the optimal choice of the interest groups is:  
  1














  2 ˆ =() GX B θ −  (23) 
 Then the Finance Minister spends whatever is left under the ceiling:  
  1 ˆ = X BG −  (24) 
  The international social planner optimally chooses  ˆ B  to maximize welfare. 
Given  1 G , by setting  ˆ B  the social planner in effect sets  X . Its first order condition 
implies:  
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Note that substituting (24) into (22) gives  the level of transfers:  
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 (27) 
 
 Since  ( ) < 0
'' X θ , (25) and (26) imply  >1
' θ  i.e.  < X X
∗. Productive spending 
is now less than optimal. This, in turn, reduces the available surplus  ( ) X X θ −  and 
thus indirectly constrains transfers  1 G . Note that  >1
' θ  implies  <1 ˆ
dX
dB
: when  ˆ B  is 
reduced,  X  falls by less, which means that  1 G  is indirectly constrained as well since 








21 when the domestic 
externality rises, the social planner reduces  ˆ B , which increasingly constrains  X  and 
1 G . For n large enough, productive spending is driven to zero. When this happens, 
the social planner does not face any more a trade-off between squeezing the deficit 
and reducing the surplus  ( ) X X θ −  and it sets  ˆ =0 B . 
The upshot is that an optimally set and credible deficit limit cannot deliver the 
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social optimum when national governments cannot precommit. This is unrelated to 
the international externality (which is removed) but due to the domestic political 
distortion. Indeed, in the absence of the domestic externality, i.e. when  =1 n , (25) 
implies that public spending is at the socially optimal level. Then (27) implies that the 
social planner uses its choice of  ˆ B  in such a way that  1 G  is also socially optimal, see 
(8). But the deficit ceiling must improve upon the Nash equilibrium; otherwise the 
social planner would set the ceiling such that the Nash outcome would prevail. 
 
 The ceiling is not credible to interest groups 
 
The interest groups now select net transfers in the first stage and the deficit 
ceiling is set in the second stage. The Finance Ministers implement  1 ˆ = X BG −  in the 
third stage. Knowing this, the best that the international social planner can do in the 
second stage is to ensure that  ( ) =1
' X θ  i.e. the socially optimal level of productive 
spending = X X
∗. Knowing this optimal action of the social planner, the interest 
groups choose  1 G  taking into account  X
∗ and  ˆ B :  
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 Now, transfers are higher than in the case of a credible social planner when 
interest groups move first.
22 The deficit ceiling becomes:  










 Since both transfers and productive spending are higher than in the case where 
the social planner is credible, the deficit ceiling is also higher here. The deficit bias 
remains because the domestic externality still applies and affects the transfers to 
interest groups. 
The situation is improved relative to the unconstrained Nash case since the 
outcome corresponds to the Nash outcome in the case of a zero international 
externality. The deficit is correspondingly smaller and welfare is correspondingly 
higher. But the situation is worse than when the social planner is credible as in 
Section (5.2). If this were not the case, the social planner would have chosen the debt 
ceiling given by ((29)) when acting as a Stackelberg leader in section (5.2). Since she 
chooses a tighter ceiling under commitment, it must be the case that this tighter 
ceiling leads to higher welfare. 
 
 Conclusions on Ceilings 
 
Three conclusions emerge from the treatment of deficit ceilings. First, the 
combination of a domestic fiscal institution allowing precommitment on productive 
spending and of a mandatory deficit ceiling delivers the social optimum. This 
conclusion does not depend on whether the Finance Minister considers the deficit 
ceiling credible or not. The reason for this is that the deficit ceiling is the same in both 
countries, which eliminates the international externality. In the absence of an 
                                                 
22To see this, note that: 
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international externality, the precommitted Finance Ministers always select the 
socially optimal level of productive spending. The deficit ceiling is then set by the 
social planner to constrain the transfers to the interest groups to their socially optimal 
level. 
The second point is that when there is no domestic fiscal institution allowing the 
Finance Ministers to precommit, a deficit ceiling never delivers the social optimum, 
irrespective of whether the ceiling is seen by the interest groups as credible or not. 
The reason is that the domestic common pool externality leads the interest groups to 
always select a level of transfers that exceeds the optimal level. 
The third conclusion concerns the debate on rules versus discretion in economic 
policy. When domestic fiscal institutions are poor, a credible fiscal rule yields a 
higher level of welfare compared to the non-credible case in which the rule can be 
changed after interest groups have set net transfers. This result is just one more 
instance of the general result that it is desirable to build credible institutions. 
 
 Golden Rules 
 
So far we have considered the case of a ceiling that applies to the overall deficit. 
It has been proposed to leave productive spending out of the ceiling.
23 In the present 
model, a golden rule would set a limit on  1 G  while leaving the Finance Minister free 
to choose  . X  Let  ˆ G  be the limit. 
If the ceiling is credible, the interest groups have no decision left.  1 ˆ = GG  and 
the domestic externality is eliminated. Irrespective of whether they can precommit or 
not, the Finance Ministers choose  X  to maximize the available surplus. As they fail 
to internalize the international externality, they set  X  according to (11) so  > X X
∗. 
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 The debt level is now higher than socially optimal due to the suboptimally high 
levels of productive spending, but lower than the deficit in the Nash outcome since the 
domestic political distortions are rained in. In short, even if it were possible to 
distinguish between productive spending and transfers to interest groups, a golden 
rule is not enough to eliminate the deficit bias in the presence of an international 
externality. Obviously, if  =0 α , the golden rule delivers the social optimum. 
If the ceiling is not credible and if the Finance Ministers cannot precommit, the 
interest groups move first and we are back to the Nash case. If they can precommit, 
the Finance Ministers move first and still choose  X  according to (11) because they 
do not internalize the international externality. Then the social planner sets  ˆ G  
according to (30). Thus, the effect of a golden rule crucially depends on whether it is 
credible, but does not depend on whether the Finance Ministers can precommit or not. 
It is worthwhile noting that a golden rule raises many practical questions. 
                                                 
23This is the traditional German "Golden Rule", adopted in the British Rule for Fiscal Conduct. See 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) and Beetsma and Debrun (2004, 2005) for an analytical justification.  20
Someone must decide which budget items are productive, which is likely to be a 
politically delicate step. The alternative is to draw up a list of productive items, but 






When both the international and the domestic sources of the deficit bias are 
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∗ is the social optimum, and subscripts C  and NC  refer to a credible 
and a not credible deficit ceiling, respectively, NSP to national social planners, PC  
to precommitment by the Finance Minister and NPC to the opposite situation of no 
precommitment, GR  to a golden rule, N  to Nash and a hat represents a ceiling. We 
cannot generally rank all solutions. The relative welfare ranking of  ,
GR U  
NSP U , 
, ˆ CN P C U  and 
, ˆ NC NPC U  depends on the relative strength of the domestic and international 
externality (i.e. on the relative sizes of α  and n). 
Except for an improbable international social planner, the social optimum can be 
reached when the Finance Minister can precommit. This is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition, though. Precommitment must be accompanied by an optimally-
set deficit (or debt) ceiling. It does not matter whether the ceiling is credible, as long 
as it is optimally set, constrains net transfers and is imposed. This result is 
independent of the source of the deficit bias, i.e. the relative strength of the domestic 
common pool problem and the international externality of debt. 
Another way of stating this conclusion is that a deficit ceiling, even optimally 
set, cannot deliver in and by itself the social optimum. It has to be combined with 
appropriate domestic budget institutions. Specifically, the domestic budgeting process 
has to make it possible to precommit the desirable or productive part of spending 
(productive in the sense that it raises output) in advance of the wasteful part of the 
budget. A golden rule, which also attempts to separate productive spending from 
transfers, does not deliver the social optimum because it does not address the 
international externality. 
Excluding the international externality, we deal in effect with a one-country case 
and (with  =0 α  and  >1 n ) the welfare ranking becomes: 
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∗  
The menu of options that deliver the social optimum is now wider. A golden 
rule or a national social planner, which can deal with the domestic externality, now 
deliver the social optimum. 
Ignoring instead the domestic externality, with  >0 α  and  =1 n , the welfare 
ranking is: 
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∗  
Precommitment by the Finance Minister is no longer important. A credit ceiling 
is now sufficient to achieve the social optimum, but this is not a general result. It 
relies on the assumption that the two countries are identical so that the deficit ceiling 
                                                 
24On the issue of creative accounting, see Milesi-Ferretti (2003), Canova and Pappa (2004), and Buti et 
al. (2006).  21
is the same for both countries and that it is binding. Once the deficit is the same, there 
is no possibility to shift the debt burden and the international externality disappears. 
Finally, note that the existence of a binding ceiling, the same for the two 
identical countries, implies that the international externality is internalized. The 
situation would be different if the ceilings were different across the two countries, or 
if the ceiling were not binding in at least one country. This kind of asymmetry - which 
greatly complicates the calculations - is not examined in the present paper. Note also 
that when the deficit ceiling is not credible, a zero deficit rule can never be an 
equilibrium outcome, irrespective of whether the Finance Ministers can precommit or 
not. To see this, note that a non-credible deficit ceiling can never bind the actors who 
move in the first stage of the game. That means that, when it is set, the ceiling has to 
allow for the unconstrained deficit decisions of the actors who move first. We know 
that the first movers always select strictly positive deficits: interest groups will always 
choose strictly positive transfers when unconstrained, due to the deficit bias, and the 
Finance Ministers will always choose the socially optimal - strictly positive - level of 
productive spending when the overall deficit is capped because the international 




This paper is a theoretical exploration of optimal fiscal rules and institutions in 
the presence of a deficit bias. The bias is the result of two distortions: internally, a 
common pool problem occurs as interest groups compete for transfers (or spending 
that they favor); externally, the two countries each expect to pass some of its debt 
onto the other one. The paper seeks to compare the role of rules (a credit ceiling, a 
golden rule) and institutions (the ability of the Finance Minister to precommit) in 
containing, and possibly eliminating, the bias. 
Except in the extreme and unrealistic case when the only source of the deficit 
bias is an international externality, the key result is that the combination of 
precommitment and a deficit/debt ceiling can deliver the social optimum. This 
conclusion is independent of the relative strength of the domestic common pool 
problem and the international externality. But the nature of the institution needed to 
deliver this combination of fiscal restraints depends on the nature of the deficit bias. If 
the domestic distortion is negligible, a supra-national fiscal authority is needed to set 
the ceiling, while the precommitment part can be carried out on the national level. If 
the international externality is negligible, domestic fiscal institutions are sufficient. 
The question is what, in practice, are the arrangements that can mimic these solutions? 
The institution of precommitment must make it possible for the government to 
isolate in the budget law some spending items that are of general interest, in contrast 
with spending that favor special interests. Precommitment also requires the 
government to decide on these items irrespective of the rest of the budget. What is 
crucial is that the interest groups know ex ante that taxation and spending on general-
interest public goods will not be affected by the amount of transfers or special-interest 
public goods that they capture.
25 In practice, however, it is not always possible to 
draw a line between " productive" and " unproductive" public goods. The implication 
is that some value judgment is required. Finance Ministers are usually those who are 
best placed to pass such a judgment, even if they too are likely to be partially 
                                                 
25This must affect the complete budget process, from the preparation and adoption of the budget law by 
the government to its passage by the parliament.  22
captured. Under this view, precommitment means that the Finance Minister - or the 
Prime Minister - is given a dominating role in the budget process. Von Hagen and 
Harden (1994) provide a detailed discussion and evaluation of existing arrangements. 
They also show that the performance of these arrangements are intimately linked to 
the structure of government, i.e. whether it is constituted by a single party or involves 
a coalition. 
More delicate is the question of who is the social planner who sets the deficit (or 
debt) ceilings. A mandatory ceiling fixed by law, for example a zero-budget rule or 
the Stability and Growth Pact's 3% limit will not do. The reason is that, in our model, 
the ceiling is optimally chosen and not set at an arbitrary level through a fixed rule. 
This is a crucial condition for achieving the social optimum. This reminds us of rules 
vs. discretion issue: rules can deliver better or worse outcomes than discretion 
depending on the nature of the disturbances. We cannot pursue this issue further here 
since we do not allow for uncertainty. In real life, however, the optimal ceiling is 
likely to vary over time in response to various disturbances, so that any permanently 
set number is not, possibly never, optimal. 
If we interpret our model as describing one of many recurring but always 
different situations, the social planner must fix a new ceiling for each annual budget. 
The role of the social planner must be delegated to a fairly sophisticated and non-
partisan agent. One possibility would be to delegate this task to the Finance Minister, 
in addition to the decision on productive spending. This institutional arrangement can 
work under two main conditions: that the Finance Minister is independent from 
interest groups and that it is not caught in a conflict of interest between its own 
spending decisions and the choice of the ceiling. 
An attractive alternative is to delegate the social planner's task to someone 
outside of the political arena. This is what lies behind the proposal of fiscal councils 
composed of independent wisepersons. Note that the social optimum is achieved 
whether the ceiling is ex ante credible or not in the eyes of the governments as long as 
the government can pre-commit. Institutionally, this means that the fiscal council can 
intervene either at the beginning or at the end of the budget process. What matters is 
that it be given the power to make a final and mandatory decision on the actual budget 
balance.
26 
The model presented here, and the policy implications, rests on a number of 
assumptions that are not all innocuous. The most obvious one is that the countries are 
identical. This assumption brings considerable simplification but at cost. Any 
asymmetry - country size and structure, but also the prevailing economic conditions - 
will make it more difficult to deal with the international externality. The assumption 
that the debt ceiling is identical and simultaneously binding, for instance, solves the 
international externality. Without symmetry, it will not be generally possible to set 
ceilings that simultaneously deal with the domestic and international externalities. If, 
however, the international externality is of second order of importance, the symmetry 
assumption is not too restrictive. 
Another limitation is that we only look at net spending. Our model explicitly 
ignores the level of public spending and the taxation burden. These are important 
issues, not wholly unrelated to the deficit bias. However, the common pool 
interpretation of the deficit bias assumes that all parties involved recognize that 
                                                 
26In the European Monetary Union, the Commission intervenes to pass judgement on the reasons why 
a country might not abide by the deficit ceiling. This can be interpreted as implicitly changing the 
ceiling in response to particular circumstances. In this interpretation, the Commission acts as social 
planner.  23
spending must be tax financed, either immediately or later on. Separating spending 
and taxation decision, in effect allowing for two separate games linked by the budget 
constraint, would greatly complicate matters without, we believe, delivering much 
additional intuition. 
A final limitation is that the model ignores the issue of separation of powers. 
The fact that parliament must vote on the budget raises a host of issues, which have 
been mentioned in the introductory section. A complete study of the implied 
interactions is far beyond the scope of the present paper. 
Finally comes the question of whether the optimal solution that combines 
precommitment and a deficit/debt ceiling can be politically supported. In this model, 
all involved parties benefit from achieving the social optimum. In particular, rational 
interest groups understand that the grab race inherent in the common pool problem is 
hurting them individually. They should welcome, therefore, an impartial referee that 
would eliminate an inefficiency. Of course, they must be convinced that the referee 












We present here the general case when the interest rate r  and the rate of time 
preference δ , which appear in (3) and (4) as 
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Note that when R β ≠  there is a rationale for shifting income intertemporally, 
hence the first term in the budget deficit equation. The corresponding welfare is:  
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 National social planners 
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 Finance Ministers as Stackelberg leaders 
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1 G  is the same as (35) but the choice of  X  is given by (37).  
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Welfare, 
PC U , is the same as (36) but with the higher  X  (given by ((37), 
() R XX θ −  is now lower, so welfare is lower than in the Nash-Nash case. 
 
 Policy responses 
 
 
 Pigouvian taxes 
 





 and on transfers to interest groups 
=1
D n τ −  remain unchanged. The international tax becomes:  





TR X X R G θβ
β
− ⎡ ⎤ −+ − ⎣ ⎦ +
 
 
 Credible deficit ceiling 
 
 
 Finance Minister cannot precommit 
 
The first-order conditions are: 
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 Golden Rule 
 
The first-order conditions are given by (32) for the choice of  X  and (31) for the 
interest groups. The cap on the net transfers to interest groups in period one is:  










With  1 ˆ = GG  The resulting welfare is:  
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The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions: 











Abstract: This paper discusses the role of fiscal institutions, including budget rules and non-partisan 
agencies, in enhancing fiscal discipline. A dynamic model of fiscal policy shows that optimal institutions 
lack credibility unless the costs to bypass them are sufficiently high. In our model, a combination of 
complete budgetary transparency and strong democratic accountability suffice to establish credibility. 
Under incomplete budgetary transparency, accountable governments may also use institutions as a signal of 
competence to increase their reelection chances, which in turn erodes the penchant for excessive deficits. In 
light of the theory, empirical tests of the effectiveness of institutions are undertaken. The results further 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Persistent and widespread evidence of fiscal indiscipline has prompted a debate on the 
likely distortions causing such behavior, and on effective ways to improve policymakers’ 
incentives. Among them, institutional arrangements—ranging from legally binding fiscal 
rules to formal commitments supported by strong accountability mechanisms and 
procedural arrangements—have received considerable attention. The underlying idea is 
that well-designed institutions effectively discourage deviations from desirable policies. 
Yet the significance of the role of institutions in improving policy outcomes has been the 
subject of debate on both theoretical and empirical grounds (see Schick, 2004, for an 
informal discussion). The issue revolves around the extent to which institutions 
themselves can alter the motivations of policymakers. In this context, the paper provides a 
formal assessment of the role of fiscal institutions in improving fiscal discipline, and 
explores some empirical implications of that analysis. 
The paper comprises two parts. In the first, a stylized model of fiscal policy illustrates the 
theoretical underpinnings of fiscal institutions. As in Tabellini and Alesina (1990), 
electoral uncertainty shortens the time horizon of partisan policymakers, creating a deficit 
bias. In principle, institutions—such as a constitutional amendment banning excessive 
deficits—can alleviate such bias. In line with McCallum (1995) and Jensen (1997), we 
explore credibility of that fiscal rule and show that it depends on the existence of 
sufficiently high costs of ignoring or bypassing the rule. The model emphasizes the role 
of democratic accountability as one natural mechanism through which deviations from 
the rule can be made costly. However, the power of voters to influence policymakers’ 
behavior is limited by the lack of budgetary transparency and by the possibility that the 
deficit bias be rooted in political institutions themselves rather than electoral incentives. 
Although third-party enforcement and market sanctions could also play a role and be 
investigated in the context of the model, the former is generally limited to subnational 
fiscal rules whereas market mechanisms are arguably weak and discontinuous in 
advanced economies (Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom, 1995).  
Beyond the credibility issue, the contribution of institutions over and above the influence 
of other factors, particularly that of specific political constituencies, has been questioned 
in the literature. It has been argued for instance that institutions only reflect preferences of 
dominant constituencies for a certain course of action, and what matters therefore are not 
the institutions per se, but rather the power of these constituencies (Posen 1995). We 
examine the extent to which this argument overlooks a key role institutions can play to 
reduce the consequences of asymmetric information between voters and policymakers.  
The second part of the paper explores some of the empirical implications of the theory, 
looking specifically at fiscal behavior in a panel EU-15 countries. We first document 
broad correlations among various elements of the fiscal framework in these countries, 
including features that can raise the costs of bypassing institutions (specifically the 
transparency- and accountability-enhancing dimensions of the fiscal framework). We then 
turn to quantifying econometrically the relationship between institutions and fiscal 
outcomes. We explicitly test for the null hypothesis that the relationship between 
institutions and outcomes is causal. Indeed, our theoretical analysis suggests that 
intrinsically well-behaved governments may adopt strict institutions merely to signal     
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competence, pointing to reverse causality (from good outcomes to good institutions) in 
standard least-squares regressions.  
Although our findings are only preliminary, there is some evidence that reverse causality 
may entail a serious bias in the estimated effect of institutions on outcomes. Incidentally, 
the instrumental variable approach used to alleviate the endogeneity problem allows us to 
explore the possibility that various features of the political system that may have no 
strong direct impact on outcomes might actually influence fiscal performance through the 
design of institutions only.  
Our empirical analysis also explores non-linearities in the relationship between outcomes 
and institutions. The results suggest that the effectiveness of the latter may vary according 
to various features of the political landscape, including political stability, government 
fragmentation, country size, and growth volatility.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly elaborates the 
effectiveness of institutions in light of the existing literature, while Section III develops a 
simple theoretical model and discusses the implications for the theoretical analysis. In 
Section IV, we undertake the empirical analysis, while policy implications and 
conclusions are discussed in Section V. 
 
II.   INSTITUTIONS, DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY, AND COST OF EVASION  
 
A.   Institutions and Policy Outcomes 
Many potential sources of deficit bias have been identified in the literature, and in dealing 
with it, the debate has so far largely focused on the design of fiscal rules, in particular, 
their coverage, nature, degree of state contingency, and the specific targets (see e.g. 
Calmfors, 2005, and Morris, Ongena and Schuknecht, 2006). As noted by Wyplosz 
(2005), there is a striking parallel between the current debate and the vast literature that 
blossomed in the 1980s and the 1990s to analyze the merits of monetary institutions, 
including rules-based monetary policy frameworks and central bank independence. In 
both cases, the very same question dominates discussions: how can a Society effectively 
encourage policymakers to avoid systematic deviations from an optimal policy stance? 
Wyplosz (2005) observes that after the demise of monetary rules, institutional reforms (in 
that case, granting political independence to the central bank in day-to-day policy 
decisions) became the dominant idea in the monetary policy literature, and he argues that 
independent institutions could play a role in the fiscal realm as well (see Debrun, Hauner, 
and Kumar, 2005 for a survey).  
 
One strand of the monetary policy literature adopted a more skeptical view on the role of 
institutions in shaping policy outcomes, and the arguments developed there might apply 
with even greater strength to the current fiscal policy debate. A key element in the 
skeptics’ thinking is that establishing rules (or institutions) does not change the 
underlying motivations or preferences of the policymakers. As such they potentially 
suffer from the same problems as policies themselves, and in particular, optimal     
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institutions may lack credibility (McCallum, 1995).
4 Proponents of institutions invariably 
reply that institutions are essentially defined by the very high costs of changing them so 
that they are intrinsically more credible than discretionary policies. 
 
In the model below, we explicitly address McCallum’s point and consider the 
policymaker as an optimizing agent that decides on both policies and the institutions. This 
leads us to investigate the costs of changing institutions, showing that they must indeed 
be sufficiently high to deter systematic deviation from optimal policies. To the extent that 
the fiscal rule is considered as a reasonably good proxy for the optimal policy, a 
combination of complete budgetary transparency and strong democratic accountability 
suffice to establish credibility. Even assuming non-transparent budgets, accountable 
governments may still find it useful to use institutions as a signal of competence.
5 In both 
cases, the impact of institutions on the deficit does not come from the “stick” of sanctions 
(either from markets or some third-party enforcer) but from the “carrot” of higher re-
election chances, which in turn reduces the temptation for excessive deficits.  
Another related critique of the role of institutions is due to Posen (1995) who argues that 
in a democracy, institutions can only be sustained if they reflect deeper social preferences 
or permanent features of the political set-up. That argument again implies that institutions 
per se do not change underlying incentives. In the context of central bank independence, 
Posen (1995) concludes that “both central bank independence and a coalition in society 
committed to protecting that independence are necessary to achieve the low inflation 
heretofore ascribed to central bank independence; either alone is insufficient (p. 271).” 
While institutions may well be merely decorative under complete information (i.e. the 
public knows the true motivation and competence of the government), their signaling role 
under incomplete information may again explain why governments set up formal fiscal 
frameworks, even though they may not directly affect incentives.  
B.   Key Features of Our Model 
In Section III, we build a simple politico-economic model of fiscal policy aimed at 
illustrating the issues discussed above. A deficit bias arises because uncertainty about re-
election increases the discount rate of partisan policymakers, who, by definition, care 
about future fiscal policy only if they expect to be in charge. Unlike the standard 
Tabellini-Alesina (1990) model, electoral uncertainty is endogenous and rooted 
asymmetric information about policymakers’ motivations and competence. Specifically, 
rational voters only re-elect the incumbent administration if the latter demonstrates 
sufficient ability to deliver a quantity public goods deemed commensurate to tax 
revenues. In fact, policymakers themselves are uncertain as to whether their actions will 
be successful in delivering enough public goods. The less tolerant the voters vis-à-vis 
policy failures, the greater electoral uncertainty, and the larger the deficit bias. 
                                                 
4 In McCallum’s words, institutions per se do not “overcome the motivation” for biased policies but “merely 
relocate it.” 
5 Cukierman (2002) discusses the relationship between accountability and transparency in central banking.     
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In that context, a simple budget-balance rule can be enacted, and its enforcement should 
be strict enough to discourage the policymaker to deviate from the optimal policy. The 
problem is that the enforcement of the rule can only result from the decision of a non-
partisan body because in the absence of costs for ignoring the rule, a partisan 
decisionmaker will always have an incentive to revert to the fully discretionary outcome. 
One natural way to rationalize such costs is to assume that voters hold policymakers 
accountable for sticking to the rule (because it encapsulates the optimal policy). Hence, if 
voters can perfectly observe budgetary outcomes (what we call transparency), compliance 
is rewarded by certain re-election, and in our model, the elimination of electoral 
uncertainty removes any incentive to deviate from the rule. That said, the combination of 
transparency and accountability is not a magic bullet in the case where the fiscal bias 
comes from elsewhere, including primarily in fiscal illusion (i.e. voters themselves would 
have a preference for short-term deficits) or in common pool problems (see Krostrup and 
Wyplosz, 2006, for a discussion of possible solutions to common pool problems).  
The lack of budgetary transparency is another obvious obstacle to the effectiveness of 
fiscal rules and institutions because voters cannot disentangle the deficit from policy 
failures, and can only observe their sum. In that conjecture, high deficits may be used 
opportunistically by policymakers to mask policy failures whereas good policy surprises 
may hide an excessive deficit. However, the adverse electoral consequence of flouting the 
rules will be stronger if voters do not pay much attention to policy failures and are 
correspondingly more concerned by evidence of excessive deficits. This implies that 
under opacity, fiscal rules are more likely to be effective precisely when electoral 
uncertainty and the discretionary deficit bias are low to start with.  
To summarize, and in contrast to existing studies,
6 the model illustrates the importance of 
the electorate, both as a determinant of the bias itself (through the tolerance for policy 
failures), and as the key player in rule’s enforcement. The institutional set-up is simple 
and comprises two components: a numerical deficit rule that can be interpreted as a 
benchmark characterizing the optimal policy, and, most importantly, an enforcement 
mechanism that imposes a cost on deviations from the benchmark in terms of utility 
losses for policymakers. In line with McCallum’s critique, we show that the credibility of 
fiscal institutions rests on sufficiently high costs to bypass them, and we characterize such 
costs.
7  
These theoretical issues raise a number of concerns regarding empirical tests of the 
effectiveness of institutions. Two areas should receive particular attention. First, 
simultaneity bias is likely to be important because governments with only moderate 
deficit bias are more likely than others to benefit from discipline-enhancing institutions. 
Second, since fiscal rules do not operate in an institutional vacuum and enforcement via 
democratic accountability is key, the effectiveness of rules is likely to depend on various 
                                                 
6 Examples include Tabellini and Alesina (1990), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997), Peletier, Dur, and 
Swank (1999), Debrun (2000), Dixit and Lambertini (2003), Manasse (2005), Beetsma and Debrun (2006), 
and Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2006). 
7 In the context of monetary policy delegation, Jensen (1997) overcomes the McCallum critique by 
introducing exogenous costs to reappoint a new central banker.     
  36
features of the political landscape. The relationship between fiscal rules and outcomes 
may therefore be nonlinear. 
 
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF FISCAL INSTITUTIONS: A POSITIVE ANALYSIS 
This section elaborates on the key issues noted above in the debate on the effectiveness of 
fiscal institutions. To illustrate the main points in a consistent theoretical framework, we 
use a simple politico-economic model of fiscal policy in the spirit of Tabellini and 
Alesina (1990). Our model draws on Beetsma and Debrun (2006) but differs in two 
important dimensions. Firstly, we introduce voters’ behavior to allow for an explicit 
analysis of institutions’ credibility. Secondly, we ignore possible bias in the composition 
of expenditure, and only look at the overall deficit. 
C.   The Model  
Consider a small endowment economy with a large number of atomistic individuals 
deriving utility from the consumption of both private and public goods. Individuals are 
identical and the world ends after two periods. The typical individual’s preferences are 













t t q v c u E U ,                                                       (1) 
where  t c  represents consumption of the private good in period t, while  t q  denotes the 
provision of a public good. The functions  ) (⋅ u  and  ) (⋅ v  are concave, strictly increasing 
and twice continuously differentiable, that is  0 > ′ u ,  0 > ′ v ,  0 < ′ ′ u , and  0 < ′ ′ v . 
Moreover, we also assume that  0 ) 0 ( = v .  0 E  is the expectation operator based on 
information available at the beginning of period 1. To simplify notation, and without loss 
of generality, we assume that the real interest rate and the social discount rate are both 
equal to zero. 
All agents in the economy can borrow freely on domestic and international capital 
markets so that the consumer’s intertemporal budget constraint can be written as: 
()l y c + − = 1 1 1 τ ,                                                           (2a) 
()l y c − − = 2 2 1 τ ,                                                         (2b) 
whereτ  is a constant and exogenous income tax rate (essentially parametrizing the size of 
the government sector), l is the stock of net private liabilities at the end of period 1, and 
t y  is the endowment at time t. In addition, we assume that  0 ≥ t c , 2 , 1 = t , which 
implies  () () . 1 1 2 1 y l y τ τ − ≤ ≤ − −  Period 1 income is subject to a zero-mean multiplicative     
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random shock  [] ε ε ε ; − ∈ with  1 < ε , while period 2 income is assumed to be 
deterministic:
8  () ε + = 1 1 y y , and  y y = 2 . 
There are two political parties indexed by  L C Q , = . Both parties share individuals’ 
preferences only to the extent that they are in power to deliver the public good. The latter 
is identical irrespective of the party. Fiscal policy is also subject to a mechanism 
discouraging policymakers to accumulate public debt b  beyond a certain threshold b . 
The utility cost of breaching the threshold is denoted by  ) (b S , with  () 0 = b S  if  b b ≤ , 
and  () ( ) b b k b S − =  with  0 ≥ k  if  b b > . One can think of  b b−  as a numerical fiscal rule 
and of k , as the enforcement mechanism through which violations of the rule turn into 
utility losses for policymakers. The objective function of the policymaker (expressed in 







− + = ∑
=
b S q v c u E V
t
t Q t Q
2
1
, 0 , . ,L C Q =                                (3) 
with  0 , = t C q  if  L Q = , 0 , = t L q  if  C Q = . In the absence of borrowing restrictions, fiscal 
policy decisions are subject to the intertemporal budget constraint: 
1 1 1 , δ τ − + = b y qQ ,                                                           (4a) 
2 2 2 , δ τ − − = b y qQ ,                                                          (4b) 
where  t δ  is a random failure in public good delivery attributable to unforeseeable policy 
mistakes, administrative capacity problems, or the action of corrupt bureaucrats siphoning 
off government resources (as in Debrun, Masson, and Pattillo, 2005). To simplify the 
formal analysis, we consider that  t δ  is uniformly distributed over the interval [] δ ; 0 . As 
in the case of consumers’ decisions, we impose nonnegativity constraints on public good 
provision: 0 ≥ t q , 2 , 1 = t , implying  δ τ δ τ − ≤ ≤ + − 2 1 y b y . Notice that the 
distribution of policy failures is the same for both parties so that there is no actual 
difference in “type” (e.g. a more competent versus a less competent) between the two 
political parties.  
The only source of inefficiency in our model is the absence of public information on 
policymakers’ ability to efficiently deliver public goods.
9 As a result, voters can only 
infer such ability on the basis of actual actions. Specifically, they assign a non-zero 
probability to the fact that a policy failure beyond a certain threshold 
+ δ  signals an 
                                                 
8 Randomizing period 2 income only complicates the notation without bringing additional insight to the 
analysis. 
9 The assumption of an under-informed public is fairly common in theoretical analyses of fiscal bias. See 
Morris, Ongena, and Schuknecht (2006) for a survey.     
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underlying lack of competence—in other words, some failures are deemed too big to be 
purely random. Voters also ignore the true ex-ante probability distribution of δ , and 
whether there exists any difference in type among policymakers of different parties. 
However, they do observe b —which we equate with perfect budgetary transparency—
which in turn allows them to assess ex-post the magnitude of policy failures, and 
possibly, adjust their voting decision. Formally, they assign a fixed probability 
[[ 2 1 , 0 ∈ ψ  that a policy failure 
+ > δ δt  can occur under a competent government. At the 
end of period 1, individuals either re-elect the incumbent (party C  by assumption) or vote 
it out—in either case by a unanimous vote. Voters will re-elect party C  if:
  
() [] () [] 2 , 1 2 , 1 L C q v E q v E ≥ ,                                                       (5) 
where  1 E  designates the expectations operator at the end of period 1.  
Expression (5) indicates that if the incumbent is not believed to be less competent than 
the challenger in delivering public goods, it will be re-elected. While voters’ beliefs about 
competence are the same for both parties at the beginning of period 1, they are updated 
following the realization of  1 δ . The incumbent’s ex-ante assessment of re-election 
chances thus reflects the probability of occurrence of a large policy failure 
+ ≥ δ δt  (see 
Proposition 1). Notice that individuals assess policymakers’ competence on the sole basis 
of their ability to deliver public goods in the most efficient way given the budget 
constraint. The level of the deficit at the end of period 1 therefore plays no role in the 
voting decision since both political parties will have to repay the debt anyway. 
Proposition 1:  
If  2 1 0 < ≤ψ  and voters follow (5), then, at the beginning of period 1, the 
incumbent assigns a probability  ( ) δ δ
+ − =1 r  of not being re-elected. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Importantly, the probability r  of losing the election depends on how flexibly voters 
assess policy failures. Flexibility (that is when 
+ δ  is large but below δ ) reduces that 
probability, effectively loosening the link between information asymmetry and electoral 
uncertainty.  
Events unfold as follows. In period 0, a representative constitutional convention (or a 
referendum) imposes a debt (or deficit) cap b  which carries a utility cost  ) (b S  when 
b b > . At the beginning of period 1, Nature draws the governing party (C by assumption). 
Then, the shock ε  is realized and government chooses b  and  1 , C q  so as to maximize  C V . 
After that,  1 δ  materializes, and private consumers select l and  1 c  maximizing their 
expected utility U . Finally, elections take place. In period 2, all debts are paid off and the 
world ends. The equilibrium is found by backward induction to ensure time-consistency. 
The last three stages of the solution are immediate. Indeed, period 2 decisions result from 
the budget constraints, and voters’ behavior depends on the realization of  1 δ . Also,     
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private consumption-saving decisions are independent of fiscal policy. Hence, denoting 




1 1 2 1 τ  and 
() ε τ y l − − = 1 2 1
* . Of course, fiscal policy would affect private behavior if productive 
expenditure was introduced in the model (as in Peletier, Dur, and Swank,  1999; or 
Beetsma and Debrun, 2006) or if the real interest rate depended on b , which is not the 
case by virtue of the small economy assumption. 
D.   Optimal Fiscal Policy 
Before turning to the political equilibrium, we characterize the first-best fiscal policy, 
assuming that a social planner is in charge. Electoral constraints and fiscal institutions are 
therefore irrelevant, and the planner selects a public debt level 
* b  defined as: 
() () () ( ) [] 2 / 2 / 1 2 max arg
*
1
* δ τ δ ε τ − − + − + + + = b y v b y v c u b
b
     (6) 
The first order condition for (6) is:
10 
() ( ) ( ) 2 / 2 / 1
* * δ τ δ ε τ − − ′ = − + + ′ b y v b y v                                         (7) 
The socially optimal public debt 
* b  equates the marginal utility of additional deficit-
financed public good provision in period 1 with the marginal disutility of foregone public 
good provision in period 2 (because additional resources are allocated to debt repayment). 




1 q q = , and it follows that  2
* ε τy b − = . On average, 
the optimal public debt is zero, and deficits or surpluses are only used to smooth out the 
income shock.  
E.   Political Equilibrium and the Role of Fiscal Institutions 
In the political equilibrium, the policymaker is exposed to electoral uncertainty and to the 
possible costs of breaching the fiscal constitution  ) (b S . Denoting by 
* * b  the deficit 
maximizing policymaker’s expected utility, we can write: 
() () () () ( ) () [] b S b y v r b y v c u b
b
− − − − + − + + + = 2 / 1 2 / 1 2 max arg
*
1
* * δ τ δ ε τ    (8) 
Equation (8) shows that uncertainty about re-election brings the policymaker’s discount 
factor ( r − 1 ) below the social discount factor. The first order condition for (8) is: 
() ( ) () ( ) ( )
* * * * * * 2 / 1 2 / 1 b b y v r b y v Γ + − − ′ − = − + + ′ δ τ δ ε τ                       (9) 
with  () 0 = Γ b  if  b b ≤ , and  () 0 > = Γ k b  if  b b > . 
                                                 
10 The second-order condition is satisfied by concavity of  ) (⋅ v .     
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Equation (9) implicitly defines 
* * b  (and the corresponding 
* *
1 q  and 
* *
2 q ) as a function of 
all other parameters and variables in the model. The main features of the political 
equilibrium are formalized in Proposition 2.  
Proposition 2: 
 
1.      Deficit (debt) bias: In general, the equilibrium public debt 
* * b  differs from 
its optimal level 
* b . Specifically, if 
* b b >  for all  [ ] ε ε ε ; − ∈ , the equilibrium 
public debt is suboptimally high for all  1 0 ≤ < r . 
2.      Fiscal institutions: If  b b >
* * , a higher marginal disutility of breaching the 
fiscal rule (k ) reduces equilibrium public debt. Specifically, a fiscal constitution 
characterized by  ( ) 0
*
1 ,
* > ′ = C q v r k  and 
* b b =  ensures that 
* b  is implemented in 
the political equilibrium (i.e. 
* * * b b = ). 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
A geometrical illustration of Proposition 2 is useful. Figure  1 displays the graph of 
marginal utility functions  ) (⋅ ′ v  in terms of b  for  0 = ε . The downward sloping curve 
represents the marginal utility derived from current public good provision  ( ) 1 , C q v′ , 
whereas upward sloping curves show the expected marginal utility of future public good 
provision under different conjectures: a social planner (plain line), electoral uncertainty 
(bold dotted line), and electoral uncertainty under an optimal fiscal rule (light dotted line). 
Each intersection between two curves with opposite slopes describes a solution to the 
optimization problem, and its projection on the horizontal axis gives the corresponding 
deficit.  
Point A identifies the planner solution defined by (7). There, the two marginal utility 
curves are symmetric with respect to the vertical axis so that equilibrium debt is  0
* = b . 
Electoral uncertainty leads policymakers to discount the expected marginal utility of 
future public good provision more heavily than a social planner. The upward-sloping 
curve is consequently flatter (bold, dotted line), leading to a political equilibrium B, 
defined by (9) and characterized by a deficit 
* * * b b > . A degree of enforcement  0 > k  
associated with the fiscal rule 
* b b =  pushes up the upward-sloping curve, reducing 
equilibrium deficit. In particular, an enforcement level  ( )( ) 1 , 2 ,
*
C C q v r q v r k ′ = ′ =  eliminates 
the “wedge” between the political and the socially optimal discount factors (light dotted 
line).     
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The optimal institutional setup can be interpreted as a state-contingent deficit rule whose 
violation entails a utility loss (or sanction) that depends upon the nature of sanction and 
the strictness of enforcement (k ). While the model offers no insight on the former, it 
suggests that the latter should increase with the incentive to deviate from 
* b . It is easy to 
verify that such incentive increases with the extent of political uncertainty 
( ) / ( 1 δ δ
+ − = r ) and the related capacity constraints altering public good delivery 
( 2 / δ ), and decreases with the size of the government sector (τ ), and the level of per-
capita income ( y ). The impact of r  on the fiscal wedge operates directly through the 
policymaker’s subjective discount factor (the higher r , the greater the relative importance 
of period-1 expenditure). The effect of the magnitude of policy failures, government size, 
and per-capita income all reflect induced changes in the marginal utility of public goods. 
Specifically, elements contributing to a low delivery of public goods increases their 
marginal utility, and thereby, the government’s incentive to spend. 
Quite intuitively, these results suggest that a fiscal bias is expected to be large in poor 
countries with small governments facing significant capacity constraints and political 
instability. These countries correspondingly need fiscal institutions providing stricter 
enforcement mechanisms to support their commitment to the optimal fiscal policy. By 
contrast, affluent countries with large government sectors, good delivery capacities, and 
b 
) (⋅ ′ v  
( ) 1 , C q v′  
( ) 2 , C q v′  
* b  
* * b  
( )
*
2 , ) 1 ( k q v r C + ′ −  
( ) 2 , ) 1 ( C q v r ′ −  
A
B    
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enjoying political stability should experience less severe deviations from the optimal 
policy, relaxing somewhat the need for strict enforcement mechanisms.
11  
F.   Are Optimal Institutions Credible? 
Time-Consistency 
While Proposition 2 establishes the joint existence of a fiscal bias and of an institutional 
response to it, the effectiveness of the latter is assumed. A classic argument in the 
literature is that of a given constitutional clause that policymakers diligently observe 
(Tabellini and Alesina, 1990). In our theoretical setup, it is easy to check that the fiscal 
arrangement  ( )
* *,b k  results from the maximization problem of a representative agent (a 
benevolent “founding father,” a nonpartisan constitutional convention, or the outcome of 
a referendum) that fully internalizes the features of the political equilibrium in periods 1 
and 2. 
In practice, however, constitutions and lower-level norms can be amended or scrapped; 
and if they prove too hard to change, they may simply  not be enforced.
12 Allowing 
policymakers to amend ( )
* *,b k  or to bypass it adds one step to our solution procedure, 
providing a test for the time-consistency of fiscal institutions (see also Krogstrup and 
Wyplosz, 2006). 
The eventual re-optimization of k  (which we can interpret as either a change in the rule 
itself or in its enforcement) takes place just before fiscal policy is selected. It is easy to 
show that if changing ( )
* *,b k  entails no cost for the policymaker, the fiscal arrangement 
will be scrapped or fall into abeyance, yielding  0
* * = k . Specifically, we can write: 
() () () ( ) ( )( ) []
* * * * * * *
1
* * 2 / 1 2 / 1 2 max arg b S b y v r b y v c u k
k
− − − − + − + + + = δ τ δ ε τ  (10) 
At  b b >
* * , the first order condition for 
* * k follows: 
 
() () () () [] () 0 2 / 1 2 / 1
* *
* *
* * * * * * = − −
∂
∂
− − − ′ − − − + + ′ b b
k
b
k b y v r b y v δ τ δ ε τ ,           (11) 
which simplifies to  ( ) 0
* * = − − b b  because (9) implies that the terms inside the square 
brackets sum to zero. It follows that (11) is satisfied as long as  b b =
* * . However, the 
second order condition indicates that this strategy actually minimizes  C V  because 
                                                 
11 One way to interpret this is that governments facing severe resource constraints may need strict 
conditionality attached to an IMF-supported program to avoid a deficit bias, while richer governments may 
rely on possibly less demanding domestic arrangements. 
12 In the monetary sphere, McCallum (1995) notes the absence of a constitutional amendment abolishing the 
















V E C . Given the first and second derivative functions of  C V E0  with 
respect to k , and taking into account the fact that  0 = k  for all  b b < , we can 
immediately conclude that the value of k  maximizing  C V  is a corner solution  0
* * = k  (see 
Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Re-optimization of k  by Politicians (for 

























Democratic Accountability and “Ownership” of the Rule 
Figure 2 suggests that optimal institutions can only be credible if changing (or ignoring) 
them brings about specific utility losses—which should be strictly greater than the 
vertical distance D. These losses can be rationalized in various ways. One possibility is to 
argue that the raison d’être of a fiscal rule is to guide underinformed voters in assessing 
fiscal performance. In that conjecture, the rule could reduce or even eliminate the effect 
of asymmetric information on voters’ behavior and thereby, on equilibrium fiscal policy. 
In the presence of a rule, the government’s capacity to adhere to it would thus become a 
reliable indication of competence in the eyes of the voters.
 13 Given equation (5) and by 
                                                 
13 This of course requires that voters do not suffer from a myopic appetite for fiscal deficits—or “fiscal 
illusion.” Calmfors (2005) and Morris, Ongena, and Schuknecht (2006) discuss fiscal illusion in detail. 
* k  
* * * b b =  
k  
* * * b b <  
0
* * = k  
C V E0  
D     
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In our model, the guarantee of re-election in case of compliance readily neutralizes the 
effect of information asymmetry, and is therefore a sufficient reward to encourage 
politicians to stick to the fiscal rule. Formally, one can check that a compliant government 
















t C q v E q v E . Because a cheater 
would be voted out with certainty (i.e.  1 = r ) and  0 > ′ v , he would select the corner 
solution  δ τ − =
= 2 1
* * y b
r . Substituting 
*
,t C q  and 
1
* *
1 , = r C q  with the budget constraints and 
using the (explicit) solutions for 
* b  and 
1
* *
= r b , the concavity of  ) (⋅ v  guarantees that the 
inequality holds:  () () ( ) ( ) ( ) δ ε τ δ ε τ 2 / 3 2 2 / 2 1 2 − + > − + y v y v .  
 
This result illustrates that, absent fiscal illusion, democratic accountability can play a key 
role in ensuring the credibility of optimal fiscal institutions. What is more, if electoral 
uncertainty is the only source of deficit bias, democratic accountability is sufficient to 
establish such credibility.
15 However, if the bias is rooted in other distortions, 
accountability may not be enough to deter unpleasant outcomes. For instance, 
policymakers may be intrinsically more impatient than the representative consumer (e.g., 
they may have a subjective discount rate  0 > ρ ), in which case the inequality discussed 
above may not hold:  ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) δ ε τ δ ε τ ρ 2 / 3 2 ? 2 / 2 1 ) 2 ( − + − + − y v y v . The effectiveness 
of the rules thus also depends upon the specific nature of the fiscal bias. 
 
Another critical assumption underlying the above result is that voters perfectly observe all 
the components of the budget identities (4-a/b); in short, the budget is transparent.
16 
Mounting evidence of creative accounting and outright manipulation of budget numbers 
undermines the assumption that formal adherence to the rule is perceived as a sufficient 
indication of competence. To study budgetary opacity in our model, we assume that fiscal 
outturns are revealed to individuals after the elections. 
 
                                                 
14 In a model of monetary policy delegation, Jensen (1997) argues that reneging on central bank 
independence causes reputation losses, which can help sustain near-optimal institutions in a repeated game. 
In our three-period setup, however, repeated games become quite cumbersome and it is more convenient to 
think in terms of political costs associated with either a change in institutions or an attempt to bypass them. 
Another well-known shortcoming of repeated games is the multiplicity of reputational equilibria, reflecting 
the arbitrary definition of the “trigger strategies.” 
15 Observe also that in this instance, rewarding compliance with the fiscal rule is a socially optimal voting 
strategy for voters. 
16 See Castellani (2002) for a formal analysis of accountability and transparency along similar lines in a 
model of monetary policy delegation.     
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The Implications of Budgetary Opacity 
Opacity implies that voters can only observe  1 , C q  (what they get from 
government), 1 y τ (what they pay to government), and the aggregate  1 δ − = Λ b . Although 
the deficit and the policy failure cannot be observed separately, a low Λ may indicate a 
large policy failure while a high Λ may reflect a deviation from the rule, two events that 
individuals would interpret as a sign of incompetence. Hence, opacity prevents the 
detection of combinations of large policy failure and a high deficit.
17  
 
By analogy with Proposition 1, we assume that voters revise upward their belief that the 
incumbent is incompetent—and elect the challenger—if Λ lies outside some interval 
around 
* b . We define that interval as [ ]
− + − − δ δ
* * ;b b , with  0 ≤
− δ , indicating that 
voters intend to punish deviations from 
* b  that they could not plausibly explain by 
random shocks on public good delivery.
18  
 
Budgetary opacity modifies policymakers’ perception of re-election chances. Specifically, 
the probability  0 r  of being voted out is now:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )




1 0 Pr Pr b b b b r       (12) 
 
Equation (12) highlights the link between fiscal policy choices, voters’ behavior, and the 
extent of political uncertainty. The first term indicates that higher deficits help offset the 
impact of policy failures on Λ, lowering the probability that voters perceive such 
failures. This points to circumstances under which opacity provides policymakers with an 
opportunity to increase re-election chances by boosting current borrowing. Opacity may 
thus lead to an opportunistic deficit bias.
19 The second term captures the effect of opacity 
on democratic accountability: random policy failures hamper the detection of breaches of 
the fiscal rule, especially if voters’ tolerance for 
* b > Λ  is large (i.e. 
− δ  is large in 
absolute value).  
 
Because the actual distribution of δ  is bounded between 0 and δ , there are limits to the 
effect of fiscal policy on electoral outcomes. In particular, higher deficits reduce the risk 
of detection of policy failures only if 
+ − ≤ − δ δ
* b b . Beyond that, the first term in (12) 
remains equal to zero as b  increases because the deficit is already large enough to 
                                                 
17 Recall that competence is only an issue for the under-informed voters. In reality, neither high deficits nor 
large policy failures originate in a lack of competence. 
18 A negative value for the delivery shock is possible from the voters’ perspective because they do not know 
the true distribution. Of course, 
− δ  could be strictly positive if individuals had a profound distrust of 
policymakers’ capacity to efficiently deliver public goods. For the sake of brevity, we do not explicitly 
analyze this issue here. 
19 See Rogoff (1990) although here the argument is related specifically to a lack of transparency, rather than 
information asymmetry per se.      
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prevent the detection of policy failures through low realizations of Λ. Likewise, any 
change in b  leaves the second term in (12) equal to zero as long as 
− − < δ
* b b  because 
the deviation of b  from 
* b  would be too small to be attributed to cheating. The 
implication for the formal analysis is that the marginal utility of future public good 
provision exhibits discontinuities at 
− −δ
* b  and 
+ − + δ δ
* b . In the remainder of this 
section, we focus on selected solutions with interesting policy implications.  
 
Case # 1: Voters have a low tolerance for signs of excessive deficits (i.e.
− δ  is small in 
absolute value) 
If voters revise their assessment of incumbent’s incompetence for only small positive 
deviations of Λ from 
* b , then the policymaker’s marginal utility function (for  0 = k ) 
writes as follows: 
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If the deficit is such that 
− − ≤ δ
* b b , then it is too small for voters to detect cheating on 
the rule. In that interval, the probability of re-election only depends on their capacity to 
detect policy failures. As higher deficits lessens that capacity, opportunistic policymakers 
have an additional motive to deviate from 
* b  (raising b  lowers  0 r ). Clearly, if 
− δ  is 
small enough and  ( ) δ 2 , C q v , large enough, the first order condition for maximum utility 
is unlikely to be satisfied in that interval (see however Case #2 below) 
 
When  []
+ − − + − ∈ δ δ δ
* * ;b b b , the link between ex-ante fiscal policy and electoral 
outcomes breaks down because the electoral benefits from higher deficits (i.e. making the 
detection of policy failures less likely) are completely offset by a higher probability of 
being found cheating on the fiscal rule. An interior solution for equilibrium fiscal policy 
located in that interval would thus satisfy a first-order condition identical to (9) with 
0 = k .  
 
Finally, if 
+ − + > δ δ
* b b , policymakers know that the deficit is too high for voters to 
detect any policy failure, and  ( ) ( ) [ ] δ δ δ δ
− − + − = + − < =
* *
1 0 Pr b b b b r . Opportunistic 
policymakers are now encouraged to show restraint because increasing the deficit entails 
a higher risk of being voted out for violating the rule. If the latter effect is sufficiently 
strong, a corner solution where 
+ − + = δ δ
* * * b b  may be observed (see Figure 3). The 
resulting deficit would be lower than in the case of an interior solution (despite being 
associated with the same degree of political uncertainty).      
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A number of interesting equilibria are therefore possible: 
 
•  If voters are prone to sanction the incumbent with only limited evidence of policy 
failure (i.e. 
+ δ  is low), equation (9) is satisfied for  0 = k  and  [ ]
+ − − + − ∈ δ δ δ
* * * * ;b b b . 
This is the interior solution depicted by point B in Figure  3. Hence, if information 
asymmetry seriously distorts voters’ behavior (leading to a large deficit bias under full 
discretion), budgetary opacity renders democratic accountability (and fiscal institutions) 
completely ineffective: the equilibrium deficit remains 
* *
B b .  
•  By contrast, if voters show substantial flexibility in the face of signs of policy 
failure (i.e., 
+ δ  is large), the equilibrium deficit is more likely to be lower than in B. 
Indeed, voters are unable to detect policy failures even at fairly low deficit levels so that 
the only impact of higher deficits on re-election chances operate through a greater risk of 
being caught cheating on the rule. In Figure 3, the corresponding equilibrium could be a 
corner solution C or an interior solution if the last segment of the upward-sloping curve 
crosses the downward sloping bold curve to the left of B.  
Overall, governments faced with less electoral uncertainty arising from information 
asymmetry—and correspondingly lower deficit bias—are also more likely to extract 
benefits discipline-enhancing fiscal institutions, making them more likely to adopt such 
mechanisms.  
 
) (⋅ ′ v      
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Case #2: Voters treat evidence of excessive deficit “flexibly” (i.e. 
− δ  is large in absolute 
value) 
The policymaker’s marginal utility function (for  0 = k ) now writes: 
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Because the second term in (12) drops off for all deficits 
− − < δ
* b b , the incumbent can 
increase re-election chances by raising the public debt (opportunistic deficit bias). If 
− δ  
is large enough in absolute value, then voters never conclude that the fiscal rule has been 
violated, and an interior solution exists.  
In that case, the impact of opacity on the resulting equilibrium deficit is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, higher deficits reduce voters’ ability to detect large policy mistakes, and 
correspondingly increase the likelihood of re-election. On the other hand, the greater 
probability of re-election associated with higher deficits reduces the bias stemming from 
electoral uncertainty. The tension between these two effects determines whether the 
equilibrium deficit is larger or smaller than under transparency and full discretion 
(Figure 4).      
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Figure 4: Interior Solutions Under Budgetary Opacity (for  0 1 = ε  and 
− − < δ
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Figure 4 shows that if the “opportunistic wedge”  ( ) δ 2 , C q v  is sufficiently small with 
respect to  ( ) 2 , C q v′ , the impact of higher deficits on electoral uncertainty can be strong 
enough to deliver a lower debt level (
* *
C b ) than in the absence of the rule but full budget 
transparency (
* *
B b ). By contrast, strongly opportunistic policymakers ( () δ 2 , C q v  is large) 
could be lured into a high deficit equilibrium 
* * * *
B D b b > . Hence, to the extent that it creates 
an opportunistic deficit bias, a rule operating under budgetary opacity could be 
counterproductive. 
 
For the same reason as in Case #1, a corner solution 
+ − + δ δ
* b  may emerge if voters 
consider that only large policy failures warrant an adjustment of their beliefs regarding 
policymaker’s competence (Figure 5). Indeed, for all  [ ]
− + − − + ∈ δ δ δ
* * ;b b b , the deficit 
is too high for voters to perceive any policy failure, and too low to raise concerns about 
possible violations of the rule, resulting in the absence of electoral uncertainty (i.e. 
0 0 = r ).     
  50














() 1 , C q v′   () 2 , C q v′  
* b   + − + δ δ
* b  
* *
B b   
() () δ 2 , 2 , 0) 1 ( C C q v q v r − ′ −  





G.    Summary and Implications for the Empirical Analysis 
The model points to a number of important determinants of fiscal outcomes and 
institutions that are interesting in their own right, and which an empirical analysis should 
consider. It also suggests that OLS estimates of the quantitative relationship between 
institutions and fiscal performance may be biased. 
 
First, the model assumes that electoral uncertainty is a key source of deficit bias. The 
reason is that the perceived risk of not being re-elected drives policymakers’ discount rate 
below the social discount rate. That risk originates in voters’ incomplete information 
about the true motivations of elected officials. The model thus suggests that, other things 
equal, countries with higher political instability (and a correspondingly higher risk of 
officials being voted out) should experience higher deficits on average. In what follows, 
we examine whether this is indeed the case in our sample of industrial and EU countries 
because the validity of some key conclusions of the above analysis, including those 
related to the effectiveness of institutions, is sensitive to that assumption 
 
The second insight of the model is that enforcement is key. Hence, to be useful, 
quantitative indicators of fiscal restraints need to properly capture the enforcement 
dimension. We have seen that the key parameter in the fiscal framework is not the 
numerical deficit rule—which simply provides voters with a benchmark characterizing 
the optimal policy—but the strength of the enforcement mechanism, whose role is to turn 
deviations from the rule into actual utility losses for policymakers. There are of course a 
number of ways, including through an outside enforcer, that this can occur. 
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The third insight is the possibility of reverse causality that may bias quantitative estimates 
of the impact of institutions on outcomes. A first reason for reverse causality is that 
institutions may be time-inconsistent because fiscal arrangements are self-enforced. This 
means that intrinsically less stable governments are likely to be more prone to weaken the 
disciplinary aspect of fiscal institutions (or not to adopt them in the first place), and that 
such weakening is more likely to occur in bad times than in good times (when even 
noncredible institutions are unlikely to be binding). A second reason for reverse causality 
relates to the fact that budgetary opacity may create an incentive for policymakers to 
opportunistically increase the deficit in order to secure electoral gains. Indeed, an analysis 
of the possible equilibria under opacity showed that if voters are sufficiently strict when 
holding the government accountable for suspected deviations from the rule, institutions 
are more likely to reduce equilibrium deficits if the deficit bias is low to start with. This 
implies that countries with relatively minor fiscal problems may be more likely to 
effectively implement discipline-enhancing fiscal rules than countries with serious fiscal 
issues. 
 
The final insight is that the effectiveness of fiscal institutions is likely to be country-
specific. This suggests that panel analyses—which are now common in quantitative 
approaches of fiscal behavior
20—should pay particular attention to cross-sectional 
heterogeneity. Specifically, the model illustrates the important role of transparency and 
democratic accountability (and by extension, of the broader political context). Indeed, to 
the extent that a fiscal rule crystallizes social consensus on what constitutes “optimal” 
policy, it will be used by voters to assess fiscal performance, possibly leading them to 
hold the incumbent accountable for complying with the rule. Democratic accountability 
can be a sufficient enforcement mechanism and make the rule credible. Of course, 
accountability works best if budgets are transparent—in the sense that its components are 
perfectly observable by voters.  
 
 
III.   EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This section undertakes empirical analysis drawing on the above insights provided by our 
model. We focus on 14 European Union Member States (the EU-15 excluding 
Luxembourg) over the period  1990–2004, using the European Commission’s (2006) 
database on fiscal institutions. The latter, based on a recent survey among member states, 
comprises quantitative, time-varying indices of fiscal rule restrictiveness and coverage, as 
well as qualitative data on nonpartisan fiscal agencies.
21 We first provide a brief 
description of some stylized facts on the link between fiscal institutions and budgetary 
performance, and on the main characteristics of institutional arrangements. We then 
undertake more systematic econometric analysis regarding fiscal behavior with a view to 
test the robustness of the apparent relationship between institutions and outcomes.  
 
                                                 
20 See Mélitz (1997), Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2002), Galì and Perotti (2003), Debrun and Faruqee 
(2004), or Annett (2006), among others. 
21 A full description of the data can be found in European Commission (2006).     
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A.   Fiscal Institutions and Budgetary Performance: Some Stylized Facts 
As the detailed European Commission (2006) study notes, the restrictiveness and 
coverage of national fiscal rules have increased in EU countries over the past two 
decades. This immediately raises two questions. The first is whether these developments 
have been associated with an improvement in fiscal performance. The second question 
relates to the role of underlying policy preferences—what should ultimately matter 
according to our model. We look at the way different features of institutional 
arrangements tend to be associated across countries. 
 
Institutional Reforms and Fiscal Performance 
Under the null hypothesis that fiscal institutions effectively influence policymakers’ 
behavior, institutional changes—a tightening of the rules or an expansion of their 
coverage—should lead to improvements in fiscal performance. Charts 1a to 1c below 
display the time path of a median fiscal indicator before and after a meaningful 




The first of these charts shows that in the three-year prior to the institutional change, there 
was a steady but quite pronounced improvement in the primary balance.
23 In other words, 
institutional reforms do appear to lag improvements in fiscal performance. In fact, in the 
three years following the change (T to T+3), there was no further improvement (and even 
some deterioration) in the balance
24. This suggests that at the time of the reform at least, 
institutional changes sought to consolidate a prior change in policy preferences or 
priorities rather than to effectively constrain policymakers’ to adopt policies they would 
not have opted for in the absence of reform.  
                                                 
22 The “change” or the “event” is predetermined as an increase in the index of fiscal restrictiveness of at 
least 10 percent. Alternative larger cut offs reduced the sample size somewhat but did not lead to an 
appreciable change in the conclusions.    
23 Similar results were obtained for the cyclically-adjusted primary balance. 




Chart 1a. Fiscal Rules Restrictiveness and Primary Balances 
 
Chart 1b. Fiscal Coverage and Primary Balances 
Chart 1c. Fiscal Rules Restrictiveness and Debt 
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The above interpretation is corroborated when we examine the change in the coverage of 
fiscal rules. In the three years prior to the increase in the coverage, there appeared to have 
been quite a noticeable increase in the average primary balance of the sample countries. 
However, after the broadening of the rules, the primary balance stabilized with little 
change in the three subsequent years.  
 
Using the public debt as a fiscal indicator (Table 1c), we see that a noticeable decline in 
the debt to GDP ratio had begun in the three year period to the reform, and that the 
decline continued albeit at a slightly weaker pace in the subsequent period. The 
stabilization in the primary balance after that period may thus reflect a lesser need to run 
high primary surpluses, probably reflecting a decline interest rates in many countries over 
the period covered by our analysis. Yet the conclusion remains: reforms do not appear to 
affect underlying policy trends. 
 
Institutions and “Revealed Preferences” 
To check whether consistent stylized facts also emerge over a longer period of time, we 
looked at the correlation between countries’ “revealed preference” for fiscal prudence—
measured by the change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio over the 1980s—and the level of 
the Commission’s institutional indices in 2004. In line with the above, one would expect 
countries that tended to have relatively disciplined fiscal policy end up having opted for 
more restrictive rules in the last 15 years. Of course, it could be that the countries with 
restrictive rules in 2004, already had some form of rules-based fiscal policy. We therefore 
did the same exercise using the change in the rule restrictiveness index over 1990–2004, 
instead of the level in 2004.
25 
                                                 
25 Given that there has been relatively much less change in the role played by fiscal agencies, the above 
analysis was confined to the restrictiveness and coverage of fiscal rules.     
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Chart 2. Institutions and Revealed Preferences 
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The results given in Charts 2a to 2c again suggest that countries that had large increases 
in public debt during the  1980s also ended up being the countries that had the least 
restrictive fiscal rules in 2004. Similarly, the countries that had the largest increase in debt 
were the ones that had the narrower coverage of fiscal rules. The same holds true—albeit 
with a somewhat lower correlation—if we take the change in the rules restrictiveness 
index. Of course, the unconditional correlations are not spectacularly high, the dispersion 
around regression lines is substantial, and the fact that outliers may be shaping the overall 
picture cannot be dismissed. However, one cannot reject a priori the possibility that a 
revealed preference for fiscal conservatism could drive countries’ attitudes vis-à-vis fiscal 
rules. 
 
Fiscal Councils: Main features and Interaction with Rules 
In addition to rules, many countries set up, some of them a long-time ago, nonpartisan 
agencies expected to provide an independent input to the budget process, with a view to 
limit the scope for politicization of fiscal decisions (see Debrun, Hauner and Kumar, 2005 
for a discussion of the issues and country experiences). The Commission’s survey 
covered many relevant dimensions of these institutions, including the legal guarantees on 
their independence, their potential impact on the policymaking process (including through 
the provision of independent forecasts, and their perceived influence on the public debate. 
We calculated summary indices for these dimensions. 
 
Unlike the above two exercises that focused on the relationship between rules and 
performance, here we examine more closely the channels through which the fiscal 
councils might be able to have an impact, and also the relationship between the fiscal 
council and fiscal rules. One premise is that the greater the degree of restraint exercised 
by the fiscal council, or the greater the guarantee of independence from political 
interference, the greater the likelihood of perceived or actual impact. There may also be a 
presumption of some complementarity between fiscal rules and fiscal councils, with the 











Figure 3. Fiscal Councils 
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Figure 3. Fiscal Councils (continued) 
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The results are shown in Charts 3a to 3g. The first of these shows that there is a strong 
positive relationship between the extent of legal restraint exerted by the fiscal council and 
its perceived impact on fiscal performance. This is complemented by a positive 
relationship between formal guarantees of political independence and the perceived 
impact of the fiscal council. It is also interesting to note that, as shown in Chart 3e, there 
appears to have been some positive relationship between the index of legal restraint and 
the guarantee of independence, suggesting that countries instituting such agencies seemed 
serious in their willingness to establish the council’s effectiveness. 
 
Finally, consider the relationship between the legal restrictiveness of fiscal councils and 
the restrictiveness of fiscal rules. Contrary to what might be expected on an a priori basis, 
the unconditional correlation points to the possibility of substitution between the two, 
although the relationship is certainly not strong. This may suggest that countries that feel 
the need for relatively restrictive fiscal rules, may be reluctant to allow for additional 
external influence on the policymaking process, possibly because they value discretion 
per se. The same correlation holds, although in an even weaker form, when one consider 
the guarantees on political independence of fiscal councils and the legal restrictiveness of 
fiscal rules.  
 
Unconditional correlations need of course to be complemented with a systematic 
assessment of fiscal rules and institutions in the context of a more comprehensive, 
multivariate model of fiscal behavior. In line with our theoretical analysis, we focus on 
the role of political variables, and explore the issue of reverse causality and possible 
interactions between the effectiveness of institutions and other economic and political 
variables. 
 
B.   Econometric Analysis 
Fiscal behavior can be assessed by estimating fiscal policy “reaction functions” similar to 
Bohn (1998). Because of the relatively short time-series available for most fiscal 
variables, panel data techniques have increasingly been used despite the likely 
heterogeneity among individual countries’ behavior. In line with the literature, the general 
specification is given by: 
 
t i i t i t i t i t i x ns Institutio d p , , , 1 , 0 , ε η β γ ρ α + + ′ + + + = − ,   T t ,..., 1 = ,  , ,..., 1 N i =            (1) 
where  , it p  is the ratio of the primary balance to GDP in country i and time t,  ,1 it d −  is the 
public debt to GDP ratio at the end of period  1 − t ,  t i ns Institutio ,  is a time- and country-
specific measure of fiscal institutions,  t i x ,  is a vector of control variables,  i η are 
unobserved country effects, and  t i, ε  is a time- and country-specific disturbance. To better 
capture fiscal behavior, it is common to filter out the impact of automatic stabilizers on 
the primary balance, using the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) as the 
dependent variable.  
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We proceed in three steps. First, we estimate standard reaction functions for a broader 
panel of 18 industrial countries, ignoring fiscal institutions. The idea is to identify 
features of the political system that may cause a deficit bias in industrial countries.
26 In a 
second step, we build on the European Commission’s (2006) work to evaluate the 
potential for reverse causality and the possible role of non-partisan fiscal agencies. 
Finally, we explore country-specific factors that may systematically influence the 
effectiveness of fiscal rules by introducing interaction terms in our basic specification. 
 
Fiscal Behavior Omitting Fiscal Institutions 
The results reported in Table 1 confirm earlier findings in similar studies. First, fiscal 
behavior tends to exhibit a fairly high persistence, with an AR(1) term estimated to be 
around 0.7. Second, the negative sign on the output gap variable suggests that on average, 
the countries in our panel have a tendency to react in a destabilizing fashion to output 
fluctuations (procyclicality). Thirdly, the response of the CAPB to the public debt is 
significant, robust, and positive, which is consistent with long-term solvency 
(Bohn,  1998). Those results are generally robust to the use of alternative estimators, 
including pooled OLS, LSDV (country fixed-effects), IV (instrumenting the output gap 
only), and GMM (Arelano and Bond’s dynamic panel estimator, which accounts for the 
possible small sample bias associated with fixed-effects estimation of an AR(1) panel 
data model). 
 
One interesting finding is that the introduction of political variables—a measure of 
government fragmentation, an ideology variable that increases with the degree of 
conservatism, and an index of government stability—eliminates most of the unexplained 
cross-sectional heterogeneity captured by country fixed effects (see the F-test of the null 
hypothesis that country effects are jointly redundant, and that fixed-effect and GMM 
estimators are correspondingly suffering from a specification bias). In particular, the 
significant and positive impact of government stability on fiscal outcomes is interesting.
27 
To the extent that government stability is likely to be inversely correlated with electoral 
uncertainty (i.e., the government stability variable is a plausible proxy of the risk faced by 
an incumbent to be voted out), our result is consistent with the key assumption of the 
theoretical model, and namely that electoral uncertainty is an important source of deficit 
bias. Our estimates suggest that a reduction in government stability by one standard-
deviation would reduce the CAPB by about 0.25 percent of GDP on average. Similarly, 
the sample range of the index (between 3 and 11) corresponds to a difference of about 1 
percent of GDP between the CAPB of a country with a very unstable government, and 
that of a very stable one. 
 
                                                 
26 The EU-15 minus Luxembourg, plus Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and the U.S. 
27 The government stability variable is an index ranging from 0 to 12, with the highest figure indicating 
perfect stability. The index is taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), compiled by the 
PRS Group, a consultancy. Other political variables have been constructed using the World Bank’s 
Database on Political Institutions.      
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Estimator:
Lagged dependent variable 0.73 *** 0.73 *** 0.72 *** 0.68 *** 0.76 *** 0.68 *** 0.67 *** 0.72 *** 0.63 ***
Output gap -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.10 *** -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 ** -0.07 **
Lagged public debt 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 0.04 ***
Government fragmentation … … … -0.10 0.34 -0.10 -0.63 -0.19 -0.83
………
Ideology (conservative) … … … -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00
………
Government stability … … … 0.12 *** 0.10 ** 0.11 * 0.14 ** 0.11 ** 0.14 ***
………
Delegation (dummy) … … … … … … -0.01 -0.15 ***
…………… …
Commitment (dummy) … … … … … … 0.50 0.51 0.06
…………… …
Constant -1.60 *** -1.61 *** … -2.49 *** -1.51 *** 0.01 -2.56 *** -1.99 *** 0.02
…
R-squared (overall) …
F-test (country effects) 2.75 *** 2.77 *** 1.10 …
Sargan test (p-value) 1.00
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.70
Fixed effects (country) …
Number of observations
Number of cross-sections 15
Table 1. Fiscal Behavior in a Panel of Industrial Countries
(Dependent variable: cyclically-adjusted primary balance)


















































































































With regard to the other explanatory variables, we see that government fragmentation and 
ideology do not appear to have any direct effect on the fiscal balance. Finally, it is worth 
noting that country specific dummies characterizing the type of fiscal governance in place 
to alleviate common pool problems (the so-called delegation and commitment models) 
have no robust impact on the average balance, which is in line with the findings of Annett 
(2006) for the post-1992 period, but also indicative of a potential collinearity problem 
between the two.  
 
The Role of Fiscal Institutions 
The availability of time-varying indices of restrictiveness and coverage of fiscal rules 
allows for a direct statistical test of their impact on fiscal behavior. In that regard, the 
Commission’s indices of fiscal rules are particularly useful as they encompass the 
strictness of enforcement, which is key according to our theoretical model. In addition to 
focusing on political control variables, one original aspect of our analysis is to examine 
the role of fiscal councils. As noted earlier, there is little to guide the construction of 
meaningful quantitative indices summarizing features of nonpartisan agencies likely to 
affect fiscal policy choices. Nonetheless, using the analytical framework proposed in 
Debrun, Hauner and Kumar (2005), we compiled indices of different features of fiscal 
councils (FCs) that might be regarded as likely to be related to fiscal performance. 
Extensive robustness checks clearly remain to be performed on those indices, and the 
results should therefore be taken with care.     
 
As noted earlier, there are good theoretical reasons and some prima facie evidence that 
the relationship between budgetary balances and fiscal rules may not be causal. First, it 
can be argued—and the theoretical analysis suggests—that intrinsically profligate 
governments would be reluctant to adopt or maintain constraining fiscal arrangements, 
while fiscally conservative governments are more prone to do so. Second, beyond the 
obvious possibility of reverse causality, omitted determinants of fiscal behavior could be 
correlated with institutions, also causing a bias in OLS estimates. 
 
Whereas instrumenting the fiscal rule indices emerges as a natural technical response to 
this potential issue, there is a scarcity of quality instruments (which have to be orthogonal 
to the error term but highly correlated with the explanatory variable to instrument) for 
institutional variables. One way to alleviate this problem is to rely on standard 
specification tests to exclude exogenous political variables that appear to play no direct 
role in fiscal behavior, and use them as instruments. In our model, good candidates are 
government fragmentation and ideology. We also introduce other excluded instruments to 
capture exogenous factors that may have affected the decision to introduce national fiscal 
rules. The European Commission’s analysis points to the role played by the run-up to 
EMU, which may have encouraged countries to adopt stricter national rules to accompany 
the fiscal adjustment process, and by the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Dummy variables capturing these events are therefore used as excluded instruments as 
well.
28 Estimates reported in Table 2 below also consider a dummy variable identifying 
election years in the EU countries. 
 
Another problem is that other explanatory variables may suffer from an endogeneity 
problem and could also be candidates for instrumentation. In particular, the fiscal council 
index, the output gap, the lagged primary balance, and the lagged public debt may all be 
correlated with the error term of the primary surplus equation, making them debatable 
instruments.
29 However, instrumenting more than one variable raises a number of 
difficulties, including potential problems in the overall quality of the set of instruments 
(e.g. a good instrument for the output gap may prove to be very weak for fiscal 
institutions). This is why Table 2 reports results where we have instrumented only one 
variable at a time, namely the output gap and fiscal rule indices. In the absence of obvious 
instruments for the lagged public debt and the lagged CAPB, we rely on standard 
specification tests to check whether they are orthogonal to the error term. (The same tests 
are used to check for the exogeneity of the fiscal council index.) Of course, the power of 
these tests is still a matter of debate, and for all practical purposes, one should treat these 
results with caution. 
 
                                                 
28 These dummies proved highly insignificant when included in the model.  
29 One reason for such correlation is the possibility of time-invariant factors affecting the capacity or 
willingness to generate high primary surpluses in each country. Another reason is the possible persistence in 
the idiosyncratic shocks to primary surplus behavior. See Celasun, Debrun, and Ostry (2006) for a detailed 
discussion of the statistical biases related to the estimation of fiscal reaction functions, and Celasun and 
Kang (2006) for a technical discussion of alternative estimators.     
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Lagged CAPB 0.63 *** 0.63 *** 0.63 *** 0.66 ** 0.69 *** 0.68 **
Output gap -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 * -0.08 *
Lagged public debt 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 ***
Government stability 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.10 ** 0.12 ** 0.12 **
Fiscal governance ("Commitment" dummy) 0.65 *** 0.66 *** 0.57 *** 0.56 *** 0.56 *** 0.56 ***
Government fragmentation -0.24 -0.31 … … … …
…… … …
Ideology 0.02 0.02 … … … …
…… … …
Election year (dummy) -0.32 ** -0.32 * -0.33 ** -0.33 ** -0.33 ** -0.33 **
Fiscal council index -0.13 ** -0.13 ** -0.12 ** -0.07 … …
……
Fiscal rule overall index 0.72 *** … 0.68 *** 0.23 -0.06 …
……
Fiscal rule coverage index … 0.54 *** … … … -0.06
…… … …
Constant -1.98 *** -1.96 *** -1.93 *** -2.00 *** -2.02 *** -2.01 ***
R-squared (overall)
F-test (country effects) 1.53 1.43 1.29 1.02 0.61 0.85
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.98 0.99 0.84 0.98 0.93 0.94
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-squared (p-value) 0.36 0.35 0.44 0.31 0.06 0.05
Cragg-Donald statistic (weak instrument) … … … 9.64 14.3 16.11
Exogeneity of suspect instrument (C statistic, p-value)
    - fiscal council index … … … 0.66 0.40 0.45
    - lagged debt … … … … 0.37 0.40
    - lagged CAPB … … … … 0.58 0.58
    - all of the above (joint test) … … … … 0.80 0.83
Notes: All estimates are obtained by two-stage least squares. Excluded instruments for the output gap are the lagged output gap 
and the average output gap in the US, France and Germany, except for France (Germany, US, and UK), and Germany (US, UK, 
and France). Instruments for the fiscal rule indices include government fragmentation, ideology, and dummies for SGP, the runup



















(Robust t- or z-statistics in parentheses)
Instrumenting fiscal rules Instrumenting the output gap
(2.71)
(6.31) (4.51)
Table 2. Fiscal Reaction Functions: Exploring Reverse Causality
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Table  2 confirms the broad patterns observed in Table 1. The first 3 columns only 
instrument the output gap, assuming that fiscal institutions (both rules and the fiscal 
council index) are exogenous. While stricter and broader fiscal rules are associated with 
higher CAPBs (supporting the European Commission’s findings), elections also seem to 
play a role, with lower CAPBs being observed in election years. By contrast, the impact 
of government stability is less precisely estimated, and its coefficient is lower, reflecting 
possible collinearity with rules and elections. Our fiscal council index enters with a 
negative and significant sign, which corroborates the (unconditional) correlation reported 
earlier. It is also worth noting that the Durbin-Hu-Hausman test does not reject the null 
hypothesis that the output gap is exogenous, despite the usual assumption of the contrary 
in most related empirical studies (e.g. Galì and Perotti, 2003). However, that result may 
also reflect a relatively low power of the test in the context of our panel. 
 
Instrumenting the rules deeply affects estimates of fiscal behavior (Table  2). It now 
appears that both the restrictiveness of the rules and their coverage have no meaningful     
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effect on the CAPB. The Durbin-Hu-Hausman tests indicate that the potential 
endogeneity problem is at least as large as for the output gap. Exogeneity is even 
unambiguously rejected at standard levels of significance if the fiscal council variable 
(which loses significance when the rule index is instrumented) is used as an excluded 
instrument. Although there remain many caveats and that extensive robustness checks are 
still needed, these results thus suggest that one should not dismiss a priori the possibility 
of a serious endogeneity problem when estimating the impact of fiscal rules on fiscal 
behavior.  
 
For the sake of completeness, Table 3 confirms the impression conveyed by specification 
tests that first-stage regressions for rules are of good quality. The significant role of 
excluded exogenous variables is particularly noteworthy. These regressions support the 
stylized fact that more disciplined governments (i.e. low public debt and high CAPB) 
tend to have more restrictive (or a broader coverage of) fiscal rules. Also, government 
stability—which is associated with better fiscal performance—is significantly positively 
correlated with the restrictiveness of the rules: the more stable the government, the more 
it will be willing to forgo discretion and implement rules. Rather strikingly, when 
controlling for all other determinants of the rules, delegation countries tend to have 
tightened fiscal rules by more than commitment countries over the sample period, perhaps 
reflecting a “catching up” effect as the former were generally less prone than the latter to 
have rules-based fiscal frameworks. 
 
Government fragmentation and ideology also appear to have a significant effect on the 
preference for tighter and more encompassing fiscal rules. Specifically, more fragmented 
governments seem to find it more convenient to enact binding rules committing all parties 
to the same aggregate objective than to rely on endless and paralyzing bargaining sessions 
among coalition partners. Also, right-leaning governments seem to have an intrinsic 
appetite for less constraining arrangements than left-leaning governments. Finally, the 
fiscal council index enters with a positive, quantitatively large, and statistically significant 
coefficient. Once one appropriately controls for other determinants of rules, the presence 
of fiscal councils would thus appear to contribute positively to either the emergence of 
fiscal rules or their more effective enforcement. 
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Lagged public debt -0.00 *** -0.01 ***
Lagged CAPB 0.06 *** 0.08 ***
Government stability 0.05 *** 0.04
Delegation (dummy) 0.44 *** 0.58 ***
Commitment (dummy) 0.20 *** 0.28 ***
Government fragmentation 0.29 *** 0.48 ***
Ideology (conservative) -0.03 *** -0.04 ***
Output gap -0.01
SGP (dummy) -0.04
Runup to EMU (dummy) -0.10 * -0.08
Elections 0.02
Fiscal council index 0.11 *** 0.14 ***
Constant -0.12 -0.03
R-squared (overall)
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments
















Table 3. First-stage Regressions for the Fiscal Rules Indices




























In Table 4, we document the existence of suggestive nonlinearities, indicating that, as 
suggested by our theoretical analysis, the effectiveness of rules depends upon the broader 
economic and political context.     
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Estimator:
Lagged dependent variable 0.60 *** 0.60 *** 0.64 *** 0.68 *** 0.68 ***
Output gap -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09
Lagged public debt 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.02 ***
Fiscal rule restrictiveness -0.47 0.22 1.52 *** 0.30 0.80 ***
   interacted with:
       Government stability 0.16 * … … … …
…… ……
       Growth volatility … 0.50 *** … … …
…… … …
       Country size … … -0.26 ** … …
…… … …
       Commitment … … … 0.51 ** …
…… … …
       Delegation … … … … -0.52 **
…… … …
Country size (population) … … -0.13 * … …
…… … …
Constant -1.81 *** -1.86 *** -0.83 *** -1.07 *** -1.05 ***
(-2.59)
R-squared (overall)






Table 4. Interactions between Fiscal Institutions and other Country-Specific Features
(Dependent variable: cyclically-adjusted primary balance)
LSDV
(Robust t-statistics in parentheses)
(8.84) (8.91) (13.53) (15.13) (15.67)
(-0.72) (-0.89) (-1.04) (-1.05) (-1.06)
(2.58) (2.46) (5.03) (4.57) (4.42)
(3.12)






Yes Yes Yes Yes
195 195 195 195 195
Yes








The results show the following. First, there is a positive and highly significant interaction 
between volatility of growth and fiscal rule restrictiveness, suggesting that the uncertainty 
engendered by output volatility, and the need to have some “anchor” likely impels 
authorities to opt for more restrictive rules. This complements the results for the 
interaction between fiscal rule restrictiveness and government stability, which indicates 
that a given rule is more likely to have an impact in a stable political context than in less 
stable one. Rules also appear to be less effective in large countries, perhaps capturing the 
fact that part of those rules are somehow connected to the implementation of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (we think of the adoption of internal SGPs in some countries). However, 
the strength of the effect is probably not unrelated to the fact large countries also tend to 
adopt a delegation mode of fiscal governance, which also appears to undermine the 
effectiveness of rules (last column of Table 4.  
IV.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has developed a stylized model of fiscal policy to illustrate the theoretical 
underpinnings of fiscal institutions. Two sets of issues were addressed: the credibility of 
optimal institutions; and the contribution of institutions over and above the influence of 
other factors, particularly that of specific political constituencies.      
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The results highlight a number of important issues relating to fiscal outcomes and 
institutions. First, they suggest that electoral uncertainty is a key source of deficit bias, 
and therefore, a central determinant of fiscal institutions. The reason is that the perceived 
risk of not being re-elected drives policymakers’ discount rate below the social discount 
rate. That risk originates in voters’ incomplete information about the true motivations or 
competence of elected officials. The model thus suggests that, other things equal, 
countries with higher political instability (and a correspondingly higher risk of officials 
being voted out) should experience higher deficits on average. Such countries should 
correspondingly adopt stricter enforcement mechanisms of fiscal rules to ensure that 
deviations from the rule entail significant costs for the policymakers.  
 
Second, the model highlighted the possibility of reverse causality between institutions and 
outcomes. One reason for reverse causality is that institutions may be time-inconsistent 
because fiscal arrangements are self-enforced. This means that intrinsically less stable 
governments will be more prone to weaken the disciplinary aspect of fiscal institutions 
(or not to adopt them in the first place), and that such weakening is more likely to occur 
in bad times than in good times (when even noncredible institutions are unlikely to be 
binding). Another reason for reverse causality is that, under certain circumstances, fiscal 
institutions are more likely to be effective if the deficit bias is low to start with. Hence, 
low-deficit countries may be more likely to set up such institutions. 
The second part of the paper explored some of the empirical implications of the theory. 
We first documented broad correlations among various elements of the fiscal framework 
in EU countries, and then turned to quantifying the relationship between institutions and 
fiscal outcomes, focusing on three key dimensions: (i) the potential sources of fiscal bias, 
(ii) the relationship between the restrictiveness and coverage of fiscal rules and fiscal 
outcomes; and (ii) the interactions between our institutional variables and various country 
specific features, as the effectiveness of fiscal institutions may vary according the 
political landscape and commitment to fiscal discipline.  
 
The results do not reject the role of political instability as a source of bias. Instability was 
also found to be associated with less restrictive and narrower rules. Finally, we found 
suggestive evidence that it interacts with the effectiveness of fiscal rules, with more stable 
political environments being conducive to a greater effectiveness of the rule, as suggested 
in our theoretical analysis. We found evidence that the greater the restraint exerted by the 
fiscal council, or the greater its political independence, the greater the perceived impact 
on outcomes. Our econometric results indicate that this perception may be related to a 
more pronounced tendency of countries with fiscal councils to adopt rules and/or to better 
enforce them. As to the relationship between rules and outcomes, we found evidence that 
simultaneity issues could be at least as meaningful as in the case of the output gap, which 
is generally assumed to be endogenous in most empirical studies. Accounting for that 
potential endogeneity bias contributes to a severe weakening of the estimated impact of 
rules under the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Overall, our analysis suggests that further 
research is needed to check the robustness of these findings to alternative specifications 
of the fiscal reaction functions, and to capture in a more systematic and robust way, the 
non-linearities that appear to matter.  
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A broad policy conclusion emerging from our findings is that rules can provide an 
important signaling mechanism that can help crystallize underlying preferences for good 
fiscal behavior, and thereby strengthen the reward for being well-behaved (e.g. through 
greater re-election chances, but also lower borrowing costs). To put it simply, rules and 
institutions work best when they are not meant to be binding. However, when they 
become truly binding, rules may well work effectively only to the extent that there is 
enough political capital to support their enforcement, or that there are high costs to bypass 
them, including the action of external enforcer or a strong response from capital markets.  
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Appendix  
A.   Proof of Proposition 1 
At the beginning of period 1, voters assign a probability  0 , Q z  of 
+ ≥δ δ1  equal to 
() 1 2 − − p p ψ ,  L C Q , = , where  p  is a probability symbolizing voters’ prior about 
politicians’ incompetence.
30 With  2 1 0 < ≤ψ , voters update their beliefs using Bayes’ 
rule: if they observe 
+ ≥δ δ1 , the probability that party C is incompetent is revised to 











, and  1 ≤ <
+ p p . As a result, the probability of 
+ ≥δ δ2  under 
Party C’s rule is increased to  ( ) 1 2 1 , − − =
+ + p p zC ψ . At the same time,  1 , 0 , 1 , C L L z z z < =  
so that  () [] () [] 2 , 1 2 , 1 L C q v E q v E < , and party L wins the election. If 
+ <δ δ1 , the probability 
that party C is incompetent is revised downward to 









guarantees  () [] () [] 2 , 1 2 , 1 L C q v E q v E > , and the re-election of party C. This establishes that, 
from the perspective of the incumbent, the probability of being re-elected is simply equal 
to the true probability of 
+ <δ δ1 , that is  δ δ
+ .  
B.   Proof of Proposition 2 
The first part of the proposition follows from the fact that no rationally chosen debt 
threshold b  should discourage the selection of the optimal debt 
* b  for any income shock 
[] ε ε ε ; − ∈ , so that 
* b b ≥ . In the case of a strict inequality (
* b b > ), 
* b  is never an 




1 , 1 C C q v r q v ′ − > ′ . Restoring equality 
between these two terms (while keeping  0 = k ) requires more spending on public goods 




1 , C C q q > , or equivalently 
* * * b b >  (see Figure 1). The 
second part of the Proposition is established by applying the implicit function theorem to 





* * < ′ ′ − + ′ ′ = ∂ ∂
−
C C q v r q v k b . Then it is clear from (9) that 







* > ′ = ′ − − ′ = C C C q v r q v r q v k  makes any deviation from 
* b  sufficiently costly 
to deter a deficit bias.
31 
                                                 
30 If  2 1 = ψ , then  1 δ  is not a signal of competence, and  1 , 0 , Q Q z z = ,  L C Q , =  irrespective of  1 δ . In 
that case, the incumbent government is assured to be re-elected, and the analysis of the political equilibrium 
loses any interest. 
31 See Beetsma and Debrun (2006) for a similar characterization of optimal fiscal institutions.     
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The Surplus Factor 
 
 
By Teunis Brosens and Peter Wierts
1,2 




A remarkable change in fiscal outcomes has taken place at the end of the 1990s when 
budgetary surpluses emerged or re-appeared in 13 out of 22 OECD countries, after deficits 
had been the norm in fiscal policy since the early 1970s. This paper investigates why 
surpluses emerged in some countries but not in others, investigating the role of economic, 
political and institutional variables. Results show that surpluses coincided with fewer 
spending ministers, a higher perception that corruption is under control, stronger 
expenditure rules and more transparent fiscal policies. Regarding budgetary behaviour, 
results indicate that (i) revenue booms lead to a procyclical increase in spending in deficit 
countries whereas this effect is absent in surplus countries and (ii) that a political budget 
cycle in expenditure is present in deficit countries but not in surplus countries. Finally, 
results show that cross country differences in expected expenditure pressures due to 
ageing populations cannot explain why surpluses emerged in some countries but not in 
others. The current policy discussion on the perceived need to move towards budgetary 
surpluses in many countries may therefore need to include the underlying political-
institutional setting in which the advice needs to be implemented. 
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Nederlandsche Bank, P.O. Box 98, 1000 AB Amsterdam, The Netherlands, tel. 0031-20-5245827, email: p.j.wierts@dnb.nl. 
2 We thank Beata Bierut and Carlos Martinez-Mongay for useful comments, and Jakob de Haan and Mark Hallerberg for 
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1 Introduction 
During the 1950s and 1960s, budget surpluses were as common as budget deficits (Grilli et 
al., 1991). This changed from the 1970s onwards, when budget deficits became a regular 
feature of fiscal policies in almost all industrials countries. As a result, a large literature has 
developed that attempts explaining why a deficit bias emerged since the early 1970s and why 
the build-up in debt differed substantially across countries. For overviews, see Alesina and 
Perotti (1994) and Mueller (2003).  
In this paper, we depart from the traditional perspective on budget deficits and focus on 
budgetary surpluses instead. As we will show in detail in section 2, a remarkable but largely 
unnoticed change in fiscal outcomes has taken place during the last decade. Whereas before 
1998 very few OECD countries were running budgetary surpluses, this has changed since 
then. The stylised fact is that 13 out of 22 OECD countries have recorded budgetary surpluses 
for longer periods (i.e. at least three years) since 1998. This paper attempts to explain why 
surpluses emerged in some countries but not in others. More precisely, we investigate whether 
differences in economic, political and institutional variables can explain why some countries 
have recorded surpluses while others have not. Our main interest is in budgetary behaviour of 
Euro area countries and to compare their budgetary behaviour to that of other OECD 
countries.  
Our investigation should be seen in the context of increasing emphasis by policymakers on 
the need to move towards budgetary surpluses in the years ahead. Several studies have 
provided estimates of future expenditure pressures due to ageing populations (e.g. Economic 
Policy Committee, 2001). On the basis of this input, the European Commission has recently 
calculated ‘required primary surpluses’ for the coming years that range from 1.6% of GDP in 
Austria to 9.2% of GDP in Greece within the Euro area (European Commission, 2006b). This 
perception that budgetary surpluses are needed in order to prepare for the costs of ageing 
populations is not limited to EU countries. See for example McKissack and Comley (2005) on 
the Australian experience and for an overview of experiences of industrial countries in ‘pre-
funding’ known future fiscal pressures. 
Existing studies that calculate the consequences of ageing populations for current fiscal policy 
abstract from the question how these policy-recommendations should be implemented. 
Positive theories from the political economy however underline the difficulties of maintaining 
surpluses, and provide clues on the political-institutional variables that may drive budgetary   75
outcomes away from surpluses. In this context, our paper aims at deepening the analysis on 
the perceived need to maintain surpluses in the years ahead by adding a political-economy 
perspective and focusing explicitly on the political-institutional structure in which the policy 
advice needs to be implemented.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the facts on how 
budgetary surpluses have re-emerged in some countries during the last decade but not in 
others, and puts our discussion on surpluses in a historical perspective. Section 3 briefly 
recalls the literature on the variables that help explaining fiscal policies outcomes, and 
classifies them into economic, political and institutional variables. The empirical relevance of 
these variables is discussed in section 4. It first investigates whether the explanatory variables 
as highlighted in section 3 show different values for countries and periods in which surpluses 
or deficits were recorded. It then investigates whether fiscal policy behaviour is different for 
surpluses, by estimating whether the impact  of the variables mentioned is different. The 
analysis is completed by investigating whether countryspecific factors may explain the 
appearance of surpluses in some countries but not in others. Section 5 summarises the main 
findings and provides policy recommendations. As a related side-issue, Annex 1 investigates 
the effectiveness of recommendations that countries with stronger long-run expenditure 
pressures should aim for higher budgetary surpluses. Finally, Annex 2 describes our data set 
that draws on a range of different sources as used in the literature. 
 
2  Budgetary surpluses in OECD countries: a brief history 
Figure 1 provides an overview of the periods during which OECD countries have been 
recording budgetary surpluses, as indicated by the black marks in the timelines for each 
country. Budgetary surpluses were still very common during the first half of the 1970s. Out of 
22 OECD countries, 9 were running surpluses for at least three years in a row. Between 1975 
and 1998 budgetary surpluses disappeared in most countries. The most obvious exceptions to 
this rule are Norway and Finland that maintained surpluses up to the early 1990s.
3 A 
remarkable turnaround in fiscal outcomes took place around 1998/1999, when surpluses 
emerged or re-appeared in many OECD countries. Out of 22 countries included in the sample, 
                                                 
3 In addition, Sweden, Japan, Iceland and Denmark also continued recording surpluses for shorter periods of 
time.   76
13 have been running a budgetary surplus for at least 3 years in a row during the last decade. 
This group of countries consists of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. In several of these 
countries, surpluses have disappeared again recently (most notably in the US), so that by 
2005, 10 countries were running a budgetary surplus, including three countries of the Euro 
area (Finland, Spain and Belgium). 
Figure 1 Budgetary surpluses in OECD countries 1970-2005 























Note: no data are available for Switzerland (1970-1989), New Zealand (1970-1984) and Portugal (1970-1976) 
 
The timelines in Figure 1 allow for a very brief review of the history of the dominant thinking 
on fiscal surpluses that serves to put the current discussion in a historical perspective. 
Buchanan and Wagner (1977) provide an overview of the fiscal principles according to ‘the 
old time fiscal religion’ (i.e. the ‘pre-Keynesian period’). The central principle was that public 
finance and private finance are analogous, and that the norms for prudent conduct are similar: 
‘barring extraordinary circumstances, public expenditures were supposed to be financed by 
taxation, just as private spending was supposed to be financed from income’. As a result, 
surpluses were normally produced during peace-time, and these surpluses were used to retire 
the debt created during war emergencies.    77
The disappearance of budgetary surpluses in the early 1970s has obviously inspired the 
subsequent literature on the deficit bias. In the view of Buchanan and Wagner (1977), 
Keynesian thinking has destroyed the old time principles of fiscal prudence. Indeed, 
Keynesian theories have had a profound influence on normative thinking about how fiscal 
policy should be run. Nevertheless, this argument cannot account for the fact that surpluses 
disappear specifically in the early 1970s and why debt increased much more in some 
countries than in others (see Alesina and Perotti, 1994, for an elaboration of this argument). 
Positive political economy theories have provided explanations as to why observed fiscal 
policy may deviate from this normative benchmark. This literature has pointed to the role of 
political and institutional variables in explaining a deficit bias in fiscal policy outcomes. 
Section 4 will provide further details on the main explanatory variables. 
The question not yet addressed in the literature is why budgetary surpluses re-emerged in 
several countries by the end of the 1990s. The historical perspective allows to put forward 
several hypotheses that will be tested formally in the remainder of this paper. Firstly, as usual 
in budgetary policy, growth may matter: surpluses re-emerged at a time of the boom of the 
late 1990s. Secondly, the re-emergence of surpluses took place after a decade during which 
increasing emphasis was put on institutional reform in many Member States. For example, 
von Hagen (2006) notes that in the EU, budgetary institutions improved over the 1990s. At 
the same time, the use of national fiscal rules increased markedly in EU countries (European 
Commission, 2006a) while in the US surpluses appeared after the Budget Enforcement Act 
had been in place during the 1990s (while the surpluses disappeared after the Budget 
Enforcement Act was not prolonged). Thirdly, it should be noted that there are two countries 
(Norway and Finland) that have maintained budgetary surpluses through almost the entire 
period under investigation, so that countryspecific ‘special’ factors may play a role, such as 
oil in Norway and the decision to build up pension assets within the public sector in Finland, 
Finally, during the last decade many studies have pointed out that surpluses would be needed 
for keeping fiscal policies on a sustainable path in the light of ageing populations. Perhaps 
this policy advice has been successful in influencing policy outcomes?  
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3  Explaining budgetary outcomes by economic, political 
and institutional variables 
Several authors have summarised existing theories that aim at explaining why fiscal deficits 
became the norm after the early 1970s, including Alesina and Perotti (1994) and Mueller 
(2003). The conclusion of Mueller (2003, p. 469) is that the evidence is somewhat equivocal 
as to what the determinants of fiscal deficits are: ‘Clearly no single hypothesis can account 
for all the differences’. In this light, explanations as to why surpluses re-emerged may also 
need to include insights of a range of existing theories.  
Our starting point in explaining fiscal outcomes is the large literature on fiscal reaction 
functions that include lagged debt (due to a sustainability motive) and the output gap (due to a 
stabilisation motive) as the main explanatory variables (see e.g. Bohn, 1998, Ballabriga and 
Martinez-Mongay, 2005, or European Commission, 2006a) and then ‘augment’ these reaction 
functions by political and institutional variables. To save space we immediately focus on the 
political and institutional variables that may help to explain budgetary outcomes, by 
summarising evidence in recent empirical studies. 
 
3.1 Political  variables 
The main political variables that have been related to budgetary outcomes in terms of the 
budget balance are: fragmentation, political instability, polarisation, ideology, elections and 
corruption.  
 
Political fragmentation  
Political fragmentation is expected to influence budgetary outcomes through the common 
pool problem. The more fragmented is the system of budgetary decision-making, the weaker 
are the incentives for each participant to internalise the full tax burden of its spending bids. 
The original version of the common pool problem as in Shepsle and Weingast (1981) explains 
expenditure pressures, and not necessarily a tendency towards budget deficits.
4 However, in 
                                                 
4 A related issue is the literature on the effect of electoral rules and political regimes on fiscal policy outcomes. 
Persson and Tabellini (2002) find evidence that presidential regimes lead to smaller governments, while 
majoritiarian elections lead to smaller governments and smaller welfare programs. However, the underlying   79
recent years a variant of the common pool problems has been developed that explains the 
speedy disappearance of budgetary surpluses due to a voracity effect (Tornell and Lane, 
1999;Lane, 2003). In a situation of surpluses, the incentive to act prudently is low, as each 
party knows that if it refrains from using the surplus to implement its desired policy, 
competing parties will do so. In addition political fragmentation may also explain why deficits 
persist despite general recognition that adjustment is needed. The reason is a “war of attrition” 
between e.g. the coalition parties, waiting for each other to concede (Alesina and Drazen, 
1991).  
In the recent literature, a common indicator for measuring fragmentation is the number of 
spending ministers (NSM). Perotti and Koptopolous (2002) find that this indicator matters for 
explaining expenditure outcomes and to a lesser extent also for the budget balance. Therefore, 
we expect surpluses to coincide with fewer spending ministers.  
 
Political instability and polarisation  
Political instability and polarisation may matter for budgetary outcomes given that they 
influence the degree to which the incumbent government uses debt as a strategic variable to 
influence the policy options of its successor (Tabellini and Alesina, 1990). The incentive to 
run deficits and leave debt is larger the lower are the chances for re-election (political 
stability) and the larger are the differences in policy preferences between alternating parties in 
power (polarisation).  
The empirical evidence regarding the impact of the frequency of government changes and 
polarisation on the budget balance is mixed; see Drazen (2000) for an overview. Both Grilli et 
al. (1991) and Hallerberg and Von Hagen (1999) find that time fragmentation matters. 
However, Ricciuti (2004) finds no evidence that is does. Furthermore, Grilli et al. (1991) find 
no evidence that polarisation matters. Therefore, we expect to find at best weak evidence that 
surpluses coincide with less instability and polarisation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
theories and the evidence in this strand of the literature concentrates on public expenditure, and not on the budget 
balance, so that it falls outside the scope of the current paper.   80
Ideology 
Different predictions have been made concerning the impact of ideology on budgetary 
outcomes. Intuition may suggest that leftwing governments run deficits, while rightwing 
governments may run surpluses or smaller deficits. However, in the model of Persson and 
Svensson (1989) in which a rightwing government favours low spending while a leftwing 
government favours a large government, the rightwing government has an incentive to run 
deficits in order to restrain the spending possibilities of its successor.  
Regarding the empirical evidence, Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) find that ideology is not an 
important determinant of the deficit when using panel estimations.
5 However, Alt and Lassen 
(2006) find that rightwing government is associated with higher government debt when using 
a cross-sectional approach that focuses on average values over the 1990s.
6 As a result, we also 
expect to find mixed evidence on the link between surpluses and ideology. 
 
Elections 
Political competition can be modelled on the basis of partisan motives (i.e. the desire to 
implement preferred policies) and opportunistic motives (i.e. the desire for re-election). The 
latter motive has given rise to the literature on political business cycles, starting from 
Nordhaus (1975). On the empirical side, there is some evidence of a political budget cycle in 
transfers in OECD countries (see Drazen, 2000, for an overview of the literature). At the same 
time, the political budget cycle seems especially strong in young and developing democracies, 
whereas it is less apparent in established democracies (Brender and Drazen, 2005b), that are 
the main focus in this paper.
7 Looking from a different angle, we investigate whether the 
political budget cycle differs between surplus and deficit countries. 
 
                                                 
5 Ideology does however impact on transfers in an intuitive way (leftwing governments spend more on transers). 
6 As a variable for rightwing government they use the ‘proportion of years from 1990-1999 with a rightwing 
party in office’. 
7 Moreover, Brender and Drazen (2005a) show that budget deficits decrease chances for re-election.   81
Corruption 
The model of Alesina and Tabellini (2005) predicts that procyclical fiscal policy should 
mainly be observed in democratic countries where political corruption is widespread. The 
intuition is that, if corruption is higher (i.e. the incumbent government extracts more rents in 
office), voters do not trust the government and demand that revenue booms are given back the 
form of lower taxes or higher spending. Empirical results of Alesina and Tabellini (2005) 
confirm that corruption matters. Their results also indicate that procyclicality is more often 
driven by a distorted policy reaction to booms, rather than to recession. These findings may 
also imply that surpluses are less likely to emerge when ‘control of corruption’ (which is the 
main indicator in their study) is lower. 
 
3.2  Institutional variables  
With dissatisfaction about persistent deficits increasing during the 1980s, attention naturally 
shifted towards fiscal rules and institutions that could act as a counterweight against existing 
spending and deficit biases. The role of rules and institutions in influencing fiscal policy 
outcomes should therefore be seen in combination with the underlying political factors that 
cause the spending and deficit biases in the first place.
8 Focusing on only the political or the 
institutional variables as is common in existing empirical work should therefore cause a 
problem of omitted variable bias.  
Much of the empirical work on the interaction of budgetary institutions and fiscal outcomes 
has used aggregate indices of budgetary institutions; many studies in this line of research have 
confirmed that aggregate indices of budgetary institutions matter during different sample 
periods and for different groups of countries (Von Hagen, 1992;Gleich, 2003;Yläoutinen, 
2006). However, this approach is less suitable for our purposes for two reasons. First, our 
focus is on the role of specific political and institutional variables. Second, we concentrate on 
variables that may have an impact in any political set-up, and do not depend on the underlying 
political structure as in theories on political institutionalism. We focus on two variables that 
have figured prominently in the literature: fiscal rules and transparency. 
                                                 
8 At the extreme, in a model of a social planner there are no conflicts of interest between individual decision 
makers so that neither political variables, nor fiscal rules or institutions can play a useful role.   82
 
Fiscal rules 
Fiscal rules may have an impact on the budget balance given that they constrain the discretion 
of policy makers. The effectiveness of fiscal rules is however controversial given that the 
rules may distort budgetary behaviour towards non-constrained form of fiscal policy (Milesi-
Ferretti, 2003) or may be less effective if independent enforcement is lacking.  
The effectiveness of the rules may therefore depend on their institutional design (Kopits and 
Symanski, 1998). Deroose, Moulin and Wierts (2006) test this hypothesis by building an 
index of the institutional ‘strength’ of expenditure rules. European Commission (2006a) 
extends their approach to all types of fiscal rules in EU Member States, and finds that the 
presence, coverage and design of fiscal rules all matter for explaining fiscal policy outcomes. 
 
Transparency 
According to Alt and Lassen (2006) fiscal transparency may matter for fiscal outcomes given 
that with more transparency, incumbent governments have less of an incentive to feign 
competence by issuing debt. The main finding from their cross-sectional estimations is that, 
indeed, a higher degree of fiscal transparency is associated with lower public debt and 
deficits.  
 
4 Empirical  evidence 
We now turn to the empirical evidence as to why surpluses emerged in some countries but not 
in others, focusing on the role of economic, political and institutional variables. Our empirical 
analysis draws on a range of data sources from different institutions and authors (details on 
the sample period, sources and data availability are provided in Annex 2). We test three 
complementary hypotheses:  
(i)  The  values of the explanatory variables differ between deficits and surpluses. 
Based on the review in section 3, one may expect that surpluses coincide with, 
e.g., less political fragmentation and corruption, stronger fiscal rules, more 
transparency, etc. Section 4.1 discusses the empirical evidence along these lines.   83
(ii)  The  impact of explanatory variables may differ for deficits and surpluses. 
According to this hypothesis, budgetary behaviour may differ between surplus and 
deficit countries (countries may respond differently to, e.g., the economic cycle or 
the degree of political fragmentation). To test this hypothesis, section 4.2 estimates 
fiscal reaction functions for the budget balance, while section 4.3 focuses on 
government expenditure. 
(iii)  Surpluses may be due to countryspecific factors that are not covered by our 
explanatory variables. If, e.g., the presence of oil would explain the emergence of 
surpluses in Norway, then one would expect this effect to be reflected in the 
country fixed effect of fiscal reaction functions. See section 4.4. 
 
A relevant issue is how to divide our sample into a surplus and a deficit group. In principle, 
there are two options. We can either select countries that have recorded surpluses or deficits 
over extended periods of time, or we can concentrate on the periods during which surpluses 
have been recorded. When grouping countries, we look at accumulated deficits, or 
government debt. In our baseline specification, we consider a country as ‘surplus’ if it is both 
among the 11 countries with lowest debt ratio in 2003, and among the 11 countries with the 
largest drop of the debt ratio between 1980 and 2003. If a country fails on both criteria, it is 
labelled ‘deficit’; if it fails on one, we consider it a doubtful case and therefore drop it from 
the sample.
9 Our alternative selection criterion labels the 11 countries with the lowest debt 
ratios in 2003 as surplus, and the other 11 as deficit.
10 When grouping periods, we take as 
alternative criteria the nominal, the cyclically-adjusted and the primary balance. When the 
budget is in surplus for at least 3 consecutive years, it is qualified as a surplus period. One and 
two years of surpluses are considered ‘coincidents’ and are dropped from the sample.  
                                                 
9 This yields the following division. Surplus countries are Australia, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, New 
Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. ‘Deficit countries’ are Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Japan and Portugal. Ambiguous cases excluded from the sample are Finland, Netherlands, Spain 
and the USA. 
10 This alternative criterion overlaps with the baseline criterion. In addition, the previously unclassified countries 
are now grouped as well: Spain and Finland are surplus countries, while the Netherlands and the USA are deficit 
countries.    84
Both countries and periods as the distinctive criterion have their pros and cons. The criterion 
based on surplus periods is closest to the idea of investigating what is different about surplus 
periods. However, the characteristics that establish surpluses do not necessarily coincide with 
the occurrence of actual surpluses. The ‘surplus characteristics’ we are looking for may 
already occur in the run-up to the actual surplus period. For example, one could argue that the 
USA started exhibiting surplus characteristics in the beginning of the 1990s. Actual surpluses 
did not occur until 1998. This illustrates that the run-up to a surplus can take a decade or 
longer. During surplus times on the other hand, a country may already be slowly gliding back 
into expansionary policy. To overcome the shortcomings of each indicator, and to check the 
robustness of our results, we use both countries and periods to group our sample.  
 
4.1  Surpluses and economic, political and institutional variables 
In order to test our first hypothesis of whether the values of our range of explanatory variables differ 
between surplus and deficit observations we use standard t-tests that are comlemented with 
nonparametric ranksum tests given that our variables are not normally distributed. In interpreting the 
results of these tests, it should be kept in mind that they do not indicate a direction of causality, as they 
simply measure whether averages differ between groups of observations. Results are reported in Table 1 
(distinguishing between surplus/deficit countries) and  
Table 2 (focusing on periods, and reporting results for the nominal balance, the cyclically-
adjusted balance and the primary balance). Overall, the tests confirm that economic, political 
and institutional variables all differ between surpluses and deficits, that these differences are 
mostly as theoretically predicted, and that they are statistically significant. We first discuss 
results that that are fairly robust across different indicators and methods, and then discuss 
variables that show more mixed results.  
The average debt ratio is much lower for surplus countries, which is a result of our grouping 
of countries based on debt ratios. The debt ratio is also lower for surplus periods, which 
suggests that surpluses are not primarily a reaction to high debt ratios. Turning to the results 
for political variables, it turns out that surplus countries are characterised by fewer spending 
ministers, a higher perception that corruption is under control, stronger expenditure rules and 
a higher degree of fiscal transparency. However, results for the institutional variables should 
be interpreted with care given the low number of observations available for these variables 
(see Annex 2; data on institutional variables generally lack a time dimension and are available 
for EU countries only).   85
Results for the output gap are statistically insignificant when focusing on surplus/deficit 
countries, but are significant for the distinction between surplus/deficit periods, with surpluses 
emerging in ‘good times’ (this results even holds for the cyclically-adjusted balance). 
Furthermore, surpluses are recorded by governments that are somewhat less rightwing
11, 
while political stability also seems to matter according to some of our indicators of 
surpluses/deficits (especially when focusing on the primary balance: the average number of 
government changes per year is 0.5 for surplus periods and 0.6 for deficit periods).  
In addition, we also investigated the variation over time of these variables, in order to see 
what changed by the end of the 1990s when surpluses were re-emerging. In this respect, the 
data show time variation in the economic and institutional variables, and much less variability 
in the political variables. At an aggregate level, the data indicate that by the end of the 1990s 
the output gap turned positive, interest rates had been on a declining trend for several years 
already, and an increase in fiscal rules and transparency took place. In order to investigate in 
detail why in some countries the upturn of the end of the 1990s translated into surpluses, 
while in others it did not, we now investigate how budgetary behaviour differs for surpluses 
and deficits.  
                                                 
11 See Annex 2 for the definition of the variable used for the ideological composition of the government.   86
Table 1 Do economical, political and institutional variables differ between surplus and deficit countries? 
Nominal balance (% GDP) 
Mean (n=number of 
observations) 
Variables 




Rank-sum test for 
(1)=(2) 
(p-value) 
Economic variables       















Political variables       



























Institutional variables       












Transparency according to Hallerberg 






Source: Calculations by the authors based on the data sources mentioned in Annex 2. 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2 Do economical political and institutional variables differ between surplus and deficit periods? 
Nominal balance (% GDP)  Cyclically-adjusted nominal balance 
(%GDP) 
Primary balance (%GDP) 
Mean, (n=number 
of observations) 
Mean, (n=number of 
observations) 

































































































































0.00*** 0.00*** 2.7(n=112)  2.4 
(n=516) 


























































































Source: Calculations by the authors based on the data sources mentioned in Annex 2. 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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4.2 Surpluses and budgetary behaviour: evidence from fiscal 
reaction functions 
We now turn to the question whether the impact of explanatory variables may differ for 
deficits and surpluses. Econometrically, this translates to the question whether the intercept 
and the coefficients of explanatory variables differ in an augmented fiscal reaction function. 
The baseline specification of the function is:  
t i i t i t i t i z x b , , , , ' ' ε η γ β α + + + + = , t=1,…,T, i=1,…,N, 
with t denoting time and i countries. b is the nominal balance as a share of GDP, x is a vector 
of standard explanatory variables (lagged dependent variable, output gap, lagged government 
debt ratio, lagged long term interest rate and dependency ratio), z is a vector of political and 
institutional explanatory variables and η represents the country fixed effects. We want to 
determine the coefficients β and γ by estimating the above equation for both deficit and 
surplus countries/periods. We do this by introducing a dummy D that takes the value 1 for 
surplus observations and is 0 otherwise. We can then combine the equations for deficits and 
surpluses by estimating the following single equation:
12  
t i i d s t i d t i d s t i d t i t i s d t i Dz z Dx x D b , , , , , , , ) ( )' ( ' ) ( )' ( ' ε η γ γ γ β β β α α + + − + + − + + + =
, t=1,…,T, 
i=1,…,N, 
with subscript d indicating the coefficient for deficit observations, and subscript s denoting 
surplus observations. For every variable, the coefficient βd of the uninteracted variable can be 
interpreted as applicable to deficit observations, while for surpluses, the coefficients of the 
normal and interacted variables (βd and βs) should be added up. Similar reasoning applies to 
the intercept α.
13 
                                                 
12 Econometrically, this is the same as estimating separate regressions for surplus and deficit observations. 
13 Note that separate intercepts αs and αd can only be calculated when using surplus periods as a criterion. When 
using countries as a criterion, αs cannot be estimated, as it is collinear with the country fixed effects. Any 
common differences in the intercept among surplus countries therefore show in the country fixed effects, which 
are discussed in section 4.4.   89
We estimate the reaction function using standard IV fixed effects, which is the method used in 
the majority of studies in this field.
14 Given that especially for the institutional variables 
insufficient observations were available, they could unfortunately not be included in the 
regression. Our sample covers the years 1975 to 2003. The first column of table Table 3 
presents the baseline regression, with no distinction being made between surpluses and 
deficits. Column 2 introduces interaction variables, showing separate coefficients for deficit 
and surplus countries. A significant interaction coefficient indicates that the impact of the 
variable concerned differs between deficit and surplus countries. Column 3 shows the result 
with the primary balance as dependent variable. To test robustness for our baseline country 
selection criterion, we use our alternative criterion in column 4. Column 5 shows the results 
when distinguishing periods instead of countries. 
The coefficients have the expected sign. Looking at the sample as a whole (column 1), the 
output gap is positively correlated with the nominal balance, reflecting the cyclical sensitivity 
of the budget.
15 The lagged debt ratio has a positive coefficient, in line with the intertemporal 
budget constraint. Distinguishing deficit and surplus countries (column 2), our main result is 
that differences in budgetary behaviour between surpluses and deficits are related to the 
‘fundamentals’ of fiscal policy: the sustainability and stabilisation motives.  
The lagged debt ratio turns out to be more important in surplus countries: the higher this ratio, 
the higher the budget balance. This suggests a stronger role of sustainability considerations in 
surplus countries. This result should not surprise us however, since the criterion used to select 
surplus countries is partly based on the debt development over time. When selecting surplus 
countries based only on the debt level at the end of the sample (column 4), this result is no 
longer significant. 
It also turns out that the coefficient of the output gap is not significant in deficit countries. 
With full automatic stabilisation, we would expect a positive correlation between the output 
                                                 
14 As noted by Gáli and Perotti (2003) and the European Commission (2004b), this method would yield 
inconsistent estimates in a dynamic panel setup because of the lagged endogenous variable on the right-hand 
side. For sample sizes of about T=25 and N=20 as we have, the bias in the estimates of the other independent 
variables, on which we focus, is typically small. Moreover, Gáli and Perotti note that small sample properties of 
the consistent estimators that have been proposed in the literature are not well understood. 
15 The output gap is likely to be endogenous to contemporaneous budgetary policy. We therefore instrument it 
using its own lags and lagged real GDP growth rates.    90
gap and the (cyclically unadjusted) balance. Interestingly, for surplus countries, we do find 
this expected positive coefficient. This suggests that deficit countries tend to have procyclical 
fiscal policies, using budgetary room available in cyclical upturns and implementing fiscal 
austerity measures in downturns, while in surplus countries automatic stabilisers are allowed 
to operate more freely. The stabilisation motive thus appears more important in surplus 
countries. We do not find a difference in cyclical policy between surplus and deficit periods 
(column 5). This suggests that the importance of the stabilisation motive is a longer-term 
property of fiscal policy. 
Finally, it should be noted that the impact of political variables does not differ significantly 
between surpluses and deficits (although, as shown in section 4.1, the values do differ).
16 
 
                                                 
16 In addition, we included dummies for EU countries for the years 1993-1998, and 1999-2003, capturing the 
effects of EU fiscal rules and the Stability and Growth Pact. None of these dummies proved significant.   91
Table 3 Does the impact of political and institutional variables differ between surpluses and deficits? 












          
Lagged dependent variable  0.74***  0.84***  0.81***  0.82***  0.66*** 
  (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.041) (0.034) 
Output gap  0.21**  -0.061  0.0073  0.0016  0.11** 
  (0.089) (0.078) (0.078) (0.068) (0.049) 
Lagged debt ratio  0.017**  0.0058  0.015*  0.0093  0.013*** 
  (0.0069) (0.0073) (0.0076) (0.0068) (0.0049) 
Lagged long interest rate  -0.047  -0.091**  0.027  -0.076*  -0.081*** 
  (0.034) (0.045) (0.044) (0.041) (0.030) 
Dependency ratio  -0.16**  -0.063  -0.12  -0.043  -0.030 
  (0.069) (0.090) (0.089) (0.079) (0.058) 
Years left in current term  0.063  0.13  0.11  0.12  0.094 
  (0.057) (0.082) (0.080) (0.072) (0.058) 
Number of spending ministers  -0.088**  -0.11***  -0.089**  -0.11***  -0.10*** 
  (0.040) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.031) 
Surplus         0.44 
         (2.30) 
Surplus*Lagged dependent variable    -0.18***  -0.16***  -0.18***  -0.12* 
    (0.065) (0.063) (0.059) (0.071) 
Surplus*Output  gap    0.35*** 0.30*** 0.30***  0.0064 
   (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.087)  (0.10) 
Surplus*Lagged debt ratio    0.022*  0.036***  0.011  -0.0073 
    (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.0093) 
Surplus*Lagged long interest rate    0.0044  -0.061  -0.035  0.0065 
    (0.066) (0.064) (0.059) (0.071) 
Surplus*Dependency ratio    -0.22  -0.11  -0.14  0.0099 
   (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.068) 
Surplus*Years left in current term    -0.13  -0.13  -0.047  -0.16 
   (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.14) 
Surplus*Number of spending ministers  0.053  0.036  0.063  0.13** 
    (0.082) (0.081) (0.073) (0.052) 
          
Surplus selection criterion  n.a.  Countries Countries  Countries  (alt)  Periods 
Number  of  observations  435 426 425 531 522 
Number  of  countries  18 18 18 22 22 
Source: Calculations by the authors based on the data sources mentioned in Annex 2. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
Other controls always included: Constant and country fixed effects. Output gap instrumented using lagged output gap and 
lagged real GDP growth. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
4.3  Surpluses and expenditure policy 
The conjecture of a stronger cyclical response of the budget balance in surplus countries 
deserves closer examination. As procyclical policy is conducted mainly on the expenditure 
side of the budget (Alesina and Tabellini, 2005;European Commission, 2006b), we focus on 
spending. During cyclical upturns, revenues boom and the budget balance improves so that 
possibly a surplus emerges. These are the times when the budgetary framework of a country is   92
put to the test: can pressures to spend the inflowing money be resisted (so that a possibly a 
surplus is maintained), or does expenditure growth follow revenues? If our conjecture is 
correct, we would observe a stronger relationship between revenue and expenditure growth in 
deficit countries than in surplus countries. We therefore estimate the following equation: 
 




with g denoting real growth of government expenditure, x a vector of standard explanatory 
variables (output gap, government revenue growth at different lags, lagged government debt 
ratio, lagged long term interest rate, and dependency ratio), z  a vector of political and 
institutional explanatory variables, with subscript d  indicating the coefficient for deficit 
observations, and subscript s denoting surplus observations. All real variables have been 
deflated using the GDP deflator. Results are presented in Table 4. When evaluating the 
undivided sample (column 1), expenditure and revenue growth are correlated. Splitting the 
sample (column 2) reveals an interesting difference. In deficit countries, expenditure growth 
co-moves with simultaneous revenue growth.
17 Interestingly, the coefficients of revenue 
growth and interacted revenue growth roughly cancel each other out. This means that in 
surplus countries, there is no clear co-movement between revenue and expenditure growth.
18 
A second difference between deficit and surplus countries is the political budget cycle. 
Theory predicts accelerating expenditure growth over the government period. Indeed, the (ex 
ante) number of years left in the current term has a negative coefficient for deficit countries. 
                                                 
17 Simultaneous revenue growth may be endogenous and is therefore instrumented using the lagged output gap 
and lagged real GDP growth. 
18 The interacted coefficient of real government revenue growth is not significant. A Wald-test however does not 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of revenue growth and of interacted revenue growth add up to zero. As 
a robustness check, we have re-estimated the regression using a sample of only surplus countries. In that case, 
the coefficient of real government revenue growth is negative and insignificant. Moreover, column 3 shows that 
using our alternative country selection criterion, the interacted coefficient is  significant. These findings 
corroborate the absence of (positive) co-movement of revenue and expenditure in surplus countries.    93
In surplus countries on the other hand, we find no evidence of a political budget cycle-effect 
related to the years left in office.
19 
                                                 
19 In fact, the coefficients of the normal and interacted Years left in the current term (YRCURNT) more than 
cancel out. A Wald-test does not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of YRCURNT and of YRCURNT 
times DUMSURP add up to zero. Alternatively, in a sample of surplus countries only, YRCURNT has a positive 
but insignificant coefficient.   94
 
Table 4 The determinants of expenditure growth 










      
Real government revenue growth  0.22*  0.38**  0.33**  0.19* 
  (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.10) 
Lagged real govt revenue growth  0.029  0.069  0.047  0.014 
  (0.047) (0.069) (0.060) (0.046) 
Two period lagged real govt revenue growth  0.10**  0.072  0.093  0.088** 
  (0.044) (0.067) (0.058) (0.043) 
Lagged  debt  ratio  -0.056*** -0.039*** -0.042*** -0.064*** 
 (0.0080)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.0075) 
Dependency  0.10 0.22 0.20  0.046 
  (0.12) (0.18) (0.15) (0.11) 
Years left in current term  -0.11  -0.35**  -0.28**  -0.13 
  (0.12) (0.16) (0.14) (0.11) 
Number  of  spending  ministers  0.18*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.17*** 
  (0.064) (0.076) (0.071) (0.060) 
Surplus      -2.98 
      (4.61) 
Surplus*Real government revenue growth    -0.37  -0.37**  -0.40 
    (0.23) (0.19) (0.27) 
Surplus*Lagged real govt revenue growth    -0.054  -0.019  0.11 
   (0.095)  (0.082)  (0.10) 
Surplus*Two period lagged real govt revenue growth  0.066  0.069  0.19* 
    (0.091) (0.079) (0.099) 
Surplus*Lagged debt ratio    -0.047**  -0.044***  0.00069 
    (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) 
Surplus*Dependency   -0.095  -0.12  0.11 
    (0.26) (0.22) (0.13) 
Surplus*Years left in current term    0.61**  0.41*  0.18 
    (0.25) (0.22) (0.27) 
Surplus*Number of spending ministers    0.063  0.036  -0.076 
   (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.097) 
       
Surplus selection criterion  n.a.  Countries 
Countries 
(alt) Periods 
Method of estimation  LS FE  LS FE  LS FE  LS FE 
Number  of  observations  456 456 561 551 
Number  of  countries  18 18 22 22 
Source: Calculations by the authors based on the data sources mentioned in Annex 2. Notes: Standard errors 
in parentheses. Other controls always included: Constant and country fixed effects. Real government revenue 
growth instrumented using lagged output gap and real GDP growth. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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4.4  Surpluses and countryspecific factors 
In the previous sections, we have shown that both the value and the impact of some 
explanatory variables indeed differ between surpluses and deficits. In addition, it may be that 
surpluses can be explained by countryspecific factors that are not covered by our variables. 
We investigate this by looking at the dispersion of the country fixed effects (CFEs) within the 
group of surplus countries that result from the regressions of section 4.2. The CFEs capture 
remaining country-specific variation that is constant over time. An F-test formally 
investigates the null-hypothesis that fixed effects are equal for all surplus countries (Greene, 
2003).  
Results as reported in Table 5 (upper two lines) strongly reject the hypothesis of equality for 
both our selections of surplus countries. This suggests that in addition to different values and 
coefficients of the variables in our regressions, there countryspecific factors at play. Upon 
closer examination, two countries have clearly different CFEs: Finland and Norway. For 
Finland this may be due to the public sector pension fund within the public sector, while 
public finances in Norway benefit from oil revenues. Leaving out these two countries, CFEs 
do not differ significantly anymore (Table 5, lower two lines).  
 
Table 5 F-test that all CFEs are the same 
Selection criterion  Countries  p-value 
Countries, baseline  9  0.00 
Countries, alternative  11  0.00 
    
Countries, baseline excluding NOR  8  0.16 
Countries, alternative excluding FIN and NOR  9  0.32 
Source: Calculations by the authors based on the regressions with 
interaction variables, columns 2 and 4 of table 4. 
 
 
5  Findings and policy implications 
In this paper, we have investigated why surpluses emerged in some countries but not in 
others. In investigating how an increasing number of countries have succeeded in overcoming 
the fiscal deficit bias, we have focused on the role of a wide range of economic, political and 
institutional variables that have been highlighted in the literature. Three complementary 
hypotheses have been formulated, asking (i) whether the level of explanatory variables is   96
different for surpluses and deficits; (ii) whether the impact of explanatory variables differs for 
surpluses and deficits, and (iii) whether countryspecific factors play a role in explaining why 
some countries have recorded surpluses while others have not. Results confirm the relevance 
of all three hypotheses. Concerning the level of our explanatory variables, results show that 
surpluses coincided with fewer spending ministers, a high perception that corruption is under 
control, stronger expenditure rules and more transparent fiscal policies. Regarding the impact 
of explanatory variables, we find that revenue fluctuations lead to a procyclical response in 
spending in deficit countries whereas this effect is absent in surplus countries. Moreover, the 
political budget cycle seems present in deficit countries but not in surplus countries. With 
respect to countryspecific factors, results show that not all the differences in budgetary 
outcomes between countries can be explained by the explanatory variables that we have 
included in our estimations.  
Overall, our paper shows that cross-country differences in the values of political and 
institutional variables coincide with fundamental differences in budgetary behaviour. As a 
possible avenue for future research, more insight in the underlying mechanisms that drive 
these differences would be welcome. Finally, results as presented in Annex 1 show that cross 
country differences in expected expenditure pressures due to ageing populations cannot 
explain why surpluses emerged in some countries but not in others. Therefore, the current 
policy discussion on the perceived need to move towards budgetary surpluses in many 
countries may need to include the underlying political-institutional setting in which the advice 
needs to be implemented. 
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Annex 1. Surpluses and future expenditure pressures 
Our quest for the surplus factor (why surpluses re-emerged in some countries but not in 
others) has been motivated by the strong emphasis on budgetary surpluses in the context of 
discussions on the long-term sustainability of public finances. We therefore develop a simple 
benchmark model of a social planner that may help to explain the emphasis by policy makers 
on surpluses at the current juncture and test its empirical implication.  
 
A1.1 A simple benchmark model 
Long-term sustainability assessments, as those produced by the European Commission, 
typically contain a time horizon up to 2050, so that the planning horizon in our model should 
not be infinite. We capture this element by including two periods. During the first period, 
expenditure pressures are not yet materialising, while during the second period target 
expenditure increases due to the effects of ageing. We use the basic set-up of the model from 
Von Hagen and Harden (1994) and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) and add the element of future 
increases in public expenditure due to the costs of ageing. 
In the two-period model, the government minimises a convex loss function that is increasing 
in the level of taxation T and in deviations of spending G from its desired level G
*. In order to 
limit the model to the essential features, it is assumed that the government does not discount 
the future so that the real interest rate equals zero. The crucial variable here is α that reflects 
the increase in target expenditure in the second period (e.g. due to an increase in the number 
of pensioners and in health expenditure). The case where α>1 reflects increasing expenditure 
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The government minimises this loss function subject to the budget constraint 
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Minimising with respect to G1 and G2 and simultaneously setting the derivatives to zero gives 
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The main implication of the model is shown in Figure 2 that plots expenditure and taxation in 
both periods as a function of α. If α=1 (i.e. target expenditure in period 1 equals target 
expenditure in period 2), the government runs a balanced budget in both periods. Higher 
future expenditure pressures (α>1), on the other hand, imply a higher budgetary surplus in 
period 1 (as measured by the difference between expenditure in period 1 and the constant 
level of taxation), a higher deficit in period 2, and a higher overall level of taxation in both 
periods.  
Figure 2. Expenditure and taxes as a function of future expenditures 
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A1.2 Evidence for EU countries 
The implication of this normative model is that surpluses should be higher in countries with 
stronger future expenditure pressures from ageing populations. This hypothesis can be tested 
for EU countries by using data on expenditure pressures from (Economic Policy Committee, 
2001) for the period 2000-2005.  
Results on the basis of standard t-tests and nonparametrive ranksum tests are reported in 
Table 6, while using different indicators of surpluses (i.e. the nominal balance, the primary   99
balance and the cyclically-adjusted balance).
20,21 Results show that average expenditure 
pressures are actually lower for countries and periods where surpluses were recorded, but the 
difference is not statistically significant. In order to account for differences in initial positions 
between countries, such as debt levels and budgetary strategies, Figure 3 also shows the 
correlation between Required Primary Surpluses as calculated by European Commission 
(2004, 2005) as part of its sustainability assessments and actual primary surpluses. The Figure 
confirms that there is no correlation between the perceived need to run surpluses in different 
countries and the occurrence of surpluses in actual policies. Hence, there are no indications 
that, by itself, increasing awareness on the perceived need to move towards surpluses can 
explain why some EU countries have moved towards budgetary surpluses while others have 
not.
22 
Table 6 Are future spending pressures higher for surplus countries? 
Nominal balance (% GDP)  Cyclically-adjusted nominal balance 
(%GDP) 

















































































Source: see annex 2 
Notes: data restricted to last decade. 
                                                 
20 Standard tests rejected the assumption of normally disturbed variables; therefore results from the t-tests are 
complemented with results from nonparametrive ranksum tests. 
21 Ranksum tests the hypothesis that two independent samples (i.e., unmatched data) are from populations with 
the same distribution using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, which is also known as the Mann-Whitney two-sample 
statistic. 
22 In addition, we also included indicators of future expenditure pressures and required primary surpluses in the 
fiscal reaction functions as presented in Section 4.2. Results confirm that the impact is not statistically 
significant.   100
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Source: Required Primary Balance is taken from European Commission (2004a) and (2005); Primary balance: OECD Economic Outlook.  
Note: data are for 2004 and 2005. 
 
Annex 2. Data sources 
Data on budgetary and economic variables are taken from the OECD Economic Outlook 
database. Our sample covers the years 1970 until 2005 and includes the following countries: 
Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Switzerland (CHE), 
Germany (GER), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), United 
Kingdom (GBR), Greece (GRC), Ireland (IRL), Iceland (ISL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), 
Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), New Zealand (NZL), Portugal (PRT), Sweden (SWE), 
United States (USA).  
Institutional variables are from a range of sources as indicated in Table 7. As can be seen, data 
availability is limited for the institutional variables, especially concerning the variation over 
time. As a consequence, these variables could not be included in panel regressions over longer 
periods.   101
Table 7 Political and institutional variables: data availability and sources 




Data availability  Source 
NSM: Number of spending ministers  Yes  All countries in sample, 
1970-2003, but shorter 
period for ESP (1977-
2003), GRC (1975-2003), 
ISL (1980-2003) and PRT 
(1977-2003) 
Mierau et al. (2006), except for ISL and 
CHE: 1980-1998, own calculations 
based on Woldendorp et al. (2000) and 
1999-2004: own calculations based on 
various editions of Yearbook of 
European Journal of Political Research. 
Data for  
 
GOVCHAN: Number of government 
changes per year 
Yes  All countries in sample 
1970-2003, but shorter 
period for ESP (1977-
2003), GRC (1974-2003) 
and PRT (1976-2003)  
Armingeon et al (2005) 
 
ICG: Cabinet composition (Schmidt-
Index): (1) hegemony of rightwing parties 
(gov_left=0), (2) dominance of rightwing 
(and centre) parties (gov_left<33.3), (3) 
patt between left and right 
(33.3<gov_left<66.6), (4) dominance of 
socialdemocratic and other left parties 
(gov_left>66.6), (5) hegemony of 
socialdemocratic and other left parties 
(gov_left=100). 
Yes  All countries in sample 
1970-2003, but shorter 
period for ESP (1977-
2003), GRC (1974-2003) 
and PRT (1976-2003) 
Armingeon et al. (2005) 
 
ELECT: Dummy; 1 if elections in 
SECOND half of year t OR FIRST half of 
t+1.  
Yes  All countries in sample 
1970-2003 
Own calculations based on Armingeon 
et al. (2005) 
YRCURNT: Years left in current term 
(only full years are counted. Thus, a “0” is 
scored in an election year, and n-1 in the 
year after an election, where n=length of 
term). 
Yes  All countries in sample, 
1975-2004, but shorter 
period for ESP (1978-
2004), FIN (1976-2004), 
ITA (1976-2004) and PRT 
(1976-2004) 
Beck et al. (2001) 
 
CORRCONTR: Control of corruption, 
measuring the exercise of public power for 
private gain. 
Yes  All countries in sample, 
1996-2004 
Kaufman et al. (2005) 
EXPRULE: Index measuring the strength 
of the design of the expenditure rule. 
No time 
variability  
Data available for GER, 
DNK, FIN, FRA, GBR, 
GRC, NLD and SWE, 
1998-2005( 
Deroose et al. (2006) 




All countries in sample 
except ESP, GRC and 
PRT. Data for year 1999; 
assumed coverage is 1997-
2001. 
Alt and Lassen (2006) 
TRANSPH: index number for EU 
Countries 
Time variability 
consists of two 
observations 
(1991 and 2001) 
Data available for AUT, 
BEL, GER, DNK, ESP, 
FIN, FRA, GBR, GRC, 
IRL, ITA, NLD, PRT, 
SWE. Assumed coverage 
is 1980-2004 
Von Hagen (1992) and Hallerberg et al. 
(2001) 
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1. Introduction 
The past two decades have seen a strong and growing interest in fiscal policy rules aimed at 
containing public sector deficits and reducing public sector debts. Fiscal policy rules specify 
numerical targets for annual government deficits, debts, or spending. They have a venerable 
history at the sub-national level, and some countries have used less specific ones – such as the 
‘golden rule’ that limits annual government borrowing to investment spending - at the national 
level for a long time. What is new is the application of specific annual targets at the national 
level. The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact establish a European fiscal 
framework based on fiscal rules expressed as deficit and debt limits which national 
governments are expected to follow.  
This interest in fiscal rules is a reaction to the experience in many countries of rapidly rising 
debt levels and unsustainable deficits in the 1970s and 1980s. But while rules seem attractive 
and straightforward to contain the spending and borrowing bias of profligate governments, it is 
by no means clear what institutional design they need and how they should be embedded into 
the government budgeting process to be effective. In the EU, all member states face the same 
fiscal  policy framework, but there is considerable variation in the budgeting institutions at the 
national level. This variation is due to characteristics of the political and, in particular, the 
electoral systems. In this paper, we analyse the impact of fiscal rules on the sustainability of 
public finances with a focus on the interaction between rules and budgeting processes. 
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) show that European governments have developed two types 
of budget processes promoting fiscal discipline. Under the “delegation” approach, the budget 
process lends special agenda-setting powers in the preparation of the budget to the minister of 
finance. Under the “contract” approach, in contrast, the budget process hinges on pre-
established, numerical budgetary targets negotiated among key policy-makers. This approach 
strongly resembles the characteristics of a fiscal rule and, at a first glance, it is more compatible 
with the design of the European fiscal framework than the delegation approach. As a result, the 
European framework may be less effective in countries whose budget process is shaped by the 
delegation approach. Furthermore, Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) argue that the differences 
between these two approaches reflect countries’ basic political characteristics such as party and 
electoral systems, implying that the two are not easily interchangeable for a given country. 
Countries which typically have one-party governments or coalitions of closely aligned parties 
are more likely to adopt the delegation approach, while countries which typically have more 
dispersed coalition governments are more likely to adopt the contract approach. This suggests  107
that differences in the effectiveness of the European fiscal framework could be a permanent 
feature of the European Monetary Union and changes in this framework might be needed to 
achieve an equal degree of fiscal discipline in the EU. 
In this paper we extend the analysis in Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999). We start with a 
characterization of the budgetary institutions at the start of Stage III of EMU and their 
evolution over the past decade using a new institutional data set. We show that there is a 
correspondence between the choice of budgeting processes and national political systems in 
line with our theoretical predictions. Several states which we expect to adopt the delegation 
approach given their political systems did develop stronger budgeting institutions most 
consistent with this approach during the 1990s. At the same time, countries we expect to adopt 
the contract approach strengthened the contracting elements of their budgeting rules. Next, we 
explore the effect of these institutions with respect to the growth of public debt. As expected, 
delegation in budgeting procedures and more stringent fiscal rules both contribute to fiscal 
discipline. Moreover, more stringent fiscal rules work in countries with dispersed government 
coalitions, whereas delegation is effective only in states with single party governments or 
closely aligned coalitions. The punchline is that both the delegation and contract approaches 
provide effective instruments to increase fiscal discipline so long as they match the pre-existing 
government structure.  
The following section presents the theoretical background. Section 3 describes the existing 
government structures. Section 4 explains which budgeting institution determines the 
stringency of fiscal rules or targets and the degree of delegation in the budget process and how 
these institutions developed in EU member states. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence on 
the impact of budgetary institutions on public indebtedness.   
2.  Fiscal governance: Types and choices 
2.1.  Types of fiscal governance 
A growing body of empirical and theoretical literature suggests that the institutions governing 
the budget process are important determinants of a country’s fiscal performance (von Hagen 
1992, von Hagen and Harden, 1994; see also the international contributions in Poterba and von 
Hagen, 1999, and Strauch and von Hagen, 2000). Budgeting institutions encompass the formal 
and informal rules governing the drafting of the budget law, its passage through the legislature, 
and its implementation. These rules distribute strategic influence among the participants in the  108
budget process and regulate the flow of information. In doing so, they have important effects 
on the outcomes of budgeting processes. 
The starting point of this analysis is to recognize the externality resulting from the fact that 
government spending is commonly targeted at specific groups in society while it is financed 
from a general tax fund to which all tax-payers contribute. The incongruence between those 
who pay for, and those who benefit from, individual public policies means that individual 
spending bids tend to recognize the full benefit of additional spending but only a part of their 
additional social cost. Policymakers engage in excessive spending, since the constituencies 
they represent do not bear the full costs of these programs. In a dynamic context, the 
externality problem also results in excessive deficits and debts.1 The tendency to spend more 
and to run large deficits increases with the number of representatives of individual spending 
interests that make autonomous spending decisions. The more representatives with policy-
making power, the greater the fragmentation of the budget process.2 
The core of this argument is that public budgeting involves a co-ordination failure among the 
relevant decision makers. The key to solving this co-ordination failure is to create institutional 
incentives that induce decision-makers to take a more comprehensive view of the budget. They 
then recognize the true marginal costs and benefits of the projects financed from the general 
tax fund, and they consequently internalize the budgeting externality.  Hallerberg and von 
Hagen (1999, see also Hallerberg, 2004) show that there are two basic institutional approaches 
to achieve that: the delegation approach and the contract approach. The delegation approach  
rests on the delegation of significant strategic powers to a decision-maker who is less bound to 
special interests than ministers heading spending departments and more prone to consider the 
budget comprehensively. In European governments, this is typically the minister of finance. 
More specifically, the delegation approach gives the finance minister strong agenda-setting 
powers over the other members of the executive during the initial budget planning stage. At the 
subsequent approval stage in parliament, the approach lends strong agenda-setting powers to 
the executive over the legislature to protect the finance minister’s budget proposal against 
significant parliamentary amendments. In the final implementation stage, the delegation 
                                                      
1   For a text book presentation of the problem see Persson and Tabellini (2000: chapters 7 and 13). Dynamic 
versions are presented in von Hagen and Harden (1994), Velasco (1999) and Hallerberg and von Hagen 
(1999). 
2   Since the most important representatives of individual spending interests in European governments are the 
individual spending ministers, an implication of this proposition is that government spending and deficits grow 
with the number of spending departments and ministers in a country’s government. Kontopoulos and Perotti 
(1999) and Volkerink and de Haan (2001) confirm this proposition empirically for OECD countries, although 
results vary across sample periods.  109
approach vests the finance minister with strong monitoring capacities in the implementation of 
the budget and the power to correct any deviations from the budget plan.  
The contract approach, in contrast, rests on an agreement among the relevant parties at the start 
of the budgeting process. Such agreements provide a medium-term orientation for fiscal policy 
and include numerical targets for specific budget items. This contractual institutionalisation of 
fiscal targets resembles elements of fiscal rules. Here, it is bargaining among policy makers 
that encourages a comprehensive view of the budget and leads to centralization of the process 
(von Hagen and Harden, 1994). In contrast to his role under delegation, the minister of finance 
in this case monitors and enforces the fiscal contract but has little power at the planning stage 
of the budget. At the approval stage in parliament, the legislature has strong information rights, 
which enable it to monitor the executive’s compliance with the budgetary targets and the 
performance of individual ministries. At the implementation stage, the contract approach 
resembles the delegation approach. It vests the finance minister with strong monitoring 
capacities regarding the execution of the budget and the power to correct deviations from it. 
2.2.  Political determinants of the type of fiscal governance 
The existence of two institutional approaches, delegation and contracts, raises the question 
which one is more appropriate to address the externality problem of the budget process in a 
given country. Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) argue that each approach is suitable for a 
particular type of government. Delegation is the proper approach for single-party governments, 
while contracts is the proper approach for coalition governments. In this paper, we extend their 
argument and focus on the ideological distance and level of political competition among the 
parties that formulate the budget in government and pass it in parliament. We assume that 
ideological distance and political competition is zero or small between members of the same 
party. Between parties, both of these measures can be small or large. This leads to the 
following proposition: delegation is the proper approach for governments where the ideological 
distance and political competition among budget decision-makers is small. Contracts is most 
appropriate when either distance or political competition is large.  
A first reason for our classification concerns under what circumstances political parties will 
agree to delegate effective power to a finance minister. Such a minister necessarily comes from 
one of the coalition parties, and vesting him with special authorities raises concerns among the 
other parties about a fair treatment of their spending preferences in the budget process. These 
concerns are likely to increase with increasing ideological dispersion of the government and  110
increasing competition among the parties in coalition for votes. Furthermore, enforcement of 
the finance minister’s budget proposal under the delegation approach ultimately depends on the 
ability of the head of the executive to remove recalcitrant spending ministers from office. This 
power may exist in single-party governments, where the hierarchy in cabinet conforms to the 
hierarchy of party power structures. It may also exist in coalitions of closely aligned partners 
that cannot continue in power without each other, such as the coalitions common in Germany 
and France and, for an extended period of time, in Austria. But this power does not usually 
exist in multi-party coalition governments where alternative coalitions are possible and the 
right to nominate candidates for (and remove them from) specific posts belongs to individual 
coalition parties.  
A second reason is that it is harder for single-party governments to commit to fiscal targets, 
since there is no effective threat against reneging on them and the executive can simply walk 
away from targets deemed no longer convenient. In contrast, as long as there are alternative 
possible coalition partners in the opposition, the threat to break up the coalition is an effective 
one for enforcing budget targets in ideologically dispersed multi-party governments. The risk 
of such a step increases for those cases where a break-up in the government leads to a general 
election. Furthermore, multi-party coalition governments have a stronger incentive to negotiate 
multi-annual fiscal targets or rules at the start of a government to avoid having to renegotiate 
the fiscal policy stance annually, which may be politically costly if the ideological constellation 
within the government is rather complex. Continued budgetary struggles distract from the 
operational functions of the government and may hamper the effective implementation of 
policies.  
The preceding discussion focuses on decision-making within cabinet and implicitly assumes 
that passage of the budget is then more or less automatic through parliament. While this may 
be reasonable for majority governments in West European parliamentary democracies, there 
have been several minority governments in these countries as well. Can the analysis be 
extended to minority cases? The question to ask is, what is the ideological distance among 
parties needed to pass the annual budget, and will those parties likely compete for votes in 
future elections? In practice, the distance is often large, but even more crucially almost by 
definition the parties will be competing with one another for votes in the next elections. and 
This indicates that fiscal contracts are most appropriate provide the needed centralization of the 
budget process. The only difference with the majority case is that the “contract” is agreed to  111
between one or more opposition parties and the government rather than among only the 
coalition partners, as is done today in Denmark and in Sweden. 
3.  Electoral systems and party constellations in government in European countries 
Party constellations in parliament and government that affect the choice of fiscal governance 
are, in turn, closely linked to the electoral system. One important feature of electoral systems is 
the number of parties that win seats in parliament. If there are few parties, there is a higher 
chance that one party can win an absolute majority, and an absolute majority is a virtual 
certainty in two-party systems. Several studies indicate that the number of parties in a given 
system is strongly and positively correlated with the number of representatives elected from 
each electoral district, known as district magnitude (Duverger 1954, Taagepera and Shugart 
1989, 1993). Electoral systems with low district magnitudes distribute seats less proportionally 
than those with large district magnitudes, and lower proportionality usually favours larger 
parties. Plurality systems, which elect only one representative per district, encourage two-party 
systems, and they are consequently most likely to have one-party majority governments. 
Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems have more variation in their district 
magnitudes, though the magnitudes are always larger than those found in plurality systems. PR 
systems tend to result in more parties in parliament and multiparty majority or either one-party 
or multi-party minority governments. Other factors that affect the number of parties 
represented in parliament include minimum-vote thresholds requiring to gain a certain 
percentage of the national vote for a party to win any legislative seats, the method used to 
apportion seats, and whether or not a second allocation of seats is used to reduce disparities at 
the district level. 
Table 1 compares the electoral systems and types of governments in EU member states. The 
first column describes the key characteristics of the electoral system, and the second column 
the district magnitude. The following columns present indicators for the dispersion of 
preferences and the competitiveness of the government formation stage for period 1980 to 
2000. The first is the average number of parties in government. The figures show that there is a 
strong, but not perfect, correlation between the district magnitude and the number of parties a 
suggested by the theory. Plurality systems and proportional systems with low district 
magnitudes tend to lead to one-party governments. As district magnitude increases, the 
relationship between district magnitude and the number of parties in government is more 
tenuous for European countries. Other factors, such as traditional party structures or the main  112
political cleavages in the party system, become more important.  Belgium and Italy (before 
1996) have the maximum average number of parties in government in our sample with 4.5 and 
4.2, respectively. 
Our second indicator, the change in coalition of ruling parties as a share of the total number of 
new governments, is an indicator of the competitiveness of the electoral and government 
formation process. There are different reasons for the termination of governments, elections 
being the most important one. However, the government formation process may not be very 
competitive if there are clearly established party blocks and parties continue in power for 
decades. Conversely, coalition governments may frequently reshuffle and the government 
formation process may be relatively uncertain ex-ante. The data indicate that there is not a 
perfect relationship between the number of parties in government and the competitiveness of 
the government formation process. For example, Belgium has a large number of parties in 
government and a relatively competitive process. By comparison, governing coalitions in Italy 
are large, but also fairly stable during the 1980s to the mid-1990s. In Ireland, there are a small 
number of parties in government, but these change rather frequently after the end of a term or 
the breakdown of a coalition. The fifth column then shows the ideological range of a governing 
coalition. This and the previous indicators are taken from Tsebelis’ dataset on veto players.3 
The ideological indicator captures the classic left-right dimension.  
The sixth column presents a proxy for political competition among parties that reach 
government. Nadenichek Golder (2005) provides data on the frequency with which pre-
electoral pacts are common among political parties running for office. The idea is that, if there 
are regular pacts among parties, political competition is low between them (although it remains 
high, of course, with their opponents). In Germany, for example, there were electoral pacts in 
13 of the 14 elections held in the post-war period through 1998. This meant that a voter 
generally knew which government would form if the parties making the pact won the election. 
This also means that the parties in government have a stake in having the whole government 
succeed in fiscal matters. It is easier in this case to delegate powers to a strong finance 
minister. In contrast, in a country like Finland pre-electoral pacts are rare events. The shape of 
a coalition is first discernable after an election. Parties have every incentive to differentiate 
themselves from one another to voters. Delegating powers to a strong finance minister is not in 
the interest of the coalition partners. 
                                                      
3   See Table A1 in the appendix for details. 
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The final column then indicates which type of fiscal governance we would expect to be most 
adequate to achieve fiscal discipline. Recall that our argument is that countries with low 
ideological distance among parties needed to pass the budget and with low political 
competition should be appropriate for delegation-type fiscal procedures. Concerning 
ideological distance, the average score is helpful in categorizing some cases—the United 
Kindgom has an average of 0, indicating only one-party majority governments—but averages 
for others can be deceiving. A country with high ideological distance in the first half of the 
period but zero in the second half would have an ambiguous ideological score, but should be 
coded as being appropriate for contracts in the first half and delegation in the second half.  
To follow the patterns of ideological distance over time, Graph 1 presents the scores by country 
over the twenty-year period, and we use this information and the information on party 
competition to make predictions about the appropriate form of fiscal governance. One observes 
three sets of cases based on the relative stability of the scores. Following closely the aggregate 
results, the first category includes states  with stable ideological distance. Germany and the 
United Kingdom have zero or almost zero the entire time while Greece and Spain have with 
distance usually at zero with a short interruption.4 Germany and Spain always have pre-
electoral pacts, so the shape of future governments is generally clear. France is a somewhat 
tougher call; it has a small average score but also periods where the scores are notably above 
zero. Given the emergence of two clear ideological blocks that face one another in elections, 
however, which is indicated with the prevalence of pre-electoral pacts, France belongs in the 
same category. Similarly, other countries have stable distances that generally score around .2 or 
above that remain above this threshold or that bounce only once below it (Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands).5 These are all “high” ideological distance states. The 
second group are countries seem to predict one type of governance in a given, defined period 
but another type of governance in the remaining period. Italy has a clear break from 1996 on, 
with a distance at zero, while it has a fairly large ideological spread in the first period. The 
country is therefore coded a small ideological distance country from 1997 onwards. Similarly, 
Portugal begins the period with a score near zero, but the score increases in the mid-1990s. It 
has again dropped to zero after the 2005 elections (not shown on this particular graph). Given 
that one of the reasons for the higher score was a minority government that missed majority 
status by just one vote, it seems reasonable the country continue to be coded small for the 
                                                      
4 Note that Greece actually has a short-lived conservative-communist coalition that appears in the Graph, but, 
because we exclude Greece 1989-93 because of data availability problems, Greece has a score of 0 during the 
time period covered in the analysis.   114
entire period. Austria has a large distance through 2000, then a small distance. It is coded 
accordingly. The final set of countries has scores that bounce around.  Ireland move down and 
up and down, with some stability at the end. It has a large score through 1997 and a small score 
thereafter. Correspondingly, it is coded a small distance state from 1998 onwards. For Sweden, 
the only period with the distance at zero is at the very beginning. It is therefore considered a 
large distance state. Once these scores are computed, they suggest clear predictions about the 
most effective form of fiscal governance over the entire period—delegation-type fiscal rules 
are most appropriate for small score states while contract-type fiscal rules are most appropriate 
for large score states.  
4.  Delegation in the budgeting process and the stringency of fiscal rules – concepts, 
data and method 
4.1. Methodology and data 
In this section, we operationalise and describe the two elements contributing to the 
centralisation of budgetary institutions. The first is the degree of delegation in budgetary 
procedures prevailing in the EU member states, while the second is the stringency of fiscal 
targets, which captures the medium-term oriented budgetary targets characterising the contracts 
approach. Table 2 lists several institutional features that capture the degree of delegation in the 
budget process. Delegation in the budget formulation stage is stronger the more encompassing 
the budgetary constraint set at the beginning of the process, the more agenda-setting power is 
given to the minister of finance in the budgetary planning, the broader the scope of the budget 
norms the minister can set for budget negotiations, and the more centralised the structure of 
negotiations. The budget negotiations in parliament are the more constrained the less scope is 
given to amendments, the higher the costs of a failure to pass the budget imposing discipline on 
legislators, and the less room for log-rolling is given by the voting procedure. The degree of 
flexibility or control during the budget execution is determined by the authority of the minister 
of finance to block expenditures, the existence of cash limits, the need for an disbursement 
approval from the minister of finance or a controller, the scope of budgetary transfers, the 
institutional barriers to changes of the budget law during the implementation phase and the 
strictness of carry-over regulations. 
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We consider the stringency of fiscal  contracts as characterised by the nature of the fiscal 
targets. Fiscal targets can range from mere declarations of intent to legal multi-annual budget 
plans containing detailed expenditure targets. They are the more stringent, the more 
encompassing the budget category or aggregate for which a target is set, the longer the time 
horizon to which the target applies, the more elaborate the forecasting procedure on which they 
build and the higher the degree of political commitment attached to them. 
We collected data on these fiscal institutions in EU member states in three rounds of expert 
surveys conducted in 1991, 2001 and 2004.6 The detailed results of the earlier surveys are 
published in von Hagen (1992) and Hallerberg et al. (2001). The surveys in 2001 and 2004 
were deliberately designed to provide an update of the earlier information and to explore the 
characteristics of additional institutional items in EU member states. We sent the surveys to 
several experts in each country belonging to the ministry of finance, the parliament and the 
central bank. We complemented these data with documentary analysis and in-depth interviews 
in member country seats of government.7 Based on these sources, we have comparative 
evidence on the 19 institutional items specified in Table 2 from 1985 onwards. 
To make the data usable for quantitative analysis, we operationalise and code fiscal rules 
according to their stringency and also budgetary processes according to the degree of 
delegation. Each institutional item ranges from 0 to 4.8 The coding scheme and the scores of 
individual institutions are provided in earlier publications and a web annex to this paper.  
Since our theory predicts that individual institutions of the budgeting process interact and that 
their choice is not random across countries, we aggregate the individual scores to an index of 
delegation inherent in the budgeting process and an index for the stringency of fiscal rules. For 
this purpose, we use the simple average of scores belonging to the multi-annual targets (see 
Table 2), rescaled to a range between 0 and 1, as our rules index. For the degree of delegation 
in the budget process, we normalise the aggregate sum of institutional items characterising the 
different stages (budget negotiations (BN), budget approval (BA) and budget implementation 
(BI)) and then add up the indices of the three stages using equal weights w of 1/12 to an 
aggregate score: 
                                                      
6   In between a survey was conducted by de Haan et al. (1999) 
7   For the 2001 survey, interviews were done in all seats of government of EU member states except Vienna, for 
which indications were already complete. 
8 In many cases, there were five possible answers, so the answers were coded on a 0 to 4 scale, with higher 






















Thus the aggregate index again ranges from 0 to 1. Adding up institutional items assumes that 
the individual institutional elements are substitutes. In contrast, a multiplicative combination of 
the items would capture a complementary relationship. The ranking of aggregate institutional 
indices is rather robust to variations in the weighting of institutional scores or the aggregation 
mode9, which allows us to conduct our analysis with a single delegation index for the 
budgetary procedures. The index for fiscal targets is the simple average of the individual scores 
of the institutional characteristics (refer to Table  2). 
4.2. Institutional changes in the 1990s 
Between 1991 and 2004, there have been a number of changes in budgetary procedures that led 
to an overall strengthening of budgetary institutions. At an aggregate level, this finding is 
reflected in Graph 2, which presents the average institutional scores for the stringency of fiscal 
rules and the degree of delegation of the different stages and the entire budget process by 
groups of countries with high or low ideological distance government before and after major 
reform efforts.10 
The changes over the past 14 years have been fairly sizeable for two classes of multi-annual 
targets. EU member states now uniformly report the usage of such targets. This practice varied 
in the early 1990s. Moreover, large improvements occurred regarding the nature of the budget 
plan. While several plans were previously based on ad-hoc assumptions, they are now more 
often reported to be based on a consistent macro-economic framework. Beyond this, the degree 
of commitment has improved in some countries, but above all Denmark and Sweden. The level 
of commitment in states using external contracts seems therefore to be equivalent to those 
where an internal contract system, e.g. being based on a coalition agreement, would be 
suitable. In line with our predictions, the existing rules in states with ideologically less 
dispersed governments are slightly less stringent than those in states with ideologically highly 
dispersed governments after major reform steps were taken. 
                                                      
9   This has been confirmed in previous research on various country groups (see Alesina et al. 1995, Gleich 2003, 
and Strauch 1998). In particular, the results remain robust when the index is multiplicative instead of additive 
and different elasticities of substitution are attached to items within sub-indices or between sub-indices. 
10  After the major reform steps captured in Graph 2 only minor modifications to budgetary institutions took 
place. For details see the Annex on the institutional codings.  117
Underlying the marked strengthening of aggregate scores for the executive planning stage are 
two developments. The general constraint and the type of norm given for budgetary requests 
have tightened across the board. Other institutions have developed more selectively. In 
particular, the agenda setting power of the minister of finance and the structure of cabinet 
negotiations provide the minister of finance with more authority today. These reforms have 
above all transformed the fragmented structures in Greece, Italy and Spain towards a 
delegation model, as one would expect given their low ideological distance. To a lesser extent 
they have also helped to overcome the institutional weakness in some states with high 
ideological distance, such as Belgium and Ireland before 1998. 
Graph 2 indicates that the position of the government vis-à-vis parliament has strengthened, but 
that overall institutional changes have been less pronounced than for fiscal rules and the first 
stage of the budget process. Nevertheless, changes have been particularly strong in states with 
low ideological distance, where it may be much easier now for the minister of finance to 
channel budgetary proposals through parliament than before. The most notable change 
concerned offsetting amendments - a majority of states introduced this requirement. Additional 
restraints on amendments have tightened the budgetary process in Germany, Greece and Italy, 
i.e. states with low ideological distance. Institutional changes are equally apparent, but 
somewhat more balanced across types of government when examining the global vote on the 
total budget—eight states introduced this requirement after 1991. Overall, countries with rather 
fragmented parliamentary institutions, such as Greece, Germany, Italy, and Sweden have 
introduced major changes to increase the degree of delegation in the process. 
Institutional change to the implementation stage of the budget process have been more mixed 
compared to other stages. The right to block expenditures has been mainly strengthened among 
states with regular minority governments. Cash limits and disbursement approval have gained 
more prevalence in states with low ideological dispersion in government. Regulations on 
transfers have been reported for six countries. Carry-over regulations are tighter in Germany 
and Spain now than a decade ago. Almost surprisingly, regulations on budgetary changes 
apparently are less stringent in several EU member states now, with five of fifteen allowing 
changes mid-year that did not allow them before. Regarding cross sectional performance, most 
institutional changes are again reported for Italy, but there is no clear pattern apparent beyond 
that. 
Overall, the stringency of budget rules has increased and the fragmentation of budgetary 
procedures diminished. The main development that can be detected for EU member states in  118
this respect is that several countries, which previously had rather fragmented budgetary 
processes, now have raised the degree of delegation inherent in the budget process. This is the 
direction of institutional reform that our analytical framework would suggest regarding the 
appropriate form of governance in these countries. 
Against this general development, there are still remaining differences across groups of 
countries in 2004. Countries where a delegation approach may be functional have on average 
less stringent fiscal rules and targets, a higher degree of delegation in budget negotiations 
during the planning stage and a more restrictive amendment and voting process in parliament 
than countries where a contract approach would be more functional. However, these 
differences emerge often from differences in specific institutional items rather than across the 
board in all items.  
5.  The impact of types of fiscal governance and fiscal rules on public debt 
We now turn to the question whether the institutions described above also differ in their impact 
on fiscal discipline. The next section presents the econometric specification of the model and 
derives the key hypotheses. Section V.2 presents the empirical results.  
5.1. Econometric  model 
To analyse the impact of budgetary institutions on deficits and debt, we estimate the following 
model which has been used in several other studies (see e.g. Roubini and Sachs 1989, de Haan 
and Sturm 1994, Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999): 
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The dependent variable is the change in general government gross public debt as share of GDP 
for country i at time t, t=(1,…,T). There are four reasons for using general instead of central 
government debt. First, as indicated above, it makes the results of our analysis comparable to 
important studies in the literature. Second, general government public debt is the relevant 
concept for the European fiscal framework. General government debt, rather than central 
government debt, has been used in the European context since it was more comparable across  119
countries before budgetary statistics were largely harmonized under ESA95.11 Third, it is the 
economically more relevant concept when thinking about long-term fiscal sustainability. 
Finally, using general government debt allows us to capture potential substitution effects across 
government levels, which may be the outcome of budgetary decisions at the central 
government level, but would be lost if one focuses only on central government debt. For 
example, Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996) show that fiscal rules induce US state governments to 
shift fiscal imbalances to the local level. Note that, with the exception of states in Germany, 
sub-national governments in Europe generally incur low levels of debt. Thus, the difference 
between central and general government debt is largely unaffected by budgetary decisions of 
lower-level governments in most European countries. In Germany, budgetary institutions at the 
state level are very similar to those at the federal level.    
In the empirical model, we include several macro-economic variables in matrix X={real GDP 
growth, change in unemployment rate, lagged debt level and debt service costs}. Real GDP 
growth and changes in the unemployment rate should affect changes in government debt 
through automatic stabilisers and discretionary measures aiming at economic stabilisation. The 
lagged debt level provides a proxy for the inter-temporal budget constraint or long-term 
sustainability to which the budgetary balance has to react. Debt servicing costs capture the 
impact of interest payments as well as political pressures that might emerge from high levels of 
interest payments on governments. The lagged change in the debt level addresses the serial 
correlation of the time series. The matrix P comprises two political controls, P={election year, 
veto}. The veto variable is taken from Tsebelis’ concept of veto-players and captures the 
ideological dispersion of parties required to pass the budget. It measures the maximum 
ideological distance among those parties based on ideological scores along an economic, left-
right dimension (see Table 1 for further explanation). Previous studies (e.g., Roubini and Sachs 
1989, Spolaore 1993) have argued that coalition governments find it more difficult to agree on 
consolidation efforts than one party-governments and included the number of parties in 
government as an explanatory variable.12 In contrast, Tsebelis (2002) points out that the 
difficulty to reach an agreement depends on how closely aligned the coalition partners are in 
their views on important political issues. Closely aligned partners should find it easier to reach 
an agreement than parties with deep ideological differences on many issues. Veto player 
distance is therefore a more nuanced way of considering the number of parties. 
                                                      
11 In particular, Germany reported its Länder figures under “Central Government” under the ESA 1979 
framework (Savage 2005, 72).  120
The matrix S={population, openness, output volatility} comprises some variables describing 
structural characteristics of the countries under consideration that may be related to budgetary 
performance. Population is taken as a measure for the size of the economy. Generally, the size 
of a country can affect the economies of scale in the production of public services. Larger 
populations may therefore be associated with lower spending, and possibly lower deficit levels. 
Openness is related to the exposure of economic sectors to external competitiveness. This 
exposure, and the associated need for sectoral adjustments, according to Katzenstein (1985), 
lead to more consensus-oriented, corporatist structures in Europe, ensuring policy support to 
the adjustment process and, if necessary, compensatory measures, which might have negative 
effects on the budgetary balance. Output volatility is obviously related to the openness of the 
economy. However, it should capture more generally the demand for fiscal insurance (see also 
Rodrik 1998). Since insurance may be provided by the automatic stabilisation of disposable 
income, there is no obvious deficit bias over the cycle. This could nevertheless lead to a deficit 
bias if the policy reaction to economic fluctuations is asymmetric, or tax and benefit systems 
lead to a ratcheting upward of unemployment rates. 
The matrix I = {fiscal convergence, borrowing restraints for lower level of government, 
delegation index, rules index} represents the institutional variables. The convergence indicator 
is based on the distance to the reference value for the deficit-to-GDP ratio of 3% from the 
Maastricht Treaty and captures the need for adjustment for those countries with larger deficits 
between 1992 and 1997. The second institutional variable is a dummy variable, which is one 
for countries where borrowing restrains are imposed on regional or local governments.13 The 
third and the fourth institutional variables are the delegation and the fiscal rules index 
explained above. 
We summarize our discussion so far in the following two hypotheses for the empirical analysis: 
H1: More delegation in the budget process contributes to lower growth of public debt in states 
with small ideological distance and low political competition but not in states with high 
ideological distance and high political competition among coalition partners. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
12   A notable exception is Volkerink and de Haan (2001) who use different measures for the ideological 
complexion of government. 
13 The information is taken from Eichengreen and von Hagen (1995) and Hallerberg et al. (2001). To assess the 
impact of fiscal federalism on debt dynamics at the national level, we also considered standard measures of 
fiscal decentralization, such as central government own revenues as a share of general government revenues, 
as explanatory variables. However, data for different layers of government are not consolidated, raising 
conceptual problems. They are also not available for all countries over the entire sample period. Given the 
limited size of our sample, we dropped these variables to avoid further missing observations. We thank 
Gerhard Schwab for the data screening.  121
H2: More stringent fiscal targets reduce the growth of public debt in states with large 
ideological distance and high political competition but not in states with low ideological 
distance and low political competition. 
The thrust of the analysis is variation finding, i.e., a comparison of the effects of institutions 
between two groups of countries. This contrasts with other empirical studies (de Haan et al. 
1999, von Hagen and Harden 1994, Kontopolous and Perotti 1999, Arreaza et al. 1999) that 
consider a universal impact of budgeting institutions across all EU-15 member states. One can 
pursue two different econometric approaches for this exercise. One is to combine the 
delegation index and the fiscal rules index with categorical dummy variables for the type of 
country and estimate the model for all countries simultaneously. The other is to split the sample 
into two parts, one for delegation states and one for contract states. The first approach has been 
used by Hallerberg et al. (2001). Here, we opt for the alternative one, since we have a larger 
number of observations and this approach does not restrict the coefficients on the other 
variables to be the same for both groups of countries.  
Our sample starts in 1985 and ends in 2004 and has a total of 296 observations due to missing 
data on debt-servicing costs in Greece during 1989-1992. Using the information provided in 
questionnaires and further documentary analysis (see Hallerberg 2004) changes in institutional 
rules during the sample period were coded for the years in which major reforms took place.14 
For the estimation of this model, two further issues have to be taken into account: 
heterogeneity and endogeneity. The nature of our data, in particular the institutional variables 
which show little time variation, does not allow us to use common panel data estimators with 
fixed or random effects to capture the cross-sectional heterogeneity. As explained in more 
detail in the annex to this paper, a dynamic panel estimate of equation (1) requires a 
transformation of variables, which would dramatically reduce the number of non-zero 
observations for budgetary institutions and lead to unreliable estimates. Therefore, we use an 
OLS estimate and include more than the usual set of structural variables in this context. A 
relatively large set of structural variables, which often have more between than within group 
variation, contributes to the consistency of the estimates since these variables capture potential 
heterogeneity across groups. Furthermore, doing so helps to minimize the risk of an omitted 
variables bias. To compute the standard errors of the estimates, we account for groupwise 
                                                      
14 In particular, the main change in the index occurs as of 1993 for Belgium, Ireland; 1994 for Spain, 1995 for the 
Netherlands; 1996 for Finland, 1997 for Italy, Sweden; and 1998 for  Austria, Denmark, France, Great Britain, 
Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal.  122
heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation  across countries of the error terms with 
panel-corrected standard errors.15 
Regarding the endogeneity problem, one might question the validity of the above specification 
to estimate equation (1) due to the potential endogeneity of contemporaneous macro-variables. 
Output growth, the unemployment rate, and the interest rate may be affected by 
contemporaneous fiscal shocks. A further objection may be raised regarding the validity of our 
institutional measures. Changes in budgeting institutions may be endogenous components of  
fiscal adjustment strategies to comply with the Maastricht criteria.16 If they are, the OLS 
estimates would be biased. To tackle this issue, we conduct a Hausman specification test for 
endogeneity of the macro-economic and the institutional variables (see Wooldridge 2002). For 
the macroeconomic variables, we also check for the impact of lagged variables in levels and 
first differences in the first stage regression.17 Since our sample includes annual data, we use a 
maximum of two lags. Then we add further variables to the model, i.e, the output gap, long-
term interest rates, and the contemporaneous US real GDP growth rate, the change in the US 
unemployment rate and the US real long-term interest rate.18 These variables are kept in the 
model when they increase the overall explanatory power of the first stage regression model.  
To control for the endogeneity of budgetary institutions, we instrumentalise the change in the 
delegation and targets index using the institutional setting and the debt level in 1991. The debt 
level in 1991 captures the need for fiscal restraint over the coming years in order to maintain or 
achieve fiscal sustainability. It should therefore be correlated with the institutional reform 
efforts made later on, but since it precedes the convergence process starting in 1992, it is 
uncorrelated with the structural error term. The results of the tests are presented in Table 3 and  
suggest that endogeneity is not a problem in our case. 
                                                      
15 The command is xtpcse in Stata 9.2. 
16  An important question to consider is why countries change their budget institutions. The answer is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but there is work that considers this question. In a book-length treatment that traces 
changes in budget institutions in the EU-15, Hallerberg (2004) contends that two preconditions are needed for 
the appropriate institutions to be put in place. First, the party system must be competitive so that voters can 
punish incumbents who do not maintain fiscal discipline. Second, the party system must be stable so that 
budget rules have time to become institutionalized.  Hallerberg (ibidem) concludes that Maastricht may have 
helped focus decision-makers on maintaining fiscal discipline in some countries like Belgium and Italy, but it 
was the institutionalisation of certain forms of fiscal governance (Belgium contracts, Italy delegation)  that 
mattered the most. 
17  This is to reflect the different approaches to instrumentalising variables in dynamic panel models using GMM 
estimators (see Baltagi 2005). 
18  See e.g Gali and Perotti (2003) who also use US GDP data for this purpose. The role of the US long-term bond 
yields for financial conditions in Europe is well-documented (see Favero et al. 1997, Cordogno, Missale and 
Favero 2004).  123
5.2. Empirical  results 
The estimation results of our model for the entire sample of countries are presented in Table 4. 
First, the baseline model including economic controls and political factors explains roughly 
60% of the variance. This is quite satisfactory. Several of the macroeconomic variables have 
the expected effects on changes in public debt. Real GDP growth has a negative impact, while 
changes in unemployment produce a strong rise in public debt. The lagged debt level has a 
small negative coefficient suggesting that countries raise their budget balances in response to 
past fiscal deficits. This reaction implies that these countries in theory respect their inter-
temporal budget constraints, although the coefficient seems rather small.  
Regarding the political variables, we find empirical evidence for an electoral cycle, indicating 
that public debt tends to increase more in election years. Smaller ideological differences among 
the parties forming a coalition reduce the growth of public debt. Adding the structural factors 
to this model does not lead to any additional explanatory power. All three structural variables – 
population, openness and volatility – remain insignificant.19 When the set of institutional 
variables is added, the overall explanatory power of the model increases, albeit slightly. The 
delegation index carries a negative coefficient, which is statistically significant only at the 10% 
level. The targets index misses even that standard, albeit by a very small margin (p=0.109) 
Table 5 contains the estimates of separate regressions for states with small and large 
ideological distance respectively. The overall explanatory power of the model for the group 
with large ideological distance is considerably larger than for states with ideologically well-
aligned governments and all countries taken together. Political business cycles are significant 
only for low ideological distance states, where debt growth on average is about 2 percentage 
points higher during election years, according to our coefficient estimate. The fact that the 
electoral cycle plays a stronger role in such states makes intuitive sense and is compatible with 
findings by Hallerberg and von Hagen (1998) and Clark and Hallerberg (2000). Coalition 
governments in competitive party systems probably find it harder to agree on a fiscal expansion 
during election years, since it may not benefit all parties equally. For one-party governments, 
such distributional aspects do not arise. Fiscal restraints on lower levels of government only 
matter for the group of high ideological distance states. This result seems to be mainly driven 
by the northern countries, which generally have minority governments. Specifically, Denmark 
                                                      
19 As discussed above, we keep these variables in the model to capture cross-sectional variance that should not be 
ascribed to the institutional indices.  124
and Sweden have borrowing restraints on local governments and had fairly low budget deficits 
or even surpluses at least from the mid-1990s onwards.20 
For the group of large ideological distance states, the delegation index has a positive 
coefficient, which, however, is not statistically significant at standard levels. In contrast, the 
targets index has a statistically significant, negative effect on the growth of public debt. This 
suggests that tightening fiscal rules in large ideological distance states leads to a decline in the 
growth rate of public debt. Our result also suggests that the strengthening of multi-annual 
budget plans in such states during the 1990s has a long-run pay-off in terms of lower public 
deficits and debt.  
For the group of small ideological distance states, the delegation index has a significant and 
negative coefficient. This shows that strengthening elements of delegation in the budgeting 
process has a negative long-run effect on public debt and deficits in this group of countries. 
Thus, the reforms of the budget processes strengthening delegation in these countries during 
the 1990s should have a long-run benefit in terms of higher fiscal discipline.21 The fiscal 
targets index, in contrast, has a negative coefficient that is statistically significant only at the 
p=.1 level for this group of countries. Thus, tightening fiscal rules is, at best, an inefficient way 
to tighten fiscal discipline in small ideological distance states. In neither of the regressions is 
the fiscal convergence variable statistically significant, which suggests that there was not a 




In this study we have updated and extended previous research on budgeting processes in 
European countries. Using a unique data set we have described the current structure of 
budgetary processes and the development of a selected set of institutions over the last ten years. 
The main finding is that budgetary processes generally are more centralised now than they 
were in the early 1990s, when several countries still showed rather fragmented decision-
making structures giving rise to a budgetary co-ordination problem. As a result, spending and 
deficit biases should be less prevalent in budgetary decision-making now than they were a 
                                                      
20  This result also overturns the counterintuitive finding for the reduced sample on which Hallerberg et al. (2004) 
was based. 
21  In contrast to Hallerberg et al. (2004), we find no statistically significant impact of fiscal rules in delegation 
states due to the larger sample period.  125
decade ago in several highly indebted European countries. Furthermore, institutional reforms in 
several countries were in line with our functional considerations relating the structure of 
government to the type of fiscal governance, and there remain clear differences in the pattern 
of budgetary institutions between low and high ideological distance states. The differences are 
small when we look at aggregate indices of budgetary institutions, but they can be large when 
we consider individual delegation and fiscal targets items.   
The budgetary impact of these forms of governance has been the main topic of our paper. We 
find that delegating budgetary decision-making to the minister of finance effectively improves 
fiscal discipline where the ideological dispersion of government is nil or sufficiently small, i.e., 
countries which typically have one-party governments or coalition governments formed by 
closely aligned parties over most of the sample period. The opposite is true for the stringency 
of fiscal targets, which are effective in states with a considerable degree of ideological 
dispersion in government. These results confirm that the choice of institutions to strengthen 
fiscal discipline and their impact depends critically on the type of government and, hence, the 
political environment and constitutional characteristics such as the electoral system.   126
Acknowledgements 
 
We thank Anthony Annett, Matthew Canzoneri, José Manuel Gonzalez Páramo, Jakob de 
Haan, Pablo Hernandez de Cos, Ana Lamo, Jorge Onrubia, Roberto Perotti and conference 
participants of the INSEAD/CEPR conference in Fountainebleau, particularly Sandro 
Momigliano, and anonymous referees for their comments. The views expressed in the paper 
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of the European Central Bank. All 
remaining errors are ours.  127
Annex – Tables and Graphs 
Table 1: Electoral System, Government Constellation and Type of Fiscal Governance, 1980-
2000  
 Electoral  System  District 
Magnitude 















Austria  2-tier PR  20/91  1.9  37.5  0.26  L 84-99, S 00-  0.71  C 84-99, D 00- 
Belgium PR  23  4.5  63.6  0.36  L  0.59  C 
Denmark 2-tier  PR  7/175  2.5  60.0  0.34  L  0.33  C 
Finland PR  13  3.9  66.7  0.41  L  0.14  C 
France Plurality  1  1.6  53.8  0.11  S  0.71  D 
Germany  2-tier PR   1/603  1.9  30.0  0.04  S  0.93  D 
United 
Kingdom 
Plurality 1  1.0  20.0  0.00  S 
0.14 
D 
Greece reinforced  PR  6  1.0  42.8  0.02  S  .  D 
Ireland  STV  4  1.8  77.8  0.20  L 85-97, S 98-  0.50  C 85-97, D 98- 
Italy  2-tier PR  19/625  4.2  23.5  0.13  L 85-96, S 97-  0.31  C 85-96, D 97- 
Luxembourg PR  14  2.0  40.0  0.20  L  0.33  C 
Netherlands PR  150  2.4  71.4  0.30  L  0.38  C 
Portugal PR  12  1.7  18.2  0.14  S  0.78  D 
Spain PR  6  1.0  28.6  0.07  S  1.00  D 
Sweden 2-tier  PR  11/350  1.5  40.0  0.22  L  0.41  C 
Note:  Data for electoral systems and district magnitude are taken from Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999). The data were 
updated where necessary. Other data are own calculations based on data provided by Georges Tsebelis (see Table 
A1 for details). A two-tiered electoral system is one where an upper level of seats is used to fill in the results at a 
lower level to make the overall distribution of seats more proportional; in Denmark, for example, there are seven 
seats per electoral district on average but there are 175 seats used to fill in the results so that the proportion of 
seats a party wins matches more closely the proportion of votes it receives. In all 2 tier systems, the district 
magnitude lists first the number of seats per district at the lower level then the number of seats in the upper level. 
The average number of parties in government and changes in the coalition or ruling party include data until 1995 
for Italy and exclude three short-term caretaker governments in Greece (1989-90). The mean ideological range is 
computed for the years 1985 to 2004 to match the years in the empirical results below.  They are calculated 
according to Tsebelis (2002) and normalized to be on a scale between 0 and 1. A score of 0 means that there are 
no ideological differences among the party(ies) in government. Abbreviations in the last column indicate whether 
the ideological scores are considered Small or Large based on the average ideological range and on the overall 
pattern displayed in Graph 1. The data on the frequency of electoral pacts is for the period 1945-98, and it comes 
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Source: Own computation based on http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/tsebelis/ and updated through 2004. The y axis 











Table 2: Institutional Items 
Budgetary Process 
Executive Planning   Legislative Approval  Implementation 
-  general constraint 
-  agenda setting of minister 
of finance 
-  budget norms (broad or for 
specific spending items) 
-  structure of negotiations in 
cabinet 
-  amendment limitations 
-  amendment off-setting 
-  budget amendment can lead 
to  fall of government 
-  all expenditures passed in 
one vote 
-  global vote on budget (vote 
on total size of budget) 
-  minister of finance can 
block expenditures 
-  cash limits 
-  constraints on transfer 
allowance 
-  changes in budget law 
-  disbursement approval 
-  carry-over regulations  
Fiscal Targets 
-  type of multiannual target 
(revenues, spending, 
deficits) 
-  horizon 
-  nature of plan (quality and 
regularity of planning 
exercise) 
-  degree of commitment 





















before after before after before after before after before after
rules index budget formulation budget approval budget implementation delegation index
low ideological distance states high idological distance states
 
Note: For institutional items included see Table 2. The sum of all items has been normalized to one. The major 
changes in the index occurs as of 1993 for Belgium, Ireland; 1994 for Spain, 1995 for the Netherlands; 1996 for 
Finland, 1997 for Italy, Sweden; and 1998 for  Austria, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Germany, Greece, 










Endogeneity of macro-variables  3.70  20.41 
Endogeneity of macro- and 
institutional variables 
4.50 8.43 
Nobs 167  129 
Country:  large ideological distance states  small ideological distance states 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in gross general government debt as share of GDP. Asterisks indicate 
statistical significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**) and 1 (***) percent level. The H0-hypothesis of the Hausman test is 
that the difference in coefficients are not significant. The three macro-economic variables GDP growth, change in 
unemployment and debt servicing costs were instrumentalised using all exogenous variables of the model 
described in model 1 plus lags of the output gap and real GDP growth, lagged changes in unemployment, lagged 
long term interest rates and US GDP and long-term interest rates. The delegation and fiscal targets index where 
instrumentatised using the debt level and institutional setting in 1991.  
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Table 4: The Impact of Budgetary Institutions on Public Debt 
 
Variables 





























































Borrowing restraints for lower 
level of government 
   -0.22 
(0.44) 
Fiscal convergence      -0.12 
(0.18) 
Delegation index      -2.01* 
(1.19) 










Wald  Statistic  274.82*** 296.22*** 342.08*** 
Nobs  296 296 296 
Note:  The dependent variable is the change in gross general government debt as share of GDP. Standard errors are 
shown in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**) and 1 (***) percent level. The 
targets index is statistically significant at p=0.109. 
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Wald Statistic  274.74***  443.49*** 
Nobs 160  136 
Note:  The dependent variable is the change in gross general government debt as share of GDP. Standard errors are 
shown in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**) and 1 (***) percent level. All 




Table A1: Variables – Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable Definition/Code  Source 
change in debt  ∆ gross government debt to GDP ratio 
(in percent) 
European Commission AMECO 
data set 
balance  general government budget balance  European Commission AMECO 
data set 
real GDP growth (in percent)    European Commission AMECO 
data set 
change in unemployment 
rate 
∆ unemployment rate (in percent)  European Commission AMECO 
data set 
debt service  debt service costs: 








where r = real long-term interest rates; y 
= real GDP growth; D =  debt/GDP 
ratio. 
own computation based on 
European Commission AMECO 
data set 
election year  Coded as the percent of a year that was 
a pre-electoral year; July 1, for example, 
is .5 this year and .5 the previous year. 
Clark and Hallerberg (2000)   
and Hallerberg (2004), 
supplemented with the country 
studies at   
http://www.economist.com 
veto  maximum ideological distance among 
parties based on ideological scores 
along an economic, left-right dimension 
needed for passage of a budget bill. 
Where the government has a majority, 
this corresponds to the coalition parties. 
Where the government is in minority, 
we add the parties that usually 
supported the budget or, where this was 
unknown, the closest parties that would 
result in a majority. Tsebelis did not 
provide information for Greece, while 
his Italian data end in 1994. We 
therefore substitute the manifesto data 
provided in Budge, et al (2001) in the 
regressions for these countries only. 
Given that distances are zero except for 
a few months in 1989-90 for Greece, 
which does not appear in our regression 
for those years because of missing data, 
this is unproblematic. Figures 
standarised to run from 0 to 1. 
Own computation based on 
http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/tsebelis/ 
population (in mill.)     European Commission AMECO 
data set 
openness  exports and imports as share of GDP (in 
%) 
Own computation based on 
European Commission AMECO 
data set 
output volatility  standard deviation of real GDP growth 
over the past 8 years (t-9 to t-1) 
Own computation based on 
European Commission AMECO 
data set 
federal borrowing restriction  1 if restriction exists, 0 otherwise  Eichengreen and von Hagen  
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(1995) until 1995, Hallerberg et al. 
(2001) thereafter 
fiscal convergence   (deficit to GDP ratio – 3%) if deficit 
stood above 3% deficit to GDP 
reference value during the period from 
1992 to 1997; 0 otherwise 
Own computation based on 
European Commission AMECO 
data set; the contemporaneous 
deficit value is instrumentalised 
using the past deficit, annual 
dummies and macro-variables 
capturing the international 
environment in year t 
delegation index    Sum of average scores of institutional 
items in the budget formulation, 
approval and implementation stage 
Computations based on data 
presented in Table A2-A4 
targets index  Average score of institutional items  Computations based on data 
presented in Table A5 
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Annex: 
The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries 
 
 
Annex I.  Specification Issues 
For panel data, typically a fixed or random effects model is estimated to capture the heterogeneity of 
data. In our case, the model (1) would take the following form: 
t i t i t i t i t i I debt debt ε υ γ ς β α + + + Γ + ∆ + = ∆ − , , 1 , ,      ( A   1 )  
For simplicity of exposition, we collect all exogenous non-institutional variables in the matrix Γ. υi 
is the country effect allowing the intercept to vary across countries. An OLS estimator of this model 
would be biased and inconsistent. Since the dependent variable is a function of the fixed effect υI, 
the lagged dependent variable included on the right hand side is correlated with the error term. This 
problem is solved by either using the within-estimator or first differencing the data.22 The within 
estimator is biased and its consistency depends on T, the time dimension, being large.23 For our 
analysis, the length of the sample for the most important specification is relatively small, with T=13, 
which would suggest the use of the second option. The first-differenced model takes the following 
form: 
t t i t i t i t i I debt debt ε γ ς β + ∆ + ∆Γ + ∆ = ∆ − , , 1 ,
2
,
2        ( A   2 )  
As is immediately evident for the institutional variables, which are our main concern, the 
transformation sets all country observations without any institutional change to zero and therefore 
reduces the sample of non-zero observations to 30 for the delegation and rules indices. Estimates for 
15 EU member states based on this specification would be extremely unreliable. 
                                                      
22   First differencing is common to all dynamic panel estimates. Estimators then differ in how to instrumentalise 
variables and whether a weighting matrix is used to increase the efficiency of the estimate. For an overview of the 
instrumental variable (Anderson-Hsiao) and GMM approaches see Baltagi, B., 2005. Econometric Analysis of Panel 
Data - 3
rd Edition. John Wiley & Sons, San Francisco; and S. Bond, 2002. Dynamic panel data models: A Guide to 
Micro Data Methods and Practice. CEMMAP Working Paper CWP09/02, London.  
23  The reason is that the transformed lagged dependent variable  i t i debt debt
______
1 , ∆ − ∆ −  is correlated with   i t i υ υ − , . See 
Baltagi (ibid:125-126) for a more detailed exposition.  
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Annex II. Institutional Data – Coding Scheme and Scores 
 
Table A1: Coding Scheme for Budgetary Institutions 
Budget Negotiations 
general constraint: none (0); balance as share of GDP (1); balance and debt as share of GDP (2);  spending as 
share of GDP or Golden Rule (3); spending and debt as share of GDP (4) 
agenda setting: for budget negotiations: minister of finance or cabinet collects bids from spending ministers 
(0); minister of finance or cabinet collects bids subject to the pre-agreed guidelines (1); cabinet decides on 
budget norms first (2); minister of finance proposes budget norms to be voted on by cabinet (3); minister of 
finance or prime minister determines budget parameters to be observed by spending ministers (4) 
scope of budget norms in the setting of agenda: expenditure or deficit (0); ‘specific’ (1.33), ‘broad’ and 
‘specific’ (2.66), ‘broad’ (4) 
structure of negotiations: all cabinet members involved together (0); multilateral (2); bilateral between 
spending ministers and minister of finance (4) 
Budget Approval 
parliamentary amendments: unlimited (0); limited (4) 
parliamentary amendments required to be off-setting: no (0); yes (4) 
can cause fall of government: no (0); yes (4) 
all expenditures passed in one vote: yes (0); mixed (2); votes are chapter by chapter (4) 
global vote on total budget size: final only (0); initial (4) 
Budget Implementation 
minister of finance can block expenditures: no (0); yes (4) 
spending ministries are subject to cash limits: no (0); yes (4) 
disbursement approval required from minister of finance or controller: no (0); yes (4) 
transfers of expenditures between chapters: unrestricted (0); limited (0.64); requires consent of minister of 
finance (1.28); requires consent minister of parliament (1.92); only within departments possible (2.56); only 
within departments with consent of minister of finance (3.2); not allowed (4) 
changes in the budget law during execution: at discretion of government (0); by new law which is regularly 
submitted during fiscal year (1); at discretion of minister of finance (2); require consent of minister of finance 
and parliament (3); only by new budgetary law to be passed under the same regulations as the ordinary 
budget (4)  
carry-over of unused funds into the next year: unrestricted (0); limited (1.33); limited and requires 
authorization by the minister of finance or parliament (2.66); not possible (4) 
Budget Rules 
multiannual target: none (0); spending or taxation (2); total budget size (4) 
planning horizon (years): two (1); three (2); four (3); five or more (4) 
nature of multi-annual target: ad hoc forecast (1); fixed forecast (2); updated forecasts, but not based on 
consistent macro-model (3); updated on basis of consistent macro-model (4) 




Table A2: Institutions – Executive Planning Stage (1999, 2001/4) 
country Gen_Con91  Gen_Con04  Ag_Set91  Ag_Set04 B_Norm91  B_Norm04 Str_Neg91 Str_Neg04 
AUT  0 4 2 4 0 4 2 2 
BEL  0 4 1 2 0 4 0 2 
DNK  4 4 3 4  1.33  4 4 2 
ESP  0 3 2 4 4 4 0 4 
FIN  1 4 2 2 0 4 2 2 
FRA  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
GBR  4 4 3 2 4 4 4 4 
GER  3 3 1 2 4 4 4 2 
GRC  0 2 1 4 0 4 0 4 
IRL  2 4 1 4 0 4 0 2 
ITA  2  4  (2)  1 4  2.66  4 2 4 
LUX  3 3 4 4 4 4 0 0 
NLD  1 3 3 2  2.66  4 4 2 
PRT  1 4 2 2  2.66  4 4 2 
SWE  0 3 0 3  1.33  4 4 4 
Note:  Figures represent scores according to the coding scheme presented in Table A2. Values in brackets indicate that 
institutions were modified after 2001. Abbreviations indicate the following items in the years 1991 and 2001 
respectively: Gen_Con (general constraint), Ag_Set (agenda setting of minister of finance), B_Norm (budget 




























AUT  0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 
BEL  0  0  (4) 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 4 
DNK  0 0 4 0 4 0 4 4 0 4 
ESP  4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
FIN  0 0 0 0 4 4 2 2 0 0 
FRA  4 4 4 4 4 4 2 0 4 4 
GBR  4 4 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
GER  0 0 0 4 4 4 0 2 0 4 
GRC  0 4 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 4 
IRL  4 4 0 4 4 4 0 4 0 0 
ITA  4 0 0 4 0 4 2 2 0 4 
LUX  4 4 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 
NLD  4 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 
PRT  0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 1 4 
SWE  0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Note:  Figures represent scores according to the coding scheme presented in Table A2. Values in brackets indicate that 
institutions were modified after 2001 Abbreviations indicate the following items in the years 1991 and 2001 
respectively: Am_Lim (amendment limitaitons), Am_Off (amendment off-setting), Am_Fall (budget amendment 



























AUT  4 4 4 4 4 4  3.2 4 0 0  2.66  2.66 
BEL  0 4 0 0 4 0  2.56 0 4 0 0 0 
DNK  0 4 4 4 0 0  1.92 0 4 3 0 0 
ESP  0 0 0 4 0 0  0.64  1.28 4 0 1 4 
FIN  0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 0 0 4 4 
FRA  4 4 4 4 4 4  2.56  2.4 4 0 1  1.33 
GBR  0 4 4 4 0 4  1.92  1.28 4 4 1 0 
GER  4 4 4 4 4 0  1.28  0.64 3 0 2  2.66 
GRC  4 4 4 4 0 4  1.28  1.28 2 0 3 0 
IRL  0 4 0 0 0 4  3.2  1.28 4 4 3  1.3 
ITA  0 4 0 4 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 
LUX  4 4 0 4 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 
NLD  0 0 0 0 4 0 0 
1.92 
(2.56) 0 0 1  1.33 
PRT  0 4 4 4 4  0  (4) 0 0 4 2 2  1.3 
SWE  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4  1.33  2.66 
Note:  Figures represent scores according to the coding scheme presented in Table A2. Values in brackets indicate that 
institutions were modified after 2001. Abbreviations indicate the following items in the years 1991 and 2001 
respectively:  Block (minister of finance can block expenditures), CashL (cash limits), Dis (disbursement 
approval), Tran (constraints on transfer allowance), Chan (changes in budget law), Carry (carry-over regulations) 
 
 
Table A5: Institutions – Fiscal Rules (1991, 2001/4) 
country  Target_91 Target_04 Horizon_91  Horizon_04 N_Plan_91  N_Plan_04  Commit_91 Commit_04 
AUT  2 4 2 2 1 4 2 3 
BEL  0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 
DNK  2 4 2 3 2 4 2 2 
ESP  0 4 4 3 1 4 1 2 
FIN  4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
FRA  0 4 1 2 1 4 1 3 
GBR  2 4 4 2 4 4 3 3 
GER  4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
GRC  0 4 2 2 1 4 2 2 
IRL  4 4 4 2 1 4 3 2 
ITA  4  (2) 4 3 3 1 4 3 2 
LUX  0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 
NLD  4 4 4 3 2 2 4 4 
PRT  0 4 3 2 1 4 2 4 
SWE  0 4 0 2 1 4 0 4 
Note:  Figures represent scores according to the coding scheme presented in Table A2. Values in brackets indicate that 
institutions were modified after 2001. Abbreviations indicate the following items in the years 1991 and 2001 















AUT  0.4 0.6 0.4 0.8 
BEL  0.2 0.5 0.0 1.0 
DNK  0.6 0.6 0.5 0.8 
ESP  0.3 0.6 0.4 0.8 
FIN 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.9 
FRA  0.9 0.8 0.2 0.8 
GBR  0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 
GER  0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 
GRC  0.2 0.7 0.3 0.8 
IRL 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.8 
ITA  0.3 0.7 0.7 0.8 
LUX  0.5 0.6 0.0 1.0 
NLD  0.6 0.5 0.9 0.9 
PRT  0.5 0.6 0.4 0.9 
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Political institutionalism suggests that countries that tend to elect single party majorities or 
ideologically similar coalitions prefer to delegate authority over the government budget to a 
strong Finance Minister. In contrast, countries that tend to elect ideologically diverse 
coalitions usually choose commitment devices that bind the parties in power to a prudent 
course of fiscal action. A recurring argument in the political institutionalist literature is that 
delegation states have been less compliant with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in recent 
years compared with commitment states because the former are less accustomed than the 
latter to the rules-based approach to fiscal governance underpinning Economic and Monetary 
Union.   
 
This paper recognises the important contribution of political institutionalism to the political-
economy literature but takes issue with its critique of the SGP on three counts. Firstly, not all 
delegation states have posted excessive deficits in recent years and both commitment and 
delegation states have failed to comply fully with the medium-term rules of the SGP. 
Secondly, not all delegation states have a well-formed system of delegation in place, which 
suggests that the source of fiscal profligacy in some of these cases may have been national 
rather than European in origin. Thirdly, delegation states are increasingly turning to numerical 
fiscal rules in their pursuit of budgetary discipline.  
*   Economist, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission. Thanks to Bob Hancké, Ivo 
Maes, Laurent Moulin and Waltraud Schelkle for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
Thanks to Danila Conte for research assistance. Any errors that remain are my own. The views 
expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent those of the European Commission.  144
1. INTRODUCTION 
A recurring theme in contemporary studies of fiscal policy is that institutions matter. The 
point of departure for this analysis is the empirical observation that sustained increases in 
government budget deficits and public debt in OECD countries during the 1970s cannot be 
fully explained by traditional tax smoothing models, which assume that the government varies 
its borrowing over the business cycle to keep expected tax rates constant (see Barro, 1979). 
One strand of analysis – which is variously known as political economy or political 
economics – seeks to explain this puzzle with reference to political and institutional factors 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Early research in this vein focused on the strategic use of fiscal 
policy and the impact of partisan politics on budgetary decisions (Nordhaus, 1975; and Hibbs, 
1977). Later research focused on the link between electoral systems and government 
borrowing (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Persson and Svensson, 1989) and on the institutional 
determinants of fiscal policy (von Hagen, 1992; von Hagen and Harden, 1994).  
A recent series of studies by Annett (2006), Hallerberg (2004), Hallerberg and von Hagen 
(1999), Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2001) and the IMF (2004) – which can be 
grouped under the heading of political institutionalism – posits a strong link between fiscal 
discipline and the underlying electoral regime. In an electoral regime that tends to produce 
single-party governments or coalition governments between ideologically similar parties, the 
optimal system of fiscal governance, it is argued, is an institutionally strong Finance Minister 
who can restrain the expenditure demands of his or her fellow Ministers. In an electoral 
system that favours ideologically diverse coalitions, however, it is more difficult to delegate 
power to a strong Finance Minister as this would give disproportionate control over the public 
finances to one party in the coalition. In view of this fact, the optimal fiscal regime for this 
electoral system is, according to political institutionalism, a commitment device that binds 
coalition members to a programme of fiscal discipline for the government's term of office. A  
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controversial corollary of political institutionalism is that delegation states are at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (Hallerberg, 2004; IMF, 2004; 
Annett, 2006). The crux of this argument is two-fold. Firstly, commitment states have, it is 
claimed, a better track record than delegation states when it comes to compliance with the 
SGP. Secondly, this difference is partly due, it is suggested, to the fact that commitment states 
are more accustomed than their delegation counterparts to the rules-based approach to fiscal 
discipline that underpins the SGP. 
This paper views political institutionalism as a significant contribution to the political 
economy of budgetary policy, but takes issue with its interpretation of the SGP. The 
remainder of the paper is divided into six main sections. Section 2 sets out the political 
institutionalist critique of the SGP in greater detail. Section 3 examines the compliance of 
commitment and delegation states with the SGP over the period 1997-2005. Section 4 looks at 
the institutional strength of Finance Ministers in delegation states and considers the 
importance of national vetoes. Section 5 reviews recent evidence about the growing use of 
numerical fiscal rules in delegation states. Section 6 considers the policy implications of this 
rejoinder to political institutionalism. Section 7 concludes. 
2. THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIST CRITIQUE OF THE SGP 
The central theoretical claim of political institutionalism is that countries choosing a system 
of fiscal governance that is well-suited to their electoral regime will, ceteris paribus, achieve 
a more prudent fiscal policy over the long term. The empirical evidence in support of this 
proposition is persuasive. In econometric studies of fiscal policy making in European Union 
(EU) Member States over the period 1981-1994, Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) find 
evidence that delegation and commitment devices have a negative and statistically significant 
impact on the gross debt burden when compared with fiefdom – a situation in which 
individual Ministers formulate their budgetary demands in isolation from one another. The  146
authors also find that a strong Finance Minister is more likely to exert fiscal discipline in a 
regime that tends to elect single party majority governments rather than ideologically diverse 
coalitions. Linking this econometric analysis to a series of carefully constructed case-studies, 
Hallerberg (2004) finds that delegation and commitment states had a positive and statistically 
significant impact on fiscal discipline in EU Member States over the period 1980-1997. 
Although this body of evidence supports the existence of a link between fiscal governance 
and the electoral regime it does not offer an explicit justification of why delegation states 
should be less suited than commitment states to the SGP. This particular claim is supported by 
two recurring arguments in the political institutionalist literature.  
The first argument is based on the empirical observation that delegation states have been less 
compliant with the SGP than their commitment counterparts (Hallerberg, 2004:34; Annett, 
2006:15). France and Germany, which posted excessive budget deficits in 2003, have relied 
on a delegation approach to fiscal policy throughout the last three decades, while Italy and 
Greece, which posted excessive budget deficits in 2004, have pursued delegation since 1996 
and 1997 respectively. Portugal, which breached the SGP in 2002, is the one euro-area 
member that failed to consistently implement either a delegation or a commitment approach to 
delegation. This leaves the Netherlands, which posted an excessive budget deficit in 2004, as 
the sole commitment state that has breached the SGP since 1999.  
The second argument in support of the political institutionalist critique of the SGP relates 
delegation states' lack of fiscal discipline to the fact that EMU’s budgetary rules work ‘in the 
spirit of the commitment approach’ (IMF 2004:92).
1 Annett  (2006:15) makes this point 
succinctly, when he argues that ‘with its emphasis on multi-annual targets and a regular 
review procedure, the SGP fits snugly with the numerical contracts approach associated with 
                                                 
1    Annett (2006) explores other explanations for the dual outcome in euro area fiscal policy, including 
macroeconomic volatility and country size.  
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commitment states, but not so well with countries relying on domestic governance 
institutions’. For Hallerberg (2004:194), there are strong complementarities between the 
rules-based approach of the SGP and the commitment approach to national fiscal 
governance.
2 In the first instance, the SGP can help to reinforce the commitment of coalition 
partners to fiscal discipline. Furthermore, the domestic institutions that commitment states 
frequently employ to monitor compliance with the coalition partners’ fiscal contract can help 
to enforce the implementation of the SGP. For delegation states, in contrast, a rules-based 
approach to fiscal discipline can, according to Hallerberg (2004:194), do little do compensate 
for an institutionally weak Finance Minister and may actually do more harm than good if it 
curtails his or her budgetary discretion in the face of economic shocks.  
Annett (2006) puts the political institutionalist critique of the SGP to the test with a panel data 
analysis of budgetary policy in EU Member States over the period 1980-2004. In the first 
instance, his results find little evidence of a link between changes in the cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance and fiscal governance. The main exception here is that the budgetary 
performance of commitment states is superior to that of fiefdom over the period as a whole. 
When the sample is split between the pre- and post-SGP periods, however, it emerges that 
delegation is beneficial for fiscal discipline before the SGP was signed but not thereafter. This 
compares with the case of commitment which does better than fiefdom in both periods but to 
a greater extent after the SGP was signed. On this basis, Annett (2006:19) concludes that the 
SGP appears to be more effective under commitment approaches to fiscal governance.  
3. A CLOSER LOOK AT DELEGATION STATES’ FISCAL TRACK RECORD 
Having set out the political institutionalist critique of the SGP, this paper explores its validity 
from a broad, political-economy perspective.  This section takes a closer look at the track 
                                                 
2    In more recent work, Hallerberg, von Hagen and Strauch (2004) have begun to revisit this particular  148
record of euro-area commitment and delegation states vis-à-vis the Stability and Growth Pact. 
The first step in this exercise is to look at the link between approaches to fiscal governance 
and electoral regimes.
3 Focusing on 2004, the latest year for which survey data on the 
ideological preferences of political parties is available, Table 1 classifies Member States 
according to their approach to fiscal governance, lists the parties that shared power and 
measures the ideological space between government members on budgetary issues.  
The classification of fiscal governance in Table 1 is based on Hallerberg (2004). Austria and 
Spain are included as delegation states by virtue of measures taken at the time of the euro's 
launch to strengthen the institutional strength of their respective Finance Ministers. Portugal 
is the odd man out as it is the only Member State that has failed to make a clear choice 
between commitment and delegation since the launch of the euro. The classification of 
ideological preferences is based on Benoit and Laver (2006) who present the most up-to-date 
and comprehensive elite survey on parties and policies. On the issue of fiscal policy, Benoit 
and Laver (2006) ask respondents to give a minimum score of 1 to parties that favour tax 
increases to pay for greater government services and a maximum score of 20 for parties that 
favour reduced government services to cut taxes. Ideological space is measured as the 
difference between the most ideologically distinct parties in government. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
argument, noting that numerical fiscal rules may have a role to play in delegation states. See Section 5 of 
the present paper for a discussion of the authors’ key findings. 
3   The focus here is on euro-area members rather than the EU-25 on the grounds that the SGP places more 
stringent conditions on Member States that share the single currency.  
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Table 1 supports the central tenet of political institutionalism. Member States with a low 
score, indicating single party majority or ideologically similar coalitions, tend to favour a 
delegation approach to fiscal governance while those with a high score, indicating ideological 
diverse coalitions, tend to prefer a commitment approach. The main outlier here is Italy, 
which has followed a delegation approach to fiscal governance since 1996 in spite of the 
relatively large ideological space between its coalition partners. In the Berlusconi 
Administration, which held office in 2004, this ideological space was highest between Forza 
Italia which, according to Benoit and Laver (2006), strongly favoured tax cuts and the 
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Alleanza Nazionale whose preferences for tax cuts and expenditure increases were judged to 
be roughly balanced. 
The case of Portugal is not surprising from a political institutionalist perspective. Although 
the ideological space between the then ruling Social Democratic Party (PSD) and People's 
Party  (CDS/PP) was small, the country’s history of minority (or delicately balanced) 
governments has frustrated attempts to pursue a delegation approach to fiscal governance. A 
recent example of such frustration came in September 1999 when the Ministries of Economics 
and Finance were brought together under the control of Minister Joaquim Pina Moura in an 
attempt to promote greater fiscal discipline (Braga de Macedo, 2002:12). Yet, as 
Hallerberg  (2004:185) records, when fuel prices rose sharply in 2000 this created a 
paradoxical situation in which ‘[a]s Economy Minister, he [Moura] was expected to uphold 
his party’s pledge to subsidize fuel prices, while as Finance Minister he was to hold down 
spending’. The experiment lasted less than a year, after which time the separate status of the 
Ministries was restored. 
The second step in this exercise is to compare the fiscal performance of commitment and 
delegation states during the period 1997-2005. From a short-term perspective, aggregate 
trends support the hypothesis that delegation states were less compliant with the SGP than 
their commitment counterparts. Graph 1 shows that net government lending in commitment 
states was clearly balanced or in surplus during the first eight years of the SGP while 
delegation states posted rising budget deficits of close to 3% of GDP at the beginning or end 
of the period. At a disaggregate level, however, a somewhat different story emerges. Graphs 2 
and 3 show that there are two important exceptions to the political institutionalist critique of 
the SGP. The first, which was noted in the preceding section, is that the Netherlands, which is 
in many ways the archetypal commitment state (Hallerberg, 2004), experienced a sharp 
increase in government borrowing following the 2001 slowdown. The second exception,  
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which political institutionalism tends to pay less attention to, is that two delegation states, 
Austria and Spain, posted budget deficits that have been within the limits of the SGP since the 
launch of the euro.  
















Source: AMECO Database. 
Note: Delegation states exclude Austria and Spain between 1997 and 1999 
 
From a medium-term perspective, the performance gap between commitment and delegation 
states since 1997 narrows further. Graphs 4 and 5 compare the annual fiscal stance (measured 
by the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance) for delegation and commitment 
states with annual cyclical conditions (measured by the output gap) over the period 1997-
2005. Two salient facts emerge from these data. The first is that, in delegation states, a pro-
cyclical fiscal loosening of the fiscal stance in 2001 and 2002 sowed the seeds for the 
excessive deficits that followed in the remainder of this period. The second is that is that 
commitment states experienced a pronounced pro-cyclical loosening of the fiscal stance in 
1999 and again in 2001 and 2002.  
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Graph 2: Net lending in commitment states   
(% of GDP) 1997-2005 
Graph 3:  Net lending in delegation states   























Source: AMECO Database 
 
Source: AMECO Database 
Note: Delegation states exclude Austria and Spain between 1997 
and 1999 
 
Graph 4:  Fiscal stance and cyclical conditions     
in delegation states, 1997-2005 
Graph 5:  Fiscal stance and cyclical conditions     
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Source: AMECO Database. 
Note: Cyclical adjustment based on potential output. 
Delegation states exclude Austria and Spain between 1997 and 
1999. 
Source: AMECO Database. 
Note: Cyclical adjustment based on potential output. 
In summary, the evidence presented in this section supports political institutionalism’s 
hypothesis about the link between electoral regimes and fiscal governance but questions its 
claim that delegation states have been more profligate than their commitment counterparts in 
recent years. Although, breaches of the SGP’s 3% of GDP threshold for government 
borrowing were higher among delegation states, there is a danger of overgeneralization. 
Firstly, the cases of Austria and Spain demonstrate that not all delegation states posted, or 
came close to posting, excessive budget deficits during this period. Secondly, from a medium- 
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term perspective, fiscal discipline was clearly lacking in both delegation and commitment 
states, as evidenced by the pro-cyclical fiscal loosening which occurred in both groups of 
Member States at different times during this period.  
4. HOW STRONG ARE FINANCE MINISTERS IN DELEGATION STATES? 
If, as the political institutionalist critique of the SGP suggests, EMU’s budgetary rules were a 
direct causal factor behind excessive deficits in euro-area delegation states, then the 
conditions for fiscal discipline in these Member States should have been in place to begin 
with. This section examines this hypothesis by examining whether Finance Ministers in the 
five euro-area delegation states have, ceteris paribus, a tight grip over the implementation and 
formation stages of the government budget.  
Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2001) design two useful indices for this purpose. The 
first index states that a Finance Minister’s strength in the formulation stages of a budget will 
depend on his or her ability to resist the expenditure demands of fellow Ministers. A powerful 
Finance Minister, they argue, will (i) negotiate bilaterally with resort Ministers, (ii) ensure 
that resort Ministers cannot ask for Cabinet decisions on their budget bids, (iii) negotiate 
bilaterally with spending Ministers, (iv) have special budgetary powers vis-à-vis spending 
Ministers, (v) act as agenda-setter in Cabinet, (vi) act as a veto player over budgetary issues in 
Cabinet, (vii) have the right of approval over changes in budget targets set in previous years 
for ministries, (viii) not give the Cabinet the right to resolve disputes with spending Ministers; 
and (ix) not be overruled with respect to budgetary matters by the full Cabinet. The second 
index states that a Finance Minister will be strong in the implementation stages of the budget 
if he or she can take steps to enforce the original budgetary agreement. A powerful Finance 
Minister, they argue, (i) can block expenditures during the budgetary year, (ii) must approve 
the disbursement of funds; (iii) can impose cash limits on particular areas of expenditure, and  154
(iv) must approve transfers of financial resources between budgetary chapters.  
Table 2: Index of strength of Finance Ministers in the formulation stages of the annual budget 
  Austria 
 
Italy France  Greece  Spain  Germany 
Budgetary negotiations take 
place bilaterally between 
Finance Minister and resort 
Minister 





Individual Ministers cannot 
ask for Cabinet discussion on 
their budget bids 
Yes Yes No  No  Yes 
 
No 
Negotiations between the 
Finance Minister and the 
spending Minister take place 
bilaterally  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Finance Minister has special 
powers  vis-à-vis spending 
Ministers 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Finance Ministers is agenda 
setter for budget in Cabinet 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Finance Minister has veto 
power in Cabinet over budget 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No  Yes 
Finance Minister must 
approve all changes to 
budgetary targets set in 
previous years for ministries 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No 
Full Cabinet does not resolve 
disputes between Finance 
Ministers and spending 
Ministers 
No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
The full Cabinet cannot 
overrule a decision of the 
Finance Minister  
Yes  No No No No No 
Finance Minister Budgetary 
Formulation Index 
8 8 7 6 6 4.5 
Source: Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2001: 65-66). 
 
The indices, which are recreated in Tables 2 and 3 for delegation Member States and for the 
euro area as a whole, assign a score of 1 for each of the attributes of a powerful Finance 
Minister. The results suggest that there is variation in the strength of Finance Ministers at both 
the formation and implementation stages of the budget. As Table 2 indicates, Italy and Austria 
receive a maximum score of 8, France scores 6 while Greece and Spain both score 6. 
Germany, in contrast, ranks well below the other delegation Member States, receiving a score 
of 4.5 because individual Ministers can take their budget bids to Cabinet and the Finance 
Minister can be overruled with respect to budgetary matters in the Cabinet. Table 3 shows a  
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similar picture vis-à-vis the implementation stage of the budget. Austria and France lead the 
pack, with a maximum score of 4, while Italy lags just 1 point behind. Germany receives a 
score of 2, because its Finance Ministers has neither the power of approval over the 
disbursement of funds nor a veto over inter-chapter budgetary transfers. 
     
Table 3: Index of strength of Finance Ministers in the implementation stages of the annual budget 
  Austria 
 
France Greece Italy  Germany  Spain 
Finance Minister can block 
expenditure during the year  
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Finance Minister approves 
disbursement of funds 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No 
Finance Minister can 
impose cash limits 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Transfers between budget 
chapters require Finance 
Minister’s approval 
 





4 4 4 3 2 2 
Source: Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2001: 72-73). 
 
It follows from these data that the SGP is unlikely to have been a direct cause of excessive 
government borrowing in Germany since from a political institutionalist perspective the 
conditions for fiscal discipline in this delegation state were not in place to begin with. 
Hallerberg (2004) tacitly accepts this point when he describes Germany as having a system of 
‘checked delegation’ due to the large number of veto players in the policy process. As 
Zohlnhöfer (1999:148) succinctly puts it, ‘the co-operative federalism with its necessity of 
joint-decision making, the Bundesrat as a powerful quasi-second Chamber, the electoral 
system compelling parties to build coalition governments, the fragmentation of the policy-
making process with the importance of ministries, the Constitutional Court with its broad 
influence on public policy and the independence of the Bundesbank – they all tend to limit the  156
leeway for reform’.  
The obstacles to economic reform in Germany are well-documented. In an influential study, 
Scharpf (1987) noted that the Schmidt administration was frustrated in the mid-1970s in its 
efforts to implement counter-cyclical fiscal policies by, inter alia, the fiscal supremacy of the 
Länder, opposition from the liberal coalition partners, and the dominance of opposition parties 
in the Bundesrat.
4 Similarly, Zohlnhöfer (1999:156) attributes the failure of the Kohl 
administration to implement ‘far-reaching reforms’ to the fact that the coalition ‘lacked 
programmatic cohesion and a common understanding of what ought to be changed in the 
relationship between the states and the market’. 
A more recent example of how national veto points can impede the pursuit of budgetary 
discipline in Germany occurred in February 1999 when the Schröder lost control of the 
Bundesrat after the Land election in Hesse in February 1999. In budgetary terms this was 
significant because Article 105(3) of the Basic Law states that ‘[f]ederal laws relating to taxes 
the revenue from which accrues wholly or in part to the Länder or to municipalities 
(associations of municipalities) shall require the consent of the Bundesrat’. In effect, this 
meant that the opposition Christian Democrats had a veto over revenue decisions in Germany 
during the first four years of EMU (Hallerberg, 2004:89). The deleterious impact of this veto 
on public finances became apparent when, in an effort to win the support of the business 
lobby and several key Länder, the Schröder administration’s draft tax reforms in 1999 were 
revised to include a reduction in the overall tax burden, rather than (as had originally been 
envisaged) a mere redistribution of the existing burden (Margerum Harlen, 2002:71). 
Moreover, when it came to efforts at budgetary consolidation, the loss of the Bundesrat 
shifted emphasis from the revenue- to the expenditure-side of the budget. As von Hagen and 
Strauch (2001:28) note, this proved to be problematic because of the fact that the Finance  
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Minister’s power to cut expenditure was restrained by rapid increases in predetermined 
federal spending on social insurance, interest repayments and wage expenditure.  
If the large number of veto players in Germany’s polity contributed towards a system of 
checked delegation, then so too, it appears, did the accession of the German Democratic 
Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990. For von Hagen and Strauch (2001:29-
31) German unification led to a two-fold erosion in the power of the Bundesminister der 
Finanzen.
5 Firstly, the use of special ‘off-budget’ funds to finance unification meant that a 
significant share of government expenditure was subject to neither the usual checks and 
balances of parliamentary scrutiny nor the supervision of the Finance Minister (Heipertz and 
Verdun 2004). As von Hagen, Hughes-Hallett and Strauch (2001:49) record, ‘while the 
federal government’s debt rose by a mere 3% of GDP from 1989 to 1997, the combined debt 
of off-budget entities amounted to twelve percent of GDP in 1997, half the size of federal 
government debt’. Secondly, the lead role of the Chancellor’s Office in the negotiations 
preceding German unification undermined the Finance Minister’s authority over budgetary 
matters. As von Hagen and Strauch (2001:31) note, when it came to decisions relating to 
public guarantees for private debts of firms from the new Länder, for example, the talks were 
chaired by the Chancellor’s Office and the Finance Ministry was largely excluded.
6 Although 
it remains a moot point as to whether the Finance Minister would have taken a more hawkish 
attitude towards the costs of unification – it appears in retrospect that such costs were widely 
underestimated (Sinn, 2000) – the involvement of the Chancellor’s Office in budgetary affairs 
                                                                                                                                                          
4   Cited in Zohlnhöfer (1999:149). 
5   Von Hagen and Strauch (2001) date the decline in the authority of the German Finance Minister from the 
resignation of Alex Möller (1971) and Karl Schiller (1972) because of their objection to plans by the 
Chancellor, Willi Brandt, to pursue expansionary fiscal policies. 
6   von Hagen and Strauch (2001:31) criticise the increased ‘ad hocery’ of budgetary measures under the Köhl 
administration, which introduced seven supplementary budgets between 1990 and 1997.  158
set a dangerous precedent by loosening Minister’s grip on public finance (von Hagen and 
Strauch, 2001).
7 
In summary, this section has suggested that Germany is something of an awkward case for the 
political institutionalist critique of the SGP. On the one hand, the existence of a large number 
of veto points in German economic policy is consistent with the political institutionalist 
hypothesis that a fragmented budgetary process is a potential impediment to budgetary 
discipline. On the other hand, the apparent importance of these national veto points weakens 
political institutionalism’s claim that the SGP undermined the conditions for budgetary 
discipline in Germany during the early years of EMU.  
 
5. ARE DELEGATION STATES UNSUITED TO NUMERICAL FISCAL 
RULES? 
As discussed in Section 2, a recurring argument in the political institutionalist critique of the 
SGP is that delegation states, by virtue of their reliance on institutionally strong Finance 
Ministers, are unaccustomed to numerical fiscal rules. This section questions the empirical 
validity of this claim in the light of recent research findings on fiscal governance in the EU.  
The most recent research in the political-institutionalist vein finds that numerical fiscal rules 
may have more of a role to play in delegation states than first envisaged. In a study of fiscal 
policy-making in EU Member States over the period 1985 to 2001, Hallerberg, von Hagen 
and Strauch (2004) find that both greater centralisation in the budgetary process and binding 
                                                 
7   At the time of unification the OECD (1991:62), for example, judged German fiscal policy to have been ‘in 
a relatively strong position to meet the financial requirements of unification’. Although criticisms of the 
Kohl administration’s budgeting of unification were central to the Social Democrat election manifesto in 
1990, this stance proved to be an unpopular move. (Marsh, 1990).  
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fiscal rules have a negative and statistically significant effect on government debt in EU 
delegation states. This result, the authors admit, represents a departure from early research in 
the political institutionalist tradition, which found little evidence that fiscal rules were 
employed in a systematic manner outside commitment states. Although their empirical 
analysis offers no conclusive evidence for the reasons behind this result, Hallerberg, von 
Hagen and Strauch (2004) postulate that stringent fiscal rules could be of potential importance 
in delegation states in so far as they help to dampen expenditure demands in parts of 
government which are not controlled by the budgetary process and because of potential 
complementarities between a strong Finance Ministry and well-designed budgetary rules.
8 
  
Table 4: A summary of numerical fiscal rules in delegation states 
Country  Type of 
rule  Overall description of the rule 
Austria  BBR 
Deficits targets for the Federal Government and regional (Länders) and local 
governments contained in a National Stability Pact (NSP) within a multi-
annual budgetary setting (four years) 
ER 
For Federal Government and RG (Länders) expenditure cannot grow by more 
than 1% 
DR 
Raising credits by the communes requires authorisation by the supervisory 
agencies and must only be used to finance investments - numerical limits and 
ceilings 
BBR  LG have to present a balanced budget ('administrative' and capital accounts) 
BBR 
Public borrowing is only allowed if credit amount does not exceeds public 




The credit volume must not exceed the investment volume (golden rule) 
except for dealing with adverse macroeconomic developments. 
BBR 
In ‘normal’ economic conditions the general government and its sub-sector 
must show a balanced budget or a surplus. This is embedded in a medium-
term fiscal framework (3 years) consistent with the Stability Programme 
DR 
As a general rule, each regional government must register the same 
indebtedness (nominal terms) at the beginning and at the end of each year 
(starting in 2003) 
DR  Restrictions on possible loans 
Spain 
DR 
LG must register a balanced budget or a surplus. Total LG debt cannot exceed 
110% of current revenues and must register a positive saving. 
France  ER  The rule defines the targeted increase of State sector expenditure in real terms 
                                                 
8   See the contribution of Hallerberg, von Hagen and Strauch to the present volume for a further treatment of 
this issue.  160
BBR 
Local authorities are subject to a golden rule; voted budgets must be in 
balance; ex post deficits cannot exceed 5% of current revenues (10% for 
small municipalities)  
RR 
Government has to define ex ante how possible revenue surpluses (compared 
to plans) will be allocated 
ER  Every year, the Parliament votes on the national ceiling for health expenditure 
ER 
Internal Stability Pact provides local entities with measures to limit 
expenditure. Expenditure evolution depends on kind of entities (regions, 
municipalities, provinces) and year to which is refers to. 
BBR 
Budget balance rule for regional governments, which regulates access to State 
financing 
BBR  Golden rule for local governments 
Italy 
ER 
The rule establishes an expenditure ceiling for pharmaceutical products equal 
to 16% of the financing level for the National Health Service contributed by 
the State 
Source: Commission services 
 
Further evidence on the use of numerical fiscal rules in delegation states is provided by a 
recent survey of budgetary practices by DG Economic and Financial Affairs of the European 
Commission (see European Commission, 2006). This survey, which was based on a detailed 
questionnaire completed by national administrations in the 25 EU Member States, covers a 
total of sixty numerical fiscal rules at the general, central, regional and local government level 
over the period 1990-2005. Several quasi-rules were excluded from this analysis, such as 
temporary expenditure freezes by governments, rules concerning the budgetary procedure and 
ill-defined budgetary targets.  
Table 4 summarises the numerical fiscal rules that were in place in 2005 in euro-area 
delegation states. Although this information does not, by itself, tell us about the effectiveness 
of numerical fiscal rules, it does show that, contrary to the political institutionalist critique of 
the SGP, delegation states are, with the exception of Greece, no strangers to the use of 
expenditure, balanced budget and debt rules at various levels of government. The experience 
of fiscal policy-making in Spain, in particular, demonstrates the willingness of some 
delegation states to embrace numerical fiscal rules. Spain, as was noted earlier, is a relative 
newcomer to delegation, having taken steps in the late 1990s to strengthen the position of its  
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Finance Minister vis-à-vis other cabinet members as part of its efforts to meet the 
convergence criteria for EMU membership (Hallerberg, 2004:188). From a political 
institutionalist perspective, such measures should have been broadly sufficient to ensure the 
conditions for budgetary discipline in Spain were in place. Nevertheless, the Spanish 
government chose to go further by adopting an ambitious set of numerical fiscal rules under 
the General Law on Budgetary Stability (Law 18/2001) and the Organic Law (Law 5/2001). 
The centrepiece of Spain’s fiscal rules, which came into effect in 2003, is that all branches of 
the general government should aim for a position of budgetary balance or surplus on an 
annual basis. These rules also apply to Autonomous Communities, which as a result of the 
trend towards decentralisation, account for nearly half of the total expenditure of the general 
government. Under the General Law on Budgetary Stability, the central government sets a 
budgetary target for the autonomous regions as a whole, which is then disaggregated by the 
Fiscal and Financial Policy Council. In principle, an autonomous region can be permitted to 
run a deficit but on condition that it outlines a three-year budgetary adjustment path for 
returning to balance. 
The implementation of Spain’s fiscal rules is monitored by the public audit office, the General 
Intervention of the State. In the event that the aggregate budget deficit breaches the EU 
Stability and Growth Pact, any financial penalties will be passed on to the culpable 
government sub-sectors. A degree of flexibility is ensured by means of a contingency fund of 
up to 2% of total non-financial expenditure to be used to cover government expenditure in the 
event of unforeseen economic circumstances. In the event of revenue windfall or an 
expenditure shortfall, the additional resources will be channelled towards debt reduction or, in 
certain circumstances, the pension reserve.  162
In July 2005, the Spanish government proposed a number of modifications to its fiscal rules. 
Under the terms of this proposal, a distinction will be made between social security and other 
categories of the central government budget (Kingdom of Spain, 2006). The former will be 
required to balance long-term revenues and expenditures taking into account medium- and 
long-term economic and demographic projections. The latter will aim for budget balance over 
the economic cycle. A general government deficit of 1% of GDP will be permitted during 
periods of slow growth, while there will be an obligation to run budget surpluses imposed 
during periods of fast growth. The proposed changes to the Law on Budgetary Stability also 
give greater leeway for government borrowing by the central government, autonomous 
communities and certain local administrations for investment in, inter alia, R&D and 
innovation. Such borrowing must not add more than 0.5% of GDP to the general government 
deficit.  
Spain’s fiscal rules have been criticised in some quarters for failing, in their original form, to 
give due regard to the economic cycle and for giving homogenous budgetary targets to the 
Autonomous Communities (see DG Economic and Financial Affairs, 2005). These concerns 
over effectiveness notwithstanding, the fact that Spain, a recent covert to the delegation 
approach to fiscal governance, has adopted an ambitious set of numerical fiscal rules in its 
efforts to comply with the SGP is important. The experience of Spain, along with the 
widespread use of fiscal rules in other euro-area delegations states, calls into question the 
recurring argument in the political institutionalist critique of the SGP that such rules are alien 
to Member States that rely on institutionally strong Finance Ministers as a source of 
budgetary discipline.   
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6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The political institutionalist critique of the SGP presents a rather stark choice for achieving a 
better institutional between delegation and EMU's budgetary rules.
9 The first option is to 
make the SGP less binding, for example, by reducing the emphasis of numerical fiscal rules. 
This would, it is implied, prevent the SGP from impinging on the institutional strength of 
Finance Ministers in delegation states. The second option is to change the electoral system so 
as to reduce the tendency to elect single party majority government or ideologically similar 
coalitions. This, it is implied, would make these countries better suited to the commitment 
approach to fiscal governance and hence to the constraints of the SGP.  
Neither of these choices is attractive. Making the SGP less binding, as Annett (2006) 
recognises, may allow for greater fiscal discretion in delegation states but it could undermine 
the conditions for budgetary discipline in commitment states. This is because a looser SGP is 
less likely to reinforce the fiscal contract between ideologically diverse coalition partners. 
Promoting electoral reform, on the other hand, is a disproportionate step. It is difficult to 
envisage radical constitutional reform in Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain 
for the sake of compliance with EMU's budgetary rules.  
The rejoinder to the political institutionalist critique of the SGP is more sanguine about the 
possibility of achieving a better institutional fit between EMU's budgetary rules and the 
delegation approach to fiscal governance. In the first place, it rejects the need for a 
widespread reform of electoral systems in delegation states. The budgetary discipline 
achieved by Austria and Spain shows that Member States which elect majority governments  164
or ideologically similar coalition governments can be compliant with the SGP. From a 
political economy perspective, the only euro-area member where the issue of electoral reform 
crops up is Portugal, where, as we have seen, the pursuit of budgetary discipline in general 
and attempts to strengthen the institutional position of the Finance Minister in particular have 
been frustrated by the tendency to elect minority or delicately-balanced governments. 
The analysis presented in this paper points towards a two-step approach to strengthening 
domestic budgetary institutions in delegation states with a view to enhancing their capacity to 
achieve budgetary discipline and, hence, comply with the SGP. The first step is for delegation 
states need to delegate properly. The political institutionalist critique of the SGP takes this 
point for granted, but the survey evidence reviewed in this paper suggests that Germany's 
Finance Minister is in a relatively weak institutional position. This position could have been 
rectified in the early years of EMU by, among other things, giving the German Finance 
Minister greater power to negotiate bilaterally with other Ministers and a stronger veto over 
budgetary decisions in cabinet.
10 The second step is for delegations states to embed the goals 
of the SGP firmly in numerical fiscal rules. The evidence reviewed in Section 5 shows that, 
contrary to the political institutionalist critique of the SGP, delegation states are currently 
employing a range of expenditure, balanced budget and debt rules. As the question of 
effectiveness is not tackled here, further analysis is required to understand the optimal design 
and effectiveness of such rules in a system of fiscal governance that relies on an institutionally 
strong Finance Minister. 
                                                                                                                                                          
9   This paper abstracts from the issue of peer pressure and its effectiveness in commitment and delegation 
states, something which the IMF (2004) devotes considerable attention to. For a further discussion peer 
pressure and its limits see Tabellini and Wyplosz (2006).  
10 This situation is complicated the “Grand Coalition” which took office in Germany in November 2005. With an 
ideological space of 5.1 on tax and expenditure issues (Benoit and Laver (2006), it is doubtful whether the 
CDR/CSU and SPD can be considered as ideologically-similar coalition partners. For this reason, von Hagen 
and Hallerberg (2005) argue that the pursuit of fiscal discipline in Germany at this time would be better served 
by the agreement of a fiscal contract between the coalition partners rather than attempts to delegate authority 
over the budgetary process to a strong Finance Minister. Whether this means that Germany should now be 
reclassified as a commitment state is a matter for further discussion.   
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The SGP is, according to political institutionalism, a poor substitute for deficient national 
budgetary institutions. The revisions to the SGP, which were agreed by the ECOFIN Council 
in March 2005, go some way towards addressing this criticism. Henceforth, Ministers agreed, 
‘[n]ational institutions could play a more prominent role in budgetary surveillance to 
strengthen national ownership, enhance enforcement through national public opinion and 
complement the economic and policy analysis at EU level’. To this end, it agreed that there 
was scope for discussing the implementation of national budgetary rules in the context of the 
stability and convergence programmes (European Council, 2005).  
The link between the effectiveness of national budgetary institutions and ownership in the 
revised SGP is a curious one. On one level, the term ownership recalls the importance 
attached to this term by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For Khan and 
Sharma (2001:14) ownership over  
IMF programmes means that ‘decisions…are likely to be made quickly and in support of the 
program, which makes it more likely that the program will succeed’ as well as making ‘it 
easier to generate domestic political support for the program, since it is likely to be seen, at 
least in part, as an indigenous product, rather than a foreign imposition’. On another level, the 
emphasis in the revised SGP on the effectiveness of national budgetary institutions is closer to 
the IMF's understanding of conditionality which refers to, among other things, the pre-
conditions on ‘domestic governance and the institutional framework of economic policy-
making’ for continued access to IMF financing (Woods and Narlikar,  2001:569). This 
conceptual blurring in the revised SGP leaves open an important question: will the 
surveillance of national budgetary institutions remain under the heading of ownership, thus 
leaving the design of fiscal rules largely in the hands of Member States, or will it evolve in 
the direction of conditionality, thus giving the EU a greater (and perhaps more controversial) 
say in how Member States go about complying with the SGP?  166
7. CONCLUSION  
In summary, this paper has acknowledged the important contribution of political 
institutionalism to our understanding of the link between electoral regimes and different 
approaches to fiscal governance. However, it has taken issue with a recurring argument in the 
political institutionalist literature which suggests that delegation states, which rely on strong 
Finance Ministers with a considerable degree of discretion over the government budget, are 
ill-suited to the rules-based approach of the SGP.  
This paper has pointed towards three weaknesses in this line of argument. Firstly, political 
institutionalism tends to overstate delegation states’ poor track record vis-à-vis the SGP. The 
fiscal discipline shown by Austria and Spain in recent years implies that not all delegation 
states breached the SGP while the pro-cyclical fiscal loosening experienced by commitment 
and delegation states alike shows that non-compliance with the medium-term aspects of the 
SGP was widespread. Secondly, political institutionalism tends to downplay the national 
sources of fiscal indiscipline which existed in some delegation states. EMU’s budgetary rules 
are unlikely to have directly undermined the conditions for fiscal discipline in Germany, as 
the large number of veto players which exist in relation to its fiscal policy suggests that such 
conditions were not in place to begin with. Thirdly, political institutionalism’s claim that 
delegation states are unfamiliar with numerical fiscal rules is at odds with the emerging 
evidence. A case in point is Spain, which, in addition to strengthening the institutional 
position of its Finance Minister in 2000, has adopted an ambitious set of numerical fiscal rules 
covering all tiers of government.  
Political institutionalism leaves few options open to delegation states for enhancing their 
capacity to comply with the SGP other than weakening EMU's budgetary rules or undertaking 
electoral reforms that will facilitate a conversion to the commitment approach to fiscal  
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governance. This paper has suggested that a more piecemeal solution may be available. The 
fiscal case for electoral reform is weak, except in Member States which tend to produce 
minority governments with a lose grip on public finances. A more important avenue of reform 
is to ensure that national systems of fiscal governance in delegation states are aligned with the 
goals of the SGP.  
As a first step in strengthening national systems of fiscal governance, it may be necessary for 
some delegation states to enact measures to tighten the grip of their Finance Ministers over 
the formation and implementation stages of the budget. As a second step, there is growing 
evidence that numerical fiscal rules have a role to play in Member States that nonetheless rely 
on institutionally strong Finance Ministers to promote budgetary discipline. Under the revised 
SGP, the EU will continue to monitor whether Member States are complying with EMU’s 
budgetary objectives. An open question is whether the EU will play a more active role over 
time in monitoring how national systems of fiscal governance affect Member States’ capacity 
to comply with the SGP.   168
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Rainy Day Funds:  
Can They Make a Difference in Europe? 
 








Rainy Day Funds (RDFs) have an important role in the USA. They allow States – which usually 
have rules requiring a balanced budget for current revenue and spending – to limit procyclical 
fiscal policies. This paper examines the possible role of RDFs in the European fiscal framework. 
The analysis suggests that RDFs would not fundamentally alter the incentive problems at the root 
of the difficulties in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. Moreover, RDFs are 
not an option for countries with high deficits. However, for low-deficit countries, RDFs can 
lessen the rigidity of the 3 per cent threshold in bad times. RDFs could be introduced on a 
voluntary basis at the national level and could contribute to make the rules more country-
specific. The introduction of RDFs would require a change in the definition of the “Maastricht 
deficit”: deposits and withdrawals should be considered respectively as budget expense and 
revenue. In this way, the balances held in RDFs could be spent in bad times without an increase 
in the deficit. To ensure that RDFs are not used opportunistically, deposits should only be made 
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1. Introduction 
 
The long debate on European Union (EU) fiscal rules has highlighted their weak points, 
including the lack of strong incentives for fiscal discipline in good times and the related 
possibility that in bad times countries have to choose between implementing procyclical 
policies and trespassing the 3-percent-of-GDP deficit threshold. The experience of US 




Almost all States in the USA have legal provisions mandating that the budget should be 
balanced on a yearly basis. Although different from European fiscal rules, this balanced-
budget requirement has similar implications. In good times it will be relatively easy to 
comply with the rule as revenue will be abundant. However, keeping a balanced budget 
through a downturn will entail procyclical tax increases and/or expenditure cuts, unless 
significant surpluses are run in the upturn. To deal with this problem, starting mainly from 
the late seventies, US States have been adopting RDFs.
2 The idea is rather intuitive and 
appealing: money is saved and accumulated into the fund in good times, whereas money is 
withdrawn and spent in bad times. This can allow the State to stick to the balanced-balance 
requirement while avoiding increasing taxes and/or decreasing expenditures in bad times.  
 
This paper addresses the following questions: can RDFs tackle the incentive problem at the 
hearth of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) difficulties? Can RDFs make the European 
framework more flexible? What changes would be required in the EU framework to make 
RDFs an effective instrument? 
 
The analysis suggests that RDFs would not fundamentally alter the incentive problems of 
the SGP. Moreover, RDFs are not an option for countries with high deficits (even in good 
times, there would be no surplus to be saved). However, for low-deficit countries, RDFs 
can alleviate the rigidity of the 3 per cent threshold in bad times. RDFs could be introduced 
on a voluntary basis at the national level and could contribute to make the rules more 
country-specific. The introduction of RDFs would require a change in the definition of the 
“Maastricht deficit”: deposits and withdrawals should be considered respectively as budget 
expense and revenue. In this way, the balances held in RDFs could be spent in bad times 
without an increase in the deficit. To ensure that RDFs are not used opportunistically, 
deposits should only be made out of budget surpluses and circumstances allowing 
withdrawals should be specified ex ante. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares the US and the European set-ups 
highlighting similarities and differences. Section 3 reviews the available evidence on US 
                                                 
1  Buti et al. (2003) suggested the introduction of RDFs in the EU. They noted that, while the possibility to 
establish RDFs would not tackle at the root the incentive problem that governments have in good times, the 
flexibility that they would provide would allow a tightening of sanctioning procedures for countries 
exceeding the 3 per cent limit. Sapir et al. (2003) noted that a voluntary system of RDFs could improve the 
incentives to secure surpluses in good times while increasing the room for manoeuvre in bad times. They 
concluded that the advantages of this step should be assessed against the cost of revision of national 
accounting rules.   
2  In the US the main rationale for introducing RDFs lies more with the need to avoid discontinuities in tax 
and spending programs, than with the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal policy. The cyclicality of 
fiscal policy at the State level is not really a big issue in the US. Indeed, the fiscal impulse will be 
determined by the federal government which is not bound by any fiscal rule and can undo the State’s fiscal 
stance.   173
States fiscal performance to see whether and under what conditions RDFs significantly 
improve fiscal performance. Section 4 discusses the possibility to introduce RDFs in the 
European framework and what can be expected from such an innovation. Section 5 
concludes and indicates issues for future research. 
 
 
2. Fiscal rules in the USA and the EU: similarities and differences 
 
The European fiscal framework was developed gradually. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) set 
the fiscal criteria to be met by EU member states in order to join the European monetary 
union (EMU). According to the Treaty, member states have to avoid “excessive deficits”, 
defined as situations where: (a) government deficit exceeds 3 per cent of GDP (unless the 
extra deficit is exceptional, temporary and small), or (b) government debt is higher than 60 
per cent of GDP and is not declining at a satisfactory pace. These same criteria were 
intended to regulate the fiscal behaviour of member states after they joined EMU.
3 
 
The SGP (1997 and 2005) complemented the Treaty with a view to reconcile permanent 
restraint on deficit and debt levels with margins for fiscal stabilization. More specifically, 
the Pact introduced the new objective of a medium-term budgetary position close-to-
balance-or-in-surplus (CTB), where medium-term can be interpreted as the length of the 
economic cycle and the CTB objective as a target in cyclically adjusted terms (net of the 
effect of temporary measures).  
 
The CTB medium-term target is intended to provide margins for stabilization policy during 
“normal” cyclical fluctuations (changes in the output gap) without breaching the 3 per cent 
deficit threshold (fig. 1). Additional room for manoeuvre in the face of other unfavourable 
events is provided by specific provisions governing the possibility to trespass the 3 per cent 




In the USA, almost all States have a balanced-budget requirement.
5 Though some deficit 
financing is allowed, this is subject to strict limits. Therefore many States also have an 
RDF as a means to avoid tax increases and/or spending cuts in bad times while complying 
with the balanced-budget requirement. RDFs are seen as a means to avoid abrupt changes 
in tax and spending policy rather than as a means to allow active fiscal stabilization.
6 The 
                                                 
3  The development of and rationale for these rules are discussed, e.g., in Buti and Sapir, 1998; Brunila et al., 
2002; Buti and Franco, 2005.
 
4  The recent revision of the SGP increased its flexibility but did not affect the trust of the fiscal framework. 
With the revision, CTB medium-term targets vary across countries depending on debt level and potential 
growth and the set of circumstances allowing the nominal deficit to exceed 3 per cent of GDP has been 
enriched.  
5 Even if most US States share many features concerning fiscal policy, there is a high degree of 
heterogeneity in the way the fiscal framework is actually implemented. In particular, the specifications of 
the balanced-budget requirement vary significantly across States. Some have a simple ex ante provision 
(i.e. a budget proposal cannot be approved unless it foresees a balance between revenue and expense). 
Others have an ex post requirement, whereby any revenue shortfall or spending overrun with respect to the 
approved budget cannot be fully financed through borrowing and must be compensated by tax increases 
and/or spending cuts. See Laubach (2005). In this paper, when we refer to the US States in general, we 
actually refer to the most common fiscal features. 
6  See Knight and Levinson (1999) and McGranahan (1999).
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idea is simple: money is set aside into the fund in good times and it is withdrawn in bad 
times.  
 
The typical state budget is made up of a general fund, which is financed through taxes and 
fees and pays out current expenditure, a capital fund, which is financed through debt and 
motor fuel taxes and pays out infrastructure investments and an RDF. The balanced-budget 
requirement usually refers to the general fund and the corresponding balance is measured 
including transfers to/from the RDF. 
 
This set-up resembles the European one: net of operations with the RDF, the general fund 
will run surpluses in good times and deficit in bad times, resulting close to balance (recall 
that some deficit financing is allowed) on average across good and bad times (fig. 2). 
 
However, there are three important differences. First, contrary to what happens under 
European provisions, the US balanced-budget requirement does not apply to capital 
spending, so that it ultimately implements a “golden rule over the cycle”,
7 closer to the 
fiscal rules adopted in the UK.
8 Second, the maximum deficit allowed in bad times is not 
fixed ex ante (as with the 3 per cent ceiling in the Maastricht Treaty), but depends on the 
resources accumulated in good times. Third, the surpluses obtained in good times must be 
saved in the RDF and cannot be used otherwise, while in the European framework 





















     
Fig. 2 - Balanced-Budget Requirement and Rainy Day Funds in the USA
budget balance - current account
general fund balance net of RDF operations

















It should also be noted that the definition of good and bad times is not the same in the two 
set-ups. In the US context, the definition of the type of shocks (bad times) against which 
RDFs are meant to provide shelter is not unequivocal. In particular, a broad and a strict 
definition can be distinguished (Hou, 2005). According to the former, bad times are those 
                                                 
7 Specific  provisions  regulate deficit financing of the capital fund in US States. 
8  The Code for Fiscal Stability (HM Treasury, 1998) defines a fiscal framework based on two rules: (a) the 
“golden rule” mandating that the public sector current balance be non-negative on average over the 
economic cycle; and (b) the “sustainable investment rule” requiring that the ratio of net public sector debt 
to GDP be kept at a stable and prudent level (currently set at 40 per cent).  
9 Indeed, because of the limit applying to gross debt, in the European framework there is an incentive for 
high-debt countries not to accumulate financial assets.   175
when a gap between revenue and expenditure opens either because of the adverse cyclical 
conditions or because of any unexpected adverse shock. The stricter definition limits bad 
times to the presence of adverse cyclical conditions. The SGP provision identifies as 
exceptional both unusual events outside the control of the Member State and severe 
economic downturns. 
 
In the European framework the budget deficit/surplus is defined according to the rules set 
out in the national accounts (ESA95):
10 net lending/borrowing (NL) is the balance of non- 
financial transactions (NL=R-G, with R indicating revenue and G expenditure) on an 
accrual basis, whose counterpart – on the financing side – is the change in the government 
net financial asset position (∆NA=∆A-∆L, with ∆A indicating the change in financial assets 
and  ∆L the change in financial liabilities). According to the Maastricht Treaty, net 
borrowing should never exceed 3 per cent of GDP: 
 
(1)  NL = R – G = ∆A – ∆L = ∆NA   ≥   -3% 
 
In this framework, deposits to/withdrawals from an RDF (∆RDF) would be included 
among changes in financial assets (∆A=∆RDF+∆OA; where OA stays for “other financial 
assets”). Changes in the balance of the RDF, like any other change in financial assets do 
not affect the deficit level, but the composition of its financing. If there is a deficit (R<G) 
and the government reduces its holding of financial assets (including the balance of the 
RDF) to finance such deficit (∆A<0), then the need to issue further debt (∆L) will 
correspondingly be reduced, but the difference between R and G will not be altered. 
 
 













Fig. 3 - Budgetary margins in bad times:




                                                 
10 See Eurostat (1995) and (2000).
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The US balanced-budget requirement applies to a different balance, which we may denote 
as BUS  and characterize as:
11 
  
(2)  BUS = R – G – ∆RDF = ∆OA – ∆L = 0 
  
Comparing (1) – from which R-G=NL – and (2) – from which R-G-∆RDF=0 – we see that 
∆RDF=NL. This highlights the similarity between the US framework and the European 
one, but also points to one of the important differences we mentioned before: while in the 
latter there is an ex ante limit to net borrowing (the 3 per cent of GDP threshold), in the 
former net borrowing is only constrained by the extent of savings set aside in the RDF (fig. 
3). 
 
The requirement that BUS be always balanced implies that RDFs cannot be financed by 
issuing bonds. This is important to avoid a ratchet effect in gross (and net) financial 
liabilities.  
 
Figure 4 compares the dynamics of budget balances (both NL and BUS), RDF balances and 
financial liabilities (gross and net) under two different regimes: one in which deposits into 
the RDF can only be made out of surpluses and another in which additional deposits can be 
financed by issuing bonds.  
 
Under the first regime (see the solid lines in Figure 4), net lending and net borrowing 
balance out over the business cycle (top panel) and BUS is always balanced (second panel). 
The balance held in the RDF grows during good times and is spent in the subsequent 
downturns (third panel). Gross debt is constant at its initial level (fourth panel) and net debt 
falls during upturns (as assets are accumulated) to return to its initial level during 
downturns (fifth panel). 
 
Now suppose that additional deposits into the RDF, bond-financed, are allowed (see the 
dotted lines in Figure 4), so that the balance held in the RDF at the end of the upturn 
exceeds cumulated surpluses (third panel). Compared to the other regime, this will have no 
bearing on net lending as R-G is unchanged (top panel), but BUS will record a deficit as 
deposits into the RDF exceed R-G (second panel). At the same time, gross debt will rise as 
new bonds are issued (fourth panel), while the path of net debt will be unaffected as new 
bonds are offset by deposits into the RDF (fifth panel). With the onset of the downturn, if 
net borrowing is allowed to rise up to the level of the RDF, it will exceed net lending 
obtained in the upturn (top panel), even though BUS is balanced as R-G=∆RDF (second 
panel). Since no new bonds are issued, gross debt will remain at the level reached at the 
end of the upturn (fourth panel), but net debt will rise above its original level (fifth panel) 
as the bonds issued in the upturn are no longer offset by the balance held in the RDF (third 
panel). As this pattern repeats over time, both gross and net financial liabilities keep 
growing. 
 
                                                 
11 This is a simplification for the sake of comparability. The US balanced-budget requirement leaves the 
overall deficit (and its financing) undetermined. It is more precisely defined as: 
BUS = Rc – Gc – ∆RDF = 0 
Where Rc and Gc indicate current revenue and expenditure, respectively.
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Paths under surplus-financed RDF
Paths under bond-financed RDF  
 
 
3.  RDFs and the cyclicality of fiscal policy  
 
In the US framework, before the introduction of RDFs, nothing prevented governments 
from accumulating resources in the general fund. Indeed, almost all States allow surpluses 
to be carried over from one year to the next (McGranahan, 1999).
12 Yet they were not 
doing so and the introduction of RDFs was justified as a means to achieve a higher degree 
of fiscal responsibility in good times.  
 
But how? Indeed, if the structure of the RDF is similar to that of the general fund – i.e. the 
funds are deposited and withdrawn at the legislature’s discretion – an RDF would not have 
                                                 
12  Nearly all balanced-budget rules are written in stock terms rather than in flow terms (Wagner, 2003; 
Wagner and Sobel, 2006).   178
any actual effect on the ability of the State to cope with bad times: it would simply play 
part of the general fund role.  
 
The criteria according to which funds are deposited into and withdrawn from RDFs vary 
significantly across States and in some cases they are fully discretionary (Appendix 1).
13 
Typically, three mechanisms are used: (a) residual determination of RDF 
deposits/withdrawals based on general fund year-end surpluses/deficits; (b) determination 
by legislative appropriations; and (c) determination through a mathematical formula.
14 
More than one mechanism can be used at the same time.
15  
 
Residual determination of deposits/withdrawals and determination  by legislative 
appropriation make an RDF little different form the general fund and can be considered 
“weak rules”. Reference to a mathematical formula, on the contrary, reduces discretion and 
can be seen as a “strong rule”. In principle, only RDFs based on strong rules can ensure 
time consistency of policies and allow a State to be better equipped for the next downturn. 
Much as with the SGP, the issue lies with the credibility/enforceability of the provisions. 
 
The empirical evidence on the impact of RDFs on the fiscal behaviour of US States over 
the cycle is mixed. The majority of States appears to fail accumulating sufficient reserves 




Tests which do not differentiate between weak and strong rules tend to suggest that the 
introduction of RDFs made little difference in fiscal behaviour (e.g. Wagner, 2003). 
Highlighting differences in provisions accompanying RDFs, other studies have found that 
the fiscal performance of States with RDFs based on strong rules tends to be better than 
average (Sobel and Holcombe, 1996; Wagner and Elder, 2005; Wagner, 2004). 
 
Results from a panel analysis over 1984-97 by Knight and Levinson (1999) suggest that 
total balances are: (a) better in States with RDFs than in States without RDFs; and (b) 
better in States whose RDFs have strict deposit and withdrawal rules (and no maximum 
size) than in States whose RDFs are run on the basis of legislative discretion. However, 
Wagner (2003) subsequently showed that the analysis in Knight and Levinson (1999) did 
not take into account non-stationarity of variables and once this is properly treated, found 
no evidence that the presence of an RDF has an impact on total government balances. 
Nevertheless, Wagner (2003) does find evidence that total balances are better when 
withdrawals from an RDF are regulated by supermajority rules.
17  
                                                 
13 In some States, RDFs balances cannot exceed a predetermined threshold.  
14 In a few cases deposits to the RDF are tied to specific revenue. This is the case of the oil taxes and of other 
mineral taxes in Alaska and Texas. Such cases are often not included in empirical analyses of US RDFs 
since they are regarded as exceptions. Indeed, funds tied to nonrenewable resources face very specific 
problems. Government revenue stemming from the exploitation of non-renewable resources differs from 
other revenue as it partly represents a depletion of assets. Secondly, using non-renewable resources raises 
important intergenerational issues (see Davis et al., 2003). 
15 For example, this is the case of Kentucky Budget Reserve Trust Fund, i.e. the Kentucky’s RDF, which can 
be replenished by the allocation of any end-of-year surplus as well as by direct appropriation. 
16  See, for instance, Sobel and Holcombe (1996), Levinson (1998) and Lav and Berube (1999). 
17  Moreover, Wagner (2004) also finds that States experience a reduction in bond yields after the introduction 
of an RDF and RDFs with different types of deposit and withdrawal rules affect borrowing costs differently 
(States with strict-rule RDFs obtain the largest reduction in yields). This suggests that the markets perceive 
RDFs as tools to enhance fiscal soundness by improving the States’ ability to manage a fiscal crisis.   179
 
Another set of studies focuses on the behaviour of expenditure over the cycle and finds 
more evidence in support of a positive role of RDFs. Hou (2005) finds that own-source 
expenditures (i.e. those that are not financed by transfers from other government tiers) are 
least affected by adverse cyclical conditions in States with fiscal reserves in RDFs. Wagner 
and Elder (2005) find a significant reduction in the volatility of expenditure in those States 
with a strict-rule RDF.
18  
 
The difficulties in implementing “good” cyclical policies and the diversity of outcomes 
under similar fiscal rules are not an exclusive prerogative of the US. In Europe, the average 
sensitivity of government budgets to the output gap over the cycle appears to be lower than 
one would expect on the basis of automatic stabilizers alone and there is evidence that this 
reflects significant asymmetries across positive and negative cyclical phases. Specifically, 
discretionary policy tends to act procyclically in good times – thus offsetting the automatic 
stabilizers – and to be neutral in bad times.
19 In general, there is little evidence that the 
introduction of fiscal rules, either with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, or with the SGP in 
1997, has affected the cyclicality of fiscal policy.  
 
We estimated a simple fiscal reaction function for each of the original members of the euro 
area (excluding Luxemburg and Germany)
20 to assess the cyclical performance of fiscal 
policy in these countries.
21 
 
Results confirm a low average cyclical sensitivity of the budget and a certain degree of 
asymmetry. Moreover, they confirm significant differences across countries. The cyclical 
sensitivity of the budget is not statistically different from zero in Belgium, France, Italy and 
the Netherlands, suggesting that procyclical fiscal policy systematically offsets the effects 
of automatic stabilizers. In Ireland, Portugal and Spain the cyclicality of the budget is 
found to be asymmetric: a countercyclical response to negative output gaps is accompanied 
by a procyclical or neutral response to positive output gaps. Only in Austria and Finland 
does the reaction of the budget appear to be consistently countercyclical across good and 
bad times (see Appendix 2 for details). 
 
In France, Portugal and Italy the unsatisfactory cyclical performance of the budget is 
accompanied by inadequate progress towards achieving the objective of a budgetary 
position close to balance or in surplus. On the other hand, in Austria and Finland not only 
did the budget react appropriately to cyclical conditions, but progress towards a close to 
balance position was steady.  
 
 
                                                 
18 Gonzales and Paqueo (2003) obtain similar findings and show that the reduction in volatility mainly affects 
social spending. 
 
19   See, for instance, Buti, Franco and Ongena (1998), European Commission (2001), von Hagen (2002), 
Balassone and Francese (2004) and IMF (2004 and 2006). While most of the evidence comes from panel 
studies, Balassone (2005) analyzes cyclical asymmetry in fiscal policy in a single country study of Sweden. 
20  The exclusion of Germany reflects technical difficulties related to the structural break due to the 
reunification. Results on a dataset truncated in 1990 suggest that fiscal policy was cyclically well-behaved 
in pre-unification Germany. Estimation of the reaction function over the subsequent 1990-2004 period 
provides no statistically significant result.  
21  We plan to run a similar exercise on US states in a subsequent version of the paper.    180
Fig. 5 – Heterogeneity of budgetary outcomes in the euro area: 
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Figure 5 shows the degree of heterogeneity of budgetary outcomes in the euro area over 
1995-2002. In 1995 the average net borrowing of France, Germany, Greece, Italy and 
Portugal (countries which were later to breach the 3 per cent deficit threshold) was much 
the same as that of the other euro-area countries, at about 5 per cent of GDP. In 2000, while 
the rest of the euro area scored a surplus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Portugal 
recorded an average deficit of 1.6 per cent of GDP. The opening of the gap was largely due 
to differences in policies. All countries improved their cyclically-adjusted balance until 
1999. Thereafter, while the other countries kept progressing towards a CTB position, 
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Greece loosened their budgets by about 2 percentage 
points, to reach a cyclically adjusted deficit of about 4 per cent of GDP in 2001-02.  
 
 
4. Can RDF make a difference in Europe? 
 
The US experience shows that RDFs per se do not fundamentally alter the incentive 
problems underlying procyclical policies. It also shows that rule-based RDFs can help to 
reconcile soundness and flexibility. But in this case, much as with the SGP and with fiscal 
rules in general, issues of commitment, credibility and enforceability arise. 
 
Nevertheless, the analysis in Section 2 suggests that there is one aspect in which RDFs 
could improve upon the current European framework. With RDFs the room for manoeuvre 
in bad times depends directly on surpluses accumulated in good times. In principle, this 
could allow more flexibility compared to the predetermined 3 per cent deficit ceiling of the 
Maastricht Treaty and would represent a further move towards a country-specific 
framework, away from the much criticized “one-size-fits-all” approach characterizing the 
original EU fiscal framework. 
 
This Section considers if and how European countries can take advantage of the 
opportunity offered by RDFs within the framework defined by the Maastricht Treaty and 
the SGP. The following issues are examined: (a) Should RDFs be introduced at the 
European or at the national level? (b) How should the EU accounting and monitoring 
framework be modified to accommodate RDFs? (c) What restrictions should apply to 
deposits and (d) withdrawals, in order to avoid the opportunistic exploitation of RDFs? (e) 
Which countries could actually benefit from the RDFs?  
 
RDFs: a national institution. – The reform of the SGP in 2005 aimed at increasing the 
flexibility of fiscal policy in EU countries. One-size-fits-all rules were not considered an   181
optimal solution, in particular with respect to the preventive arm of the Pact. Indeed the 
European Council has been calling for improvements in national fiscal frameworks, as a 
complement to the SGP reform. 
 
In this environment the introduction of a new centralized and rule-based instrument is 
unlikely to find much support. Moreover, there is no reason to maintain that all countries 
should pursue an increase in the room for manoeuvre in bad times compared to what is 
allowed under current provisions. Therefore, RDFs should more appropriately be national 
tools.  
 
Changes to the EU accounting/monitoring framework to accommodate RDFs. – As noted 
above, under ESA95 deposits to and withdrawals from an RDF would be recorded as 
changes in financial assets which do not affect the deficit level, but the composition of its 
financing.   
 
Without a change in the definition of the “Maastricht deficit”, which is based on ESA 
accounting rules, national authorities would have little incentive to introduce RDFs. With 
respect to EMU fiscal rules, the only benefit of accumulating assets in good times would be 
the possibility to avoid increasing gross debt in bad times as RDFs balances could be used 
to finance the deficit instead. However, there would be no change with respect to the 
maximum allowed deficit (the 3 per cent ceiling). 
 
A revised interpretation of ESA accounting rules could allow withdrawals from an RDF in 
bad times to be considered as additional revenue and thus reduce the deficit. This change 
may entail a revision of the EDP Protocol of the Treaty (European Commission, 2006).
22 
 
A number of monitoring/regulatory issues would arise. To minimize monitoring costs and 
hazards, there should be only one RDF per member state. Detailed reporting concerning 
level, changes and investment out of RDFs balances should be provided. In particular, this 
reporting could be included in the bi-annual Notifications of fiscal data which member 
states currently provide to European authorities. To ensure that RDF balances represent 
genuine savings and that they are readily available in bad times, they should only be 
invested in liquid, low-risk assets. For instance, financial assets which may be problematic 
to dispose of, such as shares of publicly owned companies not included in general 
government, should not qualify for RDF investment. Eligibility for the exemption could be 
granted only to bonds with a certain minimal rating, possibly those which can be used as 
collateral for monetary policy operations, and to other low risk financial assets. Adequate 
governance provisions and a transparent investment strategy should be set in place before a 
fund qualifies as an RDF under the EU fiscal framework.  
 
Restrictions on deposits: no debt financing. – As shown in Section 2, if bond-financed 
deposits into the RDF are allowed, gross debt will rise as new bonds are issued and remain 
constant when resources are drawn from the RDF. This pattern can repeat over time with 
gross and net financial liabilities gradually expanding. To avoid this ratchet effect on debt 
dynamics, RDFs should be exclusively financed out of surpluses. 
 
                                                 
22 Sapir et al. (2003) suggest that this change is worthwhile only if a critical number of governments are ready 
to introduce the RDFs. However, this consideration may unnecessarily restrict the minority of countries 
willing to create RDFs or in need of the extra flexibility that they may provide. Furthermore, once the 
provision is in place, other countries may be induced to follow.   182
Therefore, RDFs are not an option for countries with relatively high deficits. However, 
countries running a cyclically-adjusted deficit of 1 per cent of GDP (the medium-term 
objective indicated in the revised SGP for low debt/high potential growth countries) would 
be in a position to transfer resources to their RDF in good times (fig. 6). 
 
Restrictions on withdrawals. – The conditions under which withdrawals from the RDFs are 
to be considered as budget revenue have to be decided ex ante. Member states should 
evidently not be allowed to use RDF balances for running a high deficit in good times. 
Restricting the use of RDF balances to significant downturns would prevent RDFs from 
contributing to unnecessary expansionary procyclical policies. However, if RDFs are to 
allow extra margins with respect to current provisions, such conditions should obviously be 












Fig. 6 - RDF and cyclically adjusted deficits
 
 
In this respect, the recent reform of the SGP has somewhat reduced the added value that 
RDFs could offer in the European framework. The original SGP only allowed deficits in 
excess of 3 per cent under negative GDP growth rates of at least -2.0 per cent (-0.75 per 
cent in case of an abrupt slowdown or an accumulated loss of output relative to past 
trends).  The new SGP allows deficits larger than 3 per cent whenever the rate of growth of 
GDP is negative (or there is an accumulated loss of output during a protracted period of 
very low annual GDP growth relative to potential). Nevertheless, there could still be 
situations which fall outside the new provisions and yet require additional budgetary 
flexibility (e.g. a short period of very low growth). Moreover, the SGP reform did not alter 
the requirement that the deficit should stay close to 3 per cent. 
 
The introduction of additional numerical rules as means to regulate withdrawals from 
RDFs would be problematic. First, one should keep in mind the problems concerning the 
assessment of good and bad times in practice. Second, additional numerical provisions 
would counter the objective of increasing flexibility at the national level. The solution can 
be found in the ‘double-key’ procedural approach suggested by Sapir et al. (2003), 
according to which the decision to draw on the fund should require the approval of both the 
Member State and the Council (the latter based on a recommendation by the Commission). 
This procedure could also discipline the size of withdrawals. Basically, the Council should 
veto a gross misuse of RDF balances with negative externalities on the area. 
Which countries would have benefited from RDFs? – Overall, the fifteen countries which 
were EU members in 1992 – the year of the Treaty of Maastricht – recorded 50 surpluses 
and 115 deficits over the period 1995-2005 (Table 1). The surpluses were recorded by nine   183
countries: Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK. If these countries had accumulated those surpluses in an RDF, they 
would now hold reserves ranging between Belgium’s 0.5 per cent of GDP and 
Luxembourg’s 28.5 per cent. Finland would have reserves close to those of Luxembourg 
(26.8 per cent of GDP). Ireland, Denmark and Sweden would have RDF’s with balances 
well above 10 per cent of GDP. The Netherlands and the UK would hold balances of 1.7 
and 3.6 per cent of GDP, respectively. The potential benefits from an RDF are larger for 
volatile economies, where the 3 per cent threshold is more likely to be binding in bad times 
(Table 2).  
 
Table 1 - UE15 countries net borrowing over the period 1995-2005
(1) 
(as a percentage of GDP) 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Italy 7.4 7.0 2.7 2.8 1.7 2.0 3.1 2.9 3.5 3.4 4.1
France 5.5 4.1 3.0 2.6 1.7 1.5 1.6 3.2 4.2 3.7 2.9
Germany 3.2 3.3 2.6 2.2 1.5 1.1 2.8 3.7 4.0 3.7 3.2
U K 5 . 7 4 . 1 2 . 1- 0 . 1- 1 . 1- 1 . 6- 0 . 9 1 . 7 3 . 3 3 . 2 3 . 3
Spain 6.5 4.8 3.3 3.1 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.2 -1.1
Belgium 4.4 3.8 2.0 0.8 0.5 -0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3
Denmark 2.0 1.1 -0.4 -1.0 -2.2 -3.2 -2.2 -1.2 -1.1 -2.7 -4.9
Greece 10.2 7.4 6.6 4.3 3.4 4.0 5.4 5.2 6.1 7.8 5.2
Ireland 2.0 0.0 -1.3 -2.4 -2.7 -4.6 -0.8 0.6 -0.3 -1.5 -1.1
Luxembourg -2.4 -1.2 -3.7 -3.4 -3.4 -6.0 -6.1 -2.1 -0.3 1.1 1.0
Netherlands 4.3 1.9 1.2 0.9 -0.4 -1.3 0.2 2.0 3.1 1.8 0.3
Portugal 5.2 4.5 3.4 3.0 2.7 3.2 4.3 2.9 2.9 3.2 6.0
Austria 5.6 3.9 1.7 2.3 2.2 1.9 0.0 0.5 1.6 1.2 1.5
Finland 6.2 3.5 1.2 -1.7 -1.6 -6.9 -5.0 -4.1 -2.5 -2.3 -2.7
S w e d e n 7 . 0 2 . 7 0 . 9- 1 . 8- 2 . 5- 5 . 0- 2 . 6 0 . 2- 0 . 1- 1 . 8- 3 . 0
 
(1) A minus sign indicates a surplus. Data do not include UMTS proceeds. 
 
 
Table 2 - Cumulated surpluses, average gross debt 












Italy 0.0 111.5 2.4
France 0.0 59.3 1.8
Germany (3) 0.0 61.0  2.2 - 1.1
UK 3.6 43.7 1.8
Spain 1.1 56.8 2.7
Belgium 0.5 110.2 2.0
Denmark 18.8 54.0 2.3
Greece 0.0 110.7 4.2
Ireland 14.6 46.7 2.9
Luxembourg 28.5 6.9 3.3
Netherlands 1.7 59.8 1.9
Portugal 0.0 56.3 3.2
Austria 0.0 65.4 1.9
Finland 26.8 47.1 2.9
Sweden 14.9 59.7 2.0
 
 
(1) As a percentage of GDP. – (2) Standard deviation. – 
(3) The first data for real GDP volatility refers to the 
pre-unification period; the second data for real GDP 
volatility refers to the post-unification period. 
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This evidence shows that RDFs could already have a significant number of users. If most 
countries were to reach their medium-term objectives (which should not exceed a 1 per 
cent of GDP deficit) the number of potential users of RDFs would be even larger. The size 






RDFs are not a magic wand. They do not tackle at the root the incentive problem that 
governments have in good times. They are of no use for countries which are permanently in 
a deficit position. However, they can improve the room for manoeuvre for virtuous 
countries.  
 
To seize the benefits of RDFs in the European context, the definition of “Maastricht 
deficit” should be appropriately modified. Accompanying provisions should be carefully 
devised to avoid that RDFs become a means to circumvent fiscal rules. A crucial issue is 
the restrictions on deposits: only surpluses should be acceptable. 
 
The extra flexibility provided by RDFs would allow a tighter implementation of the 
procedure for countries exceeding the 3 per cent limit.  
 
RDFs would only be a viable instrument for countries which are close to the medium-term 
target of close to balance. The benefits of RDFs would be higher, the higher the volatility 
of GDP. 
 
The paper has not discussed the possibility of using RDFs at the subnational level 
(Balassone  et al., 2004). Given the current definition of “Maastricht deficit”, the 
availability of liquid balances in subnational RDFs could complicate compliance with 
European fiscal rules: an unexpected withdrawal from RDFs by subnational governments 
could push the general government deficit above the 3 per cent threshold. This may explain 
why RDFs are not that popular in Europe. The issue could be reopened by the change in the 
definition of Maastricht deficit needed for the viability of national RDFs, since it would be 
difficult to apply different rules to subnational RDFs.  
 
The development of local RDFs could contribute to limiting procyclical policies and help 
subnational governments to respect national budgetary rules (such as domestic stability 
pacts). Nevertheless, there would be problematic implications. The existence of many 
RDFs within a single country would burden monitoring at the EU level. Since a general 
government deficit is consistent with surpluses among subnational governments, the 
possibility arises that the principle according to which RDFs should only be financed out of 
general government surpluses is violated. Moreover, the regulation of withdrawals would 
become more difficult as several cycles would become relevant, not just the national one. 
 
These considerations point to the need for further work concerning the introduction of 
RDFs and the related changes in the EU fiscal framework.   
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APPENDIX 1 – US States’ stabilization funds: main features
(1)  
 
US State  Name of the fund  Deposit Method  Withdrawal 
Method 
Limit
(2)  First year in 
place 
First year with a 
positive balance 
Alaska Constitutional  Budget 
Reserve Fund 




No limit  1990  1992 
Arizona  Budget Stabilization Fund  Formula Formula 5  per  cent  1991  1994 
California  Special Fund for 
Economic Uncertainties 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  No limit  1976  1977 
Connecticut Budget  Reserve  Fund Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1979  1981 
Delaware Budget  Reserve  Account  Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1977  1979 
Florida Budget  Stabilization Fund  Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  20 per cent  1959  1965 
Georgia Revenue  Shortfall 
Reserve 
Year-end surplus Legislative 
appropriation 
No limit  1976  1976 
Hawaii  Emergency and Budget 





No limit  2000  - 




No limit  1984  1984 
Illinois -  Year-end  surplus  Legislative 
appropriation 
4 per cent  2000  - 
Indiana Countercyclical  Revenue 
and Economic 
Stabilization Fund 
Formula Formula 7  per  cent  1982  1985 






5 per cent  1992  1993 
Kentucky Budget  Reserve  Trust 
Fund Account 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1983  1987 
Louisiana  Revenue Stabilization and 
Mineral Trust Fund 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  No limit  1966  1967 
Maine  Maine Rainy Day Fund  Year-end surplus  Legislative 
appropriation 
4 per cent  1985  1985 




No limit  1985  1987 
Massachusetts Commonwealth 
Stabilization Fund 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1985  1987 
Michigan Countercyclical  Budget 
and Economic 
Stabilization Fund 
Formula Formula 25  per  cent  1977  1978 
Minnesota Budget  Reserve  Account  Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1984  1996 
Mississippi Working  Cash-
Stabilization reserve Fund 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  7.5 per cent  1982  1983 
Missouri Budget  Stabilization Fund  Legislative 
appropriation 
Budget deficit  5 per cent  1992  1992 
Nebraska  Cash Reserve Fund  Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  No limit  1983  1984   188
Nevada  Fund to Stabilize the 
Operation of the State 
Government 
Formula   Budget deficit  8 per cent  1991  1994 
New Hampshire  Revenue Stabilization 
Reserve Account 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1987  1987 
New Jersey  Surplus Reserve Fund  Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1990  1993 
New York  Tax Stabilization Reserve 
Fund 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  2 per cent  1946  1946 
North Carolina  Savings Reserve Account Year-end  surplus Legislative 
appropriation 
5 per cent  1991  1991 
North Dakota  Budget Stabilization Fund  Year-end surplus  Formula  No limit  1987  1990 
Ohio  Budget Stabilization Fund  Year-end surplus  Legislative 
appropriation 
4 per cent  1981  1981 
Oklahoma Constitutional  Reserve 
Fund 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  10 per cent  1985  1988 
Pennsylvania  Tax Stabilization Reserve 
Fund 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  3 per cent  1985  1986 
Rhode Island  Budget Reserve and Cash 
Stabilization Account 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  3 per cent  1985  1985 
South Carolina  General Reserve Fund  Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1978  1978 
South Dakota  Budget Reserve Fund  Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1991  1992 
Tennessee  Reserves for Revenue 
Fluctuations 
Formula  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1972  1972 
Texas Economic  Stabilization 
Fund 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  10 per cent  1988  1990 
Utah Budget  Reserve  Account  Year-end  surplus  Budget deficit  8 per cent  1986  1987 
Vermont  General Fund Budget 
Stabilization Reserve 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1987  1988 
Virginia Revenue  Stabilization 
Fund 
Formula Formula 10  per  cent  1992  1993 
Washington  Emergency Reserve Fund  Year-end surplus  Legislative 
appropriation 
5 per cent  1981  1989 
West Virginia  Revenue Shortfall 
Reserve Fund 
Year-end surplus  Budget deficit  5 per cent  1994  1995 
Wyoming Budget  Reserve  Account  Year-end surplus  Legislative 
appropriation 
No limit  1982  1983 
Sources: Hou (1998; 2005), Eckl (1995); Wagner and Elder (2005); Kentucky State Budget Director (2001); Zaharadnick 
(2005).  
(1) States without an RDF (according to any of the two definitions reported in Sections 2) are not reported in this table. 
More specifically, Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Oregon do not have an RDF. In particular, Alabama 
introduced a fund similar to a budget stabilization fund in 1988 (Education Trust Fund Proration Account). Nevertheless, 
this fund is only supposed to be used to supplement educational expenditure and therefore this is not a rainy day fund 
according to our definitions. Note that the National Conference of State legislatures and the National Association of State 
Budget Officers do consider this fund an RDF. Moreover, since 1982 Colorado has a fund (required Fund Balance). 
Nevertheless, it is a non-accumulating Fund and therefore it is not an RDF. – (2) As a percentage of general fund 
expenditure.   189
 
APPENDIX 2 – The cyclicality of fiscal policy in the euro area 
 
 
We specify the fiscal authorities’ reaction function in a way which is rather standard in the 
literature. The budget balance is regressed against its lagged value, the level of public debt 
and a measure of the cyclical conditions (see, for instance, Bohn, 1998; Ballabriga and 
Martinez-Mongay, 2002; and Galì and Perotti, 2003). Concerning the latter, we take into 
account separately good and bad times as measured by positive and negative output gaps 
(see, for instance, Balassone and Francese, 2004). The estimating equation therefore is: 
 




t   + εt 
 
where d is the budget deficit as a share of GDP, b is the debt-to-GDP ratio and ω
p and ω
n
   
indicate, respectively, positive and negative output gaps. We also introduce dummy 
variables to test for structural breaks. Specifically, we consider 1993, the year after the 
Treaty of Maastricht, and 1998, the first year of the euro area and the year following the 
introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact, as possible breaks for European countries.  
 
The results are reported in the following table. The panel regression highlights how the 
average cyclical sensitivity of the budget is lower than one would expect from the 
operation of automatic stabilizers alone.
23 Moreover, there is a large (though not 
statistically significant) difference between the coefficient for positive output gaps (-0.03) 
and the coefficient for negative output gaps (-0.34) confirming some asymmetry in the 
conduct of fiscal policy between good and bad times.  
 
Concerning single country equations, we tested for cyclical asymmetry in fiscal policy by 
controlling the statistical significance of differences between coefficients for positive and 
negative output gaps (where the difference was not significant we estimate a single 
coefficient). As a rule, we only kept an explanatory variable in the regression when its 
coefficient is significantly different from zero. 
 
Results confirm that for most countries, the cyclical performance of fiscal policy is not 
satisfactory. The cyclical sensitivity of the budget is not statistically different from zero in 
Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands, suggesting that procyclical fiscal policy 
systematically offsets the effects of automatic stabilizers.
24 In Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
the cyclicality of the budget is asymmetric: a countercyclical response to negative output 
gaps is accompanied by a procyclical or neutral response to positive output gaps. Only in 
Austria and Finland is the reaction of the budget consistently countercyclical across good 





                                                 
23   The average automatic semi-elasticity of the budget to the output gap is estimated at 0.5 (see, e.g., 
Bouthevillain et al., 2001).  
24 Italy is a borderline case: the point estimates of the coefficients for positive and negative output gaps have 
opposite signs (+1.0 and -0.5, respectively) are both significantly different from zero (though only at the 10 
and 5 per cent significance level, respectively). However, their difference falls just short of significance at 
the 10 per cent level.    190
panel BE FRA ITA NL IRL PT SPA AU FIN
Constant 1.58*** 2.08** 0.98** 6.60*** 1.39** 6.96** 8.39*** -0.06 1.75*** 0.79*
(4.28) (2.60) (2.13) (3.92) (2.69) (2.17) (5.20) (0.17) (2.92) (1.75)
dt-1 0.82*** 0.77*** 0.70*** 0.84*** 0.62*** 0.69*** 0.17  0.79*** 0.43** 0.66***
(19.46) (8.55) (4.69) (12.09) (4.61) (3.80) (1.19) (9.58) (2.48) (6.38)
bt-1 -0.02*** -0.06*** -0.06** -0.09***
(2.66) (4.11) (2.23) (3.75)
ω
p
t -0.04 0.17 0.49** 0.25
(0.31) (0.57) (2.24) (1.42)
ω
n
t -0.34*** -1.13** -0.81*** -0.63**
(2.95) (2.32) (3.77) (2.62)
ωt -0.16 -0.04 0.28 -0.28 -0.29* -0.48***
(0.65) (0.24) (1.24) (1.48) (1.98) (3.38)
d93 -0.48* -0.22*** -0.91* -5.07**
(1.83) (2.80) (1.83) (2.25)
d98 -1.43* -1.01*
(1.90) (1.92)
Adj. R2 0.85 0.86 0.57 0.92 0.64 0.88 0.69 0.84 0.54 0.75
o b s .2 4 9 3 42 52 43 5 1 92 73 4 2 82 9
Method of estimation: OLS (fixed effects, heteroskedasticity robust SE for the panel regression). T-statistics in brackets. 
*,**,*** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Period of analysis varies across countries (maximum span is 1970-2004).
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Abstract 
The paper provides a comprehensive overview of the numerical fiscal rules in force in the 
25 countries of the European Union, examines the reasons for the growing appetite for such 
rules, and assesses whether they have an influence on budgetary developments. The 
analysis is based on a new dataset constructed from questionnaires submitted to experts in 
finance ministries of EU countries which report a large amount of information on the 
numerical fiscal rules in force in the EU countries over the 1990-2005 period. The paper 
shows that the number of fiscal rules in force in the EU countries has increased in the past 
decades. The introduction of the Maastricht Treaty and of the SGP seem to have been 
catalysts for the introduction of fiscal rules. The analysis, based on the estimation of 
augmented fiscal reaction functions, confirms the existence of a relation between numerical 
fiscal rules and budgetary developments. The results show that some dimensions matter 
particularly for the capacity of fiscal rules to influence fiscal policy. Notably, the share of 
government finances covered by rules and the presence of strong enforcement mechanisms 
seem to be particularly relevant. The analysis also shows that there is a link between the 
design of numerical fiscal rules and the stabilisation function of fiscal policy. These 
findings confirm that while numerical fiscal rules can be useful devices to ensure better 
policies, careful attention should be devoted to the way they are designed. 
JEL classification: E62, H50, H62. 
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1. Introduction 
Post-war economic history provides evidence that fiscal authorities in industrialised countries 
may be prone to a “deficit-bias”, which shows up in large and persistent deficits and growing 
public debts (e.g., Roubini and Sachs (1989)). The behaviour of fiscal policy also appears to 
be often pro-cyclical, including in good times, in spite of the large agreement that a neutral or 
counter-cyclical stance would be preferable (e.g., IMF (2004), European Commission 
(2006)).  
There is growing agreement that the sources of the deficit bias and the “pro-cyclical bias” is 
rooted in “political economy” factors, i.e., in the system of incentives and rewards that shape 
the behaviour of fiscal authorities (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2000), and Drazen 
(2000)). Governments, being unsure to be re-elected, are inherently short-sighted and do not 
fully take into account the longer term implications of deficits. Groups in the society that 
benefit from a particular type of government spending do not fully internalise the costs of this 
expenditure, since the financing is generally spread among a wide set of contributors through 
taxation. This “common pool problem” is at the source of overspending and the accumulation 
of deficits and debt over time. As pressures for higher spending become stronger in good 
times, political economy factors can also explain why fiscal authorities often behave pro-
cyclically. 
Policies aimed at tackling the deficit bias at the source need to redress the structure of 
incentives of fiscal policy-makers. Broadly speaking, such policies would concern reforms in 
political institutions or, less radically, measures aimed at improving “fiscal governance”, i.e., 
the overall system of arrangements, procedures, institutions that underlie fiscal policy making. 
Most of the measures that have been devised in practice to improve fiscal governance concern 
one or more of the following elements. First, the procedural rules laid down in law or 
constitution that govern the elaboration and implementation of the annual budget law and fix 
the respective powers of the various actors taking part in the budget process. The main 
objective of reforming budgetary procedures is to reduce the extent of the common pool 
problem. Second, numerical fiscal rules which fix targets and ceilings for fiscal aggregates or 
set benchmarks for the conduct of fiscal policy. The purpose in this case is to replace the 
discretion of fiscal authorities prone to deficit bias with ex-ante rules. Third, independent 
fiscal institutions (Fiscal Councils) other than government and Parliament that play a role on 
the conduct of fiscal policy by providing inputs or recommendations on fiscal policy issues.   193
The underlying idea is to delegate specific tasks of fiscal policy-making to independent 
bodies which are less likely to be affected by distorted incentives (see e.g. IMF (2005)).  
This paper focuses on the features and the effectiveness of numerical fiscal rules in EU 
countries. While abundant literature exists on the role of budgetary procedures in advanced 
economies, and especially EU countries, in fostering budgetary outcomes ((e.g., Poterba and 
Von Hagen (1999)), there is proportionately less analysis devoted to numerical fiscal rules 
proper.
1 In the EU case, much of the debate and the existing analyses have focused on the EU 
fiscal framework, i.e., the numerical fiscal rules set at the EU level with the Maastricht Treaty 
and the Stability and Growth Pact. However, much less attention has been devoted to 
numerical fiscal rules set at national level (see, e.g., Von Hagen et al. (2006) among the few 
papers on the EU case), despite the growing reliance by EU countries on numerical fiscal 
rules at national level and the agreement among EU governments, expressed inter-alia in the 
March 2005 ECOFIN Council report on the reform of the SGP, that an appropriate national-
level fiscal governance is a key complement for a proper functioning of the EU fiscal 
framework. Another reason why further analysis on numerical fiscal rules seems deserved is 
that there is less than full agreement on their effects. A well-known debate regards the 
possible trade-off between fiscal discipline and fiscal stabilisation that may arise from the 
operation of fiscal rules. However, the discussion is still open on the capacity of numerical 
fiscal rules to effectively affect budgetary results. Doubts have especially been raised on the 
effectiveness of fiscal rules in absence of a strong political commitment or if not 
complemented by domestic budgetary institutions ensuring appropriate monitoring and 
enforcement (e.g., Wyplosz (2005), Von Hagen et al. (2006)).  
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
numerical fiscal rules in force in the European Union since the beginning of the nineties. 
Second, to analyse the underlying reasons for the growing appetite for such rules. Third, to 
assess whether national-level numerical fiscal rules have an influence on budgetary 
developments, both from the viewpoint of the fiscal discipline and of fiscal stabilisation. 
More specifically, we aim at addressing the following three sets of questions:  
(i)  What are the features of the numerical fiscal rules currently in force in the EU 
countries? Are there common characteristics to rules applied to different levels of 
                                                 
1   A number of recent studies have discussed the potential benefits of various forms of independent fiscal 
institutions (often named “Fiscal Councils”). See e.g., Eichengreen et al. (1999), Wyplosz (2005), Wren-
Lewis (2002), Jonung and Larch (2004).   194
government or to different types of countries (big vs. small, contract vs. 
delegation, etc)?  
(ii)  What macro-economic, budgetary, institutional and political factors have triggered 
the introduction of national-level numerical fiscal rules?  
(iii)  Is there empirical evidence that national numerical fiscal rules at national level 
have an influence on the level of deficits? Do numerical fiscal rules have 
implications for the cyclical stance of fiscal policy? What characteristics of fiscal 
rules are important for their impact on fiscal discipline and for the stabilisation 
function of fiscal policy?  
Compared with existing analyses, we aim to make a step forward in several respects. First, we 
have constructed a database on national-level numerical fiscal rules in EU countries by means 
of questionnaires addressed to fiscal experts in EU Finance Ministries which permit to 
analyse a wide range of features of a large set of different types of fiscal rules. All numerical 
rules conforming to the definition in Kopits and Symanski (1998) were considered: "a 
permanent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in terms of a summary indicator of fiscal 
performance". Information was collected both on numerical fiscal rules enshrined in the 
constitution or law and those based on political commitment or agreement between different 
general governments.
2 The database contains information of the design of the rules, their 
function, statutory basis, monitoring procedures, enforcement mechanisms, media visibility. 
The information collected is more updated and takes into account more recent developments 
compared with existing analyses. Moreover, since information is collected on a consistent 
basis over the whole 1990-2005 period, it permits to analyse not only the distribution across 
countries but also the evolution over time. 
Second, we make some progress in the construction of synthetic indicators of fiscal rules. We 
construct distinctive indicators for the overall system of numerical fiscal rules and for 
expenditure rules only. We construct indicators that permit to capture the intensity in the use 
of fiscal rules, based on what share of government finances is covered by rules. Moreover, we 
                                                 
2   If enshrined in constitution or law and having strict monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, such rules 
can impose binding constraints on the conduct of fiscal policy, and thereby may directly contribute to 
fiscal discipline. The influence of numerical fiscal rules based on political commitments or informal 
agreements between different tiers of general government is more indirect: by providing benchmarks 
against which fiscal policy it can be assessed, such rules raise reputation cost for the conduct of unsound 
policies.   195
construct indicators taking into account a number of qualitative features of the rules that are 
likely to matter for their ability to affect budgetary outcomes (which concern their statutory 
basis, their monitoring and enforcement procedures and their visibility in the media). 
A number of messages emerge from the analysis. The number of fiscal rules in force has 
increased continuously over the last 15 years. This trend has been observed in all sub-sectors 
of general government. The introduction of the Maastricht Treaty and of the Stability and 
Growth Pact seem to have been powerful catalysts for the introduction of these rules. The 
presumption that the introduction of fiscal rules would follow major crisis, recessions and / or 
marked deteriorations in government finances is not confirmed by the analysis. The analysis 
also shows that "contract countries" rely more on numerical fiscal rules than delegation states 
and that the existence of an independent Fiscal Council seems to favour the development of 
numerical fiscal rules.  
Regarding the impact of rules on budgetary outcomes, there is robust evidence that a more 
extensive use of numerical rules and rules with a more effective design are related contribute 
to reduce the size of deficits. The analysis shows that an increase in the share of government 
finances covered by numerical fiscal rules leads, ceteris paribus, to lower deficits. It also 
appears that an increase in the coverage of government finances by expenditure rules leads to 
a reduction in the primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio. The analysis also suggests that the 
characteristics of fiscal rules matter for their influence on budgetary outcomes. Some 
dimensions matter particularly for the capacity of fiscal rules to influence fiscal policy, 
notably the presence of a strong enforcement mechanism. Finally, the analysis supports the 
view that the nature and design of numerical fiscal rules may have an impact on the cyclical 
behaviour of fiscal policy. The elements of fiscal rules that are commonly perceived as 
relevant in terms of their impact on the stabilisation function of fiscal policy seem to indeed to 
be associated with a different response of fiscal authorities to the cycle. 
The paper is organised as follows. The second section provides a selected survey of the 
literature. The third section describes the dataset, provides a descriptive analysis of the 
numerical fiscal rules in force in the EU countries, and discusses the factors that may have 
triggered the introduction of fiscal rules. In the fourth and fifth section, we investigate the 
existence of a link between numerical fiscal rules and budgetary outcomes (discipline, 
stabilisation). The concluding remarks follow. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1. The deficit bias: theory 
Several different explanations have been put forward for the deficit bias. Most of them, most 
rigorously grounded in economic theory and empirically tested with strongest success, can be 
reconducted to two main lines of reasoning: governments’ short-sightedness and the so-called 
“common pool problem”.
3  
The main tenet of the explanation for the deficit bias based on governments’ short-sightedness 
is as follows: since governments are not sure of being re-elected, they have a tendency to 
overlook the long-term consequences of budgetary imbalances. Persson and Svensson (1989) 
and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) have demonstrated that the inherent short-sightedness of 
governments associated with uncertain elections lead to deficits in excess of optimal 
outcomes and that the deficit bias is further exacerbated by a strategic element whereby 
incumbent governments may have an incentive to “tie the hands” of forthcoming governments 
by creating high deficits. It has also been demonstrated that incumbents may have an 
incentive to attempt to affect electoral outcomes via fiscal policy, which in turn creates 
“electoral cycles” and may provide an additional explanation for the deficit bias (e.g., Rogoff 
(1990)). 
The second main set of explanations is related with the so-called “common pool problem”. 
Since the financing of a specific type of expenditure is often shared among a wide range of 
agents, interest groups that benefit from given categories of public spending have a tendency 
to free-ride on others’ contributions. This creates a bias towards overspending and the 
accumulation of deficits. Weingast et al. (1981) provide one of the first formal arguments for 
the common pool problem. Velasco (1999) demonstrates in a dynamic model that the 
common problem would, over time, lead to the occurrence of large and protracted deficits and 
the accumulation of debt. 
It has been demonstrated that the common pool problem is expected to be stronger in 
fragmented and heterogeneous government coalitions. Von Hagen and Hallerberg (1999) 
                                                 
3   An alternative explanation that needs to be mentioned is lack of time consistency of fiscal policy (see, 
e.g., Persson et al. (1987)). In analogy with arguments originally put forward for monetary policy, 
promises of fiscal rigour by fiscal authorities may lack credibility. If this is the case, agents anticipate high 
inflation in their wage and price demands, inducing in turn fiscal authorities to run expansionary policies   197
show that the members of a given government coalition have an interest to keep taxes low on 
their own constituencies, which could result into a higher deficit the most numerous the 
enacted targeted tax cuts and allowances. Persson et al. (2005) provide an analogous 
argument regarding spending: each member of the coalition will support initiatives to increase 
spending on items favouring their own constituencies. Again, the more numerous the number 
of different groups represented by the government, the more likely is overspending and deficit 
bias. Alesina and Drazen (1991) demonstrate that the persistence of large deficits could be 
due to inefficient political equilibria where coalition members fail to agree on a consolidation 
package. The implication of the Alesina and Drazen (1991) model is that the higher the 
degree of heterogeneity of government coalitions, the higher the likelihood that consolidations 
are delayed. Accordingly, fragmented governments may lead to deficit bias due to a 
mechanism other than the common pool problem but leading to the same predictions. Finally, 
Tornell and Lane (1999) have shown that pressures for increased spending resulting from the 
common pool problem may become stronger when resources are more abundant (i.e., in 
“good times”), since the marginal gain from lobbying becomes stronger in this phases of the 
cycle. The resulting outcome is a tendency to run pro-cyclical fiscal policies in good times. 
2.2. The deficit bias: empirical evidence 
Some papers have provided evidence in support of the explanation for the deficit bias based 
on governments’ short-sightedness. Grilli et al. (1991) put in relation deficits and measures 
for the duration of governments across a panel of industrial countries and find that deficits are 
strongly related with the frequency of changes in the executive. Moderate evidence in favour 
of the explanation of the deficit bias based on governments’ short time horizon is found in 
Lambertini (1996) in a study focused on the US. Petterson (1999) finds instead strong 
evidence in favour of the hypothesis across a large panel of Swedish municipalities. Overall, 
there is some evidence in favour of the explanation of the deficit bias based on short-
sightedness, even if there may be difficulties with the implementation of the empirical tests 
and with the interpretation of results (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2000)). 
The common pool problem explanation for the deficit bias has received relatively strong 
support from empirical evidence. Three strands of empirical literature addressing the common 
pool problem can be identified. First, analyses putting in relation measures of government 
                                                                                                                                                          
to offset the output effect of supply-driven inflation. Such arguments provide a general rationale to the 
deficit bias and the use of fiscal rules. However, they are hardly empirically testable.   198
fragmentation with budgetary outcomes. Second, studies linking political institutions to fiscal 
variables. Third, the large and growing body of literature analysing the relation between 
budgetary procedures and fiscal outcomes. 
Political fragmentation and budgetary outcomes 
Poterba (1994) and Besley and Case (2004) analyse the US case and conclude that political 
fragmentation is associated with higher spending across US states. Roubini and Sachs (1989) 
analyse a panel of industrial countries and find that more fragmented governments tend to run 
larger deficits. Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) find that government expenditure and debt are 
positively related across OECD countries with the number of members of government 
coalitions and with the number of spending ministries. In a recent comprehensive study, 
Fabrizio and Mody (2006) show that fragmented government coalitions are associated with 
larger deficits in a sample of Eastern European countries. 
Political institutions and budgetary outcomes 
To some extent the composition of governments, their degree of fragmentation and 
heterogeneity are the result of more fundamental institutional determinants, above all the 
electoral system. Proportional systems are expected to lead to more fragmented coalitions. 
Moreover, the size of the common pool problem could also be related to the way the 
institutional relations between the executive and the legislative are organized. The strength of 
check and balances are expected to be stronger in presidential rather than in parliamentary 
systems, thus leading to a less strong common pool problem (see, e.g., Persson (2002)). Some 
empirical analyses have provided support to the common pool hypothesis by putting in 
relation budgetary outcomes with electoral regimes. Grilli et al. (1991) find a relation between 
the size of deficits and proportional electoral systems across a panel of industrial countries. 
Persson (2002) finds that government spending tends be higher in countries with proportional 
elections and with a parliamentary system across a large sample of industrial and emerging 
countries. 
Fiscal governance and budgetary outcomes 
A large body of empirical literature has tackled the empirical analysis of the common problem 
by focusing on the impact of the procedures, arrangements and rules that surround fiscal 
policy making. The idea is that the common pool problem can be reduced in the presence of 
an appropriate system of fiscal governance. Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) identify two   199
broad approaches through which the common pool can be mitigated via fiscal governance. 
The first, delegation approach consists of designing institutions for fiscal policy in such a way 
to delegate strong powers to the finance ministry or to the prime minister. Such an approach 
permits to concentrate fiscal policy making in the hands of few actors and thereby to 
internalize the effects of spending and financing decisions on the budget. The second, 
contract approach consists of defining arrangements and procedures that ensure an agreement 
among spending ministries and other spending authorities (e.g., local authorities) on the total 
budget which is consistent with ex-ante defined objectives. In this case, the common pool 
problem is addressed by means of an ex-ante contract among the various parties that 
participate to fiscal policy making. These two models of fiscal governance are not mutually 
exclusive; mixed cases are possible. The models of fiscal governance followed in practice are 
likely to depend on a series of more fundamental political and institutional factors. While the 
delegation approach is expected to be suited for countries characterised by single party 
governments or small homogenous coalitions, a contract approach would be more likely to 
prevail in countries where fragmented governments are the norm. 
The papers that have analysed whether fiscal governance helps to mitigate the common pool 
problem generally make use of synthetic indicators of fiscal governance. This permits to put 
in relation country-level fiscal variables with variables measuring the degree to which fiscal 
governance permits to “centralise the budget” (i.e., to solve the common pool problem) which 
are also defined at country level.  Table 1 provides a synthesis of the main features of a series 
of such indexes that have been proposed so far in the literature.  
Von Hagen (1992) builds for EU countries a Structural Index that captures the degree of 
centralisation of the budget process, the characteristics of the Parliamentary process, and the 
flexibility of budgetary execution. He finds that fiscal discipline is enhanced by budget 
procedures in which the finance minister has a strong dominance over spending ministers, the 
amendment power of the parliament is limited and there is little flexibility with respect to the 
execution of the budget law. De Haan et al. (1999), on the basis of a similar methodology 
applied to a subset of EU countries, conclude instead that while budget institutions affect 
fiscal policy outcomes, the effect is in general relatively quite small. Hallerberg et al. (2001) 
further develop the methodology devised in Von Hagen (1992) and build different indexes, 
measuring the connectedness between stability programmes and budgetary procedures, the 
powers of the Finance Minister in the formulation stage of the budget, those of the Parliament 
during the approval of the budget and the role of the Finance Ministry in the implementation   200
stage. They find that the impact of fiscal rules on budgetary outcomes differ depending on the 
overall strategy chosen by the countries to centralise the budget. In contract countries the 
presence of multi-annual budgetary frameworks, especially if connected with Stability and 
Convergence Programmes, seem to have a significant impact on fiscal results. In delegation 
countries, budgetary outcomes appear to be affected mostly by the powers of the Finance 
Minister in the approval and in the implementation stage of the budget. 
Gleich (2003) builds indicators measuring the quality of budgetary procedures of 10 Eastern 
and Central EU countries. His indicators capture the role of procedures at various stages of 
the preparation of the budget (preparation stage, legislative stage, and implementation stage). 
Gleich (2003) assigns higher rankings to countries in which institutions are conducive to 
coordination and cooperation in decision making and that should thus promote fiscal 
discipline and finds that the institutional design of the budget process in these countries 
appears to have an impact on fiscal performance. Yläoutinen (2004) follows an approach 
similar to Hallerberg et al. (2001) to build fiscal governance indices for Central and Eastern 
European countries and shows that most of these countries rely predominantly on the 
commitment approach and that have strengthened their fiscal governance in recent times, 
mainly by establishing multi-annual frameworks. 
Von Hagen (2005) builds a Fiscal Rule Index summarising information pertaining to 
numerical fiscal rules, and an Index of Budgeting Institutions, measuring the extent to which 
other arrangements and practices permit to centralise the budget process.
4 The analysis 
considers both EU countries and Japan and concludes that numerical fiscal rules have 
disciplinary effects provided they are designed in an effective way and are combined with a 
design of the budget process that enables the government to commit to the rule. Hallerberg, et 
al. (2006, 2004) focus on the interaction between fiscal rules and budgeting processes at 
national level and conclude that fiscal rules are more effective in contract countries than in 
delegation countries. Annett (2006), shows that the Stability and Growth Pact has been more 
effective in improving budgetary outcomes in EU countries relying on a contract approach to 
fiscal governance.  
                                                 
4   The Von Hagen (2005) Fiscal Rule Index takes into account a number of features, including the time 
horizon covered by the rule, the degree of commitment to the rule, whether the fiscal targets are anchored 
in a coalition agreement, the connection between the Budget and Stability and Convergence Programmes, 
the existence of clear rules dealing with shocks to expenditures and the strength of Finance Minister to 
enforce budget law.   201
 
3. National-level fiscal rules in Europe 
3.1. The data 
In this section, we provide here basic information on the sample used in the following 
analysis. Information on fiscal rules in EU countries was collected by means of a survey 
conducted by the European Commission in 2006 in the context of the Working Group on the 
Quality of Public Finances (WGQPF) attached to the Economic Policy Committee (EPC). 
Questionnaires were filled out directly by fiscal policy experts in EU capitals. In contrast with 
existing studies which generally focus on the effect of certain types of fiscal rules applied to 
the central and, more rarely, the general government sector, our database is more 
comprehensive in several respects. It includes information on all types of numerical fiscal 
rules irrespective of the fiscal aggregate concerned (budget balance rules, debt rules, 
expenditure rules, …), of the legal status (rules enshrined in law or constitution, rules based 
on political commitment, …), of the sub-sector of general government to which they apply 
(local governments, state governments, central government, social security). The database 
contains information on all rules in place throughout the whole 1990-2005 period. This allows 
considering the dynamic dimension in the analysis of the relation between numerical fiscal 
rules and budgetary outcomes. We received information for all 25 EU countries. Among 
them, 22 have at least numerical fiscal rule; only Malta, Cyprus and Greece do not have 
numerical fiscal rules according to the definition used in our analysis.  
The following information is available for each rule: (i) the general characteristics of the rule; 
this covers the type of rule, the precise definition of the targeted variable, the government 
sectors covered by the rule, whether some types of expenditure are excluded from the 
coverage of the rule, the time frame, statutory basis, monitoring and enforcement procedures 
of the rule; (ii) the motivations for the introduction of the rule; (iii) the  relevant dates for the 
conception and entering into force of the rule and the main changes in the period under 
review; (iv) finally, the database includes (subjective) information related to the perception of 
the track record in terms of compliance and of the reasons for possible non-compliance with 
the rule. It also contains questions related to the perception on whether the rule has 
contributed to fiscal discipline and whether non compliance generally triggered a public 
debate.   202
3.2. Stylised facts 
This section provides a number of stylised facts regarding the numerical fiscal rules in force 
in the EU countries since 1990. The number of rules in force in the EU countries has grown 
continuously over the past fifteen years (see Chart 1). In the early nineties, most numerical 
fiscal rules were applied at local or regional levels of government. This reflected the 
willingness of higher levels of government to impose constraints on local entities and the need 
to ensure sufficient coordination among general government tiers. Such rules continued to 
develop throughout the whole period covered by the survey and exist today in almost all EU 
countries. In parallel, the number of numerical fiscal rules applying to the central government 
sector has increased considerably, reflecting especially an increased reliance on expenditure 
rules. A relatively recent feature has been the introduction of numerical fiscal rules in the 
social security sector and rules covering the whole of the general government sector. These 
developments may be a response to the need to redirect expenditure across sub-sectors of 
general government, to tackle the increasing spending pressures in the social security sector, 
or to the introduction of the EU fiscal rules, which impose requirements for the general 
government deficit and debt. 
The analysis of the questionnaires shows that there is a great deal of variety in the design of 
numerical fiscal rules as regards the type of rule and the definition of the target (see Table 2). 
About one third of the numerical rules currently in force in EU countries are budget balance 
rules, about one quarter are rules imposing restrictions on borrowing and debt, and about 
another quarter are expenditure rules (see also Chart 2). Most budget balance and debt rules 
are applied to regional and local governments (see Chart 3). In contrast, expenditure rules are 
more frequent in the central government and social security sub-sectors. Only few budget 
balance rules, all of them applying to the general and central government level, are defined in 
cyclically-adjusted terms. About two thirds of expenditure rules define ceilings for levels or 
growth rates in nominal terms, the remaining third being defined in real terms. More than half 
of revenue rules currently in force in the EU countries establish pre-defined principles for the 
allocation of higher-than-expected revenues (Table 2).  
Some characteristics of the rules vary markedly depending on the level of government to 
which they apply. Rules applied to regional and local governments rely preponderantly on 
annual schemes, while most of those concerning the general government and central 
government sectors have a time horizon that goes beyond the yearly budgetary cycle and are   203
integrated into a multi-annual fiscal framework (see chart 4). This could be related to the fact 
that the stabilisation function of fiscal policy takes mainly place at central and general 
government level, so that there is a stronger need for fiscal rules at higher levels of 
government that are consistent with stabilisation objectives. 
The large majority of numerical fiscal rules defined at sub-national levels of governments are 
enshrined in law or in constitution, while rules concerning central government and the whole 
of the general government sector tend to be more based on political agreements (internal 
stability pacts or other forms of political agreement or commitment). Likewise, a majority of 
rules applying to local and regional governments sectors foresee either automatic correction 
mechanisms or the obligation for the authority responsible to adopt measures in case of non 
compliance with the rule (see Charts 5 and 6). In contrast, most rules concerning the central 
government sub-sector do not include ex-ante defined actions in case of non-respect. The 
explanation could be that enforcement of rules applying to a wide range of actors (state and 
local fiscal authorities) requires stronger statutory body and tight procedures. Moreover, it 
appears from the replies to the questionnaire that the rules applying to central and general 
government level draw much more public opinion and media interest than other rules, which 
can be expected to contribute to the enforcement of the rule through higher reputation costs in 
case of non-compliance (see Chart 7). 
The questionnaire on fiscal rules included explicit questions on the perception of whether 
each of the rules in place would entail a pro-cyclical bias in the conduct of fiscal policy. The 
replies (see Chart 8) indicate in the majority of cases that the respect of the rule may imply the 
conduct of pro cyclical fiscal policy in the case of budget balance and debt rules, while 
expenditure rules are generally not perceived as leading to pro-cyclical outcomes. Regarding 
revenue rules, the majority is judged not to entail a pro-cyclical bias, which is consistent with 
the fact that more than half of them deal with the allocation of higher-than-expected tax 
revenues.  
3.3. Synthetic indicators of numerical fiscal rules 
The main objectives of this paper are to understand the reasons for the growing recourse to 
numerical fiscal rules and to assess whether such rules have an influence on budgetary 
developments. To this purpose, it is necessary to construct synthetic indicators summarising, 
for a given country and in a given year: (i) the degree of intensity in the use of numerical   204
rules; (ii) the potential effectiveness of such rules based on their characteristics. The 
construction of these indicators requires dealing with several issues. 
First, account needs to be taken of the fact that different type of rules may concur to the same 
objective of improving budget balances and may be present in the same country, in the same 
year. This implies that a weighting scheme is needed to aggregate multiple coexisting rules in 
a synthetic indicator.  
Second, the analysis needs to take into account that the vast majority of numerical fiscal rules 
apply only to a fraction of the general government sector. However, most fiscal time series of 
interest for our analysis are available only for the general government level. It would be 
meaningless to link budgetary outcomes defined at general government level with rules 
applying at general government sub-sectors. A solution could be to take into account in the 
construction of a synthetic indicator that individual fiscal rules may cover different sectors of 
the general government in such a way to differentiate between a rule applying, say, to 
municipalities from a rule defining numerical ceilings for the whole of the general 
government sector.  
Third, it must be taken into account that the effectiveness of fiscal rules may also depend on a 
number of qualitative features (see, e.g., Inman (1996) for a discussion). A first relevant 
characteristic of a fiscal rule is its statutory basis, i.e., whether the rule is enshrined in the 
constitution or in law or it is simply the fruit of a political agreement. The nature of the body 
in charge of monitoring the rule is another important element. When the respect of the rule is 
monitored by an independent body the probability that fiscal variables are adjusted to ensure 
compliance with the rule can be expected to be higher. The nature of the enforcement 
mechanisms also matters. In particular, the existence of sanctions mechanisms in case of non-
respect of the rule, which can be enacted by an independent authority, can be expected to 
foster compliance. Finally, it should considered that those rules that are neither enshrined in 
law or constitution nor regularly monitored and for which no enforcement mechanisms is 
defined may nonetheless contribute to budgetary outcomes if characterised by a high degree 
of media visibility.  
We built synthetic indicators for the overall set of numerical fiscal rules and for the subset of 
expenditure rules only. The methodology is inspired from that in existing literature (see e.g. 
Deroose, Moulin and Wierts (2005)). Considering that almost all numerical fiscal rules are 
designed to contribute to the reduction of general government deficits, our intention is to   205
relate the synthetic indicators for the overall set of fiscal rules with general government 
balances. Similarly, we intend to put in relation the synthetic indicators for expenditure rules 
with data on government expenditure. We did not construct a synthetic indicator for revenue 
rules only, the reasons being the relative low number of such rules in the sample and the 
variety of the purposes pursued by such rules (see Table 2).  
Both for the overall set of rules and for expenditure rules only we build two synthetic 
indicators. The first is aimed at measuring the degree of intensity in the use of numerical 
rules, the second aims at capturing also the characteristics of fiscal rules which may influence 
their capacity to influence budgetary outcomes. We call these two indexes, respectively, 
Fiscal Rule Coverage Index and Fiscal Rule Index. When the indexes only consider 
expenditure rules we name them Expenditure Rule Coverage Index and Expenditure Rule 
Index. We provide in the following a brief description of the criteria followed for the 
construction of the Fiscal Rule Coverage Index and of the Fiscal Rule Index. Analogous 
criteria apply to the Expenditure Rule Coverage Index and to the Expenditure Rule Index. The 
Annex provides a detailed description followed for the description of the synthetic indicators. 
The Fiscal Rule Coverage Index summarises the information on the fraction of general 
government finances that is covered by numerical fiscal rules. In absence of a strong a priori 
regarding which types of rules have a greater influence on fiscal outcomes, all types of rules 
are treated in the same way (they are given the same weight). An issue arises in case more 
than one rule applies to the same sub-sector of the general government. In such a case, it is 
likely that some rules are redundant. However, fully ignoring the fact that multiple rules are 
present may imply disregarding the impact of some of them. For this reason we adopt the 
“rule-of-thumb” assumption that when multiple rules coexist on the same government sub-
sector, those rules with the 'weaker' features (e.g. rules with no legal basis, no clear 
monitoring and enforcement procedures, low media visibility) are given weight equal to ½. 
The Fiscal Rule Index takes into account not only the information on the share of government 
finances covered by numerical fiscal rules but also the qualitative features of fiscal rules that 
matter for their effectiveness. To this aim, for each rule we calculated a composite Index of 
Strength aimed at capturing its potential effectiveness, on the basis of scores assigned to the 
five qualitative features mentioned before (the statutory base of the rule; whether there is an 
independent monitoring; the nature of the institution responsible for the enforcement of the   206
rule; the existence of pre-defined enforcement mechanisms; and the media visibility of the 
rule).  
In addition, we calculated a Fiscal Rule Cyclicality Index with the aim of providing synthetic 
information on the likely impact on the stabilisation function of fiscal policy arising from the 
system of fiscal rules operating in a given country in a given year. This index takes into 
account the share of government finances covered by fiscal rules and the properties of each 
fiscal rule with respect to macroeconomic stabilisation. Scores were attributed to each rule, 
the higher value corresponding to an a-priori larger stabilisation function of the rule. 
All indexes are calculated for the period 1990-2005, so that they permit to track the changes 
in the design or in the perimeter covered by the rules throughout the period. All indexes are 
normalised in such a way to have zero mean and unit variance. 
3.4. Which countries rely more on numerical fiscal rules? 
In this section, we examine whether some specific groups of countries show more or less 
reliance on numerical fiscal rules. To assess the reliance on fiscal rules, we focus on three 
types of indicators: (i) the number of fiscal rules in place in the countries; (ii) the share of 
government finances covered by the fiscal rules in place as measured with our fiscal rule 
coverage index; and (iii) the fiscal rule index that takes into account both the share of 
government finances covered by fiscal rules and the characteristics of these rules.  
We first examine whether "big" and "small" countries show a different pattern with respect to 
numerical fiscal rules. Prima-facie evidence indicates that the size of the country does not 
seem to be a relevant dimension for the reliance on fiscal rules. When splitting the sample in 
two groups of countries (Germany, Italy, the UK, France, Spain and Poland on one side; other 
countries on the other side), it appears that large countries have on average more rules than 
others (3.8 rules in 'big' countries, 2.7 in 'small' countries). However, as shown in Chart 9, the 
Fiscal Rule Index exhibits a comparable evolution in the two groups of countries.  
In a second step, we look at numerical fiscal rules in "high-deficit" countries and "low-deficit" 
countries (i.e., to countries with an average deficit during the 1999-2005 period which is, 
respectively, above and below 3 per cent of GDP). It turns out that the number of fiscal rules 
in force is significantly higher in countries with low deficits (3 rules on average in low deficit 
countries, as against 2 rules in the higher deficit countries). The stronger reliance on   207
numerical fiscal rules in low deficit countries is even clearer when looking at developments in 
the Fiscal Rule Index. This index is always significantly higher in these countries over the 
period 1990-2005 (see charts 10 and 11). The difference is mainly related to the fact that low 
deficits countries have a larger share of government finances covered by fiscal rules. 
Interestingly, the average 'strength' of fiscal rules in force seems to be equivalent in the two 
groups of countries. A similar conclusion is reached when splitting the sample alternatively, 
e.g., between countries with average deficits over the period above and below the median 
deficit across the whole sample (Chart 11). 
"Delegation" and "contract countries" present on average a similar number of numerical fiscal 
rules. There are however a number of differences in the distribution of the fiscal rules in 
force. Countries following the contract approach hinge more on numerical fiscal rules applied 
at the general government, central government, and social security level. Conversely, 
delegation countries have a higher number of fiscal rules implemented at regional and local 
level (see chart 12). This distribution seems consistent with the fact that the larger political 
dispersion of governments in contracts countries is likely to promote fiscal rules ("contracts") 
at general government or central level. Stronger reliance of fiscal rules at higher levels of 
government in contract countries translates into a higher value of the Fiscal Rule Index in this 
group of countries throughout the whole sample period. Looking at the time-profile of the 
Fiscal Rule Index it stands out that, while the increase of the index has been particularly rapid 
in contract countries following the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, an acceleration of the 
index in delegation countries is observed following the adoption of the SGP (see Chart 13).  
3.5. What triggers the introduction of fiscal rules? 
What motivations and circumstances lead countries to introduce numerical fiscal rules? There 
could be many factors that may be affect he willingness of countries to rely on numerical 
rules to facilitate the achievement of budgetary objectives. The fiscal situation of the country, 
its growth performance, the existing framework for fiscal governance and the overall political 
and institutional setting, both at a national and at a super-national level, are likely to play a 
role. In order to measure the impact of these different set of factors, we carried out a simple 
multivariate regression exercise. This would help to interpret the prima-facie evidence 
presented in the previous section.   208
The dependent variables are our aggregate indexes for fiscal rules, alternatively the Fiscal 
Rule Coverage Index, the Fiscal Rules Index, the Expenditure Rule Coverage Index, or the 
Expenditure Rule Index. Regarding the explanatory variables, we used fiscal data (budget 
balance, total government expenditure, debt ratio) and data on output gap from the AMECO 
European Commission DG ECFIN database. The explanatory variables capturing fiscal 
governance are a dummy capturing the existence of a Fiscal Council during the period 
covered in the sample (information obtained from the Commission survey on fiscal 
institutions – see European Commission (2006)) and a dummy indicating whether the country 
follows a "contract model" of fiscal governance or a "delegation model".
5 One dummy 
distinguishes "small" countries from those that could be considered as "big". The choice 
follows the weight these countries have in the European Council; this way the dummy 
captures not only economic size but also the possibility of a different degree of peer pressure 
coming from the EU fiscal framework, due to the different ability of countries to influence the 
outcome of the decisions by the EU Council. A series of dummies capture the main 
developments in the EU fiscal framework: the start of phase II of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (i.e., the start of the "run up to Maastricht"); the introduction of the Stability and 
Growth Pact; the 2004 enlargement of the Union to 10 new countries. The dummies take 
value 1 in the years and for the countries that are concerned with the above mentioned EU 
processes. Finally, we include a series of political variables: dummies to take into account the 
presence of elections and the nature of the electoral system (proportional or majoritarian), the 
degree of dispersion of seats in the Parliament as measured by the Herfindahl index, the 
margin of majority held by government in the Parliament, and dummies capturing the 
orientation of the ruling coalition along the political spectrum. The source of these data is the 
World Bank Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. (2001)).  
Table 3 shows the regression results. Data are pooled across countries and time. All time-
varying explanatory variables are taken with a lag to avoid simultaneity problems. To take 
into account the possibility of heteroscedastic residuals, t tests are constructed on the basis of 
robust standard errors. Overall, the regressions explain a large share of the variance of the 
dependent variables, as measured by the R-square statistics. However, only few explanatory 
variables appear to be highly statistical significant.  
 
                                                 
5   The classification used is based on Von Hagen et al. (2001, 2002, 2005) and Yläoutinen (2004).   209
Contrary to what one might expect, the evolution of fiscal rules indexes is only loosely related 
to the initial state of countries’ public finances. Alternative specifications (not reported) have 
been estimated using, instead of the lagged budget balance, total government expenditure and 
debt ratio, the 3-year lag in the government budget balance and in the total expenditure 
variable, their year-on-year change, and their cumulated change over 3 years. As a further 
alternative, the budget balance has been replaced by the primary cyclically-adjust budget 
balance both in the specifications reported in Table 3 and in the alternative specifications 
mentioned above. In none of these alternative cases fiscal variables appear to gain statistical 
significance. Overall, there is no strong evidence that national fiscal frameworks were 
strengthened neither when starting conditions in public finances were critical, nor following 
marked or protracted deteriorations in budgetary situations. The analysis also shows that 
macroeconomic conditions, as summarized by the output gap, do not seem to play a 
significant role in explaining developments in national-level fiscal frameworks. In particular, 
the hypothesis that the introduction of fiscal frameworks could follow protracted periods of 
slow growth and therefore a worsening cyclical component of the budget is not supported. 
On the contrary, our results indicate that the construction of the EU fiscal framework seems to 
have been a powerful catalyst for the introduction of numerical fiscal rules. The dummy 
variables corresponding to the start of the run up to EMU and to the entering into force of the 
SGP are generally statistically significant in explaining the developments in the fiscal rule 
index. The introduction of a credible constraint at the EU level seems to have triggered the 
development of numerical fiscal rules in the Member countries. 
Regarding the impact of national-level fiscal governance, the results in Table 3 suggest that 
both the presence of independent Fiscal Councils and a fiscal governance model based on the 
contract approach seem to favour the development of numerical fiscal rules at country level. 
A-priori, Fiscal Councils could be thought as an alternative to numerical fiscal rules, since 
they also aim at reducing discretion on the part of fiscal authorities by eliminating possible 
distortions in specific aspects of fiscal policy making. The analysis rather suggests that the 
existence of such councils favours the development of numerical fiscal rules. This 
complementarity relation can be related to the fact that fiscal councils may contribute to 
“strengthening” fiscal rules by improving their implementation and ensuring independent 
monitoring of compliance. Regarding the model of fiscal governance, the analysis shows that, 
other things being equal, contract countries are more likely to develop an internal system of 
numerical fiscal rules. This result is consistent with the arguments usually put forward in the   210
existing literature (i.e., that “contract” countries are more likely to rely on explicit agreements, 
rules and procedures rather than on delegating strong control powers to finance ministries) 
and with evidence that EU contract countries seem to have strengthened their budgetary 
procedures (e.g., Hallerberg et al. (2006)). 
 
4. Fiscal rules and budgetary discipline 
4.1. Budgetary developments following the introduction of numerical fiscal 
rules  
A first basic approach to assess the influence of fiscal rules on budgetary outcomes is to check 
whether budgetary developments in the years immediately following the introduction of fiscal 
rules differ from those observed on average across the whole sample. Table 4 reports the 
average changes over different time horizons in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance 
(primary CABs) and in the ratio of cyclically-adjusted primary expenditure to GDP, and 
compares them with the changes recorded for the same variables in the years immediately 
following the adoption of new numerical fiscal rules. All fiscal rules were considered when 
comparing the changes in the primary CABs; only expenditure rules were considered instead 
when comparing changes in cyclically adjusted primary expenditures. The sample considered 
is the same as that considered in the questionnaire on fiscal rules (22 EU countries over the 
1990-2005 period). Over the sample period there were episodes of very large and rarely 
observed changes in budgetary data, observed mostly in the countries that joined the EU with 
the 2004 enlargement. In order to avoid results being driven by these outliers, the sample was 
trimmed in such a way to exclude the observations exhibiting changes in the CAPB and in the 
primary cyclically-adjusted expenditure outside the 2.5 per cent and the 97.5 per cent 
percentiles of the overall distribution. 
The results (see Table 4) indicate that the primary CAB on average improved in the years 
following the introduction of numerical fiscal rules. This conclusion holds for the different 
time horizons considered, i.e. one, three and five years after the introduction of the rule. It 
contrasts with the fact that, on average across the whole sample, the primary CAB remained 
roughly unchanged over the same time horizons. Analogously, while expenditures did not 
change significantly over the whole sample, there was on average a reduction in government 
spending following the introduction of fiscal rules.    211
Results also suggest that the marginal benefits associated with the introduction of fiscal rules 
tend to decrease with time: the discrepancy between the change in the primary CAB in the 
years following the introduction of fiscal rules and in normal times is roughly the same when 
considering a 3-year horizon and when considering a 5-year horizon. A similar phenomenon 
is observed for expenditures. Such a result could be consistent with fiscal rules mainly 
defining targets and ceilings for fiscal aggregates in levels rather then in terms of growth 
rates: once the adjustment required by the newly-introduced fiscal rule has been achieved, no 
further significant changes in the target fiscal aggregate are required to achieve compliance 
with the rule.  
This preliminary analysis suggests that there may be a link between the introduction of 
numerical fiscal rules and budgetary outcomes. However, some caveats are in order. First, 
there is a need to control for other factors that may have affected government budgets and 
expenditure. In particular, controlling for the impact of other factors on budgets may permit to 
explain the apparent contradiction between positive developments in budgets following the 
introduction of rules and budgetary positions remaining roughly unchanged on average across 
the sample during a period in which the number of fiscal rules was growing in the EU. This 
seems to suggest that some factors may have led to a progressive budgetary deterioration after 
the initial improvement in budgetary positions following the introduction of rules. Second, the 
analysis does not take into account that the disciplinary effect of numerical fiscal rules may 
not only depend on their existence, but also on the share of government finances they cover 
and their characteristics.  
4.2. Evidence from the estimation of fiscal reaction functions 
To assess the link between numerical fiscal rules and budgetary outcomes, we estimated fiscal 
reaction functions augmented with our indexes of fiscal rules (Fiscal Rules Coverage Index, 
Fiscal Rules, Expenditure Rules Index and Expenditure Rules Coverage Index), thereby 
taking into account the information on both the coverage and characteristics of the numerical 
fiscal rules in EU countries.  
The dependent variable is the primary cyclically-adjusted balance (CAPB). Some of the 
explanatory variables appear in most analogous estimations of fiscal reaction functions (see, 
e.g., Gali and Perotti (2003)). The lagged CAPB captures an element of inertia (positive 
expected sign). The lagged debt ratio captures a debt-stabilising motive on the part of fiscal   212
authorities: the higher the outstanding stock of debt, the less likely fiscal authorities will allow 
loose structural budgetary positions (the expected sign is positive). All fiscal variables are 
expressed as shares of potential output. The output gap captures an output-stabilising motive 
of fiscal authorities (the CAPB is likely to stay high compared to the past level if output is 
perceived to be above potential). A well-known problem with the use of the output gap 
variable in the estimation of fiscal reaction functions is the endogeneity of the output gap, 
which is both a determinant and an effect of fiscal policy. Different routes have been followed 
to overcome this endogeneity issue. In some papers the output gap is used with a lag, which 
reflects the assumption that fiscal authorities take their decisions on the basis of the cyclical 
conditions prevailing before the budget is actually implemented (see, e.g., Manasse (2006)); 
in other papers the output gap variable is instrumented with own lags and measures of an 
“international” output gap (e.g., Gali and Perotti (2003)); finally, other papers adopt GMM 
estimation methods to account for the endogeneity of the output gap (e.g., Forni and 
Momigliano (2004)). In this paper we are not primarily focused on the response of fiscal 
authorities to the cycle, hence we will normally overcome the issue of endogeneity by the use 
of the output gap variable with one lag. However, when analysing the impact of numerical 
fiscal rules on the cyclical response of fiscal authorities (see section 5) we will also use 
instrumental variable estimates.  
The standard specification of fiscal rules has been augmented with additional explanatory 
variables. First, dummies capturing the main steps of the evolution of the fiscal framework 
have been introduced. These variables are the same as those used in Table 3 for the analysis 
of the determinants of the evolution of national-level numerical fiscal frameworks: a dummy 
capturing the run-up to EMU, a variable summarising the effect of the entering into force of 
the SGP, and a dummy aimed at capturing the impact of the 2004 enlargement of the EU. In 
light of the strong performance demonstrated in existing analyses (e.g., Golinelli and 
Momigliano (2006)) an election dummy was also included among the explanatory variables, 
taking value 1 in the year in which Parliamentary elections were held (source Beck et al. 
(2001)). Finally, the specification of the fiscal reaction function is augmented to account also 
for the impact of the national numerical fiscal framework, as summarised in our Fiscal Rule 
Index. The index is used lagged as an explanatory variable, to avoid possible issues of reverse 
causation.
6 Country fixed effects are aimed at capturing all remaining country-specific 
                                                 
6   The issue of reverse causation and endogeneity of fiscal rule indexes in the estimation reaction functions 
is however likely to be limited in our case. As shown in Table 3 presenting the analysis of the   213
determinants. The sample was trimmed to exclude budgetary developments that could be 
considered as outliers (see previous section). 
Results of the estimations are reported in Table 5. The estimation method is OLS with robust 
standard errors. The CAPB results to be quite strongly persistent, as denoted by the highly 
statistically significant coefficient for the lagged CAPB of 0.6. In accordance with existing 
estimates of fiscal reaction functions for EU countries (e.g., Gali and Perotti (2003), Turrini 
and in’t Veld (2004), European Commission (2006)), the estimated response of fiscal 
authorities to output gap results to be weak, while there is a strongly significant positive 
response to debt. The election year variable is highly significant and negative (big 
deteriorations in budget balances in election years). Regarding our Fiscal Rule Index, the 
coefficient is positive and significant, which indicates that an increase the share or quality of 
government finances covered by numerical fiscal rules leads to an improvement in the 
primary CAB. The coefficient of 0.21 indicates that a 1 standard deviation increase in the 
value of the index improves the CAPB by 0.2 GDP points at impact. This impact effect does 
not take into account the fact that CAPBs are highly persistent and adjust only partially at 
impact to shocks. Once the inertia of CAPBs is taken into account, the long-term impact of 1 
standard deviation increase in the Fiscal Rule Index raises CAPBs by about 1/3 of GDP 
point.
7  
Results for the impact of the Expenditure Rule Index on government expenditure are 
illustrated in columns (4)-(6) of Table 5. The dependent variable is now the ratio of 
cyclically-adjusted primary expenditure to GDP. Most explanatory variables behave in a 
similar way as in the case in which the CAPBs as the dependent variable. Although the 
statistical significance of the Expenditure Rule Index is borderline, it appears to reduce 
expenditure at impact by about 0.3 GDP points for any 1 standard deviation increase in the 
value of the index, and the long-term coefficient is about 1.5.  
Both the results in Table 3 and Table 5 do not appear very sensitive to the exclusion of 
country dummies, while significant changes are produced by the inclusion of year dummies 
                                                                                                                                                          
determinants of the fiscal rule index, budgetary variables have limited explanatory power in explaining 
fiscal rules. 
 
7   The long-term coefficient is obtained as the impact coefficient times the speed of adjustment (namely the 
average number of years necessary for the CAPB to fully adjust to a shock). The speed of adjustment is 
computed as the inverse of the fraction of adjustment of the CAPB computed in 1 year. Hence, on the 
basis of the regression results reported in Table 4, the steady-state multiplier is approximately 0.2/(1-
0.6))=0.33   214
(results are not reported but are available by the authors upon request). This may suggest that 
the impact of fiscal rules is more felt along the time series dimension than across countries. 
With a view to checking the robustness of the results to the ways the Fiscal Rule Index and 
the Expenditure Rule Index were calculated, we have calculated the indexes in a large number 
of different ways, reflecting different possible weightings for the five criteria entering in the 
composition of the index measuring the strength of each fiscal rule (statutory base, body in 
charge of monitoring, body in charge of enforcement, enforcement mechanisms, media 
visibility of the rule). Following the method used in Sutherland and al. (2005), we used 10000 
sets of randomly-generated weights to calculate the synthetic indicator in 10000 different 
ways.
8 In light of the lack of a-priori information on the weight to be given to the different 
criteria entering the construction of the index, the production of random weights allows 
defining a probability distribution for the index of strength of fiscal rules. The mean value of 
this distribution is asymptotically equivalent to the indicator calculated using equal weights 
for the constituent components. This is the baseline value of the indexes that we use in our 
analysis (columns (1) and (4) in Tables 5 refer to this case). Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) in 
Table 5 report benchmark regression results also for the case of, respectively, the Fiscal Rule 
Index and the Expenditure Rule Index when computed using different set of weights for the 
calculation of the index measuring the strength of numerical fiscal rules. To that purpose, we 
calculated the Fiscal Rule Index and the Expenditure Rule Index using the 1-percentile and 
the 99-percentile of the distribution of the indexes measuring the strength of each fiscal rule 
(low and high end of the vertical lines in chart 15 in the annex). Regression results remain 
qualitatively unchanged when using these alternative weighing schemes to construct the 
Fiscal Rule and the Expenditure Rule Index. 
4.3. Which characteristics of numerical fiscal rules matter most? 
The previous analysis shows that higher values in the Fiscal Rule Index and in the 
Expenditure Rule Index lead, respectively, to an improvement in the primary CAPB and to a 
reduction in primary government expenditure. However, these indexes encapsulate a broad set 
of information, including the share of government finances covered by fiscal rules and the 
various characteristics of fiscal rules. In this section we attempt to assess to what extent the 
various characteristics of numerical fiscal rule matter for their influence of rules on budgetary 
                                                 
8   The random weights are drawn from a uniform distribution between zero and one and then normalised to 
sum to one.   215
outcomes. Such an analysis could provide indications on what desirable characteristics fiscal 
rules should have to be effective.  
Like in the previous section, we proceed by augmenting standard fiscal reaction functions 
with Fiscal Rule Sub-Indexes constructed in different ways, taking into account none or only 
one of the five qualitative features of fiscal rules (statutory base, body in charge of 
monitoring, body in charge of enforcement, enforcement procedures, media visibility). When 
no qualitative features are taken into account in the construction of the sub-indexes, then the 
only information reported by the index is the coverage in terms of the share of government 
sectors concerned by the rule. Sub-indexes constructed this way correspond therefore to the 
Fiscal Rule Coverage Index and to the Expenditure Rule Coverage Index described in section 
3.3. 
Tables 6 and 7 report results for the estimation of fiscal reaction functions using, instead of 
the Fiscal Rule Index and the Expenditure Rule Index as in Table 5, the sub-indexes 
constructed taking into account none of the qualitative characteristics of fiscal rules (i.e., the 
coverage indexes) and the five remaining sub-indexes where only one qualitative feature at a 
time is considered. Looking at Table 6, where the dependent variable is the CAPB, from the 
comparison of the results when the Coverage Index is used as an explanatory variable (no 
qualitative features at all considered) with those in which one qualitative factor is taken into 
account, it appears that the inclusion of qualitative information on fiscal rules improves the 
degree of statistical significance of the regression coefficients in three cases (when the sub-
indexes take into account the statutory base of the rules, the body in charge of enforcement 
and the enforcement procedure). Conversely, in the case of the sub-indexes providing 
information on the body in charge of monitoring and on the media visibility of the rule, the 
degree of significance falls compared with the case in which the coverage index appears as 
the explanatory variable. Turning to Table 7, showing the results of fiscal reaction functions 
for government expenditure, it emerges that the inclusion of information relating qualitative 
features of expenditure rules improves the performance of Expenditure Rule Sub-Indexes 
compared with the case in which no qualitative factors are taken into account (the 
Expenditure Rule Coverage Index). Also for the case of fiscal reaction functions for 
government expenditure, it turns out that features of rules relating to their enforcement (body 
in charge of enforcement and enforcement procedure) are the most significant in triggering 
expenditure reductions.   216
Overall, these results provide an indication that the characteristics of fiscal rules matter for 
their influence on budgetary outcomes. There is an indication that the most important features 
of the rules to ensure an effective impact of numerical fiscal rules on budgetary outcomes 
regard the nature of the enforcement mechanisms. Both the consideration of the characteristic 
of the rule in terms of the body in charge of the enforcement and in terms of enforcement 
procedure improves the fit of the sub-index when no qualitative features are accounted for. 
This result suggests that enforcement-specific design aspects are key elements for the 
effectiveness of numerical fiscal rules.  
 
5. Fiscal rules and the cyclical stance of fiscal policy 
There is agreement that in the EU pro-cyclical policies were quite common in past decades 
(see, e.g., IMF (2004), European Commission (2006) for recent assessments and surveys of 
existing literature). There is also wide agreement that the presence of numerical fiscal rules 
and their design may have an impact on the capacity of fiscal authorities to stabilise the 
economy via an appropriate stance of fiscal policy over the cycle. 
In the case of budget balance or debt rules, there is a common presumption that numerical 
rules could induce pro-cyclical behaviour in bad times. This was always one of the major 
concerns with the SGP, and most of the efforts carried out by EU policy makers in recent 
times were aimed at revising the letter and the interpretation of the original SGP in such a 
way to reduce the risk of induced pro-cyclical behaviour in bad times (especially after having 
breached the 3% reference value for deficits, i.e., during the so-called Excessive Deficit 
Procedure) and to strengthen the incentives to run an appropriate fiscal stance in good times 
(see European Commission (2005)). The problem with the pro-cyclicality of deficit and debt 
rules is not related only to the existence of the SGP. A number of EU countries had in place 
deficit or debt rules for the lower tiers of government since years or decades. The extent to 
which deficit and debt rules interfere with the stabilisation function of fiscal policy depends to 
some extent on their design. As illustrated in section 3 of this paper, while most deficit and 
debt rules applied at sub-national level are applied yearly and do not allow for special 
provisions for cyclically sensitive items, those applied at the central or general government 
level more often are defined over a multi-annual horizon and exclude cyclically sensitive 
items.    217
The case of numerical expenditure rules is quite different. Such rules are not likely to prevent 
the operation of automatic stabilisers. Moreover, they could help curbing a possible pro-
cyclical bias in good times related with the presence of implementation and identification lags 
and strong pressures for additional spending in the presence of budgetary windfalls (European 
Commission (2006)). Of course, as in the case of deficit and debt rules, also the impact of 
expenditure rules on the cyclical stance of fiscal policy depends on the way the rules are 
designed, notably on whether all government expenditures are targeted or cyclical items are 
excluded, on the time-frame for the application of the rule, and on the specification of the 
expenditure ceilings (whether in levels or in growth, and whether defined in nominal or in real 
terms). 
Although a-priori there are clear arguments why deficit and debt rules could induce a pro-
cyclical bias in fiscal policy in bad times, providing empirical support to such arguments does 
not seem trivial. In a large panel of developed and developing countries, Manasse (2006) 
finds that the presence of numerical fiscal rules reduces the extent of pro-cyclicality of fiscal 
policy. Regarding the EU fiscal framework, Gali and Perotti (2003)) show that after the run 
up to EMU fiscal policy across euro area countries has become less, not more pro-cyclical on 
average. The evidence is also not strongly conclusive on the impact of deficit and debt rules 
applied at lower levels of government. Although there is evidence that budget balances at 
lower level of government seems to exhibit a more pro-cyclical behaviour than general 
government budget balances (e.g., Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995), Sorensen et al. (2001), 
Rodden and Wibbels (2006)), the evidence is not strongly conclusive concerning the impact 
on the cyclical behaviour of budget balances of borrowing restrictions a lower tiers of 
government.
9 Regarding expenditure rules, European Commission (2006) provides evidence 
that the episodes of pro-cyclical expenditure behaviour were less frequent in countries 
endowed with strong expenditure rules. 
These difficulties in detecting an impact of numerical fiscal rules on the cyclical stance of 
fiscal policy could be related to several causes. First, the need to satisfactorily take into 
account not only the presence of rules but also their design (whether rules are defined over an 
annual or a multi-annual framework, whether they exclude cyclically-sensitive items…). 
Second, the necessity to capture the way multiple fiscal rules interact to produce an overall 
                                                 
9   While Alesina and Bayoumi (1996) do not find a significant relation between the degree of stringency of 
borrowing constraints and the cyclicality of budget balances across EU states, Sorensen et al. (2001) find 
a positive relation between the degree of stringency and the degree of pro-cyclicality.   218
impact on the cyclical stance of fiscal policy. Finally, a proper analysis of the impact of fiscal 
rules on the fiscal stance requires controlling for all the other factors that may have an impact 
of the behaviour of fiscal authorities over the cycle. 
Taking into account these difficulties, our analysis proceeds in two steps. The first step 
consists of the construction of a Fiscal Rule Cyclicality Index which provides information on 
the likely impact of the whole set of numerical fiscal rules in place in a given country in a 
given year. As mentioned in section 3.3. and explained in the Annex, this index permits to 
take into account both which type of rules (i.e., targeting which fiscal aggregate) are present 
and how they are designed (e.g., whether they apply on an annual basis, on a multi-annual 
basis, “over the cycle”,...). A higher value of the index signals a less likely pro-cyclical 
impact on the stance of fiscal policy. 
The second step consists of assessing whether high values of the index are indeed associated 
with a less pro-cyclical behaviour of fiscal authorities. A customary way to measure the 
output stabilisation response of fiscal authorities is by means of the estimation of fiscal 
reaction functions. Whenever the coefficient of the output gap variable appears to be 
significantly negative (resp., positive), then there is an indication that the behaviour of fiscal 
authorities is pro-cyclical (resp., counter-cyclical). Our aim is to check whether high or low 
values of the Fiscal Rule Cyclicality Index matter for the output gap coefficient in fiscal 
reaction functions estimated across our sample of EU countries.  
To that purpose, we re-estimate fiscal reactions adopting the same specification used in our 
baseline regressions (Table 5). However, we now perform separate regressions for two sub-
groups of countries: countries with high and low values of the Fiscal Rule Cyclicality Index. 
The countries with high (resp., low) values for the index are defined as those with a Fiscal 
Rule Cyclicality Index which is on average equal or above (resp., below) the median value of 
the index across the whole sample.  
Table 8 reports the results. It appears that while the coefficient of the output gap is not 
statistically different from zero for the countries with a low value of the Fiscal Rule 
Cyclicality Index, the output gap coefficient is significantly positive for the countries with a 
high index, denoting a counter-cyclical behaviour of fiscal authorities. The estimates have 
been carried out both using OLS and the lagged output gap and the instrumental variables 
estimation method, instrumenting the output gap variable with its own lag and with the lag of 
a measure of the “international” output gap, consisting of the export-weighted output gap of   219
the 3 major export markets of each country. Results appear to be qualitatively similar. Also in 
the case of instrumental variables estimation the output gap coefficient is significantly 
positive for countries with fiscal frameworks a-priori less likely to induce pro-cyclicality, 
while it is not significantly different from zero for the countries with a low value of the Fiscal 
Rule Cyclicality Index.  
The analysis confirms the a-priori expectation that some type of numerical fiscal rules and 
some design features are more likely to be associated with an induced pro-cyclical behaviour 
of the fiscal stance. A relevant related question is whether there is a trade-off between the 
“strength” of fiscal rules in inducing fiscal discipline and their possible pro-cyclical effects. 
Such an issue is a complex one, and a full-fledged answer is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, some suggestive prima-facie evidence can be derived from the comparison of the 
Fiscal Rule Index with the Fiscal Rule Cyclicality Index. Across the whole sample, the 
Spearman rank correlation between the two indexes appears small but positive (0.016) and a t 
test rejects the hypothesis of independence of the two indexes at the 90% level. Looking at the 
average value of the Fiscal Rule Index in the two country groups, the one with a high and that 
with a low Fiscal Rule Cyclicality Index, it turns out that the in the former group the Fiscal 
Rule Index is significantly higher than in the latter (0.11 versus -0.09, with a t test excluding 
the equality of the two indexes at the 90% level).  
Overall, the analysis supports the view that the nature and design of numerical fiscal rules 
may have an impact on the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. The analysis also confirms that 
the elements of fiscal rules that are commonly perceived as relevant in terms of their impact 
on the stabilisation function of fiscal policy (namely, those considered in the construction of 
our Fiscal Rule Cyclicality Index, see Annex) seem to indeed to be associated with a different 
response of fiscal authorities to the cycle. This evidence, however, does not imply necessarily 
a strong trade-off between the disciplinary role of fiscal rules and their properties from the 
viewpoint of the stabilisation function of fiscal policy. There is no significant negative 
relation between the Fiscal Rule Index and the Fiscal Rule Cyclicality Index. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive overview of the numerical fiscal rules in 
force in the 25 countries of the European Union and to analyse their determinants and their 
impact on budgetary outcomes. The analysis is based on a new dataset of existing numerical   220
fiscal rules in the EU, including details on their characteristics and evolution over time. 
Synthetic indicators are constructed to measure the intensity in the use of numerical fiscal 
rules across countries and over time, to provide a quantification of the factors that are likely to 
be related to the effectiveness of rules on budgetary outcomes, and to measure the likely 
impact of these rules on the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. 
There is clear evidence that over the past decades there has been an increasing reliance on 
numerical fiscal rules in the EU countries. The introduction of the Maastricht Treaty and of 
the Stability and Growth Pact seem to have been powerful catalysts for the introduction of 
these rules. The presumption that the introduction of fiscal rules would follow major crisis, 
recessions and / or marked deteriorations in government finances (government deficit, 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance or debt) is instead not supported by the analysis. A 
framework for fiscal governance conforming with the "contract approach" (Hallerberg and 
Von Hagen (1999)) and the presence of independent Fiscal Council seem also to favour a 
more extensive use of numerical fiscal rules. 
The analysis confirms the existence of a link between numerical rules and budgetary 
outcomes. The analysis shows that an increase in the share of government finances covered 
by numerical fiscal rules leads, ceteris paribus, to lower deficits. The analysis also suggests 
that the characteristics of fiscal rules matter for their influence on budgetary outcomes. Some 
dimensions matter particularly for the capacity of fiscal rules to influence fiscal policy. 
Notably, the presence of strong enforcement mechanisms seems important to maximise the 
effect of fiscal rules. Finally, the analysis supports the view that the nature and design of 
numerical fiscal rules may have an impact on the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. In 
countries where numerical fiscal rules are designed in such a way not to hamper the 
stabilisation function of fiscal policy the fiscal stance appears to behave more counter-
cyclically.   221
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Chart 3. Distribution of numerical fiscal rules in the EU by level of government and fiscal aggregate 
































Chart 4. Distribution of numerical fiscal rules in the EU by level of government and time horizontal  
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Chart 5. Distribution of numerical fiscal rules in the EU by level of government and statutory basis of the 
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Chart 6. Distribution of numerical fiscal rules in the EU by level of government and enforcement 
























Automatic correction and automatic or possibility to impose sanctions
Obligation to take corrective measures or submit proposals in case of non-compliance
no ex-ante defined action in case of non-compliance
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The rule observance is monitored closely by the media and can lead to public debates
There is a high media interest in rule compliance but public debates are unlikely






Chart 8. Distribution of numerical fiscal rules in the EU by fiscal aggregate targeted and perceived impact 






























Respect of the rule does not imply a pro-cyclical bias in fiscal policy
Respect of the rule introduces a pro-cyclical bias in fiscal policy
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Chart 10. Evolution of the Fiscal Rule Index and the Fiscal Rule Coverage Index in countries with an 




















































 Fiscal Rule Index for high deficits countries
Fiscal Rule Index for low deficits countries
Coverage Index for high deficits countries
Coverage Index for low deficits countries
   230
 
 
Chart 11. Evolution of the Fiscal Rule Index and the Fiscal Rule Coverage Index in countries with an 
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Chart 12. Distributions of numerical fiscal rules in contract and delegation countries by level of 
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Chart 14. Distribution of numerical fiscal rules in contract and delegation countries by fiscal aggregate 
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Tables 
 













●Governor only has to submit a balanced Budget 
●Legislature has to pass a balanced Budget 
●Carry over : possibility and number of years to correct  




Structural Index  ●Structure of negotiation within government. General constraint ; agenda setting for negotiations ; 
scope of budget norms; structure of negotiations 
●Structure of the parliamentary process. Amendments: limited ; offsetting ; cause fall of government 
;one vote: on expenditure ; on total budget size 
●Informativeness of the budget draft. Inclusion of special funds ; budget in one document ; 
transparency ; national accounts ; government loan  
●Flexibility of execution. Finance Minister (FM) can: block ; put cash limits ; approve disbursements ; 
transfer ; allow budget changes ; carry over 
Von Hagen,  
EU-12, 1992 
 




●Structure of the parliamentary process. Amendments limited  
●Informativeness of the budget draft. Inclusion of special funds ; budget in one document ; 
transparency ; national accounts ; government loan 
●Flexibility of execution. FM can: block ; put cash limits ; approve disbursements ; transfer ; allow 
budget changes ; carry over 




●Constraint on the budget deficit  





Level of government that decides on: amounts, structure of spending, subcontractors, hiring, disburses 



















Ability to borrow, existence of authorisations and constraints ;limits on use of debt ; sub level of 








Index of Budget 
Institution 
 
●Sub Index of Constraint. Constitutional constraints on deficit, macroeconomic program required; 
government has: borrowing autonomy ; possibility of late adjustments, decides unilaterally spending 
cuts 
●“Agenda-setting” Sub Index. Authority of FM vs. spending ministries ; legal constraints on congress' 
authority to amend proposed budget ; options after rejection of proposed budget 
● Transparent procedures sub index. Budget covers other public entities' debt; borrowing autonomy 















●Position of the FM. Agenda setting for budget negotiations ; structure of negotiations ; FM can: block 
; approve disbursements 
●Position of legislature. Amendments: limited ; offsetting ; cause fall of government ;one vote: on 
expenditure ; on total budget size  
●Presence of some kind of constraint. General constraint ; degree of commitment 
●Transparency of the budget. Inclusion of special funds ; budget in one document ; transparency ; 
national accounts ; government loan 
●Flexibility during execution of the budget. Cash limits ; transfers ; budget changes ; carry over 
●Relationship with other parts of government. Existence of budget balance constraint in other levels 
of government ; degree of planning autonomy 
Connectedness 
Index  
●Stability or convergence programme and budget done by same department  
●Accounting rules and reporting  
●Calendar for preparing the annual budget an the stability program 
●Budget targets conceptually 
Finance 
Minister Index 
●Level of discussions within the cabinet 
●Resolution of disagreements: Finance Minister vs. spending ministers 
●Possibility that Cabinet overrules FM's decisions 
Parliament 
Index  
●Can Parliament propose separate budget? 
●Amendments: allowed ; not limited ; offsetting ; cause fall of government 




EU-15, 2001  
Finance 
Ministry- 
Information on whether Finance Minister can impose expenditure and cash limits, approves 





●Statutory fiscal rule 
●Sequence of budgetary decision-making 
●Compilation of the draft budget 
●Members of executive responsible for reconciling conflicts over budget bids 
Legislative 
stage  
●Relative power: upper house vs. lower house 
●Constraints on the legislature to amend the government's draft budget 
●Sequence of votes 
●Relative power of the executive vs. parliament 









●Flexibility to change budget aggregates during execution 
●Transfers of expenditures between chapters 
●Carry-over of unused funds to next fiscal year 
●Procedure to react to a deterioration of budget deficit 
Fiscal Rule 
Index 




















et al. 2001 
 
Von Hagen,  
EU-15 and 






●Budget Negotiations. Quantitative constraint ; strong agenda setting powers of FM ; early fixed 
quantitative constraints  
●Parliamentary Stage. Executive strong agenda setting powers , overall constrain on budget ; vote on 
total spending 
●Informativeness. Budget in one document; inclusion of: special funds, loans to non government; link 
to national account data; transparency of data 
●Flexibility of Execution. Budget law binding for government ; instruments of FM to avoid 







●Time horizon  
●Degree of commitment  
●Anchoring of the fiscal targets in the coalition agreement  
●Connection between national budget and Stability Program  
●Existence of clear rules dealing with shocks to exp  










●Executive Planning Stage. General constraint ; agenda setting of FM ; budget norms ; structure 
negotiations in cabinet  
●Legislative Approval. Amendment are: limited ; offsetting ; can lead to fall of government ; vote :all 
expenditure passed in one ; on total size of budget 
●Implementation. FM can: block ; put cash limits ; approve disbursements ; constraint transfer 










●Degree of commitment 
●Nature of plan 










fiscal rules for 
sub-levels of 
government 
●Restraining size of the public sector. Expenditure growth control ; limit on tax autonomy ; budget 
transparency ;ratchet effect 
●Supporting allocative efficiency. Board budget coverage ; board spending targets ; uniform rules for 
investment 
●Ensuring debt sustainability. Deficit and debt control, deficit and debt monitoring 
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Rules 






ceiling as a 





capacity    
Other        Total  Debt Rules 
5 2 7 1     15 
Nominal 
expenditure 
ceiling   
Real 
expenditure 







Other     Total  Expenditure 
Rules 
5 2 3 3 2  15 
Tax burden 




tax rates      
Allocation 
of extra 
revenues    
Other        Total  Revenue 
rules 
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N. obs.  217  217  217  217 
R sq.   0.88  0.92  0.88  0.92 
Notes: Estimations method: OLS with robust standard errors. Student's "t" coefficients are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, 
respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level. 
All fiscal variables are expressed over potential output.  
Dummy run-up to EMU: 1 for EU-15 countries and years between years 1994 and 1998. 
Dummy SGP: 1 for euro-area countries and years after year 1998. 
Enlargement: 1 for EU-10 countries after year 2003. 
Election year: 1 if parliamentary elections took place. 
Dummy contract vs. delegation country: 0 if delegation country, 1 if contract country. 
Dummy Fiscal Council: 1 if a Fiscal Council was in place in the country over the sample period. 
Herfindahl Index: Sum of squared seat shares of all parties in the government. 
Dummy proportional representation: indicates if candidates are elected based on the percent of votes received by their party. 
Dummy country size: 1 for the following countries: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, UK.  
Margin of Majority: fraction of seats held by the government in the Parliament. 
Dummy political colour: 2 for leftist governments; 1 for intermediate coalitions; 0 for rightist governments. 
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Table 4. Average change in budgetary variables following the introduction of numerical fiscal rules across 
EU countries, 1990-2005 
 
Change in the primary CAB 
 
Average over the whole sample   Average over cases in which a fiscal 
rule is introduced  
 
Over the subsequent year  
Over the 3 subsequent years 
Over the 5 subsequent years 
 
0.0 (-0.2; 0.2) 
 0.0 (-0.4; 0.3) 
-0.1 (-0.5; 0.3) 
 
0.2 (-0.2; 0.7)  
0.4 (-0.7; 1.5) 
0.3 (-0.9; 1.4) 
Change in primary 
expenditure/GDP 
 
Average over the whole sample   Average over cases in which a fiscal 
rule is introduced 
 
Over the subsequent year  
Over the 3 subsequent years 
Over the 5 subsequent 
 
-0.2 (-0.5; 0.0) 
-0.9 (-1.3; -0.4) 
-2.1 (-1.4; -2.7) 
 
-1.5 (-2.8; -0.2)  
-1.9 (-3.3; -0.6) 
-3.1 (-4.4; -1.3) 
Note: Confidence interval values (5%) are reported in brackets. 
 
Table 5. Influence of fiscal rules and expenditure rules on budgetary outcomes: evidence from the 
estimation of fiscal reaction functions  
 









Index - low 
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Rule Index - 
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N.  obs.  227 227 227 227 227 227 
R  sq.  0.86 0.86 0.86 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Notes: Estimations method: Fixed-effect OLS with robust standard errors. Student's "t" coefficients are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level.  
All fiscal variables are expressed as a share of potential output.  
Dummy run-up to EMU: 1 for EU-15 countries and years between years 1994 and 1998. 
Dummy SGP: 1 for euro-area countries and years after year 1998. 
Enlargement: 1 for EU-10 countries after year 2003. 
Election year: 1 if parliamentary elections took place. 
Fixed effect coefficients are not reported. 
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Table 6. Influence of fiscal rules characteristics on budgetary outcomes: evidence 
from the estimation of fiscal reaction functions  
 
Dependent variable: 









Body in charge 
of monitoring 
(4) 




















































































































N.  obs.  227  227 227 227 227 227 
R  sq.  0.86  0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 
Notes: Estimations method: Fixed-effect OLS with robust standard errors. Student's "t" coefficients are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level.  
All fiscal variables are expressed as a share of potential output.  
Dummy run-up to EMU: 1 for EU-15 countries and years between years 1994 and 1998. 
Dummy SGP: 1 for euro-area countries and years after year 1998. 
Enlargement: 1 for EU-10 countries after year 2003. 
Election year: 1 if parliamentary elections took place. 
Fixed effect coefficients are not reported. 
 
   238
 
Table 7. Influence of characteristics of expenditure rules on budgetary outcomes: evidence from the estimation of 










































































































































N.  obs.  227  227 227 227 227 227 
R  sq.    0.97  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Notes: Estimations method: Fixed-effect OLS with robust standard errors. Student's "t" coefficients are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level.  
All fiscal variables are expressed as a share of potential output.  
Dummy run-up to EMU: 1 for EU-15 countries and years between years 1994 and 1998. 
Dummy SGP: 1 for euro-area countries and years after year 1998. 
Enlargement: 1 for EU-10 countries after year 2003. 
Election year: 1 if parliamentary elections took place. 
Fixed effect coefficients are not reported. 
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Table 8. Influence of fiscal rules on the cyclical stance of fiscal policy: evidence from 
the estimation of fiscal reaction functions 
 
  Least squares  Instrumental variables  





























































































N. obs.  91  147  91  147 
R sq.  0.88  0.86  0.88  0.86 
Notes: Estimations methods: (1)-(2): Fixed-effect OLS regression with robust standard errors; (3)-(4): Instrumental variables 
regression and robust standard errors. The output gap is instrumented with its own lag and a lagged indicator of foreign output gap. 
The foreign output gap indicator is the export-weighted output gap of the 3 major export markets of each country. 
Student's "t" coefficients are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote, respectively, significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level.  
All fiscal variables are expressed as a share of potential output.  
Dummy run-up to EMU: 1 for EU-15 countries and years between years 1994 and 1998. 
Dummy SGP: 1 for euro-area countries and years after year 1998. 
Enlargement: 1 for EU-10 countries after year 2003. 
Election year: 1 if parliamentary elections took place. 
Fixed effect coefficients are not reported. 
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Annex: The construction of the synthetic fiscal rules indexes 
 
The Fiscal Rule Coverage Index 
The purpose of this index is to summarise information on the degree of reliance on numerical fiscal rules at 
country level. This index provides information on the number of rules in place and on what part of general 
government finances is covered by each rule. The construction of the indicator is based on the following 
assumptions.  
à  Aggregation of rules of different type (e.g., an expenditure rule and a budget balance rule). In absence 
to a strong prior regarding which types of rules have a greater influence on fiscal outcomes, equal 
weighting was used as a transparent and straightforward criterion. 
à  Information on rules' coverage. Taking into account that the purpose of the analysis is to assess the 
impact of numerical fiscal rules on fiscal discipline, all numerical fiscal rules have been aggregated on 
the basis of the share of general government they cover. In other words, if a part of government 
finances is covered by an expenditure rule, and another part is covered by a budget balance rule, the 
part of government finances covered by numerical fiscal rules can be considered to be the sum of both.  
à  Overlapping. In order to take into account the possible redundancy among rules, the 'fiscal rule 
coverage index' was constructed following this simple approach: when more than one rule apply to the 
same sub sector of general government, the index gives a weigh of 1 to the rule with the "stronger" 
features as measured by the Index of Strength (see next section of this Annex) and a weight of 0.5 to 
any additional rule. For instance, if in a given country, in a given year, coexist a strong expenditure rule 
applied to the whole of the general government and a weak budget balance rule for local governments 
(10% of government finances), the Fiscal Rule Coverage Index will be equal to 100%+10% * 0.5 = 
1.05.  
A time-varying 'Expenditure rule coverage index' measuring the share of government finances covered by 
expenditure rules was constructed following the same methodology, but restricting the sample to numerical 
expenditure rules.   
 
The Index of Strength of Numerical Fiscal Rules 
With a view to take into account the characteristics of the individual fiscal rules, an index of ‘strength’ of 
numerical fiscal rules was calculated for each rule. The index takes into account five criteria: the statutory base 
of the rule; whether there is an independent monitoring of the rule; the nature of the institution responsible for 
the enforcement of the rule; the existence of pre-defined enforcement mechanisms; and the media visibility of 
the rule. The methodology followed is akin to that in existing literature (e.g. Deroose, Moulin and Wierts 
(2005)). For each criterion, scores were attributed as follows.  
Criterion 1: statutory base of the rule 
The score of this criterion index is constructed as a simple average of the two elements below:  
Statutory or legal base of the rule 
4  is assigned for a constitutional base   
3  if the rule is based on a legal act (e.g. Public finance Act, Fiscal Responsibility Law) 
2  if the rule is based on a coalition agreement or an agreement by different general government tiers  
1  for political commitment by a given authority (central or local government, Minister of Finance) 
Room for setting or revising objectives 
3  if there is no margin for adjusting objectives (they are encapsulated in the rule) 
2  there is some but constrained margin in setting or adjusting objectives 
1  there is complete freedom in setting objectives (the statutory base of the rule only contains principles) 
 
Criterion 2: Nature of the body in charge of monitoring respect of the rule 
The score of this criterion index is calculated as follows:    241
3  monitoring by an independent authority (Fiscal Council, Court of Auditors…) or national Parliament  
2  monitoring by the Ministry of Finance or any other government body  
1  no regular public monitoring of the rule (there is no report systematically assessing compliance) 
The score of this variable is augmented by 1 point in case there is a real time monitoring of compliance with the rule ('alert 
mechanisms') 
 
Criterion 3: Nature of the body in charge of enforcement of the rule 
The score of this criterion index is calculated as follows:  
3  enforcement by an independent authority (Fiscal Council or any Court) or the National Parliament  
2  enforcement by the Ministry of Finance or any other government body 
1  no specific body in charge of enforcement 
 
Criterion 4: Enforcement mechanisms of the rule 
The score of this criterion index is calculated as follows:  
4  automatic correction and sanction mechanisms in case of non-compliance 
3  automatic correction mechanism in case of non-compliance and the possibility of imposing sanctions 
2  Obligation to present corrective proposals to the relevant authority 
1  there is no ex-ante defined actions in case of non-compliance 
The score of this variable is augmented by 1 point in case escape clauses are foreseen and clearly specified. 
 
Criterion 5: Media visibility of the rule 
The score of this criterion index is calculated as follows:  
3  if the rule observance is closely monitored by the media, and if non-compliance is likely to trigger a public debate 
2  for high media interest in rule-compliance, but non-compliance is unlikely to invoke a public debate 
1  for no or modest interest of the media 
In absence of strong theoretical base or preference regarding the weight to be given to each criterion, the Index 
of Strength was computed in a large number of different ways, reflecting different possible weightings for the 
five criteria. The scores of the five criteria were first standardised to run between 0 and 1. A random weights 
technique was used following the method used by Sutherland and al. (2005). 10000 sets of randomly-generated 
weights were used to calculate the synthetic indicator in 10000 different ways. The random weights are drawn 
from a uniform distribution between zero and one and then normalised to sum to one. The resulting distribution 
for the synthetic indicator reflects the possible range of values given no a priori information on the weight to be 
given to each component of the index. The mean value of the synthetic indicator is asymptotically equivalent to 
the indicator calculated using equal weights for the constituent components (unweighted arithmetic average). 
The chart below shows, for all the fiscal rules considered in the study, the range containing 98% of the values of 
the index of strength of the rule calculated with 10000 different sets of random weights (we eliminated the 1% 
lowest and highest values of the synthetic index). 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1/ The chart shows, for all the numerical fiscal rules considered in the study, the range containing 98% of the values of the index of strength 
of the fiscal rule concerned. Rules were classified in an ascending order. The scores of the individual criteria taken into account in the 
calculation of the overall index were normalised to one. The size of the vertical line provides an indication of the heterogeneity of the scores 
related to the five criteria considered in the calculation of the synthetic index.   242
2/ When the characteristics of a rule have evolved over time, the chart only present the index consistent with the most recent features. Three 
rules presented in the chart are not anymore in force in 2005. For Belgium, the expenditure rule and the revenue rule were implemented for 
the convergence process leading to EMU qualification. For Slovenia, the debt rule was in force over 2000-2004.  
 
The Fiscal Rule Index 
The purpose of this index is to summarise information on the degree of the intensity in the use of the rules and 
on the average degree of strength of the rules. The indicator is constructed in two steps. First, the potential 
contribution of each rule to the Fiscal Rule Index is computed by multiplying the share of government finances 
covered by the rule by the Index of Strength of the rule. Second, these rule-specific indicators are summed up 
over all the rules in place in a given country in an given year. For example, take the case of a country C having 
three fiscal rules in year t: an expenditure rule to contain developments in health care spending (index of strength 
x) covering a percentage of general government expenditure equal to a; a budget balance rule for local 
governments (index of strength y) covering a fraction of general government finance equal to b and an 
expenditure rule at central government level (index of strength z) covering a fraction of total general government 
expenditure equal to c. The indicator for country C in year t is therefore determined as follows:  
cz by ax I t C + + = ,  
In case several rules apply to the same general government sub-sector, we follow the same methodology as for 
the calculation of the Fiscal Rule Coverage Index. Weight 1 is given to the rule with the highest Index of 
Strength and a weight 0.5 is given to all the other rules.  
Following the same approach but taking into account only expenditure rules, a time-varying 'expenditure rule 
index' was constructed for each Member State. 
 
 
The Fiscal Rule Cyclicality Index 
The purpose of this index is to summarise the likely impact of the system of numerical fiscal rules prevailing in a 
given country in a given year on the cyclical stance of fiscal policy. The index is constructed in the same way as 
the Fiscal Rule Index, except that in this case the information on the strength of individual fiscal rules is replaced 
by information on the properties of each fiscal rule with respect to stabilisation. Positive numbers imply a 
counter-cyclical impact; negative numbers a pro-cyclical impact (note that as opposed to the Fiscal Rule Index, 
the effect of different fiscal rules may offset each other as far as their impact of on cyclicality is concerned). In 
case several rules of the same type apply, we take into account only the most binding one, as measured by the 
Index of Strength.. The scoring assigned to different types of rules is as follows. 
 
Expenditure rules 
1  is assigned for a rule capping expenditure growth or level (in nominal or real terms) 
-1 if the rule is defined in terms of an expenditure to GDP ratio 
 
Budget balance rules 
0  if the rule is defined in cyclically-adjusted terms or if the period for assessing compliance is a full business cycle 
-1 for budget balance rules defined over a medium-term horizon 
-2 for budget balance rules with a short time horizon (1 year) 
 
Borrowing and debt rules 
0  if the period for assessing compliance is a full business cycle 
-1 for other debt or borrowing rules 
 
Revenue rules 
1  is assigned if the rule ensures that cyclical revenues are used for debt reduction, or favours it (the government has to specify in 
advance how cyclical revenues will be used) 
0  is assigned if the rule targets a given revenue-to-GDP ratio 
-1 is assigned if the rule targets an amount of revenue in nominal terms . 
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WHO PROVIDES SIGNALS TO VOTERS ABOUT GOVERNMENT COMPETENCE 
ON FISCAL MATTERS? THE IMPORTANCE OF INDEPENDENT WATCHGODS 
 
Eloïse STÉCLEBOUT-ORSEAU








We present a game that first models the relationship among a population, a government and a 
watchdog. The focus is on the incentives that the government faces when making fiscal 
policy decisions. The population has incomplete information about the type of government 
that is in office, but an independent watchdog can reveal whether it is competent or affected 
by a deficit bias. In the second part of the paper, we elaborate on the strategic changes in 
fiscal policy-making induced by the introduction of fiscal surveillance at the European level. 
Based on recent developments, we discuss whether multilateral surveillance is effective as a 
safeguard against fiscal indiscipline. We find that, if the watchdog acts strategically and 
internalizes the impact of its signals on the intergovernmental game, it will only provide 
information on the economic and budgetary state of Member States in specific cases – 
namely when the cost of sanctions is sufficiently high compared to electoral stakes and 
provided that few countries are mentioned.  
 
Keywords: Stability and Growth Pact, fiscal policy, budgetary surveillance 
JEL codes: C72, D72, D80, E62, H62, H77 
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY  
We identify two stylized facts under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). First, more states 
over time have recorded “excessive deficits” as defined in the SGP. Second, larger countries 
are more likely to run excessive deficits than smaller ones. Why has the SGP not succeeded 
in maintaining fiscal discipline? 
 
To answer this question, we consider the incentives that governments themselves face. We 
begin with a model that considers the domestic game for government. Governments may be 
competent or incompetent. On average, competent governments have better economic 
performance, but an incompetent government could experience a positive shock and have the 
same performance as a competent government that experiences a negative shock. Voters 
observe economic outcomes only, not government type or the nature of the shock. Voters 
support governments in good times and throw them out in bad times, but they will not know 
what to do during periods of intermediate economic performance. It would help voters to 
make decisions if some watchdog could reveal the nature of the shock and thereby also 
provide needed information about the type of their government.  
 
We then consider the effects of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), where governments 
commit to fiscal discipline under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). To investigate the 
strategy of governments, we introduce three changes to the game. First, the SGP focuses on 
deficit levels rather than the health of the overall economy. How do populations view 
deficits? We therefore consider that they may differ in their relative aversion to deficits. We 
add a new stage to the game that comes at the beginning where nature determines whether a 
population is mostly “Keynesian” or “Ricardian”. Keynesian populations are comfortable 
with governments that implement deficit-financed expansionary fiscal policies while 
Ricardians are deficit-averse. The game therefore considers the decision for a government to 
initiate a fiscal impulse.  
 
The second change is to evaluate what happens at the European level, and more precisely in 
the ECOFIN Council. Under the SGP, multilateral fiscal surveillance implies that 
governments can choose to punish countries that are found to have excessive deficits. We 
model the circumstances under which a country can expect to be subject to sanctions under 
an excessive deficit procedure. As the implementation of the SGP depends upon the Member 
States sanctioning themselves, there is the possibility of a blocking minority preventing 
sanctions. 
 
This, in turn, leads to a third change, namely the addition of a sub-game at the EU level. We 
discuss how it affects the government’s behaviour with regard to the budget deficit and the 
odds of its re-election. The overall message from a set of two- and three-player games is 
intuitive. If voters in a given country want a balanced budget badly enough, they simply get 
it. If populations want fiscal impulses, the outcome depends upon several factors – the 
underlying distribution of Keynesian and Ricardian populations, the behaviour of other 
governments and whether governments care more about voters support or the overall cost of 
sanctions. Because of the political game in the ECOFIN Council, governments look for 
signals about whether other governments will comply with the Pact or defect. If they know 
that enough of them will not comply and can constitute a blocking majority, they will not 
comply either. These outcomes capture well the two fore mentioned stylized facts: if a large 
share of countries run high deficits simultaneously, it also weakens the incentives for other 
countries to comply with the SGP. This explains the increasing number of “sinners”.   245
 
The question then becomes, under what circumstances would a watchdog want to send a 
signal about whether a given country is running a high deficit? The answer depends on the 
relative importance of the electoral stakes and the cost of sanctions at the international level. 
We find that the one case when a signal may prevent defection in the three player game is 
when the cost of international sanctions is sufficiently high compared to electoral stakes and 
so long as only one country is mentioned. In all the other cases, signals are either useless or 
counterproductive. A signal on one country would not prevent defection, and it could even 
lead other countries to defect too. The implication is clear – if it wants to maximize the 
chances of compliance with the Pact, paradoxically a strategic watchdog will provide little 
information. It will send signals only when it expects them to be effective. There is a 
dilemma inherent in multilateral surveillance: signalling bad pupils can have 
counterproductive implications on the behaviour of other countries.    246
1 INTRODUCTION 
 The Maastricht Treaty set a series of goals that Member States have to meet to join the euro 
area. The Treaty is not specific, however, about how to prevent free-riding fiscal behaviour of 
its members once Economic and Monetary (EMU) is in place.
3 In response to domestic 
pressure both from the public and from the Bundesbank, the German Finance Minister, Theo 
Waigel, proposed a ‘Stability Pact’ in autumn 1995 to address the absence of European level 
fiscal rules. While it was renamed as ‘the Stability and Growth Pact’ (SGP) and some parts of 
the proposal were weakened, the core parts of the proposal became EU law after the Member 
States agreed to it at the Dublin Summit in December 1996 (Heipertz and Verdun 2004). 
 
The Pact’s design includes preventive and corrective mechanisms. The emphasis for the 
preventive arm rests on the monitoring of Member State behaviour. States were expected to 
submit economic plans in the form of ‘convergence programmes’ already in 1994, but the 
content of those plans as well as their timing was not clear, and was not explicitly laid out in 
legal terms at the time. Based on both the SGP and on provisions Member States agreed to at 
subsequent European Council meetings, the rules for either convergence programmes (which 
non-participating countries file) or stability programmes (which euro area countries file) 
became clear. States would have to update their programmes yearly in the late autumn. The 
Commission, for its part, would assess the programmes and make recommendations to the 
Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (henceforth “ECOFIN”) on whether the 
programmes met European goals, which in particular included budget balances “close to 
balance or in surplus,” and whether the goals themselves were realistic.  
 
In order to move to the formal corrective arm of the Pact, a Member State would have to be 
found to have an “excessive deficit,” and the procedure that was used here is important. The 
general ‘floor’ the Pact sets is a deficit of 3% of GDP. Prior to the reform of the Pact in 
March 2005, ‘exceptional’ circumstances, such as a decline in economic growth of 2% or, 
upon ECOFIN’s approval, a decline of between 0.75% and 2%, would be grounds for a state 
not to receive the “excessive deficit” label if it ran large deficits. Note that the Commission 
had to recommend that an excessive deficit existed and ECOFIN would have to agree by 
qualified majority in order for a country to receive the “excessive deficit” label.  
 
The corrective arm of the Pact was designed to encourage states not to run excessive deficits 
in the first place. The original version of the SGP specified that, once a country had an 
excessive deficit, it had only a year to correct the deficit “unless there are special 
circumstances.” If the Commission and ECOFIN judged that the Member State was not 
making progress to eliminate the excessive deficit, they could require the country to make a 
non-interest bearing deposit with the Commission up to 0.5% of its GDP. If the country did 
not make correction, the deposit was eventually to become a fine. 
 
Due to some difficulties in implementing the Pact, in March 2005 the Member States agreed 
to a revision that changed both the Pact’s preventive and corrective mechanisms. On the 
preventive side, Member States now propose their own medium-term objectives as well as 
the country-specific factors they face, including the future fiscal effects of major structural 
reforms. In terms of the corrective mechanism, the revision clarifies the definition of 
mitigating factors, such as a severe economic downturn or the fiscal consequences of 
                                            
3 Non participating Member States are required to comply with SGP requirements but they are not 
subject to sanctions.   247
European unification. Yet despite these revisions, the core elements of the Stability and 




How well has the Pact worked in maintaining fiscal discipline among European countries, 
and in particular in the euro area? The first way to think about this is in terms of the percent 
of states in the euro area that have “excessive deficits.” This measure, however, may not be 
adequate--if only a few small states that together constitute a negligible share of the euro area 
economy have problems, the overall effects may be slight, while it could also be the case that 
few states have excessive deficits but they are the largest economies. The second way to think 
about this is therefore in terms of the overall euro area economy; what percent of the euro 
area gross domestic product (GDP) is generated in countries with excessive deficits?  
 
Graph 1 presents evidence for each of the indicators. Two stylized facts emerge from this 
simple picture. First, the number of states with excessive deficits has increased over time, 
from none in the early years to 50% of the states in 2005. The second fact is that the 
percentage of the euro area economy with an excessive deficit is almost always higher than 
the percent of states, with almost 78% of the economy in excessive deficit in 2005.  
 
Graph 1. Percent of euro area countries and euro area GDP in Excessive 




















Data on GDP from the April 2006 AMECO database, while data on which countries had excessive deficits when 
is found at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/procedures_en.htm . The Netherlands is the 
state that no longer has an excessive deficit in 2006 based on the ECOFIN decision in June 2005. 
 
Why has the SGP both in its original, and in its recently revised, form not restrained Member 
States from running excessive deficits? Moreover, why are large states more likely to have 
excessive deficits than small ones? We seek to explain each of these stylized facts in this 
paper. The obvious place to begin an answer is with the incentives that the states themselves 
face to behave one way or the other. Indeed, the language of “preventive” and “corrective” 
mechanisms indicates that the intention of the Pact is to affect the incentives that 
governments face when they make fiscal policy decisions. What the incentives are in 
practice, however, is not explicit in EU documents, and they may not be obvious. Moreover, 
                                            
4 For a more detailed review of the SGP and the recent reforms, see Morris, Ongena, and Schuknecht 2006.   248
we know little about the strategy of the institution implementing European legislation in this 
framework. 
To address these issues, the paper first considers the question how, and under what 
circumstances, efficient budgetary monitoring can enable populations to sanction 
governments given what the government does in fiscal policy. The literature on economic 
voting presumes that voters are retrospective. They observe the government’s management of 
the economy. If the economy does well, they conclude that the government is competent and 
they re-elect it. If the economy does poorly, they conclude that the government is bad and 
they vote for the opposition. Consistent with the literature, our model assumes that voters 
decide that the government is competent in boom times and incompetent during busts. 
However, one important complication that retrospective models generally ignore is that 
governments do not have complete control over the economy. We presume that there is some 
random error that appears as part of the estimation of economic performance. At intermediate 
levels of performance, voters cannot deduce the government’s type. It could be that a 
competent government experienced a negative economic shock or that an incompetent 
government experienced a positive shock. This means that voters may potentially keep 
incompetent governments that get lucky and vote out competent governments because of a 
negative exogenous shock. The game indicates that there is a functional need for an unbiased 
watchdog to send signals on the nature of economic shocks to voters, from which voters can 
deduce the government’s type. When this watchdog exists, voters punish incompetent 
governments.  
Under EMU, the design of the SGP suggests that its implementation depends on the number 
of governments that comply with it. If there are few sinners, ECOFIN will sanction them, and 
governments have a reason to consolidate their budgets. If several countries, and especially 
the large ones, deviate simultaneously, the implementation of sanctions is likely to be much 
milder. This is due to the decision-making process at the ECOFIN Council: although a 
country facing sanctions is not allowed to take part in the vote on its own case, it has clear 
incentives to ally with other “bad pupils” to agree not to vote against each other. If the 
proportion of bad pupils in the Council reaches a critical level, their votes can be sufficient to 
gather a blocking minority.  
 
An important twist to the story concerns the role of information in the European-level game. 
If it were clear who runs a large deficit and who does not, the coordination among the 
Member States on whether to implement the sanctions under the Pact or not would be clear. 
Moreover, there would be no role for a watchdog. Yet a watchdog may be relevant for 
providing information for two reasons. First, Member States probably do not have complete 
information about the developing fiscal situations in other states, whereas a European 
watchdog may have better information about the fiscal situation in each country than the 
other states. Second and more importantly, it is the watchdog that decides whether to begin a 
process of identifying a state as having an excessive deficit in the first place.
5 It also is the 
actor that recommends that a sanction be imposed. In close cases, Member States presumably 
are uncertain whether the watchdog will propose that a given state has an excessive deficit. It 
is therefore important to model the decision of the watchdog to reveal its information given 
that the overall proportion of “sinners” affects whether the Pact will be enforced or not.  
 
                                            
5 The European Court of Justice reaffirmed the Commission’s agenda-setting role on these matters in its 
decision on July 13, 2004.   249
We argue that strategic considerations explain a dilemma inherent in the surveillance process: 
signalling bad pupils can have counterproductive implications on the behaviour of other 
countries and therefore a strategic watchdog will choose to send signals only when it is 
certain that they will be effective.  
The paper is organised as follows. We first model the relationship between a population and a 
government on fiscal policy choices, as well as the role of a watchdog at the national level 
(Section 2). The game changes under EMU (Section 3), as domestic fiscal developments may 
also trigger sanctions under the SGP. This may result in a trade-off for governments between 
complying with voters’ preferences and European commitments. Furthermore, as 
governments look for signals what the others will do when deciding whether to “sin” 
themselves, the watchdog acts strategically: it sends signals when there are only a few 
sinners, but will want to leave the uncertainty in place when it knows that there are more 
potential sinners (Section 4). The last section concludes.  
 
 
2  DOMESTIC FISCAL SURVEILLANCE  
We begin the domestic discussion with a principal-agent framework
6 (Figure 1). The 
principal is the population of a given country. The agent is the government. The problem for 
voters is that they cannot observe whether the government is competent or not. We presume 
that incompetence leads to both lower growth and to a lower budget balance. More formally, 
one can think of y* as the economic potential of a given country (e.g. on the basis of average 
observed growth rates in the past), R as the incompetence level, and y = (1-R)y* as the 
observed level of performance in a given electoral term.
7 This means that, if voters choose 
“wrong” and R > 0, the country will experience lower economic growth and lower budget 
balances. Note that the principal in this case does not directly observe R but only y. To 
simplify the model for now, we assume that governments come in two types, those with R=0 
(i.e., competent) and those with R > 0 (i.e., incompetent). The government type is chosen by 
nature and does not change once the government is in office.
 8 
The literature on economic voting (e.g., Fiorina 1981, Ferejohn 1986, Auberger and Dubois 
2005) considers such a relationship between voter expectations on the economy and election 
results. It presumes that voters are retrospective. They observe the government’s management 
of the economy. If the economy does well, they conclude that the government is competent 
and they re-elect it. If the economy does poorly, they conclude that the government is bad and 
they vote for the opposition.
9 In our model, voters begin at Stage 1 with ex ante beliefα that 
                                            
6 There are several principal-agent models for the European Union. For specifically fiscal policy issues modeled 
under the Stability and Growth Pact, see Schuknecht (2004), Schelkle (2005), and Hodson (2005). 
7 One simplification that we make at this point is that y reflects both the economic and budgetary performance of 
government. A dynamic extension of the model would require a more solid analysis of the link between the 
deficit and growth.  
8 There are several reasons why competence could vary, but for now all that matters is that governments vary on 
competence and nature chooses the level of competence in any given case. A future paper could treat the level 
of R as a choice variable for the government rather than one chosen by nature. 
9 One can think of the application of this general model to topics beyond economic voting. In the American mid-
term elections of 2006, there was a public debate about whether the government competently executed policy in 
Iraq. The Republican leadership argued that external shocks, such as the presence of Al Queda terrorist cells, 
were responsible for the increase in violence in Iraq. The Democrats just as strenuously argued that the root 
cause of the deterioration of the situation was due to incompetence.   250
the government is competent and  α − 1  that it is not – namely,  () α = =0 R P  and 
()α − = > 1 0 R P .
10  





















One important complication that some retrospective models ignore is that governments do not 
have complete control over the economy. Recent work (Duch and Stevenson 2006; Hellwig 
and Samuels forthcoming) suggests that economic voting may decline as the share of the 
international component of a given economy increases, while others (Alesina and Rosenthal 
1995; Duch and Stevenson 2006, 2007) consider governments that experience both 
“exogenous” and “competency” shocks when making economic policy. In a similar spirit to 
the previous models, we presume that y = (1-R)y* + ε, so that there is some random error ε 
that appears as part of the estimation of y. For simplicity, we assume that there are only two 
types of shocks, negative and positive: ε = {-e, +e}, with each having an equal probability of 
occurring.
11 Competent governments have an edge over incompetent ones, but random 
shocks mean that the outcomes that voters observe are not always clear. Specifically, we 
consider three cases: yhigh when there is a boom, ymiddle when economic performance is 
intermediate, and ylow when there is a bust, and we presume that competent governments have 
only two outcomes, booms and intermediate performance, while incompetent governments 
                                            
10 Because this paper focuses on the strategic interaction of governments and a watchdog, we do not model 
strategic voters. 
11 This model is also similar to Debrun and Kumar (2006). In their model, governments suffer random failures 
in the provision of public goods. They also have some unobserved level of competence. Populations observe 
only fiscal outcomes, not the level of competence or the possible provision failure. They then derive optimal 
fiscal rules in this context, and in particular they suggest that a state-contingent deficit rule would be desirable. 
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have two potential outcomes, intermediate performance and bust.
12 Intermediate performance 
may result either from a competent government experiencing a negative shock, or an 
incompetent government with a positive shock: ymiddle= y* - e = (1-R)y* + e. Voters do not 
observe the shock. They do, however, observe economic performance, and they know that the 
conditional probabilities for each value of y given the type of government are: 
() ( ) 0 0 R | y y P 0 R | y y P high low = > = = = =  
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 2
1
middle low high middle 0 R | y y P 0 R | y y P 0 R | y y P 0 R | y y P = > = = > = = = = = = =  
One can now estimate the probability that a given government will be re-elected. While the 
economic voting literature notes simply that the probability of re-election increases with 
macro-economic health, we simplify these findings into a presumption that voters decide a 
government is competent in boom times and incompetent during busts. Indeed, in the model 
re-election depends on the voters’ updated beliefs on the government’s type. The probability 
of re-election is equal to the probability that voters attribute to the competent type after 
observing the level of GDP. If there is a bust, voters know that the government can only be 
incompetent and they dump it. Conversely, if there is a boom, the government can only be 
competent and it is re-elected. In the intermediate case, the level of economic performance 
does not bring any new information to voters and therefore the government is re-elected with 
probability α.  
In other terms, booms or busts fully reveal the government’s type, while at intermediate levels 
of performance, voters cannot deduce the government’s type. It could be that a competent 
government experienced a negative shock or that an incompetent government experienced a 
positive shock. This means that voters may potentially keep incompetent governments that get 
lucky and vote out competent governments because of a negative exogenous shock.  
An addition to the existing literature our model provides is the consideration of possible 
watchdogs. Such bodies could provide signals that help voters reveal the true type of 
government under intermediate economic performance. In terms of the model, voters lack the 
private information that the government has about its type, but there may be others who can 
provide useful information. In particular, it is possible for a watchdog to tell whether a shock 
is positive or negative. This in turn allows voters to conclude correctly the type of 
government in office. The relevance of the signal in practice depends upon the credibility of 
the sender in the eyes of the voter. Opposition leaders are expected to signal that shocks are 
positive, so even if they have accurate information their signal is not, by itself, persuasive. 
Similarly, the government spokesperson is expected to send signals that the economic shock 
is negative and will also not be believed. An unbiased sender, however, will be believed. 
Here, we suppose that if there is a watchdog, it is assumed to be unbiased and voters take its 
signal at face value. The watchdog’s signal in case of a boom or a bust brings no new 
information to voters. However, in the intermediate case, if there is a signal, the probability 
of re-election becomes 1 if the signal is -e and 0 if the signal is +e. 
Multilateral fiscal surveillance under the SGP introduces another level to the game. In the 
next two sections, we consider how it affects the strategies of governments and the watchdog. 
                                            
12 One could also assume probabilities of all three economic outcomes to both types of government. A 
competent government could experience a disastrous shock that leads to a bust, while an incompetent 
government could be so fortunate that it experiences a boom despite rent-seeking. These events would be rare, 
however, and would complicate the model without leading to any new insights.   252
3  MULTILATERAL FISCAL SURVEILLANCE 
 
3.1   Presentation of the intergovernmental game  
 
There are several key changes to the game when one adds a European level. In particular, the 
SGP establishes a framework that considers the fiscal performance of Member States. All 
models require simplification of the world, and we must leave out some details to make the 
model tractable. There is one dynamic that is crucial to the operationalization of the SGP, and 
for explaining the two stylized facts above – namely that the number of states with excessive 
deficits has increased and it is disproportionately the large states that have not been 
complying. While the watchdog sends the signal about a given state’s finances, the Member 
States themselves (with the exception of the one Member State under consideration at a given 
point in time) determine whether sanctions will be applied. Furthermore, the SGP focuses on 
deficit levels. The budget balance is not only considered as an indicator of the government’s 
economic performance but also as a criterion per se, and under the Pact a government can be 
punished for having an excessive deficit.  
 
The first consequence of this focus on deficits is that the preferences of voters regarding the 
budget balance matter. How do populations view deficits? There is no cross-national study 
we know of that measures empirically the position of populations on deficits, but presumably 
populations may differ in their relative aversion to deficits.
13 We add a preliminary stage to 
the game (Stage 0) where Nature determines whether a population is Keynesian or 
Ricardian
14. The population may expect fiscal deficits to be necessary to pick up economic 
growth, and it will reward governments that execute such policies. For exposition purposes, 
we consider such populations “Keynesian.” A “Ricardian” population, in contrast, punishes 
governments that run large deficits. There are other intuitive ways one can think about these 
population types,
15 but the key is simply that populations differ on the desirability of the 
government to run deficits. 
 
The second change is to evaluate what happens at the European level. Under the SGP, 
governments are required to monitor their budgets closely and the ECOFIN Council can 
choose to punish countries that have excessive deficits. This is reflected in the addition of an 
intergovernmental sub-game at Stage 6 of the game. We discuss how a government decides 
whether to initiate a fiscal impulse and how the European-level sub-game affects the odds of 
its re-election. We also model how the ECOFIN Council decides on the implementation of 
                                            
13 One extension of the model would be to think of the “population” here as the median voter, and to consider 
populations with some proportion Keynesian and the remaining proportion Ricardian. These proportions would 
vary across countries and could also change over time in a dynamic model.  
14 For the time being, this is assumed to be known to all players. An interesting extension of the game could 
make the information on public opinion private to its own government. 
15 A “Ricardian” public opinion could also simply be in favour of the SGP. A public opinion that is reluctant to 
have high deficits because it expects that future taxes will increase would back the Pact. It can also be because 
the public opinion is particularly concerned about credibility issues (of government, of EMU, of the SGP). A 
“Keynesian” public opinion, in contrast, expects the government to implement an expansionary fiscal policy 
regardless of the Pact. Such a public opinion may be hostile to European sanctions if they reduce fiscal margins 
of manoeuvre and may encourage the government to breach the Pact. While we do not know of direct public 
opinion evidence for deficits, Scheve (2004) indicates that populations do differ systematically in their relative 
acceptance of inflation, with those found in countries with large financial sectors and with more past experience 
with price volatility the most inflation-averse.   253
sanctions, based on the assumption that the degree of toughness in the implementation of the 
SGP depends on the number of governments that comply with it. If there are few sinners, the 
Council will sanction them, and governments have a reason to consolidate their budgets. If 
several countries, and especially the large ones, deviate simultaneously, the implementation 
of sanctions is likely to be much milder. This is due to the decision-making process at the 
ECOFIN Council: although a country facing sanctions is not allowed to take part in the vote 
on its own case, it has clear incentives to ally with other “bad pupils” to agree not to vote 
against each other. If the proportion of bad pupils in the euro area reaches a critical level, 
their votes can be sufficient to gather a blocking minority.  
 
Figure 2 below provides the complete game tree. The introduction of the intergovernmental 
sub-game has several implications for voters and governments. First, in the EMU context, the 
probability of re-election at Stage 5 is transitory, because it only depends on voters’ beliefs 
on the government’s type. The final probability of re-election, which voters calculate at Stage 
7, also depends on the government’s decision in the intergovernmental sub-game at Stage 6. 
Therefore, in the intergovernmental sub-game, governments need to consider how their 
decision on an additional fiscal impulse affects their final probability of re-election compared 
to Stage 5. 
 
Following backward induction, we start to solve the SGP game by looking at Stages 6 and 7 
in this section. We presume that in EMU voters still take the watchdog’s signal at face value 
at Stage 5, as they are not aware of the intergovernmental game and its implications on the 
watchdog’s signalling strategy (Stage 4), which we will discuss in Section 4.  
 
The remainder of this section walks the reader through the intergovernmental sub-game. The 
overall message is intuitive. If voters in a given country want a balanced budget badly 
enough, they simply get it. If populations want fiscal impulses, the outcome depends upon 
several factors – the underlying distribution of Keynesian and Ricardian populations, the 
behaviour of other governments and whether governments care more about voters support or 
the overall cost of sanctions. Because of the political game in the ECOFIN Council, 
governments look for signals about whether other governments will comply with the Pact or 
defect. In some cases, if they know that enough of them will not comply and can constitute a 
blocking majority, they will not comply either.  
 
3.2   The intergovernmental game with two players 
 
At Stage 6, what influences a government’s decision to either implement measures to avoid 
an excessive deficit or, on the contrary, provide an additional fiscal impulse and go further 
into deficit? 
 
The government’s strategy in this sub-game depends on four factors. First, they consider their 
own budget decisions. At the European level, there are two possible actions – the government 
decides to have an additional deficit (D) or it complies with the SGP (C). Second, they 
consider the cost of sanctions (S) that come from the SGP if they choose D. Third, the 
government considers what other governments are doing. If enough of the others will choose 
D as well, the sanction from the SGP will not be imposed. Finally, the government considers 
the reaction of public opinion and how this reaction affects its electoral chances. Its decision 
regarding the fiscal impulse may have a positive or negative impact (V) on its chances of 














































Whatever the type of public opinion, there are no changes to the probability of re-election 
under booms or busts, as voters have such a clear-cut opinion on the government that they 
will always re-elect it or dump it regardless of its decision.
16 So the interesting case is again 
the intermediate one. Therefore the governments that we model below are supposed to have 
had an intermediate economic performance. 
  
We assume that Keynesian public opinions would consider an additional deficit economically 
efficient and therefore would expect the government to initiate a fiscal impulse. So in the case 
of intermediate performance, even if a watchdog has signaled a positive economic shock, an 
incompetent government could improve its image in the eyes of a Keynesian population by 
playing D, thus raising its chances of reelection from 0 to V (where V∈[0,1]). On the other 
hand, a competent government experiencing a negative shock and yet complying with the 
Pact – i.e. playing C – would be punished for not supporting the economy and the odds of its 
re-election would fall from 1 to 1-V. 
Conversely, a Ricardian public opinion would reward an incompetent government playing C 
for not making the deficit worse than it already is, but would punish a competent government 
playing D for deepening the deficit. 
When there is no signal, the probability of re-election is the average of the odds for both 
types of government weighted by their respective probability. If the population is Keynesian 
and the government plays D, its chances of re-election are (1- α)V + α.1 = V + α(1-V) and if 
it plays C, they are (1- α).0 + α(1-V) = α(1-V). If the population is Ricardian, a government 
playing D will be re-elected with probability (1- α).0 + α(1-V) = α(1-V) and one playing C 
with probability (1- α)V + α.1 = V + α(1-V). 
 
In all the above cases, when the economic performance is intermediate, regardless of the 
economic shock and the voters’ information, the difference in probability of re-election for 
the government between playing C and D, in absolute terms, is V. Hence, let -V denote the 
cost of going counter to voter preferences. 
In the payoffs matrices below, we presume that the odds of re-election increase by V/2 if the 
government adopts a budgetary position consistent with the underlying population type and 
decrease by V/2 otherwise. The players’ strategies would be exactly the same if the payoffs 
had been 0 and -V, V and 0 or any other intermediate combination: what matters is that the 
difference in terms of public support between playing C or D is always V (or -V). 
If populations are completely indifferent about what governments do on budgets, V is equal 
to zero and the game reduces to the one in Figure 1. 
 
V is the election component of governments’ payoffs. Furthermore, there is a second 
component that measures the cost of sanctions under the SGP: 
 
  0 if the government complies or if sanctions are not implemented 
  -S otherwise 
 
Thus -S is the cost of breaching the SGP if sanctions are implemented. By assumption, S is 
strictly positive. Note that a government with a budgetary surplus does not get any reward on 
the basis of the SGP. It may, however, be rewarded in terms of public opinion. 
                                            
16 We can assume that if there is a bust, it is likely that there is also a large deficit and that voters will always 
want to get rid of the government. Conversely, a large deficit is highly unlikely if there is a boom, and voters 
will nearly always be satisfied with the government. As a result, the extreme cases are trivial. 
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S partly reflects the level of financial sanctions under the SGP. It is, however, a broader 
concept. There may be clear reputation costs both to voters and to markets for violating the 
Pact. One can also imagine that ratings services could downgrade the value of a Member 
State’s credit rating. S represents the overall cost of sanctions. Because S measures a threat, it 
is of the same order of magnitude as V, so that both parameters are homogeneous.
17  
 
We begin with a two-player game and present later a three-player version. In the two-player 
game, it is assumed that if only one government breaches the SGP, sanctions are applied, 
whereas if both governments are deviant, sanctions are blocked. Three settings are then 
possible, according to what types of public opinion prevail: two Ricardian public opinions, 
two Keynesian public opinions, or one of each type. 
 
A Ricardian public opinion prefers the government to comply with the SGP, so it grants the 
government a positive payoff if it is in line with the SGP (C) and a negative payoff if it has a 
large deficit (D). The reaction of the Keynesian public opinion to compliance and deviance 
from the SGP is opposite to that of the Ricardian public opinion: it prefers the government to 
breach the SGP, so it gives the government a negative payoff if it is in line with the SGP (C) 
and a positive payoff if it has an large deficit (D).  
 
Figure 3. Payoff matrices with at least one Ricardian public opinion 
  2  
  C   D  
1 C V/2, V/2  V/2, -V/2-S 
  D  -V/2-S, V/2  -V/2, -V/2 
3.a. Two Ricardian public opinions
   2 
   C  D 
1  C  V/2, -V/2  V/2, V/2-S 
  D  -V/2-S, -V/2  -V/2, V/2 
3.b. Ricardian voters in country 1, 
Keynesian voters in 2 
 
If public opinions in both countries are favourable to the SGP (Figure 3.a), a government 
never has incentives to deviate from the rule because it would receive negative payoffs at 
least from public opinion and possibly also from the implementation of sanctions. The 
incentives coming from both voters and the SGP operate in the same direction. The Nash 
equilibrium is that both governments comply with the SGP.  
 
In Figure 3.b, the first government (actions in rows) faces a Ricardian public opinion and the 
second government (actions in columns) a Keynesian public opinion. The government whose 
public opinion is reluctant to have a deficit never has an incentive to deviate from the SGP in 
this game. Note that the government whose public opinion requires an expansionary fiscal 
policy even if it implies to breach the Pact is better off with a large deficit if sanctions are not 
implemented – but this is unlikely here, as the other government faces a Ricardian public 
opinion and will not run a high deficit. If sanctions are applied, the government in a 
Keynesian country may still have an incentive to breach the SGP provided that sanctions are 
low or that the public opinion reward is high enough to overcome the cost of sanctions, i.e. if 
-V/2 < V/2-S , or V/S > 1. 
 
At this point, it is important to stress that the ratio V/S is the key parameter in this game, 
because it measures the relative importance of the voter reward compared to the European 
                                            
17 In the model these parameters are static, but in a dynamic model they could of course vary over time. 
? 
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sanction. When deciding whether to comply with the Pact, governments face a trade-off 
between voter support (V) and threat of sanction (S). If V/S is high, governments have a 
higher incentive to follow first and foremost the preferences of voters. If V/S is low, the cost 
of possible sanctions is so high that governments may choose to go counter to the preferences 
of public opinion. We will see in the remainder of the paper that V/S also affects the 
equilibria and the watchdog’s strategy. 
 
As complying is always a dominant strategy for governments facing Ricardian populations, 
they never have an incentive to deviate. Let us therefore focus on the less straightforward 
interaction between two governments with Keynesian populations. 
   2   
   C  D   
C  -V/2, -V/2  -V/2, V/2-S  p 
1 
D  V/2-S, -V/2  V/2, V/2  1-p 
   q 1-q   
 
The outcome depends again on the relative levels of S and V. It may not be clear whether a 
government is better off complying or deviating when the other government is complying, 
especially if V is unobservable. However, if one government expects the other will breach the 
Pact, it will decide to deviate as well. In this setting, expectations are very important. 
Importantly, this situation results in self-fulfilling prophecies: if government 1 expects that 
government 2 will deviate, it will choose to deviate too, which in turn will lead government 2 
to deviate. 
 
When governments play mixed strategies, let p denote the probability that government 1 
plays  C,  q the probability that government 2 plays C, and ui(.) the expected payoff of 
government i for a given action. 
 
The expected payoffs of government 1 are as follows: 
 
u1 (C) = -V/2 
u1 (D) = q(V/2 - S) + (1-q)V/2 = V/2 - qS 
 
If government 1 deviates, it always receives support from the population (V/2) and it has to 
bear the cost of a sanction S when government 2 complies, which happens with probability q. 
 
Government 1 plays C if it yields a higher expected payoff: 
 
-V/2 > V/2 - qS 
i.e. q > V/S. 
 
As the game is symmetric, similarly, government 2 plays C if p > V/S. 
 
This is typically a coordination game whereby players are better off when they act similarly. 
Being the only one to defect is costly, so each government defects only if the probability that 
the other government defects too is high enough. Indeed, while choosing to defect has a 
favourable impact in terms of public opinion support, it can also imply a costly sanction if the 
other government does not defect. If the probability that the other government defects is high, 




opinion. Conversely, the higher the cost of the sanction and the lower the stake regarding 
public opinion, the more governments are willing to comply. 
We can compute the game’s best-response correspondences: 
 
    0   if q < V/S          0   if p < V/S  
p*(q) =   [0,1]  if q = V/S      q*(p) =   [0,1]  if p = V/S 
    1   if q > V/S          1   if p > V/S 
 
The equilibria depend on the relative values of V and S (see proofs in Appendix 1). 
 
Voter support matters more than international sanctions (V/S > 1) 
 
The conditions p<V/S and q<V/S always hold. In consequence, there is only one equilibrium: 
(p*=0, q*=0), meaning that all governments choose to have a large deficit. 
Note that, in this case, if the amount of the sanction is low compared to the stakes in terms of 
public opinion, governments always have an incentive to have a high deficit. As a result, both 
governments deviate and avoid sanctions. 
 
Voter support matters as much as international sanctions (V/S = 1) 
 
The best responses are: 
        
p*(q) =   0   if q < 1        q*(p) =   0   if p < 1  
  [0,1]  if  q  =  1       [0,1]  if  p  =  1 
 
As soon as there is a positive probability that the other government deviates, governments 
choose to deviate. In this case, there are two equilibria: (p*=0, q*=0) and (p*=1, q*=1). 
 
Voter support matters less than international sanctions ( 0 < V/S < 1) 
 
This is the most general case. The above equilibria, (p*=0, q*=0) and (p*=1, q*=1), are also 
equilibria in this case: governments either all comply or all deviate. 
Furthermore, there is also a mixed-strategy equilibrium: (p*=V/S, q*=V/S). 
 
Voter support does not matter (V = 0) 
 
This implies that V/S = 0 and that best responses are as follows: 
        
p*(q) =   [0,1]  if q = 0        q*(p) =   [0,1]  if p = 0 
1   if q > 0            1   if p > 0 
 
The payoff matrix is now: 
 
   2   
   C  D   
C  0, 0  0, -S  p 
1 
D  -S, 0  0, 0  1-p 
   q 1-q   
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Each government can intend to defect only if it is certain that the other government will 
defect too. Once again, there are two equilibria: (p*=0, q*=0) and (p*=1, q*=1). 
 
3.3   The intergovernmental game with three players 
 
We now turn to the three-player game, where the implementation of sanctions on sinners 
depends on the proportion of sinners. If only one player breaches the Pact, it is sanctioned; if 
two or three players have high deficits, they can block sanctions. 
 
The three-player game can be considered as a proxy for qualified majority voting, if one 
thinks of players not as single governments, but as groups of governments. One player would 
be smaller than a blocking minority, two players a group at least as large as a blocking 
minority or a winning majority, and three players would be unanimity. Adding more players 
would increase formal complexity with little gain in insight and realism.  
 
3.3.a.  The game with Keynesian and Ricardian public opinions 
 
The case of one Keynesian population (government 1) and two Ricardian populations 
(governments 2 and 3) is trivial (see below). Complying is always a dominant strategy for 
both Ricardian countries, so the options for the Keynesian country are simply either to 
comply or to have a high deficit and be sanctioned. The solution depends on the comparison 
between -V/2 and V/2 - S, i.e. between V and S as previously. 
   2       2   
   C  D       C  D   
C  -V/2, V/2, V/2  -V/2, -V/2-S, V/2    C -V/2, V/2, -V/2-S  -V/2, -V/2, -V/2   
1 
D  V/2-S, V/2, V/2  V/2, -V/2, V/2   
1
D V/2, V/2, -V/2  V/2, -V/2, -V/2   
                 
    3 = C        3 = D   
 
Let us now consider a three-player game in which two governments face Keynesian public 
opinions and one (government 3) faces a Ricardian public opinion. 
 
The payoff matrix is: 
   2       2   
   C  D       C  D   
C  -V/2, -V/2, V/2  -V/2, V/2-S, V/2 p  C -V/2, -V/2, -V/2-S -V/2, V/2, -V/2  p 
1 
D  V/2-S, -V/2, V/2  V/2, V/2, V/2  1-p 
1
D V/2, -V/2, -V/2  V/2, V/2, -V/2  1-p 
   q 1-q       q 1-q   
    3 = C     r        3 = D     1-r  
  
C is a strictly dominant strategy for government 3 (V/2 > -V/2 and V/2 > -V/2-S) so the 
government with a Ricardian public opinion always plays C: r* = 1 for any strategies of 
governments 1 and 2, where r is the probability that government 3 complies. 
 
Therefore, the game is reduced to a 2-player game with Keynesian public opinions, as studied 
above. For governments with Keynesian public opinions, the strategy of the Ricardian 
country is not an issue, as they know with certainty that they will comply. In consequence, 




3.3.b.  The game with only Keynesian public opinions 
 
If all populations are Keynesian, the payoff matrix is: 
    2       2  
   C  D       C  D   
C  -V/2, -V/2, -V/2  -V/2, V/2-S, -V/2 p  C -V/2, -V/2, V/2-S -V/2, V/2, V/2  p 
1 
D  V/2-S, -V/2, -V/2 V/2, V/2, -V/2  1-p 
1
D V/2, -V/2, V/2  V/2, V/2, V/2  1-p 
   q 1-q       q 1-q   
    3 = C     r        3 = D     1-r  
 
The expected payoffs of government 1 are as follows: 
 
u1 (C) = -V/2 
u1 (D) = qr(V/2 - S) + (1-q)rV/2 + (1-r)V/2 = V/2 - qrS 
 
As in the two-player game, when government 1 defects, it receives V/2 from the population, 
and the sanction S is implemented provided that both governments 2 and 3 comply, which 
happens with probability qr. 
 
Government 1 plays C if it yields a higher expected payoff: 
 
-V/2 > V/2 - qrS 
i.e. qr > V/S. 
 
As the game is symmetric, similarly, government 2 plays C if pr > V/S and government 3 
plays C if pq > V/S. 
 
As previously, this is a problem of coordination. This time, each government has to anticipate 
the behaviour of the other two governments, so it needs to calculate the product of 
probabilities that each of them complies. Note that the amount of information a player needs 
is greater in this case because the player must anticipate what two (rather than just one) 
player will do. 
 
Once more, the equilibria depend on the relative importance of voter support and the cost of 
sanctions under the SGP. Appendix 2 presents the proofs and discussions for the different 
possible situations. A summary of the best responses and equilibria in the two- and three-
players cases with Keynesian populations appears in Table 4. Graph 2 presents the equilibria 
in the three-player case.  
 
3.4   Interpretation of the intergovernmental game 
 
We have identified two sources of possibly conflicting incentives: incentives coming from 
voters (measured by V) and incentives resulting from the threat of sanctions under the SGP 
(measured by S). If voters are in favour of fiscal impulses and the electoral stakes are more 
pressing than the threat of sanctions under the SGP, then the incentives to breach the Pact are 
high. This is the case, for instance, just before an election (V high), or if the credibility 
associated to the financial and reputation cost of sanctions is low (S low).  
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Table 4. Overview of best responses and equilibria in two- and three-player 
games 
(p, q, r : probability that government 1, 2, 3 complies with the SGP) 
  Two gov’ts with Keynesian populations 
+ possibly a government with a Ricardian 
population always playing r*= 1 
Three gov’ts with Keynesian populations 
V/S > 1  p*(q) = 0 for all q 
q*(p) =  0 for all p 
 
p*(q,r) = 0 for all q,r 
q*(p,r) = 0 for all p,r 
r*(p,q) = 0 for all p,q 
  Eq.: (p*= q*= 0)  Eq.: (p*= q*= r*= 0) 
V/S = 1  p*(q) =  0  if q < 1  
[0,1]  if q = 1 
q*(p) =  0  if p < 1  




p*(q,r) =   0  if qr < 1  
[0,1]  if qr = 1 
q*(p,r) =   0  if pr < 1  
[0,1]  if pr = 1 
r*(p,q) =   0  if pq < 1  
[0,1]  if pq = 1 
 
  Eq.: (p*= q*= 0), 
(p*= q*= 1) 
Eq.: (p*= q*= r*= 0), 
(p*= q*= r*= 1) 
0 < V/S < 1      0   if q < V/S  
p*(q) =     [0,1]  if q = V/S 
    1   if q > V/S 
    0   if p < V/S  
q*(p) =     [0,1]  if p = V/S 




    0   if qr < V/S  
p*(q,r) =   [0,1]  if qr = V/S 
    1   if qr > V/S 
    0   if pr < V/S  
q*(p,r) =   [0,1]  if pr = V/S 
    1   if pr > V/S 
    0   if pq < V/S  
r*(p,q) =   [0,1]  if pq = V/S 
  1    if  pq  >  V/S 
  Eq.: (p*= q*= 0), 
(p*= q*= 1), 
(p*= q*= V/S) 
Eq.: (p*= q*= r*= 0) 
(p*= q*= r*= 1) 
(p*= q*= r*= S / V ), with  S / V > V/S 
V = 0  p*(q) =     [0,1]  if q = 0 
1  if q > 0 
q*(p) =     [0,1]  if p = 0 
1  if p > 0 
 
 
p*(q,r) =   [0,1]  if qr = 0 
1  if qr > 0 
q*(p,r) =   [0,1]  if pr = 0 
1  if pr > 0 
r*(p,q) =   [0,1]  if pq = 0 
1  if pq > 0 
  Eq.: (p*= q*= 0) 
(p*= q*= 1) 
Eq.: (p*= q*= r*= 1) 
(p*≥0, q*= r*= 0) 
(p*= 0, q*≥0, r*= 0) 
(p*= 0, q*= 0, r*≥0) 
 




















If 0<V/S<1, three equilibria: 
(p*=0, q*=0, r*=0) 











If V/S=1, two equilibria: 
(p*=0, q*=0, r*=0) 







If V/S>1, one equilibrium: 









If V=0, four equilibria: 
(p*∈[0,1], q*=0, r*=0) 
(p*=0, q*∈[0,1], r*=0) 
(p*=0, q*=0, r*∈[0,1]) 





The second lesson from the intergovernmental game is the importance of expectations on 
what the other governments are doing. The problem for a government with a Keynesian 
population is that it does not want to be the only sinner. If the other governments seem to 
comply, it has an incentive to comply too. But any sign that a sufficient share of countries 
will deviate creates an incentive to deviate as well. In the two-country game, each 
government needs to guess what the other government will do; in the case of more players, 
each government needs to form expectations about all the other member states. 
Expectations are even more critical in the case of large member states. Given the voting rule 
at the ECOFIN Council, the weight of larger countries is crucial to form a blocking minority. 
Information that the largest countries will record high deficits could be sufficient to insure 
that sanctions will not be implemented and incite more governments to deviate. 
These outcomes capture well the two fore mentioned stylized facts: Germany, France and 
Italy have run high deficits simultaneously, which has also weakened the incentives for other 
countries to comply with the SGP, hence an increasing number of “sinners”. 
The strategies of governments in the intergovernmental sub-game underline the importance 
of expectations and asymmetric information. The next section investigates the implications 
for the watchdog’s strategy. 
 
 
4  THE WATCHDOG’S SIGNALLING STRATEGY 
 
Going on with backward induction, this section now solves Stage 4 of the game. Here the 
watchdog has a strategic behaviour. In the purely domestic game, it had no reason not to send 
a true signal, whereas, as shown below, it may have incentives to remain silent in the 
multilateral game. 
 
The domestic game indicated the benefit of having a watchdog provide clear signals about the 
nature of an economic shock. But the watchdog could also interfere in the intergovernmental 
game as it provides information about the intentions of the different governments to comply 
or not comply with the Pact. In the model, when there is a particularly large deficit, or when 
public finances are particularly sound, the information is known to all players. In borderline 
cases (i.e. intermediate performance), however, the watchdog has discretion. Under what 
circumstances would it send a signal that a given country will have difficulty complying?  
 
Looking at the decision tree (Figure 2), let us consider for instance the case when the 
watchdog signals that a country that is likely to record a deficit around 3% of GDP (i.e. 
intermediate performance) has experienced a positive economic shock. The positive surprise 
on growth implies that the watchdog is likely to suggest sanctions if the deficit indeed 
reaches 3%, as there are no reasons to postpone sanctions on the ground of exceptional 
circumstances. Furthermore, as the signal is +e, voters will want to dump the government. 
The odds of re-election can however still be amended depending on the government’s 
decision on the fiscal impulse. If voters are Keynesian, they will want the government to 
implement a fiscal impulse to improve growth. The government can only be re-elected if it 
goes further into deficit, and it will do so unless the threat of sanctions is so high that it more 
than offsets the cost of non re-election.  
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Let us work through different scenarios based on the reactions functions in Table 4 to 
determine the expected impact of signals on countries with Keynesian voters, from which we 
can deduce the watchdog’s strategy when it internalizes the impact of its signals. 
 
Signals are said to be productive if they incite governments to comply more than they would 
have in the absence of a signal. They are counterproductive if they have the opposite effect. 
They are useless if they do not affect the governments’ budgetary decisions. The watchdog 
will want to send a signal only if it is productive. 
 
If voter support matters more than international sanctions (V/S > 1), signals have no impact 
as all governments with Keynesian public opinions already know that they are all going to 
defect in the two- and three-player games. Signals are useless. 
 
If voter support matters as much as international sanctions (V/S = 1), any signal that at least 
one of the other governments has a positive probability to defect leads all governments to 
defect as well. Signals are counterproductive. 
 
If voter support matters less than international sanctions ( 0 < V/S < 1), governments may 
decide to comply with the SGP with probability 1 or at least with a positive probability 
provided that the probability that the other government(s) defect is low enough.  
In the two-player game, signalling that the probability that one government defects is high 
(i.e. the probability that it complies is lower than V/S) incites the other government to defect 
with probability 1.  
In the three-player game, even if there is a signal that one government has a high probability 
to defect, the uncertainty about the second government can still lead the third government to 
comply, and vice versa. 
Signals are counterproductive in the two-player game. They may be productive in the 
three-player game provided that only one government is mentioned. 
 
If voter support does not matter (V = 0), all governments are likely to comply with a positive 
probability, if not with certainty. They will only defect with probability 1 if they find out that 
another government is going to defect with probability 1. Signals are counterproductive. 
 
We find that the one case when a signal may be productive is the three player game so long 
as only one player is mentioned. In all the other cases, signals are either useless or 
counterproductive. A signal on one country would not prevent defection, and it could even 
lead other countries to defect too. The implication is clear – if it wants to maximize the 
chances of compliance with the Pact, paradoxically a strategic watchdog will provide few 
signals. There is a dilemma inherent in the surveillance process: signalling bad pupils can 
have counterproductive implications on the behaviour of other countries.  
 
5 CONCLUSION 
This paper analyses the strategy of a government facing both a domestic constraint and an 
international constraint. Starting with a purely domestic game, we assume that voters 
scrutinize the government’s economic and budgetary performance and, on that basis, decide 
whether they want to re-elect it. When voters are imperfectly informed, an independent 
domestic watchdog can help them find out the type of government which is in office.   
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Moving on to the European level, governments are committed to fiscal discipline under the 
SGP. Multilateral surveillance implies that they can decide to punish governments found to 
record excessive deficits. This affects the strategies of governments and of the watchdog. 
There is now an intergovernmental game on top of the domestic games. On the one hand, 
governments seeking re-election may still have an incentive to overspend and go into deficit 
under pressure from voters, but on the other hand, running a large deficit may lead to costly 
sanctions at the international level. As a result, there is a trade-off between seeking voter 
support and compliance with European commitments. Sanctions, however, are voted by 
governments. One observation that emerges from past developments is that the 
implementation of the corrective arm of the SGP depends on the number of governments that 
comply with the Pact. Therefore governments look for signals what the others will do when 
deciding whether to “sin” themselves. 
The question then becomes, under what circumstances would the watchdog want to send a 
signal about whether a given country is not complying with the Pact? Working through 
different scenarios, we find that, in all but one case, the signal is either useless or 
counterproductive. In most cases, a signal on one country would lead others to defect too. 
The implication is clear – if it internalizes the impact of its signals on the intergovernmental 
game, a strategic watchdog will provide signals when there are only a few sinners, but will 
want to leave the uncertainty in place when it knows that there are more potential sinners. 
The strategic behaviour means that under multilateral surveillance, a strategic watchdog 
provides information only when it is certain that its signal will be effective.  
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Appendix 1: Proofs for the two-player game 
Voter support matters as much as international sanctions (V/S = 1) 
Let us assume that p = 1. The best response function of government 2 indicates q∈[0,1]. If q < 1, the best 
response of government 1 would be 0: contradiction. As a result, q = 1, which in turn implies p = 1. 
Let us now assume that p < 1. We deduce from government 2’s best response function that q = 0, which in turn 
implies p = 0.  
 
Voter support matters less than international sanctions ( 0 < V/S < 1) 
p = 1 ⇒ p > V/S ⇒q = 1 ⇒ q > V/S ⇒ p = 1 and p = 0 ⇒ p < V/S ⇒q = 0 ⇒ q < V/S ⇒ p = 0. 
Proof for the mixed-strategy equilibrium: 
Let us assume that p = V/S. The best response function of government 2 indicates q∈[0,1]. If q < V/S, the best 
response of government 1 would be 0: contradiction. If q > V/S, the best response of government 1 would be 1: 
contradiction. As a result, q = V/S, which in turn implies p = V/S for the same reasons. 
 
Voter support does not matter (V = 0) 
p = 1 ⇒ p > 0 ⇒q = 1 ⇒ q > 0 ⇒ p = 1. 
p = 0 ⇒ q ≥ 0. If q > 0 then p = 1: contradiction. Consequently, q = 0, which in turn implies p = 0 for the 
same reasons. 
 
Appendix 2: Proofs for the three-player game with only Keynesian public opinions 
Voter support matters more than international sanctions (V/S > 1) 
As p < 1, q < 1 and r < 1, the conditions qr < V/S, pr < V/S and pq < V/S always hold. In consequence, there is 
a unique equilibrium: (p*=0, q*=0, r*=0). 
In this case, the stakes in terms of public opinion are so high relative to the level of the sanction that each 
government always has an incentive to have a high deficit. As a result, all governments deviate and avoid 
sanctions. 
 
Voter support matters as much as international sanctions (V/S = 1) 
The best responses are: 
p*(q,r) =   [0,1]  if qr = 1     q*(p,r) =   [0,1]  if pr = 1 
  0    if  qr  <  1      0    if  pr  <  1 
 
r*(p,q) =   [0,1]   if pq = 1 
    0   if pq < 1 
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As soon as there is a positive probability that at least one of the other governments deviates, governments 




The condition pr = 1 is equivalent to p = r = 1 (and similarly for qr = 1 and pq = 1). 
Let us assume that q = 1 and r = 1. The best response function of government 1 indicates p*∈[0,1]. If p < 1, 
then pr < 1 and pq < 1. The best responses of governments 2 and 3 would be q*=r*=0: contradiction. As a 
result, p = 1, which in turn implies p = 1 and r = 1. 
Let us now assume that p < 1, which implies pr < 1 and pq < 1. We deduce from the best response functions of 
governments 2 and 3 that q = 0 and r = 0, which in turn implies p = 0.  
 
Voter support matters less than international sanctions ( 0 < V/S < 1) 
The above equilibria, (p*=0, q*=0, r*=0) and (p*=1, q*=1, r*=1), are also equilibria in this case. Moreover, 
there is a third pure-strategy equilibrium: (p*= S / V , q*= S / V , r*= S / V ).  
Note that as V/S < 1,  S / V > V/S. 
 
Proof: 
Let us assume that p = 0. pq = 0 < V/S implies r = 0 and pr = 0 < V/S implies q = 0. Furthermore, qr = 0 < V/S 
implies p = 0. Equilibrium: (p*=0, q*=0, r*=0). 
Let us assume that 0 < p < V/S. As q≤ 1,  pq < V/S, so r = 0, which implies qr=0<V/S,  hence  p = 0: 
contradiction. 
Let us assume that p = V/S.  
•  If q < 1, pq < V/S, so r = 0, which implies qr = 0 < V/S, hence p = 0: contradiction.  
•  If q = 1, pq = V/S, so r∈[0,1]. If r = 0, qr = 0 hence p = 0: contradiction. If 0 < r < 1, pr < V/S, so q = 0: 
contradiction. If r = 1, qr = 1 > V/S so p = 1: contradiction. 
Let us assume that V/S < p < S / V . This implies S / V  < (V/S)/p < 1. 
•  If 0 ≤ q < (V/S)/p then pq < V/S. This implies r = 0, so qr = 0 and p = 0: contradiction. 
•  If q = (V/S)/p, then pq = V/S and r∈[0,1].  
o  If 0≤ r < (V/S)/p then pr < V/S, hence q = 0: contradiction. 
o  If r = (V/S)/p then qr = (V/S)²/p². Now, (V/S)² < p² < V/S so V/S<(V/S)²/p² < 1. qr > V/S implies 
p= 1: contradiction. 
o  If (V/S)/p < r ≤ 1, pr > V/S so q = 1: contradiction as q = (V/S)/p < 1. 
Let us assume that p = S / V . 
•  If 0≤  q < S / V then pq < V/S, hence r = 0. This implies qr = 0, so p = 0: contradiction. 
•  If q =  S / V then pq = V/S, which implies r∈[0,1]. 
o  If 0≤  r < S / V then qr < V/S, so p = 0: contradiction. 
o  If r =  S / V then pr = qr = V/S, implying p∈[0,1] and q∈[0,1], which is consistent with 
p=q= S / V . Equilibrium: (p*= S / V , q*= S / V , r*= S / V ).  
o  If  S / V < r ≤  1 then qr > V/S so p = 1: contradiction. 
•  If  S / V < q ≤ 1 then pq > V/S so r = 1. This implies qr > V/S, hence p = 1: contradiction. 
Let us assume that  S / V < p < 1. This implies V/S < (V/S)/p < S / V  < 1. 
•  If 0 ≤ q < (V/S)/p then pq < V/S. This implies r = 0, so qr = 0 and p = 0: contradiction. 
•  If q = (V/S)/p, then pq = V/S and r∈[0,1].  
o  If 0≤ r < (V/S)/p then pr < V/S, hence q = 0: contradiction. 
o  If r = (V/S)/p then qr = (V/S)²/p². Now, V/S < p² < 1 so (V/S)²<(V/S)²/p² < V/S. qr < V/S implies 
p= 0: contradiction. 
o  If (V/S)/p < r ≤ 1, pr > V/S so q = 1: contradiction as q = (V/S)/p <1. 
Let us assume that p = 1. 
•  If 0≤  q < V/S then pq < V/S, hence r = 0. This implies qr = 0, so p = 0: contradiction. 
•  If q = V/S then pq = V/S so r∈[0,1].  
o  If 0≤ r < V/S then qr ≤ (V/S)² < V/S, hence p = 0: contradiction. 
o  If V/S ≤  r ≤ 1 then pr > V/S so q = 1: contradiction.  
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•  If V/S < q ≤ 1, pq > V/S so r = 1, which implies pr = 1 and q = 1. Consequently qr=1, so p = 1. 
Equilibrium: (p*=1, q*=1, r*=1). 
 
Voter support does not matter (V = 0) 
This implies that V/S = 0 and that best responses are as follows:       
p*(q,r) =   1   if qr > 0     q*(p,r) =   1   if pr > 0 
[0,1]  if qr = 0         [0,1]  if pr = 0 
 
r*(p,q) =   1   if pq > 0 
[0,1]  if pq = 0 
 
The payoff matrix is now: 
   2       2   
   C  D       C  D   
C  0, 0, 0  0, -S, 0  p  C 0, 0, -S  0, 0, 0  p 
1 
D  -S, 0, 0  0, 0, 0  1-p 
1
D 0, 0, 0  0, 0, 0  1-p 
   q 1-q       q 1-q   
    3 = C     r        3 = D     1-r  
 
Each government can intend to defect only if it is certain that the other two governments will defect too. 
Once again, (p*=1, q*=1, r*=1) is a pure-strategy equilibrium. There are also three mixed-strategy equilibria: 
(p*≥0, q*= r*= 0), (p*= 0, q*≥0, r*= 0) and (p*= 0, q*= 0, r*≥0). 
 
Proof: 
Let us assume that p > 0. If q > 0 then pq > 0, hence r=1. Consequently, pr>0 (which implies q = 1) and qr > 0 
(which implies p = 1). 
Let us assume that p = 0 and q = 0. pq = 0, hence r ≥0. For all r ≥0, pr = 0 (consistent with q=0) and qr = 0 
(consistent with p = 0). 
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Extended Abstract/Executive Summary 
 
  This paper does two things. First it reviews the recent literature on optimal fiscal policy, 
including work by the authors. In particular, it focuses on results in Benigno and Woodford (2003), 
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006), and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) 
that suggest that an optimal fiscal policy would involve steady-state debt following a random walk in 
response to shocks, rather than debt returning to some target level. Second, it puts forward a proposal 
for the establishment by national governments of a Fiscal Monitoring Commission. Although this body, 
at least initially, would have no statutory power, it would provide independent information about the long 
term prospect for government finances, and provide a mechanism by which governments could be 
encouraged to move towards implementing an optimal fiscal policy. 
 
  Recent developments in the public finance and macroeconomics literature have allowed an 
integrated evaluation of budgetary policy at the macroeconomic level, where costs due to distortionary 
taxes can be directly compared to the costs arising from Keynesian disequilibria. Using this approach, 
both Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) show that it is optimal for 
government debt to follow a random walk after fiscal shocks. Essentially the discounted costs of 
servicing permanently higher debt (through higher distortionary taxes) are outweighed by the short term 
costs of reducing this debt, due to both temporarily higher taxes and changes to inflation.  
 
  This result appears robust in a number of respects. First, it remains even if government 
spending as well as taxes are treated as an instrument, as Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006a) show. 
Second, it remains even if fiscal policy is not fully optimal, but is instead described by a simple feedback 
rule, where spending responds to debt disequilibrium. Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006) show in this 
case that optimal feedback will be at a minimal level, such that debt disequilibrium is eliminated over 
centuries rather than years, and so debt almost follows a random walk. 
 
  The paper discusses these results in detail. It draws on Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006a) to show 
that the random walk result depends on the existence of some form of commitment technology, so that 
policy can either by fully optimal and time inconsistent, or follow a ‘timeless perspective’ approach. Leith 
and Wren-Lewis (2006a) show that under discretion, optimal policy in a closed economy will involve a 
return to the original level of debt, so that the random walk result no longer holds. However, the paper 
argues that this does not provide a rationale for debt targets. 
 
  The random walk result does depend critically on policy makers being benevolent, in the sense 
that they maximise social welfare. The paper gives new results to show how excessive discounting by 
fiscal policy makers will distort the optimal policy, and how this can lead to explosive paths for debt. 
Debt targets provide a possible mechanism for avoiding such outcomes, but they are inevitably second 
best, in the sense that they preclude achieving the optimal outcome that would occur if policy makers 
were benevolent (the random walk result). In contrast, applying pressure on a myopic fiscal policy maker 
to be more concerned about debt disequilibrium can come very close to achieving the first best policy.   271
 
The paper suggests institutional change as a way of improving aggregate budgetary decisions. 
A number of authors (e.g. Wyplosz (2005)) have suggested various forms of Fiscal Policy Committee, 
often drawing parallels with Independent Central Banks. The proposal in this paper is a more modest, 
although we would argue it is also more politically feasible. This is for a Fiscal Monitoring Commission, 
which would be charged with producing the best available projection for the public sector finances, and 
making recommendations if these projections appeared to imply an unsustainable or sub-optimal path 
for public sector debt. 
 
The paper outlines five minimum requirements for such a body: that it be funded by 
government, that its director be responsible to an independent committee, that it should have the 
resources to undertake once a year a long term (e.g. 50 year) projection of government finances based 
on current plans, that if these projections indicated that there was a significant chance that the public 
finances were not sustainable or sub-optimal the FMC should publish proposals for changes to 
aggregate spending or taxes, and that the government is required to publish a response to these 
proposals. The FMC is compared to existing institutions, such as the Congressional Budget Office in the 
US, and monitoring by the EC Commission. 
 
Although the government would not be required to implement the proposals of the FMC, the 
paper argues that the FMC would achieve a number of goals. The government would be forced to 
address the issue of sustainability, either by agreeing with the FMC’s assessment, or by publishing 
alternative assessments of its own, and justifying why its own assessment was superior to the FMC’s. 
This would put the issue of the long term control of debt, and the funding of any fiscal changes, firmly 
into the political arena. If the government undertook expansionary, counter cyclical fiscal action they 
would explicitly have to address the issue of how deficits would eventually be funded.    272
1. Introduction 
 
  This paper does two things. First it reviews some recent literature on 
optimal fiscal policy, including work by the authors, with a particular focus on 
optimal policies towards debt. It also presents some new results involving a 
mildly myopic fiscal policy maker. Second, it puts forward a proposal for the 
establishment by national governments of a Fiscal Monitoring Commission, 
which would produce independent information about the long term prospect 
for government finances, and provide a mechanism by which governments 
could be encouraged to move towards implementing an optimal fiscal policy. 
  We argue that the proposals in the second part of the paper are 
strengthened by the analysis in the first part. In particular, results in Benigno 
and Woodford (2003), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), Kirsanova and Wren-
Lewis (2006), and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006a) all suggest that a first best 
fiscal policy would involve debt following a random walk in response to 
shocks, rather than debt returning to some target level. Simple fiscal rules, 
like those embodied in the Stability and Growth Pact or operated by the UK 
government, would find it almost impossible to reproduce this first best 
outcome. We believe this strengthens the case, made by Wyplosz (2005) and 
others, for exploring institutional solutions to improve fiscal outcomes.
1 Our 
own proposal is relatively modest, because it involves establishing an 
institution with no formal control over fiscal instruments, but for the same 
reason we believe that this proposal may be easier for national governments 
to contemplate.  
  Section 2 of the paper looks at recent research that calculates optimal 
paths for debt following shocks, using a framework that incorporate costs due 
to distortionary taxes, sub-optimal provision of public goods, inflation and 
output disequilibrium in an integrated manner. A key result is that debt should 
follow a random walk, and we examine the robustness of this result. The role 
of fiscal policy as a countercyclical device is implicit in this analysis. We make 
it explicit in Section 3, and discuss its role in complementing (in a closed or 
small open economy) or replacing (in a monetary union member) national 
monetary policy.  
  In both these sections we restrict ourselves to considering benevolent, 
cooperative policy makers. This is clearly unrealistic. In section 4 we present 
some new results that extend the analysis of section 2 to cases where fiscal 
policy makers are myopic. We compare the welfare implications of mildly 
myopic policy makers with policy that is forced to follow simple rules for debt. 
We show how both outcomes are inferior to cases in which ‘outside pressure’ 
leads to an adaptation of policy makers preferences such that they include a 
concern about debt disequilibrium.  
  Section 5 presents our proposal for a national Fiscal Monitoring 
Commission, and also compares these proposals with existing institutional 
arrangements, including the Congressional Budget Office in the United 
States. A final section concludes. 
                                            
1 The case for independent fiscal institutions remains strong, however, even without these 
arguments.      273
2. The Benevolent Policy Maker and Debt 
 
  How should a national fiscal authority respond to some unexpected 
shock to the budget deficit, which raises (say) national debt? It is generally 
acknowledged that some fiscal action is required in this situation, because 
otherwise a debt interest spiral will emerge (where additional debt interest is 
paid for by borrowing, which raises debt further etc), and debt will eventually 
explode.
2  
Until recently, the general presumption in the literature has been that 
some action should be taken to bring debt back down to its original (pre-
shock) level, and the main question was how quick this correction should be. 
(See Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2000, for example.) The outlines of this debate 
are familiar. If correction is too rapid (at the extreme, if the budget is always 
balanced), the automatic stabilisers are switched off and fiscal action may 
generate unwelcome movements in output and inflation. However, correction 
that is very slow may not be credible. 
More recently, an alternative answer has emerged. On the assumption 
that policy makers (both fiscal and monetary) are benevolent (i.e. they act to 
maximise social welfare), then the optimum response to a shock that 
increases debt is to leave debt permanently higher. The implication is that, 
under an optimal policy regime, steady-state debt will behave as a random 
walk, increasing or decreasing as a result of whatever shocks hit the 
economy.  
This result is powerful because it comes from an analysis which 
integrates a number of issues involved in budgetary policy in a consistent and 
microfounded way. It takes account of the costs of Keynesian disequilibria 
(due to nominal inertia/price rigidity), but also the costs of distortionary 
taxation and the utility derived from public goods, all using a common metric 
based on the utility of a representative agent. It has the striking implication 
that a policy that aims to hit an unconditional debt target is bound to be sub-
optimal. 
Two key papers are Benigno and Woodford (2003), and Schmitt-Grohe 
and Uribe (2004). Both consider a closed economy, and examine a single 
fiscal/monetary policy maker (or equivalently cooperation between the two). 
Both treat government spending as exogenous, and have distortionary 
income taxes as the fiscal policy instrument. Policy makers are benevolent, in 
that they maximise the welfare of the representative consumer, and they are 
able to implement a time inconsistent policy. The papers differ in the particular 
methods they use. Benigno and Woodford take a ’linear quadratic’ approach, 
by deriving an approximation to social welfare using Taylor expansions.   
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) take a Ramsey approach. However, both 
                                            
2 It can be argued that if no action is taken, debt will not explode, but instead inflation will 
increase to erode the real value of debt (or reduce the real rate of interest) through 
mechanisms related to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (see, for example, Woodford 
(2001)). However, even if such a process might occur, it seems likely that the result would in 
most circumstances be severely sub-optimal, as we note below.   274
suggest that steady-state debt should follow a random walk under an optimal, 
time inconsistent policy.  
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Imagine two alternative 
paths for, say, taxes. In one, taxes are immediately raised to eliminate any 
disequilibrium in debt. In another, taxes are raised by a much smaller amount 
to simply service the interest payments on the excess debt. In the first case 
we incur quite large, but short term, costs from higher distortionary taxes. In 
the second, we incur much smaller distortions, but they are permanent. 
However, a benevolent policy maker discounts these permanent costs, so 
they will be finite. Both paths will involve welfare costs because higher taxes 
are distortionary, so output will fall as taxes rise. However the social welfare 
function will in general imply that large output gaps are more costly than a 
sequence of smaller gaps of the same total size (in terms of budgetary 
arithmetic). Thus, the path where taxes are raised permanently by enough to 
service the additional debt is likely to involve lower social costs to one that 
involves eliminating the additional debt. 
As this intuition suggests, the optimality of steady state debt following a 
random walk is implied by tax smoothing (see Sargent (1987) pages 380-390 
for example). This conclusion is reinforced when we consider inflation. 
Inflation will be zero in steady state (assuming zero is the policy target), and 
as a result it will be zero in all periods where taxes are raised just to service 
the additional debt. (The output gap is identical in each period.) However, 
under the alternative path where the additional debt is eliminated, the output 
gap will be larger in the short term than in the long run, and a changing output 
gap will imply changing inflation. So the path where debt disequilibrium is 
completely eliminated will also be more costly in terms of inflation. 
This intuition assumes that taxes are the instrument used to control 
debt. However, the same arguments can be applied if government spending is 
the instrument. In the original steady state, assume that the provision of public 
goods is optimal (given consumer preferences). Any variation in government 
spending away from this level will have social costs, which will also be 
convex. Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006) show that the results in Benigno 
and Woodford also apply if government spending is the policy instrument, and 
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006a) show that it also applies if both spending and 
taxes are instruments. 
The analysis in Benigno and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and 
Uribe (2004) involves optimal policy: policy can react immediately to all 
shocks hitting the economy, including the shock that generates the debt 
disequilibrium. It might reasonably be objected that while such discretionary 
activism might be possible for monetary policy, it is unrealistic for fiscal policy 
from an institutional point of view. However, as the intuition outlined above 
suggests, the random walk result is ‘first order’ robust to simpler set-ups. 
Suppose, for example, we postulate the simplest possible form of 
‘fiscal feedback rule’, where disequilibrium in the policy instrument (spending 
or taxes) is a linear function of debt disequilibrium, and the feedback 
parameter is λ. Whatever model we are using, conventional stability analysis 
can determine a minimal value of feedback required to avoid explosive debt 
(as in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006c) for example), on the assumption that   275
monetary policy is ‘active’ in the sense of Leeper (1991). Clearly this minimal 
value will imply a random walk in debt. Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006) 
show, using government spending as the instrument, that the optimal value of 
fiscal feedback is virtually the same as this minimum value, so that for all 
practical purposes optimal fiscal feedback implies a random walk in debt.  
  Figure 1 is taken from this paper. It shows how welfare losses vary with 
different values for fiscal feedback λ following a cost-push shock. There are 
two panels: one for small values of λ, and one for larger values. Where values 
are not shown, the model is indeterminate/unstable. The optimal (loss 
minimising) value of fiscal feedback is very small: government spending is cut 
by about 5 p.a. for every 100 increase in debt. Figure 2 plots two paths for 
debt following a shock. One is the fully optimal path, and the other involves 
optimal fiscal feedback (i.e the optimal value of λ from Figure 1). Although 
debt under optimal fiscal feedback is not a pure random walk, debt has hardly 
decreased after 500 years! 
 




* Taken from Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006). Unit cost-push shock, loss is 
measured in percentage of steady state consumption, assuming 1% standard 
deviation of shocks. 
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Figure 2   Response  of  government  spending and debt to a cost-push 





** Taken from Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006). Solid line is optimal fiscal 
feedback, dashed line is fully optimal policy. Unit cost-push shock, assuming 
1% standard deviation of shocks. Period=Quarterly. 
 
Figure 1 shows that if we increase the degree of fiscal feedback from 
this optimal value, the welfare costs associated with this shock rise: not by 
much at first, but significantly once we correct debt disequilibrium rapidly. In 
addition, Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006) show that this is accompanied by 
a less aggressive monetary policy. This is because large fiscal feedback is 
deflationary, reducing the need for monetary policy to respond to the shock. 
However, fiscal policy is less efficient than monetary policy at dealing with the 
cost-push shock, which is why welfare deteriorates. (The worst outcome in 
welfare terms, however, occurs when there is no fiscal feedback at all, when 
monetary policy is forced to become ‘passive’, controlling debt rather than 
stabilising inflation. Although the model is determinate for no fiscal feedback, 
for reasons described in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, Figure 1 shows 
clearly that social losses are highest in this case, so this is not a desirable 
policy.) 
  The basic model in Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006), like Benigno 
and Woodford (2003), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), involves ‘infinitely 
lived’ consumers. However, Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006) also examine 
consumers of the Blanchard/Yaari type. Although optimal policy in this case 
(whether fully optimal or using a fiscal feedback parameter) departs very 
slightly from a random walk, the return of debt to its original steady state is 
very slow.  
All the analysis described so far applies to a closed economy. 
However, the basic intuition behind the random walk result does not depend 
on this assumption. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006b) and Lambertini (2006) 
show that the result applies in an open economy, either under flexible 
exchange rates or as a monetary union member.   277
  In all these senses, the random walk result for optimal debt policy 
appears to be robust. However, so far we have considered optimal 
commitment policy i.e. policy that is time inconsistent, so implicitly there exists 
some commitment mechanism in place to prevent policy makers from re-
optimising in the absence of new information. (Benigno and Woodford (2003) 
assume commitment, but of the timeless perspective variety.) Many would 
argue that this is rather unrealistic in the context of policy towards debt, 
because of the long time horizons involved. Does the random walk result still 
hold for discretionary policy i.e. policy that is constrained to be time 
consistent? 
  Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006b) show analytically that in a closed 
economy it does not. The reason can be seen by looking at the path of 
government spending with the fully optimal policy in Figure 2, taken from 
Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006). In the first period of the simulation, 
government spending falls by more than in the new steady state. This 
indicates that the optimal commitment solution does not completely 
accommodate the additional debt caused by the shock: there is an attempt in 
the first period to reduce debt slightly. (Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006b) 
demonstrate this algebraically, in a model with both spending and taxes as 
instruments, and discuss which instruments of policy will be used in this first 
period to reduce debt.) Spending is cut, or taxes increased, only in the first 
period, because this minimises any inflation impact.  
  However, the promise not to reduce debt is subsequent periods is time 
inconsistent. In each period, policy makers will be tempted to re-optimise, and 
surprise agents with further action to reduce debt. In fact, this temptation will 
remain as long as debt disequilibrium in the long run is positive. As a result, a 
time consistent policy in this context will involve debt returning to its original 
level in the long run. The optimal discretionary policy does not involve a 
random walk in steady-state debt.  
  Does this result provide a justification for debt targets? The answer is 
clearly no. Consider the analogy with inflation bias. In a Barro-Gordon type 
set-up, the optimal discretionary policy involves positive long run inflation i.e. 
inflation bias. Under certain circumstances (see Kirsanova, Vines and Wren-
Lewis (2005) for example) the optimal commitment policy involves no inflation 
bias. This provides a rationale for inflation targeting. But note that here 
inflation targets are designed to move us away from the discretionary solution 
towards the commitment solution. Debt targets would do the opposite: they 
would lock us in to the sub-optimal discretionary solution. 
  It could be argued that risk premia that might emerge as debt levels 
begin to look potentially unsustainable may negate the random walk result. 
However, one can conjecture that while such effects may raise the costs of 
sustaining a higher debt stock, such long-term costs will still need to be traded 
off against the short-term costs of reducing the debt stock. We can explore 
this to some extent by looking at a model with Blanchard/Yaari consumers.  
As we noted above, in this model higher debt in steady state will raise real 
interest rates in steady state. Under a standard calibration, where the 
probability of death (p) is 1% per quarter, then this trade-off is small: an 
increase in the debt to GDP ratio of 10% (from 40% to 50%, say) will raise   278
real interest rates by only 0.02% points. As we noted above, debt is almost a 
random walk in this case. 
  However, if we set p=7%, then the real interest rate effects of higher 
debt are more significant: a permanent 10% increase in debt to GDP raises 
the long run real interest rate by 0.8%. (Although a value of p this large is not 
realistic in a literal sense, it can be justified as a proxy for other sources of 
discounting by consumers: see Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) or Kumhof, 
Laxton and Schule (2006)). In this case, the optimal path for debt does involve 
a return to its original steady state value, with about half of the initial increase 
in debt (following a cost-push shock) recovered after 15 years. Debt 
correction therefore remains very slow, although it would be interesting to re-
examine this case in a model with physical capital, where we would get 
additional costs from crowding out. 
  These results therefore suggest that any policy that involves 
unconditional debt targets is bound to be sub-optimal. We consider the size of 
the costs involved in section 4.  
 
3. Cyclical Fiscal Policy Stabilisation 
 
  The results above suggest that benevolent policy makers would not act 
‘as if’ they were trying to hit debt targets. Even if policy was formulated such 
that debt targets were explicit (as in Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis, 2006), those 
targets would to all intents and purposes be missed by a benevolent policy 
maker. Another powerful reason for departing from debt targets in the short 
term is provided by the potential for counter cyclical fiscal policy. 
  A common benchmark for assessing the contribution of fiscal policy to 
stabilisation objectives is that of automatic fiscal stabilisers. Automatic 
stabilisers apply where there is no deliberate change in fiscal instruments over 
the business cycle, but where progressivity in the tax system and the 
dependence on income levels of certain government expenditures and 
transfers can, potentially, offset some of the macroeconomic volatility 
associated with the business cycle. As discussed in Andres and Domenech 
(2006), automatic stabilisers fail to function in the presence of balanced 
budget fiscal rules (an extreme form of debt target) as the progressivity in the 
tax system is dominated by the pro-cyclicality of government expenditures. 
Stockman (2001) shows that this failure to allow automatic stabilisers to 
function, as a result of balanced budget fiscal rules, may have significant 
welfare consequences. Furthermore, although embedding fiscal policy in real 
business cycle models appears to exacerbate rather than mitigate 
macroeconomic volatility (see for example, Gali (1994)), fiscal policy in the 
form of automatic stabilisers in the absence of strict debt targets can reduce 
volatility in more realistic economies containing significant real and nominal 
rigidities (see Andres and Domenech (2006)).  
  Given that automatic stabilisers appear to have a potential stabilisation 
role, an obvious question to ask is whether or not a more active approach to 
fiscal stabilisation can generate further welfare benefits. It is certainly the case 
that in some circumstances optimal monetary policy is completely adequate at   279
dealing with shocks, and fiscal stabilisation would add little or nothing. For 
example, if the only source of nominal inertia are Calvo contracts in price 
setting, and shocks are to technology or tastes, then monetary policy can in 
principle completely negate the welfare consequences of these shocks. (This 
is because these shocks have real impacts, but no necessary impact on 
nominal variables, so they need not incur the nominal inertia externality.) 
Even with cost-push shocks, changes in government spending may add little 
to monetary policy. For example, Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006) show that 
the difference for social welfare between a fully optimal, commitment policy 
and optimal fiscal feedback is small. 
  However, the ability of monetary policy to fully stabilise the economy on 
its own disappears once we consider models that incorporate other rigidities 
such as nominal wage inertia. In addition, the effectiveness of fiscal policy 
increases when we allow for more than a single fiscal instrument. Leith and 
Wren-Lewis (2006b) consider optimal fiscal and monetary policy following a 
persistent technology shock in an open economy with wage as well as price 
inertia, when fiscal policy has three potential policy instruments: government 
spending, income taxes and revenue (or employment) taxes. They consider 
both a small open economy, and a (small) member of a monetary union. 
Including wage as well as price inertia means that monetary policy alone can 
no longer fully offset taste or technology shocks. 
In a small open economy, allowing government spending to 
complement monetary policy as a stabilisation tool adds little to welfare. 
However revenue taxes are much more useful. If both tax instruments are 
used, fiscal policy combined with monetary policy can in principle be used to 
fully eliminate the impact of technology and cost-push shocks.  
  The benefits to fiscal stabilisation are even more evident if we consider 
a member of a monetary union, subject to asymmetric shocks. Tax 
instruments remain useful (as Ferrero (2006) shows in a two country model of 
a union), but now government spending can also play an important (welfare 
enhancing) stabilisation role, as Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006b) show in a 
model with several small national economies. Other papers (see for example, 
Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) and Beetsma and Jensen (2004)) 
emphasise the importance of coordinating stabilising national fiscal policies in 
order to reap the welfare benefits of fiscal stabilisation when one economy’s 
policy can have significant spillover effects on others.   
    Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006b) also consider the impact of 
implementation lags in the operation of fiscal policy. These clearly diminish 
the effectiveness of fiscal policy as a stabilisation device, but benefits remain, 
particularly if shocks are persistent. The authors also show that allowing for 
government debt without lump sum taxes does not significantly alter these 
results, particularly for optimal policies under commitment.  
  While fiscal policy can in principle complement monetary policy as a 
stabilisation tool, particularly if a range of fiscal instruments is available or if 
the economy is part of a monetary union, the size of any welfare gains will 
depend critically on the type of model being used. In models with few rigidities 
except the most basic form of nominal inertia, the welfare gains of any   280
stabilisation (monetary or fiscal) tend to be small, as Lucas has noted.
3 
However, once we add more rigidities, the welfare benefits of stabilisation 
tend to increase. For example, Kirsanova, Satchi, Vines and Wren-Lewis 
(2007) examine a two country model of monetary union with inflation 
persistence as well as nominal inertia. They look at simple stabilisation rules 
for fiscal policy, where the rules have spending reacting to inflation, output 
and the terms of trade with a one quarter lag. They find significant benefits to 
stabilisation in terms of social welfare. One interesting result in this paper is 
that these rules are still effective if fiscal policy responds only to national 
differences in output and inflation. Recent work using relatively large SDGE 
models of a monetary union with a variety of ‘rigidities’, such as Coenen et al 
(2006), Forni et al (2006), Ratto et al (2006) and Kumhof et al (2006), also 
suggests that fiscal stabilisation can have an important stabilising role. 
                                            
3 See Lucas (2003) for a summary of his argument.   281
 
4. Myopic behaviour by fiscal authorities 
 
  Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006d) argue that the main reason why many 
economists are wary of fiscal stabilisation relate to problems of political 
economy rather than economic effectiveness. Part of this has to do with 
implementation lags of the kind discussed above. In some countries, 
particularly the US, institutional constraints place important barriers to timely 
fiscal action. The more the details of fiscal action need to be negotiated 
between different political actors, the longer is the delay before they can be 
implemented, and the more distorted they may become. 
Perhaps a more serious concern is that politicians may not act 
benevolently. In particular, as we note in the following section, behaviour in 
the majority of OECD countries over the last few decades points to a ‘deficit 
bias’. One possible reason for deficit bias (others are noted below) is that 
governments may not be re-elected, and as a result may discount the future 
more heavily than the private sector (see Alesina and Tabellini (1990)).     
Building up debt also restricts the ability of a future government to undertake 
spending that may not accord with the preferences of the current government.  
In this section we re-examine, in a very simple way, how governments would 
react to shocks if they were ‘mildly myopic’ – although they remain concerned 
about the utility of the representative agent, they discount that utility at a 
higher rate than the private sector. We will look at how debt behaves when 
the fiscal authorities are mildly myopic, and when debt targets might improve 
social welfare in these circumstances. 
  To do this, we use the closed economy model of Leith and Wren-Lewis 
(2006a). We assume a benevolent monetary policy maker, but a mildly 
myopic fiscal policy maker, who together play Nash. (Details are given in an 
appendix.) The fiscal authority’s annual discount rate is approximately 6%, 
compared to 4% for the monetary authority and the private sector. We 
consider only one fiscal instrument, government spending, but deviations from 
the initial steady state in government spending are costly for welfare because 
of over/under provision of public goods. Figure 3 plots the reaction of the 
fiscal instrument and debt to a cost-push shock, and compares it to the same 
shock when the fiscal authorities are benevolent.   
The solid line represents the outcome when we have benevolent fiscal 
and monetary policy makers, and this outcome follows the random walk 
result, for reasons discussed at length above. The dashed line represents the 
outcome from a Nash game between fiscal and monetary policy makers, 
where the only difference between the two is that the fiscal authorities have a 
higher discount rate. In this case, debt steadily increases, and does not (and 
will not) reach a new steady state.
4 
                                            
4 Although this solution is explosive (as inspection of eigenvalues confirm), the rate of increase in debt is 
less than the rate of discount, so welfare costs will still be finite. As a result, we can compute optimal 
paths. This is why we only consider mild myopia: with stronger discounting, the increase in debt 
and other macro variables would explode more rapidly, and the social costs of this would be 
infinite.    282
 
 
Figure  3    Debt following a cost-push shock under optimal cooperative 




Solid line = cooperation, Dashed line = Nash. *period=quarterly. 
 
 
  The reason is straightforward. Government spending needs to fall to 
provide funds to service the higher debt level. Impatience by the fiscal 
authorities means that they cut spending by less than is required to stabilise 
the debt stock. As Figure 3 shows, this will eventually imply that larger cuts 
are required, but mild myopia means that these future cuts are valued less 
than smaller cuts in spending in the short term.  
  Such a result might seem inevitable, given that the socially optimal 
response with a non-myopic fiscal policy maker is a random walk in debt. 
However, this simple intuition ignores the actions of the other player. For the 
monetary authority, explosive debt is costly, because it is maximising social 
welfare. In principle, it can use monetary policy to influence the budget deficit 
to prevent this happening. In fact, even in the socially optimal case it does this 
to some extent (i.e. interest rates fall, despite positive inflation: see Leith and 
Wren-Lewis (2006a) for a detailed analysis of when and why this happens). 
However, Figure 3 shows that, when the fiscal authority is short-sighted, it is 
not optimal for the monetary authority to try and reduce interest rates 
sufficiently to prevent an explosion in debt. (Of course, any attempt by the 
monetary authority to do so would encourage an even looser fiscal policy, so 
it’s a game they may not be able to win.)    283
  Unconditional debt targets that were enforceable (by which we mean 
targets that had to be met come what may) would clearly prevent the 
explosion of debt shown in Figure 3. We characterise unconditional debt 
targets by assuming that the fiscal authority is forced to follow a feedback 
rule, where deviations in government spending from the steady state are 
given by a simple feedback rule on debt disequilibrium of the kind considered 
above. Table 1 shows the social loss that occurs under various policies 
following the shock described above.   284
 
Table 1  Welfare costs of different debt policies/preferences* 
 
Policy Welfare  cost 
Fully Optimal, co-operation  0.190 
Myopic fiscal (6%), Nash  0.349 
Optimal debt feedback rule  0.332 
Fast debt feedback rule  0.358 
Myopic fiscal (6%), plus debt 
disequilibrium in objective function 
0.192 
 
* Absolute units of loss. Cost push shock is autocorrelated with ρ=0.9. 
 
  The benchmark loss comes from the social optimum random walk 
result. A (mildly) short-sighted fiscal authority increases the loss considerably, 
but it is still finite, despite explosive debt. This is because debt explodes at a 
rate less than the rate of discount, so losses are still finite. The third row 
shows the optimal degree of debt feedback, which for reasons discussed in 
section 2 is very slow in returning debt to its original level. The next row 
shows welfare under more rapid fiscal feedback, such that debt returns to 
target more rapidly (corrections worth 40 a year for 100 debt disequilibrium). 
This increases the welfare cost of the shock, such that it is actually above the 
cost under Nash when debt explodes. This shows that it is possible that strict 
and very tight debt targets could actually be worse for welfare than debt that 
exploded very gradually. Of course, if policy makers were more myopic, debt 
would explode at a rate above the rate of time preference, and so the welfare 
cost would be infinite, and any debt target would be preferable. 
  The final row of Table 1 shows the impact of introducing an additional 
element into the fiscal policymakers objective function, besides (over 
discounted) representative agent utility. This is a term in the deviation of debt 
from its original steady state.  If the parameter on this additional term is 
chosen to maximise welfare, then as Table 1 shows we can almost match the 
benchmark result achieved with benevolent policymakers. We could interpret 
this result as representing a conditional debt target i.e. a target that fiscal 
policy makers should aim to get close to alongside other objectives. An 
alternative interpretation is that it reflects external pressure on fiscal policy 
makers to avoid debt disequilibrium, perhaps from a ‘watchdog’ body of the 
kind discussed in the next section. 
  We can use these results to draw two conclusions. First, there is a 
danger with short-sighted policy makers that debt could become uncontrolled: 
following a positive shock to debt, policy makers would not raise taxes or cut 
spending by even enough to service the higher level of debt, leading to a   285
debt-interest spiral.
5 Second, this outcome is avoided when we have 
unconditional debt targets. However, these targets may be costly in terms of 
social welfare if they are achieved too quickly. Better outcomes are achieved 
when debt correction is very slow, but such slow adjustment may in the short 
term be difficult to distinguish from lack of control, and may therefore lack 
credibility. 
  The results above also suggest a third possibility: that by applying the 
right degree of ‘pressure’ on short-sighted policy makers to avoid debt 
disequilibrium, we can almost achieve the social optimum. This could take the 
form of a complex rule for fiscal action, where policy makers attempted to 
achieve the optimal trade-off between various targets, including minimising 
debt disequilibrium. However, complex rules of this type do not seem a 
practical option from a political point of view. In the next section we explore an 
alternative means of applying pressure: institutional change. 
                                            
5 Short sighted behaviour cannot provide a complete explanation for the tendency for debt to 
rise over the last few decades in many European economies, because following random 
shocks we would expect to see as many debt implosions as explosions (although it could be 
argued that Australia and New Zealand provide examples of steadily falling debt: see Leith 
and Wren-Lewis (2006d)). The problem may be that the standard model is set-up in a way 
that makes tax decreases as costly as tax increases.   286
 
5. A proposal for a quasi-independent Fiscal Monitoring Commission  
 
  A number of authors have argued the case for establishing some form 
of new fiscal institution to tackle problems associated with the control of debt 
in an uncertain macroeconomic environment. (See, for example, Eichengreen 
et al (1999), Wyplosz (2001) and (2005), Ball (1997), and Wren-Lewis (1996) 
and (2003).) One motivation comes from the parallel with monetary policy and 
independent central banks. To the extent that it may be desirable for fiscal 
policy makers to take discretionary action in the face of macroeconomic 
shocks (see section 3 above), then they will be subject to an inflation bias 
problem, and delegation may help to avoid this (see Calmfors (2003)). 
  However, a stronger motivation may come from the problem of ‘deficit 
bias’. Levels of government debt in the OECD area today are around double 
their level thirty years ago, although there is considerable variation among 
countries around this average. It seems extremely unlikely that increases in 
debt of this size could represent an optimal response to shocks. Instead, it 
seems more plausible that this reflects non-benevolent behaviour on the part 
of fiscal authorities. 
Two of the most popular theories used to explain deficit bias are the 
time inconsistency of preferences theory formalized by Alesina and Tabellini 
(1990), and the common pool theory (see, for example, Von Hagen 
and Harden (1995) and  Krogstrup and Wyplosz (2006)). In the former theory, 
governments do not fully internalise the cost of debt, because those costs 
may be born by an opposing party if the government is not re-elected. Indeed, 
it may be advantageous for a government to increase debt to constrain the 
actions of a future government with different political preferences. This is likely 
to lead to myopic type behaviour of the kind explored in the previous section. 
Common pool theories focus on the fact that many decision makers (e.g. 
spending ministries) may be involved in formulating budgets, and these 
decision makers fail to internalise the overall costs of higher spending and 
debt.   
  Most of the literature has focused on the use of policy rules as a means 
of tackling problems of deficit bias, following the adoption of rules of various 
types by some governments, and of course the Stability and Growth Pact of 
the EU. However, as we noted in the previous section, rules that involve 
returning debt to its pre-shock level are likely to be sub-optimal. This sub-
optimality can be reduced if debt correction is very slow, but in this case rules 
may not be credible. More generally, credible and enforceable rules may by 
necessity have to involve a significant departure from optimal behaviour.  
  This motivates an interest in some form of institutional change.
6 The 
IMF categories such proposals into two types: those which involve giving 
control over fiscal instruments to an independent agency (‘Independent Fiscal 
                                            
6 While we would argue that rules alone are likely to be inadequate in encouraging optimal 
policy, it may be the case that rules can coexist alongside new institutions, particularly when 
these rules are ‘soft’ and open to interpretation.    287
Agencies’ (IFAs), analogous to monetary policy committees setting interest 
rates in independent central banks (ICB)), and Fiscal Councils, which only 
have an advisory role. The basic difficulty with IFAs is that they require policy 
makers, and through them the public, to give up rather more control than is 
lost by establishing an ICB. An ICB varies a single instrument to achieve a 
well defined goal. In some countries that goal is established politically (as in 
the UK). While changes in interest rates can have powerful effects on 
individuals, those effects are relatively short term: changes in real rates will 
not last beyond a business cycle.  
  An IFA that had control over a variety of tax rates and which was 
required to ensure long term fiscal sustainability would potentially have much 
more political discretion. If the IFA decided that taxes should increase, which 
taxes? More fundamentally, the impact of such tax increases may be 
permanent, and the only beneficiaries could be unborn generations. Although 
the IFA could be seen as representing such generations, this position would 
be bound to be intensely political. Such difficulties might be overcome, 
particularly if the IFA was only concerned with short term stabilisation, as in 
Wren-Lewis (2003). However, the fact that no examples of IFAs as yet exist 
suggest that the political costs involved are very high. 
  Alesina and  Tabellini (2004) discuss some of the criteria for successful 
delegation. One of these is that there should be a broad consensus on what 
constitutes ‘sound policy’ in any particular domain. In the context of public 
debt, this seems to be true only in part. There is a clear consensus that debt 
should follow a sustainable path i.e. that fiscal actions (rather than inflation) 
should ensure that the government’s intertemporal budget constraint holds. 
However, there is less agreement on what an optimal path for debt might be. 
Should steady state debt follow a random walk, as the literature cited above 
suggests, or should there be a target for debt? If the latter, what should that 
target be? This lack of agreement makes delegating decisions over debt 
problematic.  
  Fiscal Councils, on the other hand, take no formal power from 
governments. They may nevertheless be effective, because they help correct 
an asymmetry of information between the government and its electorate. The 
electorate does not have the expertise to establish whether an increase in the 
budget deficit represents the optimal response to some shock, or additional 
spending designed to appease particular government supporters. The 
government has an interest in claiming the former, while opposition parties will 
invariably claim it is the latter. A Fiscal Council can play a ‘watchdog’ role in 
providing this information in an unbiased manner, and thereby help the 
electorate to provide the appropriate judgement.  
  Although a Fiscal Council is an alternative to an IFA, it can also evolve 
into an IFA. If the government invariably follows the advice of an established 
Fiscal Council, and that advice is perceived as helpful in managing public 
debt, then it becomes much easier for both the government and electorate to 
then transfer some decision making power to the Council. Indeed, it could be 
argued that a Fiscal Council is a prudent first step in establishing an IFA. In 
this sense, Fiscal Councils can facilitate rather than detract from the 
establishment of IFAs. However, the transformation of a Fiscal Council into an   288
IFA is neither inevitable or necessarily desirable, as it could be argued that 
giving a Fiscal Council formal powers removes an important democratic 
safeguard from fiscal decision making.  
  Stéclebout-Orseau and Hallerberg (2006) set out three criteria for an 
institution to provide a successful fiscal ‘watchdog’ role: technical capacity, 
visibility and lack of bias. Technical capacity is clearly necessary to correct the 
informational advantage the government has. Visibility relates to the extent to 
which the electorate has access to the information provided by the watchdog. 
Lack of bias is required to ensure that the information provided is free from 
any strategic interest beyond achieving an optimal outcome for debt. If these 
criteria are fulfilled, then the government will incur a cost in ignoring the 
advice of the council, which is essential if the council is to play a useful role 
(see Debrun and Kumar, 2006).      
  The body we propose, which we call a Fiscal Monitoring Commission 
(FMC), is a form of Fiscal Council that would be required to monitor the long 
term national fiscal position, and if these projections suggested an 
unsustainable position, to indicate how the overall fiscal position should 
change to correct this. The minimum requirements for the Fiscal Monitoring 
Commission (FMC) would be as follows: 
 
1) It would be established, and financed, by the national government.  
 
2) The director would be appointed by, and subject to, an executive 
committee made up of experts in relevant fields. Ideally, members of the 
committee should be appointed on long term (5-10 year) contracts in a bi-
partisan manner. Their role would be to ensure the FMC and its director 
applied best practice, but also that it remained politically neutral. 
 
3) The FMC would employ sufficient economists to be able to undertake long 
term projections of the public accounts, or equivalently evaluate in a complete 
and critical manner any similar projections put forward by the government. 
This would involve complex issues such as judging what the current output 
gap was, evaluating trends in technical progress etc. 
 
4) The FMC would report once a year. Its projections would be based on 
published government plans. Unless its projections suggested that current 
plans, to a reasonable degree of approximation, were sustainable, it would 
attempt to compute the optimal degree of correction, in terms of overall 
changes in either spending, or taxes, or both. (In other words, it would attempt 
to calculate what a benevolent policy maker would do).  
 
5) The government would be required to formally respond to the proposals 
made by the FMC, but it would not be required to implement them.  
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  Thus, the FMC would apply political pressure on the government, but 
that pressure could be ignored. However, as the government finances the 
FMC, and had a role in appointing its board, ignoring its recommendations 
would incur some political cost.  Once established, then it would always be 
possible as a further step to give the FMC some control over policy, but to go 
this far as a first step seems politically unrealistic. 
  To have the FMC appointed and financed by the current and previous 
governments might seem unwise in term of independence. However, we also 
need to ensure that the other key criteria for a watchdog cited above are also 
fulfilled: technical capacity and visibility. Various countries have completely 
independent bodies and academics already making evaluations of the longer 
term fiscal position, but these can easily be dismissed by the relevant 
government as ‘just another view’. It would be much more difficult to dismiss 
the views of a body set up and financed by the government itself.
7 Ignoring 
the advice of the FMC has to be politically costly, and it is clearly more difficult 
for the government to ignore the advice of an institution it established and 
finances.  
  The role of the executive committee of the FMC is crucial for 
independence. This committee is the Director’s protection from political 
interference (or under-resourcing), but also the safeguard against the political 
‘capture’ of the Director. The precise composition of this executive committee 
will depend on the existing political and institutional framework, and this differs 
considerably among countries.  
  The advantage of publishing 50 year projections is that the issue of 
sustainability is directly addressed. The UK’s finance ministry, H.M.Treasury, 
publishes 50 year projections of the public finances each year as part of its 
pre-budget report. If a FMC were established in the UK, this work would be 
‘duplicated’ by the FMC. The key difference, of course, is that the FMC’s 
projections would be independent. This is not to suggest that H.M.Treasury’s 
projections are necessarily politically distorted. However, as the reaction to 
the recent decision in the UK to change the timing of business cycles 
illustrates
8, its calculations will always be perceived as potentially biased. If 
the Treasury is doing its job correctly, the projections of the FMC would 
demonstrate that it was unbiased, and therefore add to the government’s 
credibility. 
  The proposed FMC has a number of similarities to the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) in the United States. The CBO is designed to be 
politically independent, it has a director appointed by the President and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and has a panel of economic 
advisors. It publishes budget projections, including 50 year projections of the 
                                            
7 This is an example of where a competitive market (“competition among fiscal councils”) is 
unhelpful, in part because the quality of the product is very difficult to establish. With diversity 
of advice, inevitably the government will choose to follow the advice that suits its own interest. 
This problem can be reduced to some extent by setting up ‘wise men’ councils, which in effect 
collect and in some way aggregate diverse opinions. However, if the technical capacity of the 
government still exceeds those of individual wise men, and the resources of wise men are not 
pooled, then the government can still claim that it has additional information.   
8 One of the UK Government’s fiscal rules requires balance over the course of the cycle. The 
timing of the cycle can therefore be crucial in assessing whether this rule has been met.   290
kind suggested for the FMC.
9 There are however important differences. The 
scope of the CBO is much more wide ranging, providing detailed analysis of 
micro as well as macro aspects of the budget process. Most importantly, a 
key difference between the CBO and the FMC is that the latter would be 
committed to explicitly advising on policy, in the sense that it would say 
whether some fiscal correction was needed, and what the optimal timing of 
that correction should be. The CBO is explicitly precluded from making policy 
recommendations. Furthermore, under point (5) above, the government would 
be required to respond to those recommendations. An interesting thought 
experiment is to imagine whether a CBO refashioned as a FMC would have 
had an impact on recent US fiscal policy, or public discussion of that policy.
10  
  Two countries that do operate Fiscal Councils which make specific 
policy recommendations are Belgium and Denmark. In Belgium the 
institutional detail is complex, in part because of the more decentralised fiscal 
structure (Lebrum, 2006). However, an important role of the ‘High Council of 
Finance’ is to provide reports on the budgetary position and make 
recommendations on short and especially medium-term budgetary targets 
(and since 2002, also on long-term targets) for the general government and 
other spending institutions.  
  In both Belgium and Denmark that central bank is represented on the 
council. Would it be sensible to go much further, and let an independent 
central bank take on the role of a Fiscal Council? There are two reasons why 
this is probably undesirable. First, the focus of the central bank is on short 
term stabilisation, while the FMC is concerned with long term trends in public 
debt. While Wren-Lewis (2003) suggests giving the central bank some limited, 
short term control of selected fiscal instruments, this was to strengthen its 
ability to stabilise the economy over the business cycle (or in the case of 
EMU, to partially make up for the lack of a national monetary policy), and not 
as a means of optimally managing debt. Second, there are good reasons for 
thinking that a central bank’s primary focus on controlling inflation might 
produce a ‘surplus-bias’ in its recommendations.   
  The European Commission monitors budget developments in member 
countries as part of the SGP. It also makes very public policy 
recommendations. However, in both respects it falls short of what the FMC 
would be required to do. Its forecasts operate over a rather short time horizon. 
Its recommendations are designed to meet the criteria laid down in the SGP. 
This is quite different from the key aspects of optimal debt policy as described 
above. 
If these two aspects could be corrected, would EC monitoring provide 
an alternative to a national FMC for EC member states? The difficulty here is 
that EC monitoring would interact with the strategic position of other member 
                                            
9 A number of other countries ask independent or semi-independent bodies to prepare 
projections or forecasts that are used as part of the budget process. For example the 
Netherlands’s Central Planning Bureau provides the economic assumptions for the budget. 
One particularly interesting additional role played by Central Planning Bureau is that it 
assesses the budgetary implications of the major political parties ahead of elections. 
10 The CBO has published 50 year projections (e.g. December 2003) showing that US fiscal 
policy is not sustainable. However, it is precluded from saying when this should be corrected, 
perhaps thereby allowing politicians to postpone solutions.     291
states, and so advice coming from the EC could reflect those strategic 
interests. An example of this kind is explored in Stéclebout-Orseau and 
Hallerberg (2006). It is politically important that the FMC is seen as having 
only one interest, which is that fiscal policy is optimal from a national point of 
view. The danger is that advice coming from the EC might not only be 
ignored, but that politicians might gain nationalistic benefits from doing so.  
On the other hand, there are good reasons for retaining an important 
role for EC monitoring, even if a national FMC is established and its advice is 
followed. This is because of the externalities involved in fiscal actions by 
individual EU members (see Uhlig (2003) among others). For example, there 
may be a tendency for policies based on national welfare to attempt to 
appreciate the real exchange rate against other members of the union (see 
Gali and Monacelli, 2004), but of course collectively they cannot achieve this, 
leading to a sub-optimal union wide allocation. One role that continued EU 
monitoring would have would be to encourage FMCs to internalise these 
externalities. 
Although the government would not be required to implement the 
proposals of the FMC, we would argue that the FMC would achieve a number 
of goals. The government would be forced to address to issue of 
sustainability, either by agreeing with the FMC’s assessment, or by publishing 
alternative assessments of its own, and justifying why its own assessment 
was superior to the FMC’s. This would put the issue of the long term control of 
debt, and the funding of any fiscal changes, firmly into the political arena. If 
the government undertook expansionary, counter cyclical fiscal action they 
would explicitly have to address the issue of how deficits would eventually be 
funded. From the perspective of a benevolent policy maker, the FMC would 
give the government credibility in undertaking countercyclical action, or in 
allowing ‘drift’ in the level of public debt where that was appropriate. In short, it 
could help provide a ‘commitment mechanism’ by which optimal policy 
decisions could be implemented. 
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6. Conclusion  
 
  Recent research has reinforced the suggestion that optimal policy 
under commitment should involve steady-state debt following a random walk. 
Following a fiscal shock stemming from any source, it is not optimal to return 
debt to its pre-shock level. As a consequence, a policy that involves an 
unconditional debt target (i.e. a target that has to be met) is bound to be sub-
optimal.  
  The random walk result appears robust, in that it applies (at least 
approximately) in different types of economies, and to a variety of models. It is 
also relevant to the design of simple policy rules, where the optimal degree of 
feedback from debt disequilibrium should be very slow. Our research 
suggests that it need not apply to optimal discretionary policy (i.e. where there 
is no commitment mechanism in place, and policy is constrained to be time 
consistent), but we argue that policy targets should be designed to encourage 
achieving commitment solutions, rather than locking policy into discretionary 
solutions.  
  In practice debt targets may be designed to avoid the consequences of 
non-benevolent policy makers, and we give an example based on a myopic 
fiscal authority. We would certainly not recommend that debt targets be 
abandoned in such circumstances. However, we argue that because such 
targets will move policy away from the policy that maximises social welfare, 
this strengthens the case for institutional remedies to non-benevolant 
behaviour.  
  We propose one particular institutional change designed to improve 
budgetary outcomes, which is the establishment of a national Fiscal 
Monitoring Commission. This body would have no formal control over policy, 
but with good design can apply advice and pressure on politicians to move 
towards a first best policy for government debt. In particular, this body would 
be mandated to provide policy advice on how aggregate fiscal outcomes 
should be adjusted to achieve not just sustainable but optimal paths for 
government debt, and the national government would be required to justify 
any deviation from those recommendations.   
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Appendix: Details of simulations in Section 4 
 
  The results set out in Table 1 are derived using the closed economy 
model set out in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006a). The representative agent 
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where C is a basket (using a CES aggregator) of consumption goods, G is 
government spending, and N is labour supply. (We ignore stochastic terms 
not used in this exercise.) Maximisation gives rise to the standard Euler 
equation and first order conditions for labour supply.  
  Monopolistically competitive firms, facing a linear production 
technology, set prices according to Calvo contracts. This gives rise to a 
standard New Keynesian Phillips curve. Monetary policy sets the nominal 
interest rate to maximise social welfare. The government finances its 
spending through lump sum and labour taxation, and by issuing debt. There is 
an employment subsidy in steady state, which exactly offsets the impact of 
monopolistic firms and distortionary taxation, so that the steady state is 
efficient (i.e. equal to the allocation determined by a benevolent social 
planner). The budget is balanced in steady state using lump sum taxation. 
However both the employment subsidy and lump sum taxation are fixed at 
their steady state values, so lump sum taxes cannot be used to respond to 
shocks to the government budget constraint. 
  Social welfare is derived as a quadratic approximation to utility, and 
involves quadratic terms in the output, consumption and government 
spending gaps (where a gap is the difference between actual and flex price 
levels of a variable), and a quadratic term in inflation. The fiscal authority 
maximises per period social welfare, but with a discount rate that may exceed 
β.  
  The simulations shown in Figure 3 are derived by applying a unit cost-
push shock (a shock to the Phillips curve), with the fiscal authority using 
government spending as the instrument used to maximise its objective 
function. The technique used to derive Nash equilibria is described in 
Kirsanova, Stehn and Vines (2005).     
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The Swedish budget "model":  a genuine beauty or in need 




* and Jonas Fischer
** 
 
(21 December 2006) 
In an international setting, the Swedish budget "model" has been praised to be a beauty - an 
example of a well established rules-based fiscal framework. The national judgement has in 
some respect been harder. From this dual perspective we assess in the paper what has worked 
well and less well in relation to the objectives. We also ask whether the "model" is still in 
shape or needs a face lift. Our conclusion is that the "model" is still successful and that the 
critical national debate and the memory of the fiscal crisis in the early 1990s are reasons to 




Sweden operates what nowadays can be considered a well established framework of 
budgetary rules. The framework consists of three parts. Firstly, there are 3-year nominal 
expenditure ceilings on central government expenditures. Secondly, there is a general 
government surplus objective. Thirdly, local governments have to follow a budget balance 
requirement. The overall objective of the framework is to ensure sustainable public finances 
and to reduce incentives for pro-cyclical polices. 
The framework was set up over the period 1997-2000 and it has now been in place for, 
arguably, a full cycle. Therefore it seems to be a good moment in time to have a broader look 
at the framework and assess what has been successful and what has worked less well with a 
view to identify what, if anything, could be further developed. The purpose of this paper is to 
contribute to such an assessment. There have, of course, been numerous earlier inputs to this 
                                                 
* Sveriges Riksbank, Monetary Policy Department (email: Robert.boije@riksbank.se). 
** European Commission, DG ECFIN (email: Jonas.Fischer@cec.eu.int). 
Paper prepared for the 24 November Workshop “The Role of Fiscal Rules and Institutions in Shaping Budgetary 
Outcomes”, at the European Commission. The views expressed in the paper are the responsibility of the authors 
and do not necessarily represent the views by the Riksbank and the European Commission.    298
debate.
1 However, we believe that our paper provides a more comprehensive and systematic 
picture of the issues involved including also possible avenues for improvements.
2 
The paper is organised as follows: Section (1) gives the background to the Swedish 
rules-based fiscal and budgetary framework. Section (2) provides a detailed description of the 
rules and how they work. In section (3) follows an assessment of how the rules have 
performed since their introduction. Given the identified strengths and weaknesses, section (4) 




1. The background to the Swedish budgetary framework 
 
The key driver behind the introduction of the rules-based budgetary framework was the 
experiences gained dealing with the economic and budgetary crises in 1992-1994. The crises 
in the early 1990's were probably among the deepest in the industrialized world at that time. 
Jonung (2005) qualifies the crises in Sweden as being as severe as those that hit the world 
during the exceptionally crisis-ridden interwar period. Some figures illustrate the quick turn 
around in economic conditions. The general government budget balance went from +4 per 
cent of GDP in 1990, to -11.4 per cent in 1993 (see Figure 1). Over the same period 
unemployment increased from 1.7 to 9.1 per cent. GDP growth was negative 1991-1993. The 
depth of the crises was influenced by the international slowdown, but had without doubt also 
domestic causes in form of a long preceding period of an asymmetric stabilization policy, an 
infelicitous sequencing of the deregulation of the capital market and the 1991 tax reform and a 
badly working wage formation process.  
Following the deep crisis, Sweden essentially altered the monetary and fiscal policy 
frameworks. When the fixed exchange rate had to be abandoned in 1992, the Riksbank was 
given responsibility for monetary policy with the objective of price stability. Fiscal policy was 
initially aimed at improving public finances by reducing budget deficits and halting the 
increase in central government debt. A consolidation programme was successfully 
implemented in stages between 1995 and 1998 containing a strengthening of public finances 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Boije (2005), Fischer (2005), Hansson-Brusewitz and Lindh (2005), IMF (2005), OECD 
(2005) and SOU (2002:16). 
2 We thank Lars Jonung , Klas-Göran Larsson, Yngve Lindh, Gösta Ljungman and Ralph Wilkinson for valuable 
comments. 
3 Please note that when we refer to the government, we have the former and not the newly elected government in 
view, if nothing else is said.    299
of around SEK 125 billion (7.5 per cent of GDP). During the same period a more austere 
budget process was implemented including the introduction of the expenditure ceilings in 
1997. The basic rules governing the budget process, including the multi-year expenditure 
ceilings, are collected in the Budget Act from 1997. It was also decided that a general 
government surplus target of 2 per cent of GDP over the cycle should be applicable as from 
2000. In addition, as from 2000 local governments are required to plan for balanced budgets.  
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There are a number of national institutions that follow up the different parts of the 
rules-based framework besides the government itself in its Autumn Budget Bill and pre-
budget statement. The National Financial Management Authority (ESV) has a special 
responsibility to survey expenditures under the ceilings and publishes medium-term forecasts 
of central government revenues and expenditures four times per year. The National Institute 
of Economic Research (NIER) quarterly publishes medium-term forecasts of central and 
general government net lending as well as forecasts of ceiling-restricted expenditures. The 
National Debt Office publishes forecasts of the central government borrowing requirement for 
the current year and the coming fiscal year. These institutions, although not strictly politically 
independent, do not hesitate do complain in case of non-compliance with the rules. In 
addition, on the EU level the Commission and the Council assess compliance with the EU 
fiscal framework which also includes commenting on the respect of the national budget rules.   300
Further, on the international level, the IMF and the OECD express their views in their 
respective surveillance procedures.  
 
2. Description of the budgetary framework 
2.1 The expenditure ceilings
4 
The expenditures subject to the ceiling includes central government expenditures and 
expenditures of the pension system outside the budget, but not interest expenditures on 
government debt. The ceilings cover approximately two-thirds of total general government 
expenditures. Even cyclically sensitive expenditures, such as expenditures on active labour 
market programmes, unemployment benefits and social security, are included. Interest costs 
are excluded with the argument that in the short term it is not possible for the government to 
influence them. Local government expenditure is excluded with reference to the autonomy of 
the local governments. 
  One purpose of the expenditure ceilings is to prevent temporary rises in revenue from 
being used to finance increased spending, thereby making it harder to run a pro-cyclical 
policy on the expenditure side of the budget. It also contributes to preventing a trend rise in 
government expenditure as a share of GDP and helps to ensure that consolidation measures 
are implemented if expenditure risks exceeding the ceiling.  
  There is a “top-down” budgetary process that assigns a clear role to the Ministry of 
Finance in drawing up the budget. The multi-year framework includes nominal expenditure 
ceilings for the coming two or three years. For the two coming fiscal years (t+1 and t+2) these 
ceilings are already laid down in decisions of earlier years. The new expenditure ceiling three 
years ahead (t+3) is presented to the Parliament in the Budget bill in September and is 
approved by the Parliament in November.  
The budget process also includes a "two-stage" frame decision process. Total 
expenditure is divided into 27 different expenditure areas for the coming fiscal year, for each 
of which the Parliament first determines a budget frame. This decision must comply with the 
previously set expenditure ceiling for year t+1. The Parliament then approves the level of the 
appropriations within each expenditure area. The total sums of the appropriations must not 
exceed the previously determined budget frame. Hence, additional spending on one 
                                                 
4 This section draws on Hansson Brusewitz and Lindh (2005). 
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appropriation must be matched with corresponding spending cuts within the same expenditure 
area. Otherwise the proposal will not be permitted to be discussed by Parliament. The new 
decision process in Parliament has reduced the size of parliamentary amendments to the 
budget. Indicative frames for the expenditure areas for the years t+2 and t+3 are also approved 
by the Parliament as a starting point for the preparation of future budgets. 
A critical feature of the expenditure ceiling is that it has an ex post dimension. It 
should be implemented in such a way that the outcome of the ceiling-restricted expenditure is 
below the decided expenditure ceiling. It is not enough that the target is met ex ante when the 
ceiling is determined three years in advance or at the time of budget approval.  
Since the ceiling limits the actual expenditure – not just appropriated funds – one has 
to take uncertainty in the expenditure forecast into account. To accommodate the impact of 
unanticipated developments there is a buffer – a so-called budget margin - between the ceiling 
and the ceiling-restricted expenditures. The main purpose of the budget margin is to absorb 
fluctuations in the expenditure level due to changes in the business cycle (automatic 
stabilisers) and other macroeconomic uncertainties. It should also, to some extent, cover 
unspecified expenditure reforms. The margin should also absorb the uncertainty that is caused 
by the fact that Swedish agencies can shift the consumption of appropriated funds between 
years
5.  
There is, within the framework, no established principles for determining the level of 
the expenditure ceilings and the size of the budget margin. The last few years practice has 
been that the expenditure ceiling has been set more or less as a fixed share of potential 
nominal GDP. When the ceiling has been set for the third year, the budget margin has 
normally amounted to about 2 per cent of the expenditure ceiling. We will come back to these 
issues in section 3.1. 
 
                                                 
5 For most appropriations there is a carry-over possibility, which means that unused appropriations – within 
certain limits – can be carried forward to the next year. For most appropriations there is also a possibility to 
borrow against next years appropriation within certain limits. Such a credit is automatically deducted from the 
carry-over fund the following year.    302
2.2 The surplus objective 
The surplus target covers the general government sector, i.e. the central government, local 
governments and the old age pension system. The target states that the general government 
net lending (according to ESA95) should amount to 2 per cent of GDP on average over the 
business cycle. The target was introduced step by step during a transition period by setting up 
annual surplus targets.
6 
The principal purpose of the surplus target is to strengthen, via lower government 
debt, the public sector’s position ahead of the strains that will be placed on government 
finances thereafter by demographic factors.
7 A budget surplus in normal cyclical conditions 
also lessens the risk of incurring a substantial deficit during a protracted economic slowdown. 
However, the former argument can not be used to motivate an eternal surplus on average over 
the cycle, since the government, once the debt is gone, in that case would have to build up net 
claims on the private sector. 
Ex ante the medium-term target is translated into an annual target for the actual budget 
surplus in year t+1. This annual target is proposed by the Government in the Budget Bill for 
the year t+1 in September in year t and is approved by Parliament later in the autumn. The 
annual target could, according to the government, deviate from the 2 per cent of GDP 
objective for cyclical reasons. In its 1999 Convergence Programme (pp. 4-5) the Swedish 
government stated: 
 
"As the medium-term goal refers to the public sector fiscal balance seen over the business 
cycle, the actual budget surplus could fall below 2 per cent of GDP in a phase of the business 
cycle with relatively high idle capacity in the economy, but conversely exceed 2 per cent of 
GDP in the peak phase of the business cycle. Thus, the level that the budget surplus will reach 
in an individual year is dependent on the phase of the business cycle, which provides scope 
for the automatic stabilisers to work. In this way it is possible to refrain from a pro-cyclical 
policy. A medium-term goal of a public sector surplus equivalent to 2 per cent of GDP should 
                                                 
6 For 1997, it was decided that the deficit in the government finances was not to exceed 3 per cent of GDP. For 
1998, the aim was to achieve a balanced budget. These targets were to be attained irrespective of the economic 
situation. For 1999 and 2000, the targets were a surplus of 0.5 and 1.5 per cent of GDP, respectively. See 
Stabiliseringspolitik i valutaunionen (Stabilisation policy in the monetary union) (SOU 2002:16), pp. 137-138.   
7 If the overall objective is to lower debt it may be argued that a debt target would be preferable. However, there 
are two key arguments against this. Firstly, the change in debt depends on several other factors than fiscal policy, 
for example, financial transactions and valuation effects (which gives rise to stock-flow adjustments). Secondly, 
if the objective also is to prevent pro-cyclical policies, a target for net lending is both more appropriate and 
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also be compatible to some extent with conducting an active fiscal policy, with the aim of 
moderating swings in the business cycle without risking excessive deficits during down-turns."  
 
The formulation of the surplus objective however leaves some open questions. In 
particular it does not include a clear specification on how to measure compliance. How to 
understand what is in practice “on average over the cycle” is left open as there is no specified 
method within the framework for calibrating “the cycle” and measuring surpluses against it. 
We will come back to these aspects in section 3.2 
 
 
2.3 The local government balance requirement 
 
In 1998 it was stipulated, in the local government law, that as from 2000 at the latest, local 
governments must plan for revenues higher than or equal to expenditures. The local 
government sector in Sweden is responsible for roughly 40 per cent of the general public 
sectors primary public expenditures and for 70 per cent of public sector investment and 
consumption. Local government revenues include (non-capital) income taxes, central 
government grants (covered by the central government’s expenditure ceiling) and fees.
8  
The balance requirement follows the budgeting accounting framework and relates to 
the financial result net of extraordinary posts. A key argument behind this balance 
requirement is that the current community citizens should be financially responsible for its 
public expenditures. In addition, communities should follow the principle of good financial 
"house keeping" taking into account future costs in form of pension liabilities. As a 
benchmark this would require a surplus of 2 per cent of total revenue (SOU 2001:76). The 
balance requirement is therefore seen as a minimum requirement. Moreover, there is also a 
principle of caution applied in the local government accounting conventions. For example, 
capital gains to do not count as revenue while capital losses count as expenditures.  
Local governments are allowed to borrow to finance investments. It is the cost of the 
loan and not the investment expenditures that affect the result. As a consequence, the balance 
requirement can not be satisfied by simply postponing investment expenditures into the 
future
9.  Should a deficit materialise ex post, there is a clear consolidation rule: the own 
                                                 
8Appendix B in the end of the paper provides more detailed information about the Swedish local public sector 
and its finances.  
9 This is different to a National Accounts defined net lending objective where the investment expenditure is 
booked up front. Therefore, a net lending budget target can be reached by postponing investment expenditures.   304
capital must be restored through surpluses within the next three years. Up to 2004, the own 
capital had to be restored within two years. The longer respite makes it easier for the 
communities to compensate for budget slippages without risk running pro-cyclical policies.  
There are circumstances under which a local government may be exempt from having 
to restore its own capital in case of a deficit, for example if it has built up funds as a buffer for 
future negative budget surprises. However, even with a strong own capital position it is not 
allowed to plan for a deficit. 
In the case of non-compliance with the balance requirement there is no explicit 
sanction mechanism (except, perhaps, for the voters’ disapproval in the coming election). 
 
3. Performance and assessment  
3.1 The expenditure ceilings 
 
The level of the expenditure ceiling 
General government expenditure as a percentage of GDP rose sharply during the economic 
crisis in the early 1990s. In 1993 the expenditure to GDP ratio amounted to 72.4 per cent of 
GDP. The savings in the consolidation program contributed to a fall in the expenditure to 
GDP ratio. After the completion of the consolidation program general government 
expenditure continued to decline as a percentage of GDP, from 60.3 per cent in 1998 to 56.8 
per cent in 2000, mainly due to relative restrictive expenditure ceilings. As a percentage of 
GDP, expenditures under the ceiling fell by about 2.5 per cent between 1997 and 2000 (see 
Table 1). The expenditure ceiling, measured as percentage of GDP, has been relatively stable 
since 2000. The ceilings that now are in effect up to year 2009 imply that the expenditure 
ceiling to GDP ratio will decline somewhat over the next few years.  
Praxis the latter years has been that the expenditure ceiling ( )
Cap E  has been set as a 
fixed share of nominal potential GDP ( )
* Y : 
 
(1)    
*
3 3 * + + = t
Cap
t Y c E  
                                                                                                                                                          
Indeed, in the EU debate on the SGP an issue has been how to reduce incentives for Member States to reach 
budgetary targets by cutting productive investment expenditures, which is a relatively easy measure in the short 
term.   305
 
where the constant includes the budget margin. This praxis has, in our opinion, two major 
drawbacks: 
 
1. There is no clear link to the surplus target. The set expenditure ceilings have not in any case 
been adapted with a reference to achieve compliance with the surplus objective.  
 
2. It does not take into account structural changes of the composition of the tax bases caused 
by for example demographic factors. A minimum requirement of the expenditure ceiling 
should be that it is set in such away that the surplus target can be reached without the need to 
increase tax rates if demographic developments lead to decreasing tax bases.  
 
We will come back to these specific problems, and how they can be dealt with, in section 4.1. 
 
Table 1: Expenditure ceilings, expenditures subject to ceilings and budget margins 1997-
2009 
Percent of GDP and SEK billions 
 
  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Expenditure ceiling 
 % of GDP*  35.9  34.1 33.5 32.3 32.3 31.9 32.3 32.3 32.5 32.1 31.2 30.7 30.2 
Actual expenditures 
 % of GDP*  34.6  34.0  33.4  32.0 32.1 31.8 32.2 32.2 32.3  
  
Ex post budget margin   1.3  0.1  0.1  0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2      
Ex ante contingency margins in Budget Bill for (bn SEK):  
1999  24.1  1.1 3.3 6.4 20.4      
2000    2.0 1.0 1.5 3.7 22.6      
2001     1.5 0.6 1.2 9.2 17.2      
2002       3.0 2.0 2.0 7.0    
2003       0.3 0.4 0.6    
2004       0.4 0.1 0.2 13.8 28.5    
2005       2.9 0.2 0.2 1.4 10.0   
2006       2.9 2.4 1.6 2.2 11.9   
2007       5.7 7.8 15.8 17.6 34.9 
*In the first section, the table shows the level of the ceilings and expenditures in % of GDP across time. For reasons of 
comparability across years, the expenditure ceilings are harmonised to take into account technical adjustments (source ESV). 
Figures over the 2006-2008 period are consistent with the 2007 Budget Bill. In the second section of the table, the 
development of the budget margins are shown, as from being set 3 years ahead to the first outcome level ("below the 
staircase"). For example, when the ceiling for the budget year 2003 was set in the budget for 2001 it was estimated to be 17.2 
bn SEK. However, already in the budget for 2003 it the estimated margin was down to 0.4 bn SEK and the outcome as given 
in the 2004 budget was 0.1 bn SEK which was later revised upwards to 2.9 bn SEK.   306




Respect of the ceilings 
As can be seen from Table 1, the expenditure ceilings have been respected all years since their 
introduction, that is, ex post expenditures have stayed under the ceilings. What explains this 
apparent success? Firstly, a lot of political prestige has been invested in the expenditure 
ceilings. By lending a term from the monetary policy terminology one could say that the 
ceilings have worked as a “budget anchor”. Secondly, there is a legal requirement in the 
Budget Act stipulating that the government must act if there is a risk that the expenditures 
subject to the ceiling exceed the ceiling. Thirdly, the transparency of the ceiling has facilitated 
an effective surveillance by external institutions and by media leading to an open assessment 
and debate.  
  Although the expenditure ceilings have been respected, the system has not been 
applied fully according to the intentions. The budget margin has not been used as intended 
and the expenditure ceilings have been circumvented. Let’s have a closer look on this.  
 
The budget margin   
The difference between the expenditure subject to the ceiling and the expenditure ceiling – the 
budget margin – is supposed to be a buffer both against uncertainty in economic 
developments and against factors that may cause unforeseen increases in expenditure, such as 
increased sick leave. Table 1 shows the outcome of budget margins for 1997-2005. In 1997 
the budget margin was relatively large in relation to the expenditure ceiling. Between 1998 
and 2005, however, the outcome of the budget margin was just a fraction of a per cent of the 
expenditure ceiling
10.  Since 1998 until 2004 the budget forecasts for the current year have 
usually indicated a risk of an overrun of the expenditure ceiling. That is because the budget 
margin has been used to new spending reforms, examples being increased expenditures for 
education and economic security for families and children. In addition, higher than expected 
expenditures related to absence from work due to illness did also contribute to the low 
margins.  
 
                                                 
10 The new budget process with relatively small budget margins under the expenditure ceiling implies that 
expenditure forecasting over the short- and medium-term has become a high priority activity. Forecasting now 
plays a central role both during the budgeting phase and as a component of the in-year monitoring activities.   307
Tax expenditures and creative accounting
11 
The Swedish government has some years been able to keep expenditures below the ceilings, 
by taking measures that clearly are against the intentions of the Budget Act. As is well known 
also from the EU debate, a drawback with hard budget constraints is that they might 
encourage the use of creative accounting practices, reducing the transparency in the 
government budget. On the one hand, such operations give the government some flexibility in 
the implementation of fiscal rules, on the other hand, if used systematically it erodes the 
purpose of the rules.   
One way to circumvent the expenditure ceiling is to introduce subsidies on the revenue 
side of the budget. Tax subsidies have been used, although to a limited extent, as a remedy by 
the Swedish government when the expenditure ceilings have been threatened. In 2005 and 
2006 the pure tax reductions defined as expenditures in the National Accounts amounted to 
about 0.5 per cent of GDP. The introduction of such measures has usually not been used as a 
substitute for existing expenditure programs but as a substitute for new expenditure reforms. 
We will come back to this issue in section 4.1 in a discussion of how incentives to such 
behaviour can be avoided.   
As a rule the Budget Act prescribes that the state budget shall include all government 
revenue and expenditure accounted for in gross terms, although the are some exceptions from 
this rule. The Parliament may also during some circumstances decide on exceptions from 
these rules. This has occurred on a few occasions when the Government has been given 
authority to decide on the disposition of certain revenues from user-fees. This means that 
related expenses are no longer accounted for in the budget. The effect of these operations on 
ceiling-restricted expenditures has been relatively small and the proposals have been 
presented to the Parliament in a transparent way.  
Other measures have also been used. For example, the Government has submitted 
proposals to the Parliament on exceptions from the normal rule that infrastructure investments 
are financed by appropriations. Instead the Government has, in a few cases, proposed that 
such investments shall be financed by loans in the National Debt Office. This means that 
accounting in relation to appropriations and the expenditure ceiling takes place in future years 
when the loans are amortized and not in the fiscal year to which the investment expenditure 
                                                 
11 This section partially draws on Hansson-Brusewitz and Lindh (2005)   308
relates. Such operations tend to reduce the level of the budget margin in the coming fiscal 
years.  
To cope with the ceilings the Government has most years used its right to set 
maximum allowed expenditures below the amounts appropriated by the Parliament by using 
so-called limitation amounts. Because of the carry-over possibility that is applied to most 
appropriations in the Swedish budgetary system, the limitation amounts have carried forward 
expenditure from the current year to the next fiscal year.  Hence, the limitation amounts have 
therefore not given rise to a permanent reduction of the expenditure level. They have, 
however, reduced the level of the budget margin in the next fiscal year and have therefore 
reduced the scope for expenditure reforms or increased the need for budgetary retrenchments 
in that year. 
Restrictive budget constraints might also increase the temptation to present biased 
expenditure and revenue forecasts. By strategically manipulating the budget assumptions, the 
government can abide by the law ex ante and then have a list of explanations as to why the 
targets were missed ex-post. This may call for politically independent forecasters (Jonung and 
Larch, 2006). However, overall there is no empirical support for that the Swedish government 




Have the expenditure ceilings prevented pro-cyclical policies? 
One key purpose with the expenditure ceilings is to limit the risk of pro-cyclical policies on 
the expenditure side of the budget. To what extent has the application of the expenditure 
ceiling been successful in this respect?  
Figure 2 shows, on the basis of the Commission 2006 Autumn forecast figures, the 
actual net lending, the fiscal stance (measured as the change in the cyclically-adjusted 
balance), the estimated output gap and the GDP growth between 1997 and 2005. From a 
budgetary perspective, it is instructive to take a closer look at this period, by separating out 
three different time intervals: the favourable 1997-2000 period, the weak 2001-2003 period 
and the again better 2004-2005 period.  
 
 
                                                 
12 See the Swedish National Audit Office (2006).   309
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Between 1997 and 2000, average GDP growth was 3.7 per cent per year and the 
output gaps were positive in the end of this period. Net lending increased and was usually 
better than budgeted as the economic upswing, in particular in 2000, were substantially more 
powerful than expected, leading to higher revenues and lower expenditures. The central 
government expenditure to GDP ratio fell by 3.6 per cent of GDP between 1997 and 2000 and 
reached 32.3 per cent (see Table 1). As several transfers in the Swedish system are indexed to 
inflation, low inflation mitigated the pressure on the ceilings. This development was also 
reinforced by the declining unemployment. However, at the same time, the budget margins 
(reserved for cyclical effects on the budget in “bad times”) were more or less fully used up 
due to permanent increases in non-cyclical expenditures.  
Overall, during this period, the expenditure ceilings provided strict limits for total 
expenditures pre-venting an extended pro-cyclical policy on the expenditure side of the 
budget. Significant temporary increases in tax revenue from capital incomes, over and beyond 
what is captured by the standard budget elasticities used for calculating the CABs, did also 
contribute to an estimated restrictive fiscal stance during this period.    
At the same time, the budget margins were used to new permanent expenditure 
reforms, leading to some pro-cyclicality and the failure of preserving budget margins for the 
subsequent weaker period.  
The cycle peaked in late 2000. Export demand decreased in 2001 following the dip in 
the world economy. Stock exchange prices fell dramatically and the IT bubble cracked. GDP   310
growth was well below potential rates as domestic demand developed weakly. In this 
unexpected weak economic situation, the general government net lending deteriorated from 
approximately plus 5 per cent of GDP to just around balance. A significant part of the 
deterioration was however caused by discretionary fiscal policy measures, non-related to the 
economic down-turn. The budgetary stance in 2001 and especially in 2002 (the election year) 
was quite expansionary including both significant tax cuts and increased expenditure. Major 
expenditure increases were directed towards increased child allowances, education and 
research and to health care, schools and social services, the latter by increased grants to local 
governments. Most of this expenditure increases must be seen as permanent measures. Like 
the pre-ceding period, the budgetary costs for illness and also early retirements grow rapidly.  
While the pressure on the ceilings for cyclical reasons was not that hard in 2001, it 
was more so in 2002 and grew stronger in the two successive years (see Table 1), reflecting 
the lagged reversal effect on the expenditures due to the low inflation in earlier years and that 
unemployment increased late in the slowdown. Summing up, due to the earlier “up-eaten” 
budget margins for 2002 and 2003 there was no room for contra-cyclical fiscal policy. The 
expansionary policy during these years, although working contra-cyclically, was mainly a 
result of “permanent” reforms. 
During 2004-2005, the economic conditions improved significantly, characterised by 
high productivity growth and a strong export demand. Labour market conditions, however, 
did not improve in line with the cycle. The fiscal stance was restrictive over this period 
mainly explained by positive surprises on the revenue side, in particular due to temporary 
increases in corporate tax revenues. Disregarding this, the budget improved less given the low 
tax content of the export-driven growth and weak labour market developments. The pressure 
of the ceilings remained relatively strong as costs for illness still were high. Additional 
measures were taken rather on the revenue side, although to a limited extent. 
Overall one could conclude that the expenditure ceilings have been successful in 
preventing an extensive pro-cyclical policy on the expenditure side of the budget. However, 
the budget margins have to some extent been used in a pro-cyclical way and the ceilings have, 
although to a limited extent, been circumvented by tax expenditures.    
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3.2 The surplus target 
The actual net lending 2000-2005 
As noted above, a problem when assessing to what extent actual budget positions or budget 
plans are in compliance with the surplus target “on average over the cycle”, is that there is no 
method within the framework for calibrating “the cycle” and measuring surpluses against it. 
The lack of an agreed method makes an assessment of compliance unclear. Nor is it clear how 
on average” should be understood. The surplus target, as it is defined from 2000, can of 
course be evaluated ex post by calculating the general government sector’s annual net lending 
for a whole business cycle. If net lending is 2 per cent on average over the cycle, the surplus 
target has been met. During the period 2000-2005, net lending averaged 1.9 per cent (see 
Table 2). Assuming that this period covers a whole business cycle – an issue we will come 
back to – one could conclude that the surplus target roughly has been met.  
Since 2000 – except for 2001 when the distribution of general government net lending 
was affected by large transfers between the old-age pension system and the central 
government due to the change in the pension system – the old-age pension system has 
accounted for the main surplus in the general public sector.  As regards the distribution of net 
lending between the different sub-sectors, it should also be noted that the local public sector 
has been able to stick to the local government balance requirement partly due to that it has 
received additional grants from the central government at the price of a lower central 
government net lending. Expansionary measures in the central government budget, for 
example, reduction of labour income taxes, have also contributed  to a low (and for some 
years negative) central government net lending. 
 
Table 2: General government net lending, 2000-2005 
Per cent of GDP  
    2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
    
Average 
General government  5.0% 2.6% -0.5% -0.2% 1.6% 2.8% 1.9%
o f   w h i c h          
Central government  2.6%  0.6% -1.8% -1.8% -0.5% 0.4%  -0.1%
Local public sector  0.2%  -0.2% -0.5% -0.2% 0.2%  0.5%  0.0%
Old-age pension system  2.2%  2.3% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 2.0%
 
Note: In 2001 there was a 155 bn SEK (6.8% of GDP) one-off transfer of funds from the pension system to the 
central government. The figures in the table have been adjusted for this one-off transfer. 
Source: Statistics Sweden and own calculations.   312
The cyclically adjusted budget balance 
Since the period 2000-2005 is not likely to cover an entire business cycle, it is difficult to 
determine whether the obtained general government net lending during this period has been 
consistent with the surplus target. A measure of the cyclically adjusted budget balance (the 
CAB) provides an indicator to which extent the budget position in an individual year is in line 
with the target. However, in practice there are several methods to be used to calculate the 
CAB and there is among the relevant institutions in Sweden no consensus on which method to 
be used; or rather there is no (open) discussion about it at all. The Ministry of Finance (MoF), 
the National Institute of Economic Research (NIER) and the Riksbank use different methods 
to calculate the CAB. In Appendix A these different methods are described in detail and we 
will here only give a brief description of them:  
The MoF calculates the CAB with an aggregate GDP-gap and budget elasticity, thus 
not taking into account composition effects.
13 To estimate the GDP gap for the individual 
years during the forecast period, the MoF usually assumes that the GDP gap is to be closed in 
the end of the forecast period (i.e. three years ahead). The budget elasticity is assumed to be 
0.7. In principle, the Commission uses the same approach. However, the Commission 
estimates the output gap using the commonly agreed production function approach in 
combination with an aggregate budgetary elasticity estimated on the basis of calculations 
made by the OECD (close to 0.6, see Commission, 2004) .  
The Riksbank uses different methods to calculate the CAB but does not publish the 
results on a regularly basis. Here we will refer only to the method used by the Riksbank in the 
cooperation within the European System of Central Banks (the ESCB method). The ESCB 
method takes into account composition effects by de-trending tax- and expenditure bases 
rather than only the GDP and by making use of several tax- and expenditure elasticities rather 
than an aggregate budget elasticity. No explicit measure of the GDP-gap is used.  The method 
used by the NIER takes into account composition effects similarly to the ESCB-method (by 
de-trending the tax bases to GDP-ratios), but makes also use of an explicit measure of the 
GDP-gap and a measure of the cyclical component of unemployment.   
 
                                                 
13 See Appendix A for an explanation of what is meant by composition effects.   313
Table 3: Cyclically adjusted budget balances obtained by different methods 
Per cent of GDP 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005     Average
ESCB 2,3 0,7 -1,3 0,0 2,4 3,6 1,3
MoF 1,8 2,1 -0,1 1,0 1,9 2,7 1,6
NIER 3,9 2,5 0,4 1,3 2,9 3,6 2,4
COM 3.8 2.3 0.0 0.8 1.9 3.0 2.0  
Sources: The Riksbank (October 2006), NIER (Swedish Economy, August 2006), the Ministry of Finance (2007 
Budget Bill), European Commission (Autumn forecast 2006). 
 
Table 3 provides, for the years 2000-2005, CABs as obtained by those different 
methods, including also the most recent figures by the Commission.
14 No matter of the 
method used, the results indicate that the surplus target has not been respected all years during 
this period; however, this conclusion should be drawn with the reservation that the CAB, due 
to estimation problems, usually has a tendency to co-vary with the GDP.
15 The measure used 
by the MoF indicates that the surplus on average has been slightly undershot during this 
period, while the indicator used by the NIER states that it has been somewhat overshot. The 
indicator used by the Riksbank (the ESCB) states that the target on average has been 
undershot significantly. The Commission measure indicates that the net lending on average 
has been right on target.  As can been seen, the differences in results between the different 
indicators are substantial for some years. The indicator used by the Riksbank (the ESCB) 
provides a cyclically adjusted budget balance for 2001-2003 that is about 1 per cent lower 
than what the other indicators show.
16 If nothing else, this clearly shows the sensitivity to the 
choice of method used to assess compliance.  
 
Ex ante evaluation of the surplus target and the annual targets for net lending
17 
 
The Swedish surplus target, as presently defined, does not preclude the use of an asymmetric 
fiscal policy. The target can be met even with small surpluses when times are good, but fiscal 
policy would then have to be contractive during economic downturns. However, such a policy 
works pro-cyclically and will not contribute to an appropriate fiscal and monetary mix in 
terms of stabilisation policy. Obviously, the Swedish government aimed to avoid a pro-
                                                 
14 The figures obtained by the ESCB-method are not to be regarded as the Riksbank’s official ones. 
15 See, for example, Boije (2004) for explanations to why the CAB usually has a tendency to co-vary with the 
GDP. 
16 In the comparison we have ignored potential differences in the treatment of one-off and temporary effects.   314
cyclical fiscal policy using the medium-term objective and some measure of the automatic 
stabilisers, to define yearly targets for the budget balance (see section 2.2). Rather than 
translating this view into a formal rule determining targets for the annual budget balances, the 
government instead chose to refer to the use of the nominal expenditure ceiling for the central 
government as a means of supporting a symmetric fiscal policy. However, the government has 
deviated from those intentions. The 2005 budget bill (presented in September 2004), for 
example, provides clear evidence on this (equally apparent in other budget bills). Given the 
forecast of the automatic stabilisers and the annual budget balance as provided by the Swedish 
government in the 2005 Budget Bill, Table 4 shows the difference between the expected 
actual budget balances and those that would have been required if they had to be determined 
by the medium term objective adjusted for the effect of the automatic stabilisers. As a 
benchmark, the annual required budget balance can be calculated as: 
 
(2)        ( ) ( )
* * arg 7 . 0 2 Y Y Y S
et t − + = .  
 
where “2” is the surplus target and “0.7” is the budget elasticity used by the government.  
 
Table 4.  A comparison of required and expected budget balance in the 2005 Budget Bill 
Per cent of GDP 
2004 2005 2006 2007
(1) Budget balance 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.9
(2) GDP gap -1.3 -0.5 -0.2 0.0
(3) Automatic stabilisers -0.9 -0.4 -0.1 0.0
(4) Annual target for budget balance (strictly 
required by the surplus target)
1.1 1.6 1.9 2.0
(5) Annual target actually set up 0.5
(6) Under/overshooting, (1)–(4) -0.4 -1.0 -1.5 -1.1
Sources: 2005 Budget Bill, Swedish Ministry of Finance, and own calculations.  
 
 
 In the 2005 Budget Bill the government decided that the target for the annual balance target 
for 2005 was to be 0.5 per cent of GDP. No targets were set up for the following years. The 
output gap for 2005 was, at the same time, estimated at -0.5 per cent of GDP. A proper 
application of the surplus target should instead have resulted in an annual budget balance 
target of 1.6 per cent for 2005 (2+0.7 (-0.5))=1.6), provided that no discretionary stabilisation 
policy measures were (and needed to be) taken. For each year during the relevant forecast 
                                                                                                                                                          
17 This section follows Boije (2005).   315
period the predicted net lending would, ex ante, have been missed for every year. The 
government must have been aware that the forecasts of the annual budget balances were not in 
line with the medium-term objective. The government’s ex-post defence has been that a 
labour market upswing has been delayed despite strong GDP growth and that this has 
motivated some discretionary stabilisation measures which weakened the actual and the 
cyclically adjusted budget balances. A closer look at the reforms in the latter years indicates, 
however, that most of them, for example, the reduced labour income taxes, are intended to be 
permanent and hence cannot be regarded as stabilisation policy measures. One explanation for 
the ex-ante non-adherence to the medium-term objective is rather that the government has 
circumvented the expenditure ceiling by introducing new tax expenditures, as we argued 
earlier.
18 A further sign of this is that the government’s own forecast in the Budget Bill for 
2005 showed that the surplus would not reach 2 per cent of GDP even when the GDP-gap 
(and also the unemployment gap) was expected to be closed in 2007. One conclusion of this is 
that the surplus target has not been seen as a binding ex ante restriction. However, ex post, net 
lending outcomes have been shown to be better than expected ex ante, mainly due to positive 
surprises on the revenue side of the budget. Overall, this illustrates that there has been a lower 
degree of political ownership of the surplus objective compared to the expenditure ceilings.  
 
3.3 The local government balance requirement 
 
Fulfilment of balance requirement 
 
Table 5 shows the local government finances between 1997 and 2005.  We have here chosen 
to report national account figures rather than the net budget results, providing a better link to 
the overall medium term surplus objective. The national account figures give broadly the 
same messages and differ normally only marginally to the net budget results. On this basis, 
over the 2000-2005 period, the average budget balance at the local level has been zero, overall 
in line with the balance requirement.  
However, some qualifications are warranted. First, over the 2001-2003 period, the net 
lending showed deficits. In 2002, the deficit was even rather substantial considering the 
requirement of balance. The main reasons behind this development will be discussed further 
below, suffice to say that initially the main driver behind the deficits was high consumption 
                                                 
18 See also Boije (2002 and 2005) and Fischer (2005).   316
growth and weakening tax bases. This period was followed by a consolidation period where 
efforts were made to control expenditures while tax rates and central government grants were 
increased. Clearly, in recent years the situation has improved substantially and also the 
outlook is beneficial. Overall, the balance requirement did not stop deficits to develop but it 
has forced an ensuing period of consolidation.  
 
Table 5. Local government finances 
Per cent of GDP 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005 
Revenue  22.1 23.4 23.0 22.2 22.6 23.0 23.4 23.0  23.5 
Taxes    15.4 15.4 15.4 15.2 15.7 16.0 16.4 16.3  16.2 
Central  government  grants  4.3 5.5 5.3 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.7  5.2 
Other  2.5 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0  2.0 
           
Expenditure  22.6 23.2 22.9 22.0 22.8 23.6 23.6 22.8  22.9 
Consumption    18.4 19.3 19.1 18.6 19.2 19.9 20.1 19.7  19.7 
Other  4.2 3.9 3.8 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.1  3.2 
           
Net  lending  -0.5 0.2 0.1 0.2  -0.2  -0.5  -0.2 0.2  0.5 
Source: MoF and own calculations 
 
A second issue to mention is the great disparity of performance across municipalities 
and County Councils. Firstly, while the municipalities as a whole has shown a surplus over 
the entire period (even though in 2002-2004 not in line with the 2 per cent of revenue surplus 
benchmark), County Councils have continuously been in deficit except for 2005 (which was 
the first time in surplus since 1992!). The main bulk of the local tax increases has come from 
County Councils. Secondly, while the municipalities as a group has been close to balance or 
shown surpluses, many individual municipalities have been in financial trouble. For example, 
in 2003, 40 per cent of the 290 municipalities showed a deficit. However, in 2005 only 17 
municipalities and 3 County Councils (of 20) showed deficits (SKL 2006).  
 
 
Pro-cyclical policies and implicit bail-out commitment by the central government 
 
Table 6 shows growth patterns in local government expenditures and revenues over the 2000-
2005 period. In 2000 (in fact over the 1998-2000 period), tax bases grew relatively strongly in 
line with overall growth and employment. At the same time central government transfers 
increased. Backed by the strong growth in revenues, local government activity expanded and   317
real consumption increased by 2 per cent on average over the 1998-2002 period. In 2002, 
consumption growth was particularly strong and the sector recorded a large net lending 
deficit. Hence, in 2003, a year of weak GDP growth and falling employment in the economy 
as a whole, measures were taken to curb the growth in consumption while at the same time 
tax rates were increased by 0.65 percentage points. 
 
Table 6. Local government finances: revenue and expenditure dynamics 
bn  SEK  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Taxes and central government grants  420 444 466 494 510 539 
Change,  %  6.0 5.7 5.0 6.0 3.2 5.7 
Tax  revenues,  adjusted  for  rules  6.5 5.9 4.4 4.7 4.2 3.5 
Tax  base  6.3 5.4 4.3 2.4 3.0 3.2 
Tax  rate  changes  0.2 0.5 0.1 2.3 1.1 0.3 
Central government grants  4.3  4.8  7.8  11.4  -0.8  16.3 
Contribution  to  income  growth  -0.5 -0.2 0.6 1.3 -0.9 2.3 
        
Consumption  411 438 471 495 507 527 
Change,  %  2.5 6.6 7.5 5.2 2.4 3.9 
Price  3.0 4.5 5.4 4.8 1.8 2.3 
Volume  -0.5 1.9 2.0 0.4 0.5 1.6 
        
Net lending, % of GDP  0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 0.2  0.5 
        
GDP  growth,  nominal  5.8 3.2 3.6 3.7 4.6 3.9 
Source: MoF and own calculations 
 
In 2004, the measures to curb the growth in consumption had an increased effect as 
mirrored by a negative local government employment growth. Even so, tax rates had to be 
raised again, this time by an additional 0.34 percentage points. The yearly increase in central 
government grants merely followed nominal GDP growth. Nevertheless, in 2004, the sector 
showed a surplus again, partially explained by an increased sale of real estate. In the 2005 
budget bill, the central government significantly increased the transfers to the communities 
(also by giving them tax reductions defined as expenditures in the National Accounts) with 
the aim to support employment. To some extent these “transfers” were instead used to 
consolidation which reduced the need for further tax increases in the local public sector.  
Summing up, thanks to the local government balance requirement, the financial 
situation of the local governments as a whole seems to be under control. However, the balance 
requirement has not prevented pro-cyclical budget policies. When income growth has been 
favourably for cyclical reasons, expenditures have been increased. Consequently, when 
economic conditions thereafter have deteriorated, it has been necessary to cut consumption 
(and employment) and increase taxes. In addition, there is evidence of strategic budgeting   318
whereby local governments have handled the ex ante dimension of the balance requirement by 
showing up overoptimistic budgets (SOU 2001:76), thereby partially avoiding necessary 
expenditure cuts or tax increases.   
Given the key role of local governments to provide general public services (also 
regulated by law) it is clear that financial problems quickly feed through to the central 
government. As central government only allocates annual grants to the municipalities on a 
discretionary basis, as opposed to following an automatic index formula, questions have been 
raised on the impact for effective planning at local level. The purpose with the discretionary 
decisions is to put pressure on local authorities to plan cautiously. On the other hand it makes 
planning more difficult at local level while in reality the general transfers have been raised to 
cover for increases in prices and wages. In addition, as pointed out earlier, the central 
government has supported local governments in times of financial pressure. This implicit bail-
out commitment by the central government creates incentives for the local governments to set 
spending at the limit, leading to expansionary pro-cyclical policies in good times, when 
revenue growth is healthy, and to rely on additional central government transfers in bad times. 
This problem of moral hazard may call for a tighter rule but, as in the case of EU, there is a 
limit to the restrictions that higher levels of governments can impose on lower levels while at 
the same time respecting their independence




4. Priorities for reform 
 
4.1 The expenditure ceilings 
 
Principles for determining the level of the expenditure ceiling 
 
As we argued in section 3.1 there are two main drawbacks by letting the expenditure ceiling 
be determined as a fixed share of potential nominal GDP.
20 Firstly, there is no clear link 
between the expenditure ceiling and the medium-term surplus target, which also means that 
the expenditure ceiling can be circumvented, once it has been set, by replacing new 
expenditures with analogous tax reductions. Secondly, it does not take into account structural 
                                                 
19 In the EU, the no-bail-out clause included in the Treaty is aimed at mitigating this type of moral hazard. 
20 According to the new government’s assessment, the expenditure ceiling as percentage of potential GDP will 
decrease somewhat over the next few years. However, they still link the expenditure ceiling to potential GDP.   319
changes of the tax bases caused by for example demographic factors. How can those 
drawbacks be avoided?  
Let us assume that the municipalities stick to the local government balance 
requirement and that the surplus is obtained in the old-age pension system. Given this, a 
reasonable minimum requirement is that the expenditure ceiling is set in such away that it 
contributes to that the central government’s cyclically adjusted budget balance is close to 
balance each year. The first drawback, as mentioned above, can then be avoided by letting the 
expenditure ceiling be determined by predicted tax revenue (R) adjusted for the cycle.
21 This 
can formally be expressed as
22 
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where BM is the budget margin. 
If the GDP-gap in the forecast of the MoF always is assumed to be closed t+3 (which, 
so far, often has been the case), no adjustment for the cycle is necessary. Such a formulation 
of the expenditure ceiling would eliminate incentives to circumvent the expenditure ceiling by 
planned tax reductions/tax expenditures. Of course, it would not prevent the ceiling to be 
circumvented by non-planned tax reductions, if it is not decided that such tax decreases 
should lead to a downward reduction of the ceiling. However, then some would argue that it 
also should be possible to raise taxes to be able to increase expenditures which of course 
would undermine such a rule. Another, solution would be to adjust the ceiling in case new tax 
expenditures are introduced. See the discussion below. 
The second drawback could be avoided by extending this “rule”, letting the ceiling be 
determined by a demographically contingent forecast of tax revenue (R): 
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where D is a vector of demographic variables. Such a formulation of the expenditure ceiling 
“guarantees” that tax rates do not have to be adjusted due to demographic factors.  
                                                 
21 We have here ignored that the ceiling doesn’t cover all central government expenditure. 
22 We have here ignored that the expenditure under the ceiling is accounted for in cash terms while the net 
lending target is defined in national account terms.   320
The experience is that the local governments have been able to stick to the local 
government balance requirement partly due to that they have received additional grants from 
the central government. Given this, one could think about including a “bail out margin” under 
the expenditure ceiling. However, this would create incentives for the municipalities not to 
stick to the balance requirement. 
 
Integrating tax expenditures into the budget process
23 
 
In section 3.1 we argued that the expenditure ceilings have been circumvented by tax 
measures taken that in the National Accounts are defined as expenditures. However, there are 
also other types of tax expenditures. In Sweden, tax expenditure calculations have been 
presented in an appendix to the annual spring budget proposals since the spring of 1996. The 
spending departments also indicate in the autumn budget bill, based on the calculations in the 
spring budget bill, the tax expenditures that are linked to the expenditure area in question and 
if new tax expenditures will arise on account of the proposals presented in the budget.  
In this reporting, a tax benefit or tax expenditure is the result of levying tax at a 
reduced rate in relation to a particular tax norm. In order to identify a tax expenditure, 
therefore, the actual tax rate charged (the existing tax system) must be compared with the 
chosen norm.  The norm that is used for the Swedish government’s tax expenditure 
calculations is based primarily on the principle of uniform taxation of economic activities of 
similar types.
24  This norm means, for example, that all types of income shall be taxed 
according to uniform principles, and that all consumption of goods and services shall be 
subject to the same level of VAT.  A departure from a uniform tax charge is perceived to be a 
tax benefit if a particular category of tax-payers enjoys some form of tax relief in relation to 
the norm
25.  
These tax expenditures are reported by tax area and, in those cases where the tax 
expenditure is obviously linked to an expenditure area, to that expenditure area. For example, 
carbon dioxide tax is not levied on domestic flights. The civil aviation sector thus enjoys a tax 
                                                 
23 This section follows Boije (2002). 
24The principle of uniformity was one of the keystones of the 1990/91 tax reform.  
25 A couple of examples can serve to illustrate this point: (i) The standard rate of VAT in Sweden is assumed to 
be 25 per cent. The reduction in VAT on food from 25 per cent to 12 per cent is therefore treated as a tax benefit 
in the government’s tax expenditure calculations. (ii) According to the norm, all income from capital shall be 
taxed at the same general rate of 30 per cent. However, income from private pension schemes is taxed at the 
lower rate of 15 per cent. Individuals who save through such private pension schemes thus enjoy a tax benefit.   321
benefit, which is stated under the tax area “Excise duties” and under expenditure area 22 
(Transport and communications).  
The tax expenditure reporting currently has no formal importance in the budget 
process. In contrast to spending proposals, tax reduction proposals are neither subject to a 
limit nor to the same type of careful scrutiny within the budget process as spending proposals. 
The current purpose of the government’s tax expenditure report is instead to clarify 
departures, if any, from the principle of uniformity applied to the tax system; another is to 
highlight any tax benefits that are directly comparable to transfer payments on the expenditure 
side of the budget.  
One proposal that has been discussed, in the light of the latter purpose of the tax 
expenditure reporting, is to integrate the tax expenditures in the budget process: tax reductions 
that can be regarded as benefits, i.e. support that could equally well have taken the form of a 
transfer payment, should always trigger a reduction of the expenditure ceiling. Such a budget 
rule would entirely remove any incentive to circumvent the expenditure ceiling by proposing 
tax expenditures instead of new transfers. A rule for the expenditure ceiling, like equation (3), 
would automatically take care of this. However, this wouldn’t mean that tax expenditure 
calculations are unnecessary to report. On the contrary, a transparent reporting of tax 
expenditures and their purpose would promote a more informed discussion of the revenue side 
of the budget and fiscal policy priorities.
26 Our recommendation is therefore that the 
government fully reports the purpose of all tax expenditures, which is not the case today. 
 
 
How to protect the budgeting margin to be used for new expenditure reforms? 
 
The analyses in section 3.1 showed that the expenditure ceilings have worked well overall to 
restrict central government expenditures, also leading to a gradual decline in the share of 
expenditures to GDP. However, the budget margins, which should mainly cover for 
unforeseen swings in expenditures, have to a large extent been used for permanent 
expenditure reforms. This has gradually eroded the margins; often well before the actual 
budget year. The small budget margins have promoted the use of creative accounting 
measures and resulted in new tax expenditures. Even if the appropriate size and the use of the 
                                                 
26 It should be noted that there are some technical problems with calculating tax expenditures and also when 
linking them to a relevant expenditure area. See Boije (2002).    322
budget margin are not regulated by law, it is our interpretation that the system has not been 
applied as intended.  
The key problem seems to be the lack of clear principles for how the budget margins 
are to be used. The committee dealing with stabilisation policy issues in case of a Swedish 
EMU membership (see the report SOU 2002:16) discussed these issues. They argued that the 
margins, ex ante, must be sufficiently large to handle the general uncertainty in forecasts as 
well as the automatic stabilisers and the possible need for additional discretionary stabilisation 
policy measures. They also argued that there should be two separate margins; a “cyclical 
margin” and a “planning margin”. The “cyclical margin” is to be used for automatic 
stabilisers and discretionary stabilisation policy measures including labour market measures. 
The "planning margin" is to bed used for expenditure reforms. This margin should also 
encompass structural changes in expenditures, for example related to absenteeism from work 
due to illness. It could therefore also be negative, that is, require expenditure reductions. 
There is of course a trade off between allowing enough degrees of freedom for policy 
makers while at the same time supporting transparency and accountability. Nevertheless, 
dividing the budget margin in a cyclical part and planning part would clearly be a step in the 
right direction, since it in a transparent way would clarify the need of a cyclical buffer and the 
existing room for permanent reforms. To avoid an asymmetric use of the cyclical margin, it 
could be formulated in terms of a "buffer fund" where cyclically motivated withdrawals of the 
fund should be compensated for in a better phase of the cycle.  
 
4.2 The surplus target
27 
 
As we illustrated in section 3.2, the medium term surplus target has not been seen as a binding 
ex ante restriction on fiscal policy. The application has not prevented the use of a pro-cyclical 
policy, for example that the expenditure ceiling is circumvented by the introduction of new 
tax expenditures when revenues grow faster than expected. Due to this, one may ask how the 
application of the target can be improved. It seems particularly important to translate the 
medium-term target into proper annual restrictions on the fiscal policy. As stated by the 
government (see the earlier quotation in section 3.2), this was also the original ambition when 
the surplus target was introduced, but obviously the annual targets set up have not been 
consistent with the original ambition.  
                                                 
27 This section follows Boije (2005).   323
Given a predetermined medium-term target, the appropriate targets for the annual 
actual budget balance should be set with reference to the cyclical state of the economy. This 
can roughly be done trough some measure of the GDP-gap, or alternatively by identifying the 
type of chock that hits the economy, possibly also be taking into account the composition of 
different tax- and expenditure bases. To simplify things, we have here chosen to discuss the 
appropriate link between the medium term objective and the annual net lending targets only in 
terms of the GDP-gap. The principle will be the same using some of the other mentioned 
approaches. The appropriate link can then formally be expressed as  
 











b β θ  where  0 > β . 
where b is the actual budget balance,β is the budget elasticity assumed to capture the effects 
on the budget balance of the automatic stabilisers (but not discretionary measures), ( )
* Y Y −  is 
the output gap and θ  denotes the medium-term objective.
28 That is, the actual budget balance 
must be equal to the medium-term objective plus the budget elasticity times the output gap. 
This equation is just a generalisation of equation (2). The equation thus indicates what each 
year’s ideal budget balance should be to satisfy the medium-term objective and avoid a pro-
cyclical fiscal policy. Of course, this rule is equivalent to stating that the cyclically adjusted 
budget balance, as measured by the MoF (se Appendix A), each year should match the 
medium-term objective. However, pedagogic and budget transparency reasons as well as 
communication aspects speak in favour of translating the medium-term objective into yearly 
targets for the annual actual budget balance, rather than into a target for the cyclically 
adjusted budget balance.
29  
As the rule is defined by expression (5), fiscal stabilisation depends entirely on the 
symmetric work of the automatic stabilisers (under the assumption that the budget elasticity 
only captures the effects of the automatic stabilisers). Thus, it does not admit discretionary 
fiscal stabilisation policy. In case of large real disturbances (leading to substantial GDP-gaps) 
not handled by monetary policy and the automatic stabilisers, it might be necessary to take 
some fiscal stabilisation policy measures. In that case, one should accept temporary deviations 
                                                 
28 In practice, it can be hard to econometrically distinguish between automatic stabilisers and discretionary 
stabilisation policy measures.  
29 Worth noting is that Chile, some years ago, introduced a medium-term objective defined directly in terms of a 
cyclically adjusted budget balance and that the experiences so far are very good. It should, however, be noticed 
that a politically independent body, in practice, determines the cyclically adjusted budget balance.   324
from the medium-term objective (in line with the argumentation in section 2.2). Such 
measures, however, must be accounted for in a transparent way.
30 
Some might argue that a budget rule based on an uncertain and unobservable variable 
such as the output gap should be avoided. This does also apply for our suggested principle for 
how the expenditure ceiling can be determined unless the GDP-gap always is assumed to be 
closed t+3 (see section 4.1). However, solving the asymmetry problem by applying budget 
principles with no link at all to the cyclical state of the economy seems to be difficult. The 
alternative approach based on identifying the type of chock that hits the economy and taking 
into account composition effects would also entail a great deal of uncertainty. If governments 
have to adhere to a properly defined medium-term objective at the same time as they should 
avoid a pro-cyclical fiscal policy, they obviously need to have some idea about the economy’s 
cyclical position. However, since such measures entail uncertainty, the rule should not be too 
strict. Perhaps one should therefore talk about these rules as “budget principles” or “budget 
devices” rather than strict rules.
31 The value of such principles lies in the first place in their 
use as a preventive tool. If they are well established, understood by the public and properly 
evaluated – perhaps by a politically independent fiscal body – they should serve in the first 
place to exert “peer pressure”.  
 
How to treat slippages from the target 
There are some other practical issues connected with a rule requiring precise targets for the 
actual budget balance, besides that of the uncertainty of measuring the cyclical position. Even 
if the government does everything it can to adhere to the rule, there might be circumstances 
beyond its control that lead to the yearly required budget balance being missed. One such 
situation arises if the outcome of the output gap (or the idendified ex post chock) deviates 
from the predicted gap (or the ex ante chock). This must, of course, be taken into account in 
the ex post evaluation of target fulfilment. Provided the forecasts are unbiased, the 
calculations are transparent and there is an open evaluation of target fulfilment, such an ex 
post clause should not provide scope for undetected manipulation of the rule.  
                                                 
30 The rule could be extended by taking into account composition effects and the need of discretionary 
stabilisation policy measures. See Boije (2005). 
31 In the monetary policy literature a rule determines for example the appropriate choice of the key interest rate 
given a specific objective, where it is assumed that the key interest rate is fully controllable by the central bank. 
This applies for example to the Taylor rule. In the fiscal policy literature the term rule is used in a broader sense 
as it does not only refer to a rule for discretionary fiscal policy but also to restrictions on fiscal policy in general, 
such as expenditure ceilings.    325
Another relevant question is how the rule should be applied if, due to forecasting 
errors, the government during a boom runs higher surpluses than the rule requires. Some 
would argue that the government should then be allowed to run somewhat lower surpluses 
than required by the rule during the following economic downturn. However, since the 
forecasts for the coming years are also uncertain, such a strategy would probably not be 
optimal. Instead, it would increase the risk of the target not being met at all. If forecasts are 
unbiased, positive and negative random forecasting errors will cancel out over time. Thus, 
unconscious forecasting errors that cannot be compensated for during the ongoing budget year 
should be treated as bygones.    
  A relevant question in this context is what the government should be required to do if 
it  consciously deviates from the annual net lending target and the medium-term surplus 
objective; a question that also has been in focus within the discussion of the SGP. Within the 
new SGP, a clear difference is made as to what extent slippage is due to economic events 
outside the control of the government and to what extent it is due to policy while in the latter 
case there is really no excuse. The Council has also agreed that that EMU countries that have 
not reached close-to-balance positions should take measures that annually improve the 
structural budget balance with 0.5 per cent of GDP.
32 A similar adjustment factor could, in 
principle, be included in a rule determining annual targets for the net lending. However, under 
certain circumstances it may contribute to a pro-cyclical fiscal policy. This, however, seems 
to be a small cost compared to the cost of unsustainable public finances. Furthermore, in the 
Swedish case with a national independent monetary policy, this potential cost of pro-
cyclicality could, in principle, be limited by an accommodating monetary policy (depending, 
of course, on the other monetary policy considerations).  
 
On the choice of the optimal level of the surplus target 
As indicated in section 2, one reason given for maintaining a 2 per cent over the cycle surplus 
is the need to run surpluses up until 2015 when the impact of ageing becomes more severe. 
However, there is no precise argumentation for why 2 per cent is more optimal than other 
options. Anecdotal evidence suggest that when the objective was set it was agreed that a 
surplus was necessary but that the precise figure of 2 per cent rather reflects that it is 
                                                 
32 The structural budget balance is here defined as the cyclically adjusted budget balance, net of temporary 
effects and one-off measures.    326
consistent with balance at central and local government level and a 2 per cent surplus in the 
pension system. However, some developments require a second look at the chosen level. 
Firstly, following a Eurostat decision, funded pensions schemes have, from March 
2007, to be classified outside the general government sector in the national accounts. For 
Sweden this means that the premium pension fund part of the pension system will not 
contribute anymore to the general government surplus. The premium pension fund, which is 
currently building up, will run annual surpluses of about 1 to 1.2 per cent of GDP. One option 
then would be to keep the "ambition constant" and aim for a pure "technical revision" of the 
surplus objective implying a downward revision from 2 per cent to about 1 per cent of GDP. 
Another option would be simply to keep the 2 per cent objective which implicitly would entail 
an “increased ambition”. A third option, would be to keep the relevant surplus figure defined 
in terms of ESA 95 net lending plus the net lending in the premium pension fund of the 
pension system, although it probably would create some confusion. 
The issue will become slightly more complex when the impact of ageing gradually 
starts to feed through into net lending outcomes. Figure 3 below shows the Swedish budget 
position between 2005 and 2015 as predicted in the 2005 Swedish Convergence Programme 
(the premium pension fund part has been netted out so only the pay-as-you-go part (ATP) is 
in the general government). It is implicitly assumed in the figure that for the years up to 2015 
the surplus objective is continuously achieved via a residual on the revenue side.  
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The net lending in the pension system is expected to go from almost +1 per cent of 
GDP currently to a deficit of 0.2 per cent in 2015. From this follows that if the current surplus 
objective is left intact up to 2015, a substantial tightening of the central government balance is 
required to compensate. This carries the implicit risk of having to run pro-cyclical polices. 
Also, if such a tightening of the central government budget to compensate does not take place 
when needed, a time-inconsistency problem may build up over time leading to a loss of 
credibility of the framework. This gradual weakening in the ATP net lending is an argument 
for defining the surplus objective only in terms of net lending for the central government and 
the local public sector (whatever the level of “ambition” chosen). The 1999 pension reform 
made in principle the pension system actuarially neutral which is an argument for not 
compensating the gradual weakening in the pension system via a tightening stance in the 
central government budget.   
   
 
 
4.3 The local government balance requirement 
 
As was shown in section 3.3, the local government balance requirement has on the one hand 
worked well in keeping overall local government finances at a good track while it has not 
been able to prevent a pro-cyclical policy in terms of expansionary expenditure reforms in 
good times compensated by necessary tax increases in bad times. There are also signs of 
strategic behaviour by local governments, being over-optimistic ex ante counting on 
additional support from the central government ex post. This calls for improvements of the 
framework. However, measures to deal with these problems must be weighed against the 
tradition of local government independence. In any case, reforms with a view to reduce the 
incentives for pro-cyclical policies seem to be warranted. 
In the debate a number of proposals going in this direction have already been 
presented. In the government report SOU 2001:76 on local government finances it was 
proposed that 4-year plans should be made covering the political mandate period and that the 
budget should be balanced on average over this period but with a possibility to budget for 
deficits in specific years.
33 In the same report, it was also proposed that it should be easier to 
                                                 
33 The local government political cycle is the same as for central government with elections on the same day.   328
refer to "special reasons" in order to allow for planned budget deficits, examples being large 
restructuring costs or short term capital losses.  
Another governmental committee (see the report SOU 2002:16) however did not agree 
that local governments should be allowed to budget for deficits, except when substantial 
solidity had been build up as cyclical buffer. They proposed that cyclical swings in local 
government tax revenues could be smoothed by the central government, for example by 
letting the local government tax base be calculated on a five year average or by letting the size 
of the government grants be cyclically determined.
34 
The central organisation for local governments (Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting, 
SKL) argues for reforms that make it easier for local governments to plan in the medium term 
and would like to see indexing of central government grants (SKL, 2006). Also SOU 2002:16 
saw the discretionary decision process on central grants as a problem for planning at local 
level and saw also a risk that the discretionary procedure leads to repetitive negotiations 
between local and central authorities that in the end would risk diluting the financial 
responsibility at local level.  
Overall, we would argue that changes that booth smoothes revenues at local level and 
improve the medium term planning capacity should be looked at favourably. It would also 
seem useful to increase the incentives for good behaviour in good times by making it easier 
than it is today to set up "buffer funds" via surpluses that could be used to budget for deficits 
in difficult cyclical conditions.  
 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
It is our view that the rules-based budgetary framework in Sweden has kept its beauty and that 
it has served well in providing a culture of budgetary prudence and medium-term planning. 
The overall assessment of the Swedish national rules-based framework must be on a positive 
note given that: 
 
•  The expenditure ceilings have been met in all years since their introduction.  
•  The surplus objective has, depending on how compliance is assessed, been met ex 
post.  
                                                 
34 In Sweden, the local taxes are in a first step collected by the central government but is in a second step 
distributed to the local authorities.   329
•  The local government budget balances have been restored.  
•  Sweden is one of few EU-member countries that with a margin fully comply with the 
regulations in the SGP. 
 
One reason to its success is the critical surveillance of several national institutions and the 
relatively extensive media coverage. The memory of the fiscal crisis in the early 1990s has 
also contributed to this. 
However, our assessment point at some shortcomings of the framework. A common 
problem in all three parts of the framework has, contrary to intentions, been the difficulty of 
fully avoiding pro-cyclical expansionary policies in good times, leading to pressure for pro-
cyclical tightening policies in bad times. In particular: 
•  The expenditure ceilings have been circumvented by the use of tax expenditures when 
tax revenue has been favourable and by other accounting measures, not in line with the 
intentions of the Swedish Budget Act. 
•  The budget margin has been used for permanent expenditure increases (that have at 
occasions been pro-cyclical).  
•  To some extent, depending on how compliance is assessed, the surplus objective has 
not been met ex ante for a number of years.  
•  The expenditure ceiling proposals do not seem to have been compatible with the 
surplus objective given the revenue forecasts. 
•  The local government balance requirement has been under pressure in weak cyclical 
conditions forcing higher central government grants and pro-cyclical tax increases. At 
the same time, there has been little pressure in good times not to use cyclically high 
revenues for permanent expenditure increases.   
•  The motive for having the surplus target set to 2 per cent and for including the net 
lending of the old-age pension system is unclear.   
 
More generally, we have argued that the current framework gives to much space for arbitrary 
interpretations of the rules and that there are no clear guidelines for assessment. This may, to 
some extent, reduce the credibility of the framework. However, we acknowledge that there is 
a delicate balance problem; while rules, principles and guidelines should be clear and promote 
a sustainable and non pro-cyclical fiscal policy, they should not over identify fiscal policy but   330
leave enough degrees of freedom for policy makers to deal with the uncertainty of reality in 
real time. Having said this, we propose the following seven avenues for improvement: 
 
Expenditure ceiling 
1.  Clarify the principles for how the level of the expenditure ceilings is determined and 
include a direct link to the surplus objective. This requires a clearer link to the cyclical 
state of the economy and to the demographic development. 
2.  Integrate more formally tax expenditure calculations in the budget process. The 
minimum requirement is that the purposes of all tax expenditures are reported. 
3.  Make clear the principles for how the budget margins are to be set and used. 
 
Surplus objective 
4.  Clarify how the 2 per cent surplus objective is to be assessed and provide principles 
for action in case of slippages. A more transparent link between the medium-term 
surplus objective and the annual net lending targets, via some measure of the cyclical 
state of the economy, is warranted. The cyclical state of the economy could roughly be 
estimated by the GDP-gap or by more sophisticated methods used to identify the type 
of chock that hits the economy (including also the composition of different tax- and 
expenditure bases). 
5.  Strengthen credibility by explaining more clearly what the appropriate level is and 
what purpose it is to serve, possibly by relating it explicitly to the budgetary impact of 
the ageing of the population. 
6.  Think about reformulating the medium-term surplus target in terms of only central and 
local government net lending (thus, excluding, the net lending in the old-age pension 
system).  
 
Local government balance requirement 
7.  Reduce incentives for pro-cyclical policies by reformulating the balance requirement 
or by smoothing revenues over the cycle.  
 
Some of our suggestions require that a measure of the cyclical position of the economy 
explicitly is included in the rules, which perhaps some would think is arguable due to the 
significant measurement problems involved.  However, we have argued that applying budget 
principles with no link at all to the cyclical state of the economy seems to be unwarranted if   331
governments have to adhere to a properly defined medium-term objective at the same time as 
they should avoid a pro-cyclical fiscal policy; they obviously then need to have some idea 
about the economy’s cyclical position. However, since measures of the cyclical state of the 
economy entail large uncertainty, the rules should not be too strict, or should rather be 
regarded as “budget principles” or “budget devices”.  
The discussion on the Swedish framework clearly shares many aspects of the debate at 
EU level on the experience with the SGP rules.
35 However, the application and compliance 
record at EU level is weak compared to the experience of the Swedish national rules. One 
conclusion of this is that national owned rules, surveillance by several national institutions 
and transparent procedures are very helpful for compliance with the SGP rules, which also has 
been recognised within the discussion of the SGP.  
The Swedish budgetary framework has been somewhat of "a baby" of the Social 
Democratic 1994-2006 government. The new elected right wing government has 
acknowledged its apparent success and stands behind it. However, it has signalled an intention 
to have an overview of the framework with possible changes presented in the 2007 Spring 
budget. Hopefully, this paper can function as an input with some ideas for this process. We 
also hope that it can provide some insights for countries that still are in the position to 
introduce or develop its national fiscal rules. 
 
                                                 
35 See, for example, Fischer (2004).    332
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Appendix A: Indicators of the CAB used in Sweden
36 
 
This appendix describes the methods that have been used to calculate the CAB:s as reported 
in Table 3. 
The MoF calculates the CAB on the basis of an estimated output gap and an 
“aggregated” budget elasticity that is assumed to be 0.7. That means that if the (estimated) 
output gap changes by 1 percentage point, the cyclical component of net lending as a share of 
GDP is judged to change by 0.7 percentage points. To estimate the GDP gap for the 
individual years during the forecast period, the MoF usually assumes that the GDP gap is to 
be closed in the end of the forecast period (i.e. three years ahead). The formula used for 
calculating the CAB (as a percentage of GDP) is:
37 












whereS  is the actual budget balance, 
* S is the CAB, Y is GDP, 
* Y is potential GDP and 
* * / ) ( Y Y Y − is the output gap expressed in per cent of potential GDP. The aggregate budget 
elasticity  β ˆ  (thus, assessed to be 0.7) is assumed to catch the impact of the automatic 
stabilisers but not the effect on net lending of temporary stabilisation policy measures.
38  
The ESCB method decomposes several tax and expenditure bases into a trend and a 
cyclical part (using a HP filter).
39 The cyclical component of each tax and expenditure is 
obtained by multiplying the “gap” that the decomposition results in by an estimated elasticity 
that shows how the tax or expenditure varies with each "gap". For instance, if actual private 
consumption, which is the principal base for indirect taxes (e.g. VAT), is above the estimated 
trend value in a particular year, this is interpreted to mean that the revenue from indirect taxes 
in that year is higher than "normal", i.e. that there is a positive "cyclical component" in the 
indirect taxes. Consequently, this method does not estimate the CAB on the basis of an 
                                                 
36 This section follows Boije and Fischer (2006). 
37 When this equation is used in practice, the output gap is expressed in real terms while the actual budget 
balance and the CAB is expressed as a share of nominal GDP.  
38 In principle, the Commission uses the same approach. However, the Commission estimates the output gap 
using the commonly agreed production function approach in combination with an aggregated budgetary 
elasticity estimated on the basis of calculations made by the OECD, which is somewhat lower than 0.6 (see 
Commission, 2004). 
39 This method can not be regarded to be the Riksbank’s official method.    334
assessment of the aggregate output gap. The formula used for calculating the CAB (in levels) 
is:
40 
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where i T represents a special tax category (for example, indirect tax revenue),  i B is the i:th tax 
base (for example, private consumption), 
*
i B is the trend value of the i:th tax base (obtained by 
a HP-filter), 
i i B T , ε is the i:th tax elasticity (measuring, for example, how indirect taxes respond 
to a change in private consumption),  U E is unemployment-related expenditure, the 
elasticity U EU , ε  measures how unemployment-related expenditure respond to a change in 
unemployment, U is the number of unemployed and 
* U is its (HP-filtered) trend value.
41  
     One advantage of this method compared with the “aggregated” method based on an output 
gap and aggregated budget elasticity is that, at least in some measure, it takes account of 
composition effects, i.e. that different kinds of macroeconomic shocks can affect the tax and 
expenditure bases in different ways and that tax bases are not necessarily linearly related to 
GDP. The benefit of the “aggregated” method, on the other hand, is that it is somewhat more 
transparent and the results are directly related to a total measure of economic conditions. 
     The NIER adjusts the actual net lending for (i) the difference between the actual output 
and the estimated potential output (the output gap), (ii) the difference between the actual 
unemployment rate and the estimated equilibrium unemployment rate (the unemployment 
gap) and (iii) the deviation of principal tax bases from their normal proportion of GDP. The 
equilibrium base-to-GDP ratios are estimated with help of an HP filter. Tax revenues are 
assumed to be proportional to their respective tax bases, thus, the tax elasticity is assumed to 
be 1 for all taxes (in contrast to the ESCB method where they are allowed to differ from 1). 
Other revenue is assumed to be proportional to GDP. Unemployment expenditure is assumed 
to be proportional to unemployment. Other expenditure, such as public consumption, is 
assumed to be proportional to nominal potential GDP and thus independent of the cyclical 
state of the economy. The formula used for calculating the CAB is:
42 
                                                 
40 See Bouthevillain (2001) et al for a derivation of this formula.  
41 For simplicity, the same index has been used for the tax and its base. 
42 See Braconier and Forsfält (2004) for a derivation of this formula.   335
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This formula states that the difference between the actual budget balance and the CAB 
depends on the output gap, the unemployment gap and the deviations of base-to-GDP ratios 
from their equilibrium levels (the composition effect). Worth noting is that this formula, under 
some conditions, is similar to equation (A:2). In defining the CAB, the NIER makes use of the 
trend values of the base-to-GDP ratios while the Riksbank (or ESCB) uses the trend values of 
the bases in levels (thus not related to GDP). The trend value of the base divided by the trend 
value of GDP is not necessarily the same as the trend value of the base-to-GDP-ratio. Let us 
assume, however, that this is the case (under most circumstances the discrepancies should be 
small). The equation (A:3) can then be written as 



















Under this assumption, the only difference between equations (A:2) and (A:3) is that equation 
(A:2) includes elasticities allowed to differ from 1 and that the trend values of B and U show 
up in the denominators instead of the actual values. For small tax base and unemployment 
gaps and for elasticities close to one, these differences should have only a minor impact on the 
level of the estimated CAB. The NIER’s practical implementation, however, gives rise to 
some other discrepancies which may induce quite large differences in results. Equation (A:3) 
explicitly makes use of an estimated output gap, while equation (A:2) does not. Furthermore, 
the NIER applies several sophisticated models and indicators to estimate the unemployment 
gap, not just an HP filter (the same applies to the estimation of the output gap).    336
Appendix B. Some key features of local government finances 
 
Local government in Sweden consists of 290 municipalities and 20 county councils. By long tradition 
they enjoy a strong political and financial independence. While independent, local governments are 
nevertheless required by law to provide a large part of general public services. For example, 
municipalities are responsible for the provision of social services including child care, environmental 
and health protection as well as primary and secondary education. The county councils mainly deal 
with healthcare. Municipalities and county councils share responsibility for public transport. The 
municipalities account for 70% of local government expenditure while the county councils cover the 
remaining 30%. Overall, local government is responsible for roughly 40% of general government 
primary expenditures and 70% of general government investment and consumption. More than half of 
the costs are for personnel and local governments employ about 25% of the employees in the 
economy. 
For its financing local governments have the right to levy direct tax. Tax revenues cover 
roughly two-thirds of total revenues. They are raised through a flat rate tax on income, that is, salaries, 
unemployment and illness benefits and pensions. The average municipality tax is about 21% and the 
average county council tax 10.5% making the average local tax about 31.5% (varying across local 
governments, in 2006 the highest local tax rate is 34.3% while the lowest was 28.9%). Local 
governments also raise income through fees for some of the services provided.  
Most of the remaining revenues consist of general grants and grants directed towards a 
specific use. The level of the grants does not follow any indexation rule but is decided each year on a 
discretionary basis. As from 2005, general grants are provided within an “equalisation” system 
administered by the central government. This consists of an “income equalisation” system and a “cost 
equalisation” system. On the income side, local governments with low income per capita are 
compensated by central government general grants (there is also a small co-financing by local 
governments with very high income per capita). On the cost side there is compensation for structural 
differences in the cost structure (for example due to differences in demography). The cost equalisation 
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At the end of the eighties, large public deficits and increasing public debt-to-GDP ratios 
coupled with the regionalization of the state constrained Belgian authorities to establish 
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1.  Introduction 
The revised Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) adopted by the Council of the European Union 
in March 2005 underlined the need to strengthen fiscal governance in the EU Member States 
through the development of national budgetary rules that should complement the EU 
framework. The Council acknowledged the important role national institutions could play in 
that respect. The Council also called for reliable budgetary statistics and realistic, even 
cautious, macroeconomic forecasts.
3  
These conclusions draw on the now generally accepted view, both by academics and policy 
makers, that the national institutional framework affects budgetary outcomes: some 
institutional characteristics lead to tighter budgetary discipline than others (European 
Commission, 2006). As was shown in a report prepared for the Dutch Ministry of Finance 
(Hallenberg et al., 2001), budgetary practices differ extensively across Member States. In 
particular, some governments produce their economic forecasts in-house and leave the 
decision on what adjustments to make to the Finance Minister, while others use forecasts 
from independent organizations and establish strict rules on how changes in forecasts lead to 
changes in annual targets.  
Over the last twenty years, specific circumstances constrained Belgian authorities to establish 
institutions providing independent inputs, analyses and recommendations in the area of fiscal 
policy. Firstly, the regionalization of the Belgian state at the end of the eighties, in a context 
of very high budget deficits and a soaring public debt (respectively 7% and 125% of GDP in 
1988), forced the government to take action in order to avoid overspending arising from 
independent regional governments. Consequently, the High Council of Finance (HCF) was 
reformed in 1989 and one of its new tasks was to monitor the fiscal policy of regional 
governments and to formulate medium-term budgetary objectives for the federated entities. In 
1992, the HCF also received a mandate to assess the convergence programmes. Secondly, as 
the Maastricht criteria for entry into the European Monetary Union were set in national 
accounts concepts, the National Accounts Institute (NAI) was created in 1994 in order to 
ensure the quality and the independency of the main economic statistics and macroeconomic 
forecasts upon which the budget was based. Following various reports on population ageing 
and its impact on public finances, a Study Group on Ageing was created in 2001 within the 
HCF. 
The role of the Federal Planning Bureau (FPB) in the budgetary process is manifold but 
limited to the field of positive economics, as it does not make policy recommendations. The 
                                                           
3 The Commission’s initial proposal that stability programmes should be based on macroeconomic assumptions 
provided by the Commission was rejected. Even so, these assumptions should still be used as a benchmark (Buti, 
2006). 
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FPB produces, on behalf of the NAI, the macroeconomic forecasts used by the Belgian 
federal government for drawing up its budget and prepares, jointly with the National Bank of 
Belgium, the general government account within the national accounts. Each spring, the FPB 
also publishes a medium-term economic outlook for the Belgian economy. This report is 
updated in autumn and serves as a starting point for the elaboration of the stability 
programme. The FPB also holds the secretariat of the Study Group on Ageing and produces 
its long-term projections of age-related budgetary expenditures. 
The purpose of this paper is to briefly describe the role of fiscal councils in the budgetary 
planning process in Belgium and to emphasize the part taken by the Federal Planning Bureau 
in producing independent short-term macroeconomic forecasts and medium-term projections. 
The importance of independent forecasts in the budgetary process should not be 
underestimated, as illustrated in Jonung and Larch (2006). These authors show evidence that 
for several large European countries, official growth forecasts are biased towards optimism 
and that this forecasting bias, coupled with inertia in the budgetary process, has hampered 
fiscal consolidation. While short-term forecasts are relatively widespread, the supply of 
independent medium-term projections is more limited. The FPB has been producing medium-
term macroeconomic projections for the Belgian economy since the beginning of the eighties. 
The tradition to produce a baseline simulation with a medium-term horizon was inherited 
from the (failed) indicative planning experiments in the seventies.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the concept of fiscal councils and 
describe the two main institutions that have to be considered in the Belgian budgetary 
process. The importance of having independent institutions to produce the official short-term 
forecasts and medium-term projections is stressed in section 3 and illustrated with an 
assessment of the quality of the Belgian forecasts and projections. The last section concludes 
the paper by drawing some lessons from the Belgian experience.   340
2.  Role of Fiscal Councils in the Belgian budgetary process 
Based on the model of independent central banks, a number of economists have recently 
suggested that a more or less extensive part of fiscal policy should be entrusted to an 
independent fiscal agency so as to avoid the injudicious use of discretion by politicians. These 
proposals are supported by evidence showing that fiscal policy discretion often entails a 
deficit bias or leads to a procyclical behaviour by policymakers in good times (European 
Commission, 2006). Political and distributive conflicts, time inconsistency, short-time 
horizons of policymakers or the membership of a (small) country to a monetary union can all 
be quoted as possible underlying political or economic reasons for a deficit bias and 
procyclical fiscal policies (IMF, 2005). 
The International Monetary Fund identifies two types of fiscal agencies. The first type, called 
Independent Fiscal Authorities (IFAs), would receive a mandate comparable to that of 
independent central banks but on the fiscal side, i.e. to set and enforce long-term fiscal 
objectives and annual budgetary targets. Although theoretical arguments can be put forward 
in favour of setting up such institutions, there are to date no IFAs in operation in any country, 
most likely reflecting the issue of democratic accountability. 
A less drastic and more realistic option lies in the setup of Fiscal Councils (FC), which do not 
receive any specific authority over fiscal policy but undertake analyses and assessments of 
fiscal developments and policies. These national bodies, functionally independent but 
primarily financed by public funds, come on top or besides the usual budgetary process.
4  
They could provide in particular: 
-   independent macroeconomic forecasts for evaluating tax revenues and public expenditure; 
-   public finance forecasts with a focus on fiscal balances; 
-   impact analyses of shocks or policies; 
-   policy recommendations such as rules, targets and strategies; 
-   statements on the conduct of fiscal policy. 
The first three items are in the field of what has been called "positive economics", while the 
remaining two items are in the field of "normative economics".
5  
The complex institutional framework of the Belgian state and the dramatic deterioration of the 
fiscal stance in the seventies and eighties forced the country to put in place FC-type 
institutions. The National Accounts Institute (NAI), created by the law of 21 December 1994, 
                                                           
4 Private think tanks, private research bodies as well as Central Banks or Directorates of the Ministry of Finance 
are not within the scope of the definition (European Commission, op. cit.). 
5 This dichotomy between positive and normative economics was first introduced by John Neville Keynes (1891) 
and later on elaborated by Milton Friedman (1966). Positive economics has to do with "what is", while 
normative economics has to do with "what ought to be". Positive economics is a social science, and as such is 
subject to the same checks on the basis of evidence as any science. By contrast, normative economics has a 
moral or ethical aspect, and as such goes beyond what a science can say.   341
is a special purpose vehicle - it has no staff and no resources – but according to the organic 
law, it delegates its tasks to three institutions. The National Bank of Belgium (NBB) produces 
the national and regional accounts, the foreign trade statistics, the financial accounts and the 
supply and use tables. The Federal Planning Bureau (FPB) produces the macroeconomic 
short-term forecasts (called the “economic budget”) and the input-output tables, and is jointly 
responsible with the NBB for the general government account. Statistics Belgium is in charge 
of collecting the data upon which the above-mentioned statistics are based. Each institution 
has access to the inside information of the others. Note that only the forecasting activities can, 
strictly speaking, be considered as typical tasks for a fiscal council, although providing high 
quality and reliable budgetary statistics is also recognised as an important input for fiscal 
policy (Council of the EU, 2005). The FPB also publishes, under its own name, a medium-
term economic outlook each year in spring. This report is a very detailed macroeconomic 
projection. It is the only occasion on which the FPB publishes forecasts of the public sector 
accounts as well as a comprehensive analysis of public finances.
6 These forecasts are updated 
in autumn as a starting point for the elaboration of the Belgian stability programme. 
The High Council of Finance (HCF) is composed of high-level experts: academics, members 
of the National Bank and representatives of the federal and regional administrations. Their 
mandate is incompatible with any political office, so as to ensure the independence of the 
Council. The secretariat is held by the research department of the Ministry of Finance. The 
“Public sector borrowing requirement” section of the HCF
7 publishes two yearly reports. The 
first report, published around March, assesses the stability programme of the previous year. 
The second, released in June/July, analyses the borrowing requirements of each government 
and makes recommendations on short and especially medium-term budgetary targets (and 
since 2002, also on long-term targets) for the general government and the different entities. 
The HCF-recommendations form the basis of cooperation agreements between the federal 
government and regional governments that set the budgetary targets and act as internal 
stability programmes. Until 1999, they were integrated in the Belgian convergence 
programmes and, since then, they have been incorporated in the stability programmes. The 
Study Group on Ageing produces a yearly report including projections of age-related 
budgetary expenditures. The FPB holds the secretariat of the Study Group on Ageing and 
produces its long-term projections. The section "Public sector borrowing requirements" takes 
these projections into account for its fiscal policy recommendations. With the new law 
regarding the setup of the Ageing Fund
8, the section will also advise the government on the 
amount to be transferred every year to this fund. 
                                                           
6 The economic budget does not include forecasts of the general government account. 
7 The HCF also contains a permanent section on "Taxation and social security contributions" and the Study 
Group on Ageing. 
8 This fund was set up to finance the additional expenses resulting from ageing in the various statutory pension 
schemes between 2010 and 2030.   342
The diagram below gives an overview of the main activities of the fiscal councils, 










Table 1 summarizes the timing of the main activities of the fiscal councils regarding the 
budgetary process.
9 The process starts in May with the release of the medium and long-term 
projections. The recommendations by the HCF follow in June. A provisional short-term 
macroeconomic forecasting exercise is prepared by the NAI by the end of June and revised in 
the economic budget in September. The federal budget is presented to the Parliament in 
October. In the wake of the new budget, the stability programme is updated and extended. 
The economic budget is reassessed in February and precedes the budgetary control of March.  
3.  Importance of independent institutions and forecasts 
As a recent survey on national fiscal institutions in the EU indicates, only three out of twenty-
five governments, namely Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands,
10 rely solely on national 
independent agencies to produce macroeconomic forecasts for the preparation of the 
budgetary plans (European Commission, 2006). Another survey on budgetary rules and norms 
in EU Member States reveals that all three countries were on the list of states where 
respondents thought that growth assumptions were “deliberately cautious”. Countries with 
cautious growth forecasts also seemed to have higher than expected budget balances as 
indicated by a positive correlation between growth and budget errors (Hallenberg et al., 
2001). Computing an indicator of “degree of optimism about the future” by comparing 
                                                           
9 As a reminder, the month of release of the European Commission and Eurosystem forecasts are also mentioned. 
10 In Austria, the Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) provides the forecasts while the Netherlands Bureau 
for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) fulfils this task for its government. In the remaining countries, the 
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official GDP growth forecasts and consensus forecasts, Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama (2004) 
found that Belgium and Austria had an indicator close to zero and the Netherlands the most 
negative indicator of all countries, pointing to very cautious official forecasts. 
In analysing the track record of budgetary forecasts contained in the stability and convergence 
programmes, Hallenberg et al. (2004) found that countries with overly optimistic growth 
assumptions were also those with the largest slippages from budgetary targets. Other studies 
show evidence of a clear link between budgetary outcomes and growth forecasts. Larch and 
Salto (2005) and very recently Jonung and Larch (2006) show that official forecasts for (real 
and potential) GDP are biased towards optimism for Germany, Italy and France
11 and that this 
forecasting bias, coupled with inertia in the budgetary process, is passed on to the structural 
deficit. These authors conclude that the bias of official growth forecasts partly explains the 
poor performance of fiscal consolidation observed in recent years in the euro area.
12  They 
also stress that, although in budgetary terms an overestimation of potential GDP growth 
produces ex post the same results as active expansionary fiscal policy, the former requires 
another form of policy response to improve fiscal consolidation. These conclusions led the 
authors to plead for the establishment of independent forecasting authorities in all EU 
Member States. The usefulness of their proposal is supported by empirical evidence showing 
that in the three Member States mentioned above, where official forecasts are produced by 
independent national agencies, these forecasts show no statistically significant bias. 
Furthermore these independent national agencies could play a leading role in strengthening 
national ownership of the budgetary surveillance procedure. 
To reduce the risk of bias in the official national growth forecasts, the initial package of the 
Commission concerning the reform of the SGP contained a proposal to delegate the economic 
growth projections used in the budgetary plans to the Commission (Deroose and Langedijk, 
2005). A comparison of the forecasting performances by Member States and by the European 
Commission (Hallenberg et al., op. cit.) reveals that GDP forecasts produced by the latter 
have been more accurate for several countries but notably not for Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands.  
Official forecasting procedure in Belgium 
In Belgium the legal status of the institutions involved greatly contributes to the independence 
of the forecasting authority. The FPB is a public institution and, as any other public 
institution, has ministers who oversee it and set its budget. However, because of its specific 
tasks, it is independent in fulfilling them. To earn this independence, the FPB has a policy of 
                                                           
11 The United Kingdom is the exception among the ‘big four’ with unbiased and remarkably accurate forecasts. 
12 Although they confirm the relevance of growth forecasting errors in some EU countries for explaining 
budgetary slippages, Moulin and Wierts (2006) also point to the non-implementation of ambitious planned 
restraint in nominal general government expenditure as a source of divergence between budgetary plans and 
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being very transparent: it publishes its forecasts, methods, models and data.
13 It also assesses 
its own forecasting performance.
14 Staff recruitment is governed by a transparent procedure 
and the candidates are appointed on the proposal of the Bureau’s managing board. Besides the 
federal government, the Central Economic Council, the National Labour Council and the 
legislative chambers may apply to the FPB to assess the economic impact of policy measures. 
Because its reputation as an independent institution and the credibility of its analyses could be 
undermined, the FPB does not make policy recommendations. Its role is thus limited to the 
field of positive economics. 
The figures contained in the economic budget are discussed and approved by the Board of the 
NAI and are therefore considered as official NAI forecasts. The Board is composed of the 
highest civil servant of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Governor and a director of the 
National Bank, the Commissioner of the FPB and his deputy and the Director General and a 
director of Statistics Belgium. The economic budget also has to be submitted for advice to a 
committee of experts (called scientific committee), chaired by the Commissioner of the FPB 
and composed of representatives of the main institutional users of the forecasts. The endorse-
ment of the forecasts by the various independent institutions represented in the Board and in 
the scientific committee prevents political intervention, as the credibility of all institutions 
involved is at stake. 
Whether the Law of December 1994 (which created the National Accounts Institute) implies a 
legal requirement for the government to use the economic budget is probably disputable from 
a juridical point of view. However, up to now, the forecasts have always been adopted by the 
government. Because the institution has achieved high credibility, not following the forecasts 
would entail a loss of reputation for the government. In times of uncertainty, the government 
can be more cautious and include safety margins in the budget, for instance to allow for 
negative growth surprises or unforeseen rises in interest rates. 
Assessing the quality of the economic budget 
The economic budget is released twice a year, once in September of the year t-1 for the 
preparation of the federal government’s budget of the year t and once in February of the year t 
for the budgetary control of the year t. The quarterly macroeconometric model Modtrim
15 
serves as a central tool for producing the economic budget. The model’s results, however, are 
adapted to take into account the most recent business cycle information, for instance 
stemming from leading indicators. 
The economic budget supplies forecasts for a large range of economic variables. Here only 
                                                           
13 All available on the website: http://www.plan.be. The document describing the economic budget is published 
twice a year.  For a detailed account of the forecasting process see Dobbelaere et. al. (2003). 
14 See for instance: Dobbelaere and  Hertveldt (2004). 
15 See Hertveldt and Lebrun (2003) for a detailed description of the model.   345
two variables, namely real GDP growth and CPI inflation, will be examined, as both series are 
of primary importance for the users of the economic budget. A choice to make first is to 
define what is considered as the outcome. For inflation, this is quite straightforward as the 
monthly published CPI is never revised. GDP growth figures, however, are subject to 
significant revisions. To avoid that unpredictable factors in the national accounts (such as 
methodological changes) would affect the analysis, outcomes are defined as the figures 
published in the first version of the national accounts of the year concerned. 
Besides the problem of what should be chosen as outcomes, post-mortem analyses are 
generally surrounded by other problems. In particular, the limited size of the sample should 
lead to a cautious interpretation of the results that can be influenced by some outliers. One 
should also bear in mind that accuracy is only one aspect of quality. Other important quality 
features are for instance coherence and completeness. A full quality assessment should take 
into account all these aspects simultaneously. 
The most intuitive indicator to evaluate the size of forecast errors is the mean absolute error 
(MAE), that yields the average difference between forecasts and realisations in percentage 
points (see Table 2). A look at the declining profile of the MAEs, especially for GDP growth, 
shows that the additional information that becomes available between the first and the second 
forecasting round significantly increases the accuracy of FPB projections, which proves the 
usefulness of the February updating of the economic budget. 
Another way to evaluate the accuracy of FPB projections, is to compare them with naive 
forecasts. Three kinds of naive forecasts have been examined: a random walk (Theil 1), a 10-
year moving average growth rate forecast (Theil 2) and an ARIMA projection (Theil 3). Theil 
coefficients are calculated as the ratio between the root mean square error of the reference 
forecasts and of the naive forecasts. Table 2 shows that naive forecasts are less accurate than 
the economic budget in all cases for CPI and in round 2 for GDP. Theil coefficients exceed 
unity only for Theil 2 and Theil 3 for GDP growth during the first round. As shown in the 
Graph 1, there has undeniably been one period of systematic over-optimism for the years 
2001-2003, a period with successive bad surprises following the technology hype of 1999-
2000. This is however not systematically the case over the whole sample. Theil coefficients 
fall below unity if these specific years are removed from the sample period. In conclusion, our 
findings confirm the commonly accepted view that over a 4 to 6-quarter horizon, structural 
model based forecasts outperform naive forecasts.  
The size of the forecast errors is one thing, but the nature of those errors is at least as 
important. An interesting way to check whether systematic forecast errors can be found, is to 
decompose the mean square error (MSE) into three components: (i) the bias proportion (BP) 
measures which part of the error is due to systematic over- or underestimation; (ii) the 
variance proportion (VP) provides the part of the error owing to the misforecasting of the   346
systematic component of the variability of outcomes; (iii) the covariance proportion (CP) is 
the part of the errors arising from other, unsystematic factors.
16  
Table 2 shows that the BP is small in all forecasting rounds, which means that FPB forecasts 
can be considered as unbiased.
17 The VP of first round forecasts, however, is quite large. This 
should not come as a surprise as the available business cycle related information at that 
moment does not provide clear indications for the year ahead. Hence, first round forecasts are 
commonly based on a plausible trend scenario, which is obviously subject to upside and 
downside risks. If one of those risks or another shock materialises, the variability of the 
outcomes will be higher than that of the forecasts. In all cases, the CP represents the highest 
proportion, which leads to the conclusion that the nature of the forecast errors is mainly 
unsystematic and simply due to the fact that economic variables are stochastic. 
For a small, open economy as Belgium yet another question to examine is whether and to 
what extent the observed forecast errors are due to false exogenous assumptions. The 
development of foreign export markets is a crucial exogenous variable for forecasting Belgian 
GDP. The export market hypothesis is typically based on weighted (reflecting the 
geographical orientation of Belgian exports) import growth figures taken from the most recent 
short-term forecasts of international organisations (EC, OECD, IMF).  
The regression line in Graph 2 shows that there is a clear positive relationship between the 
forecast errors made in export markets and GDP growth. The fact that the regression line in 
the graph crosses the intersection of both axes and divides the quadrants in almost equal parts 
is another indication for the unbiased character of the GDP forecasts. Rewriting history, one 
can try to examine what would have been the GDP forecast if the correct export market figure 
was known at the moment of the forecasting exercise. To calculate this in a simplified 
manner, GDP forecasts were adjusted based on the error in the export market figure and the 
estimated elasticity between GDP and export markets.
18 Correcting GDP forecasts in that way 
and comparing them again to the realizations, the absolute forecast error is reduced on 
average by more than 50%, both in the first and the second round forecasts and for almost all 
individual years. 
Assessing the quality of potential GDP growth projections 
The FPB has been producing medium-term macroeconomic projections for the Belgian 
economy since the beginning of the eighties. This baseline is a no-policy-change scenario, 
notably with regard to fiscal and social policies, based on a “neutral” international 
                                                           
16 See Gutierrez and Vuchelen (2001). 
17 This is confirmed by other measures, such as the mean forecast error, that is not significantly different from 
zero at conventional confidence levels. 
18 This elasticity was derived from a model simulation with Modtrim, in response to a shock on the export 
markets. The average value of the elasticity is 0.2 over the first four quarters after the shock.   347
environment. Scenario analysis is sometimes performed to illustrate potential risks 
surrounding the baseline or to analyse the effects of changes in economic policy.
19 The 
economic outlook for the Belgian economy is published each year in May
20 and presented to 
the representatives of the social partners within the Central Economic Council. This medium-
term outlook takes as a starting point the forecasts for the current year (as published in the 
economic budget, possibly adapted on the basis of new business cycle information) and 
covers a five-year period. These projections are updated in October by incorporating the latest 
short-term forecasts (elaborated for the new budget) and are used as the macroeconomic 
framework for the Belgian stability programme. 
Although the outlook is a very detailed macroeconomic projection covering developments in 
industry, the labour market, public finances and even energy consumption and associated 
greenhouse gas emissions, we shall limit our analysis in this section to potential GDP 
estimates which are crucial to assess the credibility of multi-annual budgetary programmes. 
Budgetary projections will be examined in the next section.  
To check the accuracy of one-year-ahead forecasts of potential GDP growth we follow the 
methodology used by Jonung and Larch (2006) for other European countries.
21 The results are 
presented in Graph 3. Following a period of relatively low economic growth for the first half 
of the eighties, potential GDP growth was clearly underestimated at the end of that decade. 
Conversely, high growth figures recorded during the period 1987-1990 generated hopes of 
higher potential growth which did not materialize. The period following the 1993 recession 
was characterised by more cautious projections and thus a slight underestimation of potential 
growth, while the end of the nineties and the belief in “the new economy” gave rise to overly 
optimistic projections. This analysis clearly illustrates the difficulty to separate the trend from 
the cycle at the end of the sample: a sustained period of economic upswing tends to make the 
forecaster think that this upswing is permanent, while a prolonged period of slow growth has 
the opposite effect. However, Belgian potential growth turned out to be quite stable over the 
past twenty years using ex-post data. In other words and as is shown in Graph 3, projections 
tended to be too optimistic (pessimistic) in periods of positive (negative) output gaps. These 
errors in potential GDP growth largely reflect the errors made in estimating future foreign 
export market trends. Regressing potential GDP growth errors on the difference between 
actual and projected export market trend growth indicates that for each percentage point error 
on export market trend growth, the potential GDP growth projection will deviate by half a 
percentage point from its outcome. These results are in line with the analysis made for the 
short-term forecasts in the previous section. 
                                                           
19 The baseline and variants are produced using the HERMES model (see Bossier et al., 2004). 
20 The exact publication date has evolved slightly in the course of time, as well as the frequency, but at least one 
outlook has been published each year in spring since 1980. 
21 The methodology is recalled in the footnotes of Table 3.   348
The statistics in Table 3 show a slight overestimation of Belgian potential GDP growth over 
the period 1987-2003, but this negative mean error (see column ME) is not statistically 
different from zero at conventional confidence levels (see column No bias). The forecasting 
errors clearly exhibit serial correlation (see column No corr), which doesn’t come as a 
surprise considering the explanations given in the previous paragraph. Table 3 also shows that 
the accuracy of the forecasts (see columns MAE and RMSE) is quite similar to that in France 
but clearly better than in Germany and Italy, with only the UK performing better.  
Potential GDP growth can be split into the respective contributions of employment and 
productivity. Graph 4 shows the breakdown of the forecasting error on potential GDP into its 
two determinants. Clearly, trend employment growth has been underestimated in periods of 
prudent potential GDP forecasts, while it has been overestimated only in periods of growth 
optimism. The forecasting error on trend productivity growth has been displaying a 
systematic optimistic bias since the beginning of the nineties.
22 As Graph 5 shows, the 
decreasing trend in productivity growth revealed by the latest available data was not captured 
sufficiently in the successive projections.
23 The very volatile nature of productivity growth, as 
clearly visible on the graph, makes disentangling the cycle from the trend not an easy task. 
Also very important to assess the fiscal stance is the output gap which allows to compute the 
cyclically adjusted budget balance. Graph 6 compares one-year-ahead forecasts of output gap 
estimates based on the medium-term outlook with the actual output gap estimates.
24 As 
several empirical studies point out, output gap estimates in real time are highly unreliable.
25 
Not surprisingly, output gap forecasts may exhibit large revisions due to the cumulative errors 
on potential output growth estimates but also on GDP growth estimates/forecasts.
26 The 
forecasts presented in Graph 6 are not an exception to the rule: as can be judged from the 
vertical distance between the points and the 45-degree line, output gap forecasting errors are 
huge in many cases. However, the vast majority of the points are in the first and third 
quadrant, meaning that the sign of the output gap has been correctly forecasted in most cases. 
The few points in the fourth quadrant are very close to the X or Y-axis. Points above the 45-
degree line imply that cyclical conditions finally turned out to be less favourable than 
expected, while points below the line indicate the opposite. In “bad times” (negative output 
gap), the forecasts seem to be unbiased, as the points are evenly distributed around the 45-
degree line. In “good times” (positive output gap), there is a tendency to underestimate 
                                                           
22 Analysing the medium-term projections of the CPB, Kranendonck and Verbruggen (2006) have found a 
similar phenomenon for the Netherlands. 
23 For the possible reasons behind the decline in trend productivity gains in Belgium, see Lebrun (2005). 
24 Output gap estimates rely on potential GDP estimates computed as described in the footnotes of Table 3. 
25 For the United States, see for instance Orphanides and van Norden (2002) and for the euro area, see ECB 
(2005). 
26 As shown by Denis et al. (2006) in an analysis for the EU countries, the revisions of GDP estimates for some 
countries and the poor quality of GDP forecasts for all countries are the main sources of error for output gap 
estimates.   349
cyclical conditions. The periods 1989-1992 and 2000-2001 are two such cases.  
Examining the budgetary projections and outcomes 
As mentioned previously, the medium-term outlook covers much more than just economic 
growth projections. Specifically, it provides, within this coherent macroeconomic framework, 
a very detailed analysis of public finances and budgetary prospects under the hypothesis of 
“no policy change”. Accordingly, the aim of the exercise is not to provide the best budgetary 
forecasts anticipating the most likely political decisions, but rather to provide a benchmark 
scenario against which the fiscal objectives of the government can be assessed, including 
those contained in the stability programmes. Consequently, it can point to the existence of 
some room for manoeuvre for new policies or, conversely, to the necessity for taking 
additional structural measures in order to reach the budgetary objectives. It can also help the 
government to (re)define its medium-term budgetary objective or contribute to the setup of 
realistic numerical fiscal rules, especially after elections, when a new coalition programme is 
being elaborated. Assessing these projections therefore requires a different approach than 
investigating the track record of multi-annual budgetary plans of the governments, as is done 
for example in Hallenberg et al. (2004) and Moulin and Wierts (2006) for the EU or 
Heinemann (2005) for Germany. 
Before analysing the successive budgetary projections, it is useful to describe the 
methodology of “no policy change” used to evaluate public expenditure and revenue. Public 
expenditure depends only to a limited extent on economic factors (apart from inflation) and 
thus has a mainly exogenous character. Behavioural equations are used solely for interest 
payments and unemployment benefits. As far as the authorities at the federal level (including 
Social Security) and at the federated entities’ level are concerned, the estimation of 
expenditure and the integration of discretionary decisions are based on a detailed analysis of 
available annual budgets and their conversion to the ESA definitions. In the medium term, 
expenditure projections are the result of the translation into the national accounts of the multi-
annual projections carried out by the authorities themselves, of a quantification of the planned 
measures, or, failing that, of hypotheses elaborated by the FPB (such as, for example, 
extrapolating the trend of the previous years). For the local authorities’ primary expenditure, 
the method is different. Given the great number of actors involved, it is impossible to take 
their budgets as a starting point. As a consequence, behaviour observed in the past is 
extrapolated, while trying to fully integrate the decisions taken, among others, by authorities 
at other levels. Just as for expenditure, the main non-fiscal revenues are almost entirely 
exogenous, and their projections reflect the decisions as closely as possible, depending on the 
accuracy of the information contained in budgets and official announcements. On the other 
hand, the evolution of fiscal and parafiscal revenues depends both on the macroeconomic 
context and on the measures taken. Those revenues are therefore calculated endogenously,   350
while taking into account the characteristics of the tax system (e.g. progressiveness). Where 
applicable, discretionary measures are incorporated in the projection. 
Beside the issue of “no policy change” discussed above, confronting budgetary projections 
with budgetary outcomes raises another problem: changes over time in accounting concepts 
modify the outcomes themselves.
27 To prevent that adjustments in accounting methodologies 
affect the analysis, the “outcomes” were constructed by linking realizations from several data 
vintages with different accounting concepts. The reason for the discrepancies between 
projected and observed values is thus essentially twofold: errors on macroeconomic and 
financial variables and changes in fiscal policy including one-off measures.
28 
Graph 7 presents the “outcome” for the general government balance (in percent of GDP) and 
the successive projected trajectories starting with the current year and covering a five-year 
period.
29 Although consolidation of public finances was projected in all exercises during the 
nineties, the pace at which the deficit decreased was faster than foreseen, while the surpluses 
projected from 2002 onwards never materialized. 
In order to have a somewhat more precise idea of the origin of these differences, we have split 
up the budget balance into the primary balance and interest payments. The primary balance 
shows a fairly similar pattern as the overall balance, improving more rapidly than projected 
during the nineties (except for the 1995 projection), whereas the decrease in the primary 
balance was not projected before the 2001 projection. The reduction of the deficit was also 
favoured by the decrease in interest payments. This decline was stronger than expected, 
especially in the projections made in the mid-nineties. 
Table 4 gives the mean difference between the observed and projected cumulated change in 
the general government balance, the primary balance and interest payments for the different 
forecasting horizons. The general balance improved faster than projected on the whole 
sample, as we saw on the graph, but with no cumulated increase for a horizon above t+2. The 
changes in primary balance turned out to be greater than projected up to two years ahead, but 
the difference drops to zero at horizon t+4. Looking at the two sub-samples, we see that this 
decrease is entirely due to the end of the sample, for which further projected increases in 
primary balances never materialized. The cumulated decrease in interest payments was 
stronger than projected for all the forecasting horizons and for the two sub-samples. 
As an examination of nominal GDP growth errors reveals (results not reported here), nominal 
growth was somewhat overestimated during the period 1993-2001, which means that the 
                                                           
27 The main changes occur in 1993 with revisions to comply with the “Maastricht” definitions and in 2000 with 
the shift from ESA79 to ESA95. Data vintages before 1988 are reported in Belgian national accounts concepts 
and are not comparable with data vintages in ESA. 
28 Model misspecifications may of course also play a role. 
29 For the sake of readability, only projections from 1993 onwards have been considered in the analysis.   351
denominator effect cannot be the reason behind the underestimation of the improvement in 
budgetary stance. Using the semi-elasticity of the primary fiscal balance to real GDP growth, 
we can roughly correct the projections of the primary balance for growth errors.
30 Table 5 
shows that on the full set of projections, economic growth was slightly overestimated: the 
difference between observed changes in primary balance and projections is due to changes in 
fiscal policy. Indeed, during the period between 1993 and 1998 new measures were taken 
annually, especially on the revenue side, to comply with the Maastricht criteria and 
subsequently to converge to the close-to-balanced target of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Corrected for growth surprises, projections for the changes in primary balance do not seem to 
have been too optimistic during the period 1999-2004 for a horizon up to two years, while for 
longer horizons more favourable evolutions were projected. These “virtual surpluses” 
certainly encouraged the federal government to initiate a tax reform and to allow increases in 
a number of expenditure items. 
4.  Conclusion 
Measuring the (full) influence of the Belgian fiscal councils on budgetary outcomes is by 
nature difficult. However, judging by the indisputable improvement of Belgian public 
finances over the last twelve years (see Graph 8), the fiscal councils that have been created 
have proven their usefulness. The recommendations and the assessment of the stability 
programmes by the High Council of Finance have given rise to a transparent system with 
clear objectives for the general government and the different entities. This imposed discipline 
has helped policy-makers to resist pressures to increase expenditure (Bethuyne, 2005). The 
HCF’s recommendations and assessments have been backed up by independent bodies 
operating in the field of positive economics. The production by the National Accounts 
Institute of independent short-term macroeconomic forecasts has ensured unbiased, politically 
neutral macroeconomic assumptions for the drafting of the federal government’s budget. The 
medium-term economic outlook published by the Federal Planning Bureau has delivered 
consistent macroeconomic hypotheses for multi-annual budgetary planning and budgetary 
projections in a scenario of no policy change, which have helped the High Council of Finance 
and the government to define realistic medium-term budgetary objectives. Finally, the long-
term projections produced by the Study Group on Ageing have assisted the government in 
integrating age-related budgetary expenditures into the budgetary strategy and in shaping 
fiscal rules which take into account the increase in expenditure due to population ageing. 
                                                           
30 The semi-elasticity is obtained with a simulation using the HERMES model supposing an external growth 
shock. It is clear that this semi-elasticity is not invariant to the type of shock, but as we saw in the previous 
section, an important part of GDP growth errors are due to external growth surprises. Specific composition 
effects are also neglected here.   352
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Table 1 - Timing of the Belgium budgetary process and forecasts 
 








May  Medium and long-term 
projections 
Spring forecasts   
June HCF  report  Integrated Guidelines  Projection 
June Provisional  short-term 
forecast 
     
August          




     
November Stability  Programme 
(SP) 
Autumn forecasts    
December        Projection  
January     Assessment of SP and 
NRP 
  
February Economic  budget 
updated 
 Interim forecasts    
March  Budgetary control       
April          
 
 
Table 2 - Key forecast error statistics (1994-2005)
 1 
 
  Economic growth  CPI inflation 
  round 1  round 2  round 1  round 2 
Mean Error  -0.43*  0.02*  0.15*  0.15* 
Mean Absolute Errror  1.11  0.72  0.60  0.47 
Theil 1 (random walk)  0.72  0.51  0.75  0.86 
Theil 2 (10-year mov. avg.)  1.68  0.81  0.73  0.56 
Theil 3 (ARIMA-forecast) 1.11  0.77 0.69  0.74 
Breakdown of Mean Square Error         
 BP  10.7%  0.3%  3.9%  6.7% 
 VP  45.3%  6.3%  38.6%  18.7% 
 CP  44.1%  93.4%  57.6%  74.7% 
1 Forecast error = outcome – forecast 
* not different from zero at 10% significance level 
Source: Federal Planning Bureau, National Accounts Institute 
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Source: Belgium: own calculations based on historical FPB databases; other countries: Jonung and Larch (2006) 
 
Methodology: the forecast of potential GDP growth for the year t is obtained by HP-filtering the GDP series 
(historical data plus projected figures) contained in the database of vintage t-1. “Actual” potential GDP growth is 
computed by applying recursively (using each time the same sample as for the forecasted estimates) the HP-filter 
on the latest available vintage of the GDP series. The forecasting error is defined as the “actual” value minus the 
forecasted value. Thus a positive (negative) error indicates an underestimation (overestimation) of potential 
GDP. 
 
Notes:    ME = mean error 
MAE = mean absolute error 
  RMSE = root mean squared error 
  No bias = probability for zero mean error (t test with Newey-West standard error for Belgium) 
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Table 4 - Mean difference between observed and projected cumulated change in general 
government balance and components (in % of GDP) 
 
Source: own calculations based on historical FPB databases 
Note: As we only use the projections from 1993 onwards, the sample considered is reduced by a year with each 
increase in forecasting horizon. Comparisons between observed and projected values are expressed as a 
percentage of observed and projected nominal GDP respectively. 
 
 
Table 5 - Mean difference between observed and projected cumulated change in general 
government primary balance (in % of GDP) 
 
Source: own calculations based on historical FPB databases 
Note: Difference in cumulated change in primary balance corrected for growth error = difference in cumulated 
change in primary balance – 0.3 * cumulated error in real GDP growth. The sensitivity of the primary balance 
(expressed in percentage of GDP) to real GDP growth is obtained by simulating a shock on foreign export 
markets with the HERMES model and comparing the primary balance in the variant with the one in the baseline, 
both expressed in percent of GDP respectively of the variant and of the baseline. 
 
 
Projections 1993-2004   
  t  t+1 t+2 t+3  t+4 
General balance   0.2   0.6   0.7   0.7   0.7 
Primary balance   0.2   0.4   0.3   0.1   0.0 
Interest payments   0.0  -0.2  -0.4  -0.6  -0.7 
                                                               Projections 1993-1998 
General balance   0.3   1.1   1.5   1.8   2.9 
Primary balance   0.4    0.9   1.0   1.2   2.2 
Interest payments   0.1  -0.2  -0.5  -0.6  -0.7 
                                                               Projections 1999-2004 
General balance   0.1   0.2   0.1   0.1   0.0 
Primary balance   0.1   0.1  -0.2  -0.4  -0.7 
Interest  payments  -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5  -0.7 
Projections 1993-2004   
  t  t+1 t+2 t+3  t+4 
Primary balance   0.2   0.4   0.3   0.1   0.0 
Real GDP growth (in % points)   0.2  -0.2  -0.6  -0.9  -0.6 
Primary balance corrected for 
growth error 
 0.2   0.5   0.5   0.4   0.2 
                                                        Projections 1993-1998 
Primary balance   0.4  0.9  1.0   1.2  2.2 
Real GDP growth (in % points)   0.3  0.4  0.1  -0.4  0.6 
Primary balance corrected for 
growth error 
 0.3  0.8  1.0   1.3  2.0 
                                                         Projections 1999-2004 
Primary balance  0.1   0.1  -0.2  -0.4  -0.7 
Real GDP growth (in % points)  0.1  -0.7  -1.1  -1.1  -0.9 
Primary balance corrected for 
growth error 
0.0   0.3   0.1  -0.1  -0.4   357
Graph 1 - GDP growth: First round forecasts and outcomes
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Source: Federal Planning Bureau, National Accounts Institute 
 
 
Graph 2 - GDP forecasts and export market assumptions (1994-2005)
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Graph 3 - Potential GDP growth: Forecasting error


































































































Error potential GDP growth Actual output gap
 Source: Federal Planning Bureau 
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Graph 5 - Trend productivity growth: One-year-ahead forecast 
versus actual
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Source: Federal Planning Bureau 
 
Graph 6 - Forecast vs. actual ouput gap (1987-2005)















































Source: Federal Planning Bureau   360
Graph 7 - Projections and outcome 
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Graph 8 - Evolution of Belgian public finances
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